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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the concept of EU corporate tax abuse in light of the tensions between 
the protection of EU Fundamental rights and the susceptibility of those rights to abuse.  
 
Consideration is given to the major tax abuse practices and arrangements, accompanied by 
analyses of the responses of a selection of EU member states, and the role and impacts of 
judicial, state and commercial stakeholder interests.  Consequent upon an examination of why 
past proposals have failed to attain either policy adoption or policy success, it is suggested 
that the legal concepts of abuse of rights, substance over form and proportionality may be of 
value in assessing and validating a corporate tax abuse proposal. 
 
It will be argued that Member State tax rules and policy initiatives to date have been 
unsuccessful in eradicating the effects of corporate tax abuse deriving from the exploitation 
of Fundamental Freedoms and that this failure is attributable to reasons of poor transactional 
data lineage and disclosure, unresolved political and judicial conflicts between balancing 
Member State rights with the Internal Market ideal and from a corporate culture that is 
incentivised to circumvent tax rules with limited recourse.  
  
Following an assessment of whether reform should focus on transactional based tax rules or 
on a broader legal framework to induce taxpayer behavioural changes, it is contended that EU 
corporate tax abuse can be addressed by rejecting the traditional ideals of tax harmonisation, 
formulary apportionment, and principles or rule-based tax law approaches as a complete 
solution. An effective scheme of reform should instead be based on Enhanced Disclosures 
and Attestation incorporating country-by-country reporting, additional reporting metrics and 
legal attestations, underpinned by civil and criminal penalties. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Background 
 
The European Union, hereafter referred to as ‘the EU’, has an unresolved problem relating to 
endemic tax avoidance practices exploited by multinational enterprises, hereafter referred to 
as ‘MNEs’, in consequence of the uncoordinated and fragmented direct tax environment 
implemented by Member States in an economic union underpinned by Fundamental 
Freedoms that provide opportunities for abusive tax mitigation. EU case law is becoming 
settled in many areas of direct tax law but the disparities between Member State anti-
avoidance measures remain material and damaging to the efficiency of the Internal Market
1
. 
Traditional approaches to categorising tax conduct rarely sought to look beyond evasion or 
avoidance. Member States legislate tax laws and invoke penalty regimes to mitigate evasion 
and avoidance in their own jurisdictions, aiming to underpin both domestic policy objectives 
and EU law. Historical failures to address the issues necessitate a fresh assessment and 
approach to resolving what may be considered legal but abusive tax avoidance practices. The 
concept of abuse of law is pertinent to EU corporate tax abuse given that the EU construct is 
underpinned by EU law and Fundamental Freedoms.  
 
An exposition of the conceptual phraseology used and referred to in the expression of tax 
conduct reveals some of the complexities inherent in addressing the issue of tax avoidance, 
planning, evasion, fraud, circumvention, misuse and abuse. For some time the significance of 
some of these references were not quite so clear as they more loosely referred to the 
boundaries of acceptability as defined by codified law, case law precedent or jurisprudence 
The complexities of the EU internal market and legal system and the evolution of more 
complex and creative commercial practices means that they are often used in an apparently 
interchangeable manner underpinned by a common set of objectives and effects i.e. a 
reduction in tax liabilities. There is neither a set of consistent criteria to characterise certain 
tax conduct nor is there a coherent understanding of what separates one expression of conduct 
                                                     
1
 Jacques Malherbe et al, The Impact of the Rulings of the European Court of Justice in the area of direct 
taxation, European Parliament (2010) 7 
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from another. For the purposes of this research, some broad assumptions shall be used with 
regard to such phraseology to ensure clarity and consistency.  
 
‘Tax Avoidance’ shall be defined as bona fide tax planning arrangements executed by legal 
means within the permissible scope of Member State tax rules. This will be considered to be 
synonymous with ‘Tax Circumvention’ when specifically entered to exploit EU Fundamental 
Freedoms in order to escape from the scope of specific Member State tax legislation. Tax 
misuse is a form of circumvention contrary to the purpose of EU law on account of failure to 
act in good faith. ‘Profit or Loss Shifting’ shall be referred to as a technique of tax avoidance 
that represents the act of transferring taxable profits or losses to jurisdictions that would result 
in a reduced tax burden through the utilisation of preferential tax rates, tax relief or tax 
deductions. The concept of ‘Tax Abuse’ is a more interpretative and subjective conduct that 
is the primary focus of examination in this research. It shall be referred to as intentional tax 
circumvention engineered using wholly artificial arrangements to achieve a tax benefit in an 
excessive or disproportionate manner in relation to the purpose of the underlying legislation 
or EU Treaty right. ‘Tax Fraud’ is a derivative of abuse although limited to conduct which, 
by providing and relying upon false statements, is considered illegal. ‘Tax Evasion’ shall 
refer to the illegal practice of not reporting taxable income at all through the utilisation of 
shell companies or trusts in jurisdictions with no taxation. It remains out of scope of this 
research.       
 
1.2  The European Direct Tax Law Problem 
 
The issue of taxation remains at the top of the political agenda, with Member States airing 
ever more passionate public views on curbing tax abuse activities. Opinion remains divided 
between traditional rights to organise tax affairs in a legitimate and legal manner as notably 
promoted by Lord Tomlin
2
, versus those who think that MNEs employing tax planning to 
reduce their tax burden are short-changing Member States. The new frontier to this debate 
relates to differentiating between unacceptable abusive tax avoidance and acceptable non-
abusive tax mitigation. Courts have been open to the notion that “a taxpayer has always been 
                                                     
2
 IRC v Duke of Westminster [1936] AC 1 (HL)  
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free to mitigate his liability to tax”3 in contrast to judicial resistance to  unacceptable tax 
avoidance which “typically involves the creation of complex artificial structures….by 
which… the taxpayer conjures…a loss or a gain…which would have otherwise never have 
existed”4. The difference can often be difficult to define and various governments and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, hereafter referred to as CJEU, rulings provide little 
consensus on how to measure or evaluate different circumstances.  To assess more effectively 
the EU corporation tax avoidance issues and to promote an effective solution, this research 
will focus on examining a selection of Member States, namely Germany, France, UK, 
Netherlands and Italy. 
 
Member States are obliged to create an internal market to ensure its efficient operation by 
removing any specific impediments that compromise cross-jurisdictional transactions relating 
to goods, resources, services and capital throughout the EU. EU Fundamental Freedoms 
provide tax-planning opportunities for MNEs, most notably through the Freedom of 
Establishment
5
 and Free Movement of Capital
6
. Member State rules seeking to prevent tax 
avoidance must still reflect these entitlements. Corporate organisational complexity and 
globalisation infers that MNEs have the ability to generate income in multiple locations. 
Advancing early academic promotion of the primacy of shareholder value
7
, various other 
academics
8
 have found that competitive pressures regarding maximising shareholder value 
mean that MNEs view tax as a competitive lever in the marketplace. Balancing 
responsibilities between their shareholders, customers, employees and communities create a 
dilemma as they may encourage conflicting behaviours.  
 
The response to the challenges of tax avoidance has been varied at both national and EU 
level. At national level, tax avoidance rules relating to specific practices such as transfer 
                                                     
3
 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd [1987] 1 AC 155, 167 
4
 Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd v Stokes [1992] 1 AC 655, 681 
5
 Consolidated version of the European Treaty [2010] art 49, OJ C83/13 
6
 Ibid, art 63 
7
 Milton Friedman, ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, New York Times, (New 
York, 13 September 1970) 
8
 Sohnke Bartram, ‘Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation’, 9, Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Investments (2005) 5, 281; Amy Hillman and Gerald Keim. ‘Shareholder Value, 
Stakeholder Management and Social Issues: What’s the bottom line?’  (2001) 22, 129   
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pricing continue to evolve across Member States in response to addressing loopholes, and tax 
authorities are becoming empowered to implement more aggressive auditing tactics for 
investigating and closing out those practices deemed in contravention to national anti-
avoidance measures
9
. According to the United Nations, “Tax avoidance and the industry that 
drives it are increasingly an international phenomenon and it is vital that we have effective 
international cooperation to tackle it, as we do for tackling terrorism, organised crime, money 
laundering and fraud”10. The complexities and diversities of implementing a consensus driven 
solution have encouraged cooperation at an international level. Judicial authorities are 
becoming more empowered, through precedent rather than by treaty, to establish a set of 
settled case law
11
 that may over time become a more powerful force but one that may neither 
close out all the gaps nor nurture the consensus necessary for a sustainable long-term 
solution. 
 
It is not the primary objective of this research to hypothesise about the rather speculative 
measures attempting to quantify the specific levels of adverse corporate tax conduct but more 
to make lucid the scale of the issue in the EU as a precursor to the ensuing analysis. 
Quantitative assessments relating to the impact of EU tax avoidance are widely stated by 
various organisations but often difficult to consolidate into a consistent set of statistics. In the 
UK a study found that a third of FTSE 100 MNEs paid no corporation tax at all in the UK in 
2005/6, and another third paid less than £10m in corporation tax
12
. The latest HMRC data for 
2012/13 suggests a UK tax gap at £34bn, of which corporation tax avoidance is estimate to 
account in the region of £3.9bn.
13
 This contrasts with earlier estimates from the Tax Justice 
                                                     
9
 PWC, ‘International Transfer Pricing 2011’ (2010) <http://pwc.com/pl_PL/pl/publikacje/itp_2011.pdf>  
accessed 25 August 2011 
10
 Governance World Watch, ‘Public Policies and Globalisation’ (2004) 
<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan016612.htm> accessed 22 July 2011 
11
 Claudio Radaelli and Ulrike Kraemer, ‘Why Tax Cooperation? The Selection of Modes of Governance in EU 
Direct Taxation Policy’ in Tommel, Verun A eds, Innovative governance in the European Union, (Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 2009) 
12
 Tax Gap Reporting Team, ‘Firms’ secret tax avoidance schemes cost UK billions’, The Guardian  (London, 2 
February 2009) 
13 HMRC, ‘Measuring Tax Gaps 2014’ (2014) 
<http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/364009/4382_Measuring_Tax_G
aps_2014_IW_v4B_accessible_20141014.pdf> accessible 2 January 2015 
 13 
Network estimating a tax gap of £120bn, largely attributable to corporation tax avoidance.
14
 
In 2008 the UK Trades Union Congress publicised a corporation tax gap of £12bn
15
. 
Statistics confuse the exploitation of tax law loopholes with blatant evasion and late payment 
of taxes. Every metric is demonstrating increased tax avoidance whether it is by effective tax 
rate, or a falling percentage of tax revenues from corporate income tax. For example, in 1989, 
UK corporation tax accounted for 4.4% of GDP compared to 2.85% in 2009
16
. UK 
corporation tax revenues as a percentage of total tax revenues have remained reasonably 
constant despite evidence of cyclicality attributable to the volatile fortunes of financial 
services. The percentage has fallen from 10.4%
17
in 1989 to 8.0% in 2013/14
18
. 
 
This UK centric data if extrapolated to create a pan-EU view suggests a tax gap of €23.57bn 
for the Eurozone (or €20.98bn for the five sample EU countries) reflecting the EU equivalent 
of a UK ratio of 0.23% between the official UK tax gap and total GDP. An econometric 
perspective published in 2011
19
 identified direct taxes in the five sample Member States 
contributing, on average, 33.2% of total tax revenues. In terms of corporate income taxes as a 
percentage of GDP, revenue from taxes on corporate income have increased over the last 
twenty years as a share of GDP, but has fallen as a share of total tax revenue
20
. For example, 
according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, hereafter referred 
to as ‘OECD’21, in relation to the sample Member States, between 1990 and 2006, the 
percentage of corporate income tax as a percentage of GDP actually rose in France (from 
2.2% to 3.0%), Germany (1.7% to 2.1%), UK (from 3.6% to 4.0%) and NL (from 3.2% to 
3.4%). Only Italy witnessed a fall from 3.8% to 3.4%. As a share of total tax revenue, 
                                                     
14Richard Murphy, ‘Tax Justice and Jobs: The business case for investing in staff at HM Revenue & Customs’, 
(2010) Tax Research LLP, Tax Justice Network, 2 
15
 Richard Murphy, The Missing Billions, (Trade Union Congress, 2008)  
16
 Michael Devereux and Simon Loretz, ‘Corporation Tax in the UK’ (2011) Oxford University Centre for 
Business Taxation,13  
17
 Michael Devereux et al, ‘Why has the UK Corporation Tax Raised So Much Revenue’ (2004) Institute of 
Fiscal Studies, WP04/04, 3 
18
 HMRC, ‘Tax and NIC Receipts’ National Statistics (2015), 10  
19
 Commission, Taxation Trends in the European Union (Publications Office of the European Union, 2011), 301 
20
 Ibid  
21
 OECD ‘Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Tax Database, Table B’ (2008), 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/27/41498733.pdf> accessed 27 August 2011 
 14 
corporate income taxes as a percentage of total tax revenue in the EU has fallen from 30% in 
1985 to 25% in 2006 representing a general downward trend but distorted the changing 
constituency of the EU as a whole. This may reflect a downward trend in tax rates, broader 
corporate tax bases and more favourable corporate profitability. 
 
1.3  Research Objectives 
 
The objective of this research is to establish an effective corporate tax avoidance reform 
proposal for materially reducing tax arbitrage across the EU. This will be approached through 
an assessment of anti-tax avoidance legislative measures, judicial rulings and stakeholder 
influences in the sample set of representative Member States. This thesis will consider the 
merits of a tax law solution and alternative forms of reform, taking account of the inherent 
conflicts between respecting EU Fundamental Freedoms and the need to protect the Internal 
Market from tax abusive conduct that undermine the collective tax revenues within that 
market. This endeavour is motivated by a desire to challenge existing paradigms in the field 
of tax avoidance and address an unresolved area of EU law. A solution is sought that may be 
applied to a unique legal and economic unit such as the EU while being potentially extensible 
for global adoption. Corporate tax anti-avoidance measures offer the largest opportunity for 
reform in the area of direct taxation, as well as providing a thought process that will leave a 
mark in its field and open lines of further thought for future research as governments and 
global institutions pursue a long-term solution. 
 
1.4  In Search of a Solution 
 
Member States possess robust control over the formulation and implementation of their 
corporate tax policy, with tax policy considered a basic right associated with national 
sovereignty and beyond any EU competence. As economic integration evolves, there is a 
common view that national tax rules create impediments to attaining an efficient Internal 
Market. National tax rules nurture divergences in effective tax levels and rates encouraging 
complexity and conflicts between MNEs and tax authorities
22
. Therefore, tax-planning 
decisions are directly impacted by tax law parameters with the tax base distribution 
                                                     
22
 Michael Devereux and Clemens Fuest, Corporate Income Tax Coordination in the European Union,  (Oxford 
University, 2009), 3 
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depending on the home jurisdiction of the parent company and the location of foreign 
entities. Statutory accounting increasingly reflects transactional reporting based on the lowest 
tax jurisdiction rather than the legitimate operating jurisdiction
23
.  
 
Member state tax systems are as widely heterogeneous as the MNEs serving their tax base. 
Historically EU policy proposals have been based around tax reform, either through tax rate 
tax policy harmonisation, or through legislative reform of Member State tax avoidance laws. 
The tax avoidance practices in operation, national anti-avoidance measures and the role of the 
European institutions and other stakeholders will all be reviewed as an input to a solution. 
Successful solutions are often engineered and implemented in times of crisis and the timing 
of the proposals in this thesis is opportune. Every angle will be examined including the merits 
of existing solution proposals as well as more fringe solutions based on ethical behaviour and 
the role of Corporate Social Responsibility, hereafter referred to as 'CSR'. Behavioural 
aspects of MNEs to tax avoidance will be factored in particularly in relation to the influence 
of the EU economic and political environment to propensity to engage in tax avoidance. 
Credible reform demands focus on the underlying governance and legal process with due 
consideration granted to the interests and concerns of all principal stakeholder issues 
including the sensitivity of national sovereignty protection and the corporate mentality. 
 
1.5  Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One provides an outline of the corporate tax 
avoidance issues and background data. It identifies the research synopsis, challenges and 
thesis organisation. In Chapter Two the conceptual construct of principal tax avoidance 
practices and contemporary tax planning arrangements are set out. This forms the basis of 
understanding the nature of the core tax conduct issues and how they contribute to the 
concept of corporate tax abuse. To establish context, the key EU tax avoidance concepts, 
practices and national provisions associated with mitigating these practices in the sample set 
of Member State jurisdictions are identified. The national provisions are contrasted, factoring 
in recent changes in the law as well as underlying legal norms directing the approach adopted 
in each jurisdiction. Chapter Three examines the scholarly debate on the direct tax law 
                                                     
23
 Lisa De Simone, ‘Does a Common Set of Accounting Standards Affect Tax-Motivated Income Shifting for 
Multi-National Firms’ (2013) University of Texas, 11 
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matters relating to corporate taxation cross referenced against some legal models relevant to 
the subject of this research. In Chapter Four a stakeholder analysis extends the assessment to 
include influences outside of tax law that are relevant to the EU tax debate that will influence 
the direction and success of a reform proposal. The significance of the CJEU is reviewed and 
analysed in its role shaping EU direct taxation law to date. Other stakeholders such as MNEs 
themselves, national tax authorities and various international pressure group and 
organisations are assessed to understand how their influence can impact a policy change for 
mitigating corporate tax avoidance. The political dimension is considered whereby research is 
conducted into the various political orders in the sample jurisdictions to ascertain the appetite 
to accommodate legal changes associated with EU direct taxation. By treating the outcomes 
of our stakeholder analysis as an agenda for change dialogue it is possible to model a solution 
around their principles and behaviours. Chapter Five assesses the impact on national 
sovereignty is critically reviewed since consideration of this issue resides at the centre of 
implementing a successful direct taxation solution. The CJEU is mandated a role for ensuring 
oversight and authority over direct tax matters, particularly in relation to abuses relating to 
EU Fundamental Freedoms and this has had a marked impact on both current tax law and 
reform proposals. It follows in Chapter Six that over a number of years a proliferation of 
solutions have been proposed by academics, international organisations and national 
governments that cover a broad spectrum of change initiatives from harmonising the tax base, 
tax rates or tax rules to more extreme scenarios of centralising the direct taxation 
environment under central European control and governance akin to indirect taxation. These 
policy options are critically reviewed, particularly in the context of legal credibility and 
practical workability. Chapter Seven pulls together the analyses, observations and 
conclusions in the preceding chapters to formalise a reform proposal capable of addressing 
the tax conduct issues facing the EU. It sets out a clear and detailed assessment of country-
by-country reporting, thresholds and attestations, and what part they would contribute in 
resolving corporate tax abuse issues. Chapter Eight assesses the legal reasoning of the reform 
proposal. A credible reform proposal will demand legal reasoning and to this point a detailed 
critique around each element of the proposal and how they align to the rule of law provides 
such substance to its legal positioning. Specific reference is made to the established legal 
doctrines of  ‘substance over form’,  ‘proportionality’ and ‘abuse of rights’, to not only 
underpin the reform proposal but also to establish how such an underpinning would be 
accommodated within the legal systems of the sample Member States. A set of criteria is also 
identified to measure success if such a proposal was to be adopted. The final chapter 
 17 
concludes with a specific set of observations and research findings. These observations and 
findings are correlated to the reform proposals so that there is a clear relationship between the 
research issues and a viable proposal for reform. This reform proposal is augmented with 
reasoning around why it addresses those points that have failed to achieve success in the past 
and how it is underpinned by leading scholarly research completed in related academic areas. 
As ever in a subject as broad and controversial as EU corporate tax abuse there will also be 
opportunities for further research and these are set out for consideration.  
 
 
1.6  Research Hypothesis 
 
Member States, through enacting and enforcing tax laws, and the EU, through the 
implementation of Directives and other policy initiatives, have been unable to establish an 
effective solution for the problems engendered by EU tax abusive behaviours. It is argued 
that a new approach is required to combat MNEs persistently leveraging EU Fundamental 
Freedoms as a shield to abuse the tax system by introducing a corporate behaviour changing 
initiative. If a corporate taxpayer evidences fraudulent or improper use of EU law rights then 
the assertion is that such behaviour may be classed as abusive. Historically, corporate tax 
abuse decisions have directly impacted statutory accounting disclosures. However, the flow 
of influence needs to reverse whereby accounting disclosures impact and steer the corporate 
tax planning decisions. This can be achieved by radical reform through exposing the 
transactional data responsible for tax abuse outcomes that enables Member State tax 
authorities to engender the desired behavioural changes. Reform focused on extended 
statutory accounting disclosures, threshold metrics and attestations would serve as an 
effective instrument for Member State tax laws in the struggle against tax abusive behaviours.  
1.7  Methodology  
 
This research has been conducted using both traditional doctrinal law research and law 
reform research methodologies
24
.  In both instances, a careful use of critical and comparative 
analyses has been adopted. Chapters Two to Six adhere to the doctrinal law research 
                                                     
24
 Harry Arthurs ‘Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law’ (1983) Information Division, Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada, Ottawa 
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methodology, initially setting out an identification of legal tax rules relating to the particular 
tax avoidance practices in existence in the sample set of Member States. This provides a 
useful insight into the nature of the problem that the thesis seeks to resolve by providing an 
orderly exposition of the tax rules governing tax avoidance, analyses the relationship between 
these rules and between Member States and explains areas of difficulty. Tax avoidance 
practices are then critically assessed in relation to the measures that have either been adopted 
so far by the EU and the Member States as well as in relation to various schemes that have 
been proposed to date. Particular attention has been granted to ensure that the concept of tax 
abuse is carefully defined and understood and it’s differentiation against more standard tax 
conduct concepts more widely debated to date.   
 
The comparative analysis has been achieved through an assessment of the policies adopted by 
a selection of Member States in their attempts to protect their tax base and mitigate tax 
abusive activities by resident MNEs. This approach enables identification of preferred 
practices and dominant themes in policies.  This is further extended to compare and contrast 
the relative influences of the various stakeholders that have a role to play in both the 
practicing of abusive tax avoidance practices and in the formation and agreement of reforms 
to resolve such abuses. These stakeholders include the European Commission, the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, Member State tax authorities and legislatures and the MNEs 
themselves. Further consideration has been given to the importance of legal sovereign rights 
in this debate and the constraints that sovereign rights offer in the EU corporate taxing 
powers debate. The comparative assessment is important for this research because any reform 
proposal needs to reflect the both the importance of relative stakeholder influence in the 
formation of a solution and on the alignment with the legal systems and context of Member 
States through the selected jurisdictions in the implementation of the proposed reforms.  
 
Bringing together these analyses results in the development of a solution for abusive 
corporate tax avoidance. This utilises a law reform methodology in Chapters seven and eight 
including testing the reform proposition by assessing alignment to established doctrines such 
as the rule of law, abuse of rights, substance over form and proportionality. It transitions from 
the doctrinal approach of the earlier chapters to applied legal research
25
 the purpose of which 
is to propose a future change in the law, including how it is administered. It utilises 
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traditional legal analysis of primary and secondary sources of data and is important because it 
“evaluates the adequacy of existing rules and recommends changes to rules found wanting”26. 
Through an understanding of the tax abuse practices, Member State tax law deficiencies and 
reform scheme failures, a proposition is promoted that is assessed in light of its alignment to 
legal doctrines.  
 
The research data utilised to form these assessments has been derived from primary and 
secondary sources of law. Primary sources include the texts of EU Treaties and Directives 
and Member State statute law. Secondary sources have been principally based around judicial 
case law rulings derived from the CJEU and national courts, academic journals, academic 
working papers and similar published treatises, academic books, professional literature and 
material generated by special interest groups lobbying for reform in this domain. The primary 
and secondary sources have been accessed through academic libraries, e-library databases, e-
journals, and various electronic databases such as LexisNexis, Kluwer and WestLaw.  
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Chapter Two: Tax Avoidance Practices and Provisions 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate direct taxation in the Internal Market faces a number of challenges. Irrespective of 
the underlying drivers, lawful recognition of what constitutes a functional corporate group for 
tax purposes has become an increasingly complex issue and impacts both the structural 
organisation and accounting framework that MNE’s enact in their commercial arrangements. 
The commercial impact of a MNE group entity structure may look very different when 
observing it for legal, tax or accounting perspective. MNEs, by nature, have large cross-
border entity structures in which they are able to leverage EU Treaty rights in the context of 
both tangible and intangible transactions, using tax reliefs granted by Member States in an 
advantageous manner. These are often at odds with their original legislative intention to 
attract and retain investment and are aimed at reducing consolidated group tax liabilities. In 
response Member States have implemented a succession of anti-avoidance rules to protect 
their tax bases from specific types of transaction, or arrangements. Such anti-avoidance laws 
vary across Member States but have a commonality in form to the extent that they are 
typically aimed at identifying wholly artificial arrangements structured for the specific 
purpose of claiming a tax benefit in a way that is either inconsistent with or disproportionate 
to the underlying legislative intent. The manner in which such assessments are administered 
are a reflection of both Member State rules and the influence of CJEU rulings but the 
underlying objective being to ascertain the economic authenticity of an activity. In addition to 
these challenges there remains an ongoing tension generated by a requirement for these 
Member State anti-avoidance rules to be consistent with the exercise of EU Treaty rights 
supporting the Internal Market. 
 
This chapter does not aim to provide a comparative technical assessment of Member State 
anti-avoidance tax rules but rather to provide an overview of contemporary tax practices and 
arrangements and a comparative review of differences in approach adopted by these Member 
States. In achieving an understanding of what arrangements have been popularised and the 
legislative provisions that have been enacted in response, it provides an insight into the 
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relationship between corporate tax planning practices and the law as a basis for critically 
analysing the concept of anti-abuse law options in the formulation of an alternative reform 
proposal. 
 
The aforementioned selection of Member States examined in this discussion represents a 
broad cross-section of economically important Member States with sufficient diversity in 
their tax laws providing substantial coverage across uncodified common law and codified jus 
civile jurisdictions. The nature and functioning of these different legal systems will permit a 
comparative assessment of differences in approach to corporate tax avoidance and likely 
adoption success in relation to a reform proposal. These sample Member States enable a 
comparative analysis of common law rules as well as civil law general principles raising 
distinct forms of differentiation in terms of how law is formed, enforced and interpreted.   
This may be exemplified in tax law litigation whereby in the UK case law not only sets out a 
tax rules for a given set of parties in a case but it also must be pursued in future similar tax 
cases evolving into what is deemed to be a common law. Conversely in civil jurisdictions 
such as Germany, France, Netherlands and Italy the judicial system relies on legislation as the 
most highly respected source of tax law. It is only when there are specific gaps in the written 
tax law then the Courts advance with an interpretation to enable an exercise of judgement 
ensuring new law is created to yield a decision despite the perils of such “mechanical 
jurisprudence”1 that challenge “legal behaviourism”2. The EU has bought these legal systems 
closer together but nevertheless although the outcome in many areas of tax law is now 
converging, the methods adopted to attain those outcomes are rarely consistent across 
different legal systems. It would have been appealing to incorporate lower corporate tax rate 
jurisdictions into the sample but these jurisdictions are generally profit shifting benefactors 
and most do not have a substantial body of anti-avoidance tax law in place. For example, 
Cyprus and Ireland, both with legal system foundations structured on UK common law, and 
promoting the lowest corporation tax in the EU, have no basic anti-avoidance provisions such 
as controlled foreign companies or thin capitalisation rules. Furthermore Cyprus has no 
transfer pricing rules and Ireland has only recently introduced transfer pricing provisions 
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providing little substance for the basis of a comparative law assessment. The UK is the 
largest common law jurisdiction in the EU while Germany, France and Italy are the largest 
civil law jurisdictions. A discussion encompassing these jurisdictions provides extensive 
coverage across a substantial part of the EU.  
 
2.2 Cross Border Taxation in the Internal Market 
 
2.2.1 Controlled Foreign Companies 
 
A Controlled Foreign Company, hereafter referred to as ‘CFC’, is a concept based around the 
legal and economic control of a non-resident company residing in a lower tax jurisdiction 
established for the purpose of reducing corporate tax. Unilateral rules are implemented as a 
means to limit the impact of these arrangements while protecting Fundamental Freedoms. 
However, the preponderance of CJEU case law suggests that Member States are being 
regularly challenged on the promotion of discriminatory legislation regarding direct taxation. 
CFC legislation is based on the doctrine of Capital Export Neutrality, hereafter referred to as 
'CEN', which states that foreign income is treated in the same way as home income. 
According to the OECD
3
 CFC legislation can regulate the distribution of taxable income, 
ensuring that corporate income is taxed equally irrespective of where it is owned. Judicial 
rulings have held that CFC rules were only relevant when applied to wholly artificial 
arrangements aimed at reducing national tax that otherwise would normally be payable
4
. Any 
judicial challenge to CFC arrangements typically necessitates distinguishing “between the use 
and abuse of Freedom of Establishment”5. A series of objective and subjective assessment 
criteria
6
 is typically applied by the CJEU to ascertain whether an arrangement is deemed 
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wholly artificial
7
 and restrictions applied.  Even if an establishment in another State is made 
to avoid tax in the parent company’s State, it is not necessarily an abuse of the Freedom of 
Establishment if the holding company is pursuing genuine economic activity.  There appears 
to be no settled CJEU case law precedent regarding what constitutes genuine economic 
activity only the criteria that should be used in such an assessment
8
. 
 
The EU Treaty guarantees all companies in a Member State the right to set up an 
establishment in another Member State and to do so under the same conditions as the 
domestic companies of that Member State
9
. Furthermore, the home state may not impose any 
conditions regarding direct taxation that would make such an establishment less favourable 
compared to an establishment in the home state
10
. For CFC legislation to apply, a resident 
taxpayer in the home state must have a certain amount of de facto control of the overseas 
entity. Where a company holds only a minority interest in a foreign entity then it may be 
necessary to demonstrate control to support CFC status. In the UK, CFC rules set out clear 
tests to demonstrate the parameters between legal and economic control
11
 whereas in 
Germany, France and Italy any minority shareholding would not be eligible for CFC status. 
For the prevention of abuse to be justified the legislation must have the sole purpose of 
preventing wholly artificial arrangements and the arrangement itself must be architected for 
purpose of tax abuse. In order to justify a restriction Member state CFC rules need to 
elucidate the characteristics, predictability and reasonableness of a genuine establishment, 
along with clear accountability for determining the burden of proof. Defining a genuine 
establishment may reflect carrying out some economic activity such as in France or represent 
an effective place of management of that activity such as in Germany. Member States 
generally approach assessing the genuineness of an establishment from the perspective of 
requiring an MNE to prove a CFC is based on economic reality and requires data by Member 
States to identify an element of doubt upfront regarding a CFC’s authenticity.  
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If the purpose of CFC legislation is to address elements of tax abuse it may be compromised 
by the presence of a tax treaty whose purpose is to prevent double or non-taxation. Tax 
treaties can introduce conflicts when implementing CFC rules although Member State rules 
may not override international obligations
12
. If a Member State wished to limit the scope of its 
bi-lateral obligations by CFC rules, it would only be able to do so if its tax treaty counterpart 
agrees. This principle stems from the point that a MNE that sets up a subsidiary in another 
Member State is entitled to receive national treatment. The national treatment principle could 
therefore encourage tax arbitrage as “the national treatment principle requires the Member 
State which is party to the treaty to grant to Permanent Establishments of non-resident 
companies the advantages provided for by that treaty on the same conditions as those which 
apply to resident companies”13. The home state of the CFC still has the right to taxation and 
Member States have adopted different approaches for achieving this such as the UK’s deemed 
dividend and the French approach in redefining the subsidiaries income as the parent entity 
income, both of which represent prospective treaty overrides. 
    
Some technical differences exist between Member State CFC rules but in many respects they 
all use common evaluation criteria, with clear and consistent examples of utilisation of 
ownership thresholds
14
, legal, economic or accounting control
15
 and ascertaining either tax 
rate differentials
16
 or an “effective tax rate test”17. This highlights both their credibility and 
importance of genuine activity tests and on thresholds for ascertaining a line of acceptance 
between acceptable and unacceptable ownership and control as a means of trying to identify 
what is tax abusive and what is not tax abusive. Once assessed, Member State rules have 
converged towards a common form of redress based on apportioning a foreign subsidiaries 
income to the parent company and applying current taxation in the parent company’s country. 
In theory these CFC anti-avoidance criteria should have the effect of limiting profit shifting 
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activities as advocated by Ruf and Weichenrieder
18
 who found that CFC rules were effectual 
in reducing the propensity to utilise passive investments through low-tax jurisdictions. 
However, when applying CFC rules, different approaches are evident in determining 
breaches. The transactional approach characterises the taxable income of residents based on 
income type, whereas the jurisdictional approach characterises taxable income based on total 
income earned by the CFC in a given jurisdiction. In an attempt to capture the merits of both 
approaches some Member States such as the UK
19
 and Italy
20
 introduced a transactional 
approach against a use a specific list of countries for determining CFC legislation, based on 
acceptable or harmful criteria respectively. Such an approach can be more complex and this 
is reflected in the Italian rules that demand more lengthy tax procedures to apply to its non-
black list exclusions as a prerequisite to prove whether an arrangement is wholly artificial. 
Conversely, Germany
21
 employs a comparative approach, whereby the CFC legislation will 
apply to certain items of income where the amount of taxes paid by the CFC is less than a 
specified rate or amount but this is only limited to EU jurisdictions. 
 
UK CFC legislative provisions
22
 have a novel two pronged approach. Consistent with France 
and Italy, a set of exemptions are set out but are more defined to include a low profits 
exemption, an exempt period exemption and a low profit margin exemption, with clear 
criteria for a CFC to determine any exemption from a UK tax charge. However, a CFC does 
not qualify for any exemption there is a further Gateway test, based on tax purpose, control 
and management of CFC assets and commercial effectiveness. If a CFC meets a gateway test 
then an arms-length pricing test is applied to compute chargeable profits to UK tax. Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, hereafter referred to as ‘HMRC’ openly targets MNEs with 
subsidiaries earning material income from intangible assets where more contemporary criteria 
for determining whether income is genuine or not may fail
23
. German CFC rules
24
 are 
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similarly based on ownership, control and tax rate differentials thresholds but differ in that the 
prescriptive application genuine activity tests are much more draconian than in other Member 
States and there is evidence of persistent judicial challenge
25
. The distinguishing factor 
regarding French and Italian rules is that CFC legislation extends to both non-cooperative 
jurisdictions as well as low tax jurisdictions.  Italian CFC rules
26
 accommodate three inter-
related principal tests, namely the active business test, passive income test and commercial 
exception test based on the recommendations of a recent Italian Revenue Agency circular
27
. 
Rules apply to MNEs that are majority owned, and which demonstrate evidence of de facto 
control or dominant influence stressing the concept of business substance by requiring a link 
between the CFC and the relevant foreign market. These rules stand out as the only 
jurisdiction administering detailed substance links in the underlying activities between entities 
to trigger CFC rules rather than the genuine tests relating to the control or ownership of the 
establishment itself more pertinent in the other Member States. In contrast, there are no 
explicit CFC rules in Netherlands, but the subject-to-tax assessments in the participation 
regime
28
 could be viewed as CFC rules because they have the same impact
29
. There is an 
obligation to annually revalue shareholdings whose assets breach a passive assets threshold.  
These Dutch assessments, however, do not advance any consideration of whether 
arrangements are wholly artificial and the concept of a genuine activity test is notably absent 
providing fertile opportunities to MNEs to exploit Netherlands based establishments for tax 
purposes.  
 
2.2.2 Group Relief 
 
Group Relief offers additional challenges to an ambiguous area of EU law. One consequence 
of the group relief regimes across the EU is the potential to consolidate profit and loss in a 
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group encouraging the shifting of profits or losses for the purposes of tax liability mitigation. 
Group consolidation usually incorporates intra-group loss relief, deferred taxation of losses 
realised on intra-group transactions, exemption of dividends paid between group entities and 
avoidance of withholding taxes. As noted by Ting, “A consolidation regime is often one of 
the most complex regimes in an income tax system”30. In relation to intra-group losses, 
Member State tax rules usually provide some degree of tax relief to domestic firms that incur 
tax losses against their profits but these provisions do not always apply to non-resident 
subsidiary entities of resident PE’s. These provisions may reflect differences in a loss carry 
back or carry forward rule, or simply represent a fundamental difference in the profitability of 
subsidiary entities within a group that incentivises the use of absolute loss offset provisions. 
The existence of both profits and losses can change the income shifting incentive. Group 
entities with loss making subsidiaries within the entity structure could benefit from loss 
consolidation to the extent that they may be offset by other profitable subsidiaries in other 
Member States. Losses can only be used once and so the MNE would be better positioned to 
use these losses if the immediate consolidation of those losses into the MNEs consolidated 
accounts were greater than carrying forward the loss to set against its own profits in a future 
accounting period. Relative tax rates are similarly important for assessing the decision to 
consolidate the losses or not. Over time reform proposals based on “deduction and 
recapture”31 or part of the apportionment methodology inherent within the CCCTB detailed 
later in Chapter 6 have all been promoted but never gained enough support to be viable 
propositions. 
 
It is not clear whether there must be symmetric treatment of profits and losses for the 
purposes of tax accounting consolidation. What appears to be a legitimate use of losses for 
reducing tax liabilities generally attracts less emotion than shifting profits for the same 
purpose. Any prohibition in the use of losses with a MNEs consolidated accounts appears to 
contradict the underlying ethos of the Internal Market particularly given the fact that such 
loss offsets are typically available to resident MNEs within a jurisdiction. However, the irony 
of group relief is that is it ordinarily an accounting standard that would be difficult to apply 
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the standard tests of tax abuse against as the underlying purpose of the loss shifting is to 
reduce tax. The impact of loss shifting is not unlike some of the aforementioned practices and 
arrangements that are recognized as profit shifting, but profit shifting is not recognised as 
being an accounting treatment for the purposes of tax liability minimization.   
 
The case of Marks and Spencer
32
 provides the clearest example of the issues and has been 
subject to prolonged litigation for a number of years. The case initially focused on the 
legitimacy of the UK’s position in prohibiting, as part of its group relief rules, the use of a 
parent entity to deduct the losses of its subsidiaries established abroad.  Representing both a 
direct challenge to the conflict between taxing powers and the Internal Market, as well as 
proffering the case that loss shifting was in fact a means of tax avoidance, the initial case 
ruling found that these rules were incompatible with EU law despite the reasoning by Marks 
& Spencer that a tax jurisdiction should not accommodate loss relief from another 
jurisdiction if it has no competence to tax the profits in that other jurisdiction. Under such 
circumstances it provides for an accounting anomaly that will only encourage artificial 
movement of profits and losses consistent with the arrangements that provide for the same 
outcome but are more typically subject to justifications based on purposive reasoning. 
Subsequent litigation introduced the concept of both the principle of “effectiveness”33 that set 
out time limits regarding loss relief claims, and most importantly a “no-possibilities”34 test 
that essentially provided acceptance of loss shifting within the EU providing all reasonable 
means for utilising the losses made by its EU subsidiary in its country of residence had been 
exhausted. In practical terms, this means that the group relief claim cannot be reliably made 
until the subsidiary has been closed down with unused losses remaining, and there are no 
other local group companies that could utilise that remaining loss. Although this has now 
established a more coherent approach to evaluating and legitimizing loss shifting it 
nonetheless has reinforced the view that this is less tax abuse and more a tax accounting 
practice that the EU now feels more comfortable adopting in the context of the Internal 
Market. 
 
                                                     
32
 HMRC v Marks and Spencer plc [2013] UKSC 30 
33
 Ibid, 45  
34
 Case C-172/13 Commission v United Kingdom [2015] 
 29 
For the sample set of Member States group taxation rules exist across all these jurisdictions. 
Based on IAS 27, MNEs compute tax liability on a consolidated basis with a common theme 
that uses shareholder voting rights as a basis for qualifying a group for consolidated taxation. 
These do vary widely though between 50% in Italy and 95% in France and the Netherlands 
reflecting consistently the variability inherent between the aforementioned CFC control 
thresholds in these two jurisdictions. Although the UK and Netherlands do not regulate the 
minimum periods of group taxation but Italy, France and Germany do. The marked 
differences between Member State regimes, however, come to the fore with regard to 
consolidation methodologies. The Netherlands utilises full tax consolidation under its 
consolidation regime placing great emphasis on the parent company to pay corporate taxes. 
Conversely in Germany, France and Italy consolidated tax results are pooled onto the parent 
company meaning that the individual tax results of each subsidiary are aggregated without 
consideration of intra-group transactions. Furthermore in Italy the group relief rules 
distinguishes its consolidation regime between those for Italian resident MNEs only as 
opposed to the broader worldwide consolidation regime available for all MNEs. Shareholder 
control thresholds are similarly important and to prevent abuse, tax losses realised before the 
election for tax consolidation can only be used by the company that incurred such losses. The 
Italian group relief system has been cited as “particularly favourable compared to the group 
tax regimes of other EU countries
35
. Only the UK offers consideration for intra-group loss 
transfers whereby tax integration is limited to surrendering losses on an entity-by-entity basis. 
Subsidiaries can transfer their losses to a group member which is profitable and immediately 
offset although loss relief is only available on a cross-border basis in France and Italy using 
the pooling method. The UK, however, does have certain exceptions in its group relief rules
36
 
supporting surrendering losses made by EU resident MNEs resident and again akin to its CFC 
rules is based around ownership threshold criteria. The Netherlands fiscal unity
37
 regime has 
proved to be the most controversial in tax anti-avoidance terms reflected by a preponderance 
of challenges granted to the Netherlands by both the EU Commission
38
 and most recently the 
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CJEU
39
 to amend its tax legislation on fiscal unities to avoid conflicts with EU Treaty rights. 
For too long it was recognised that legislation not permitting two domestic subsidiaries held 
by a foreign parent company to form a fiscal unity between themselves implying that MNEs 
that have their parent company in another Member State may be denied the tax advantages 
associated with a fiscal unity arrangement.  
 
2.2.3 Transfer Pricing 
 
Transfer Pricing, hereafter referred to as 'TRPRICE', is a mechanism deployed by MNEs for 
the purposes of exporting income or capital to more tax favourable locations. Encouraging 
optimal allocation of revenues amongst subsidiaries within a group of related entities, it has 
become a common tool for avoiding corporate taxes as “it is largely invisible to the public 
and is difficult and expensive for regulatory authorities to detect
40
. Research has found a 
positive correlation between corporate profitability and international TRPRICE
41
. By 
manipulation of TRPRICE, tax liability may be reduced
42
 and empirical studies have 
conclusively proven that MNEs strategically relocate income to low tax jurisdictions
43
 and an 
increasingly significant proportion of this income is attributable to intangibles
44
. TRPRICE 
practices may be either formal rules or informal guidelines in nature, usually based around 
the OECD standard arm’s-length principle45. The arm’s-length principle is difficult to 
determine although the OECD’s guidelines provide direction by providing for a comparison 
assessment of the conditions in a controlled transaction between related parties, with the 
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conditions in an uncontrolled transaction between unrelated parties
46
. Various methodologies 
can be used to determine consistency with the arm’s-length principle such as the Traditional 
Transaction Methods of Comparable Uncontrolled Price method, Resale Price Method and 
Cost-Plus Method, and Transactional Profit Methods such as the Profit Split Method and 
Transactional Net Margin Method
47
 but differentially these are largely immaterial from a tax 
abuse perspective. The EU has provided leadership in resolving TRPRICE abuses, with the 
Commission focusing on mitigating not only the risk of a loss of tax through manipulation of 
transfer prices so that profits arise in Member States in a way that they would not under 
arm’s-length conditions, but to also enable Member States to have transparent information on 
intra-group transactions in order for them to enforce national TRPRICE rules. Furthermore, 
the Pricing Forum
48
 was created to promote EU-wide guidelines on Advance Pricing 
Agreements
49
, hereafter referred to as ‘APA’s’. Other initiatives followed such as the Code of 
Conduct for the Effective Implementation of the Arbitration Convention
50
 and a Summary 
Report on Penalties
51
 aimed at enforcing TRPRICE rule compliance. 
 
 
The effectiveness of Member State TRPRICE regulations can only be measured by its impact 
on reduced profit shifting, the most recent compelling evidence of which was offered by 
Lohse and Riedel who found that TRPRICE regulations “significantly reduced multinational 
income shifting as measured by the sensitivity of corporate pre-tax profits to changes in the 
corporate tax rate”52. Furthermore they concluded that “the implementation of transfer pricing 
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documentation regimes is found to reduce profit shifting behaviour by around 50% on 
average”53. The drivers impacting the effectiveness of TRPRICE laws for stemming tax 
abusive behaviour are a factor of a Member State’s TRPRICE documentation rules, its 
enforcement strategy of the regulations, and the role and emphasis on APA’s. The UK 
TRPRICE rules
54
 apply to an unusually wide range of transactions and are based on the 
arm’s-length principle. It operates in a relatively loose fashion through self-assessment with 
no formal auditing of the returns. APA’s prevail with encouraging growth of related 
Advanced Thin Capitalisation Agreements as well.  Upon conclusion of an enquiry, if a 
TRPRICE adjustment is required only general rather than specific penalties are applied. Such 
a penalty is highly variable, however, based on the perceived culpability of the MNE. The 
German TRPRICE rules
55
 vary little from the UK rules except the documentation 
requirements are more burdensome demanding detailed economic and legal context of a 
transaction to establish the arms-length price. This clearly increases the cost of TRPRICE for 
MNEs and in many instances represents a more threatening and transparent approach that 
discourages TRPRICE profit shifting arrangements than is prevalent in other jurisdictions. 
The penalty regime is broadly consistent with other jurisdictions based on the imposition of 
tax on the basis of an income estimate and additional penalties
56
. A succession of favourable 
rulings from the German Federal Fiscal Court
57
 has prompted the tightening of the rules 
governing adjustments to the actual transfer prices. There is likewise evidence of more 
proactive circumstantial adjustment to the law, with recent legislation
58
 providing for special 
rules relating to business restructuring.   
 
Control features heavily in the French TRPRICE rules
59
 which placed much greater emphasis 
on French MNEs that control, are controlled by or are under common control with entities 
established outside France to determine the level of TRPRICE scrutiny. In response to the 
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recent OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting initiative, hereafter referred to as ‘BEPS’, 
larger capitalised French MNEs are now required, by French law
60
, to prepare TRPRICE 
reports with a significantly enhanced set of details relating to product and business strategy, 
intangible assets and income flows, cross-border intercompany transactions and the 
functional profile of all legal entities. This represents a clear advancement in an anti-tax 
avoidance initiative prompted by the global OECD initiative and demonstrates the 
importance of data transparency and the behaviours it attempts to prompt in discouraging 
TRPRICE abuses. The French Tax Authority, hereafter referred to as ‘FTA’, is placing 
greater emphasis on delineation of actual transactions and conduct in their assessment of 
intra-group arrangements in an effort to clearly bring closer together accounting and tax 
reporting of cross-border passive intra-group transactions. In a similar fashion the Italian 
TRPRICE rules are similarly under scrutiny and review in light of OECD BEPS proposals. 
The Italian approach has been to target specific transactional types such as digital 
transactions reflected in Italian law
61
 that has recently been amended to exclude the cost plus 
method for online advertising services unless accommodated in an APA. Historically Italy 
has had relatively loose TRPRICE regulations with a non-mandatory regime of publishing 
information on TRPRICE arrangements, the use of a more subjective fair market value 
concept rather than arms-length pricing and a non-specific penalty regime that does little to 
discourage opportunistic TRPRICE arrangements. The increased compliance burden that will 
stem from the BEPS initiative is likely to prompt a strengthening of TRPRICE regulations in 
jurisdictions such as Italy where proportionality concerns have prevailed to balance the 
burden on MNEs with the need to apply appropriate and reasonable TRPRICE rules. The 
Netherlands has similarly embarked on transformational changes in its approach to TRPRICE 
regulations in recent years
62
. It has embraced fully the ethos of increased TRPRICE 
transparency in its documentation requirements but now also requires data to be filed as part 
of a move towards country-by-country accounting. Interestingly in contrast to the French 
approach that now demands specific information relating to the underlying business 
arrangements, the Dutch approach has been to set out a more rigid structure around the 
reporting parameters and timeliness. Broadly consistent control thresholds, penalty regimes 
and enforcement procedures make the Dutch rules reasonably standard, although there is 
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greater emphasis on the use of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral APAs
63
, but its recent 
incorporation of country level reporting again underlines the growing realisation of the 
importance of data transparency and all the behaviours that this is likely to prompt in the 
future.      
 
2.2.4 Thin Capitalisation 
 
THINCAP is typically a subset of rules contained within a broader set of TRPRICE rules, and 
result from the fact that in a number of jurisdictions interest is a deductible expense for tax 
purposes, but dividends are not
64
 It may therefore be advantageous from a tax perspective for 
a parent company to provide additional capital to its subsidiaries through debt than equity 
capital. The recipient subsidiary directs more of its operating profits to the parent in tax-
deductible interest, leaving fewer profits subject to tax, thus representing a further dimension 
beyond profit and loss shifting, namely cross-border debt shifting. This is significant because 
governments “consider that there is nothing to stop groups of companies from capitalising 
subsidiaries with excessive levels of debt”65. Empirical research66 has found a positive 
correlation between the tightness of THINCAP rules and debt shifting while others have 
found a robust link between THINCAP rules and the tax sensitivity of the capital structure of 
a MNE
67
. There is no better example of the challenge facing Member State’s in their 
corporate tax avoidance rule making than in the improper use of intra-entity financial 
contracts engineered to take advantage of tax treaties and EU Treaty rights to reduce 
corporate tax. THINCAP rules must accommodate commercially and legally bona fide tax 
avoidance activities while putting in place mechanisms for mitigating possible abuse. To date 
this has been architected around applying threshold limitations to prevent subsidiaries from 
being capitalised with excessive debt, by denying interest deductions for interest on such debt 
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rather than providing a broader set of data that would allow the Member States to identify 
abuse. Such an approach is reflective of the continued judicial challenges against THINCAP 
rules by placing a rather blunt form of relief limitation that may be considered a reasonably 
clear threat to Fundamental Freedoms. Such judicial challenges are further aggravated by 
their interaction with bilateral double taxation treaties. Avoiding a claim of discrimination by 
either offering preference THINCAP rule debt relief to resident entities as opposed to non-
resident entities is to be avoided
68
. 
   
Across the EU there is no standard THINCAP rule that either standardises limitations on debt 
relief across Member States or a judicial precedent that sets out criteria to be used 
consistently on ascertaining the abusiveness of an arrangement containing THINCAP 
transactions. The former is, however, usually denoted by a debt to income threshold that is 
either subjective or fixed ratio in nature that, upon a breach, triggers a limitation on debt 
relief. This safe harbour rule, although common in principle, does offer variation in technical 
detail. For example, the debt may relate to total debt, as is the case in Germany
69
 and Italy
70
 
or limited to parent company or related party debt as in France
71
. In some Member States 
such as Italy the THINCAP rules include non-resident related party debt
72
, whereas in most 
others such as UK
73
, Netherlands
74
, Germany
75
 and France
76
 the rules relate to just related 
party debt. Upon a breach it may result in no debt relief above a threshold, as is the case with 
the German interest capping regime or is uncapped but based solely on a specific ratio such 
as in France
77
. Some jurisdictions do not rely so clearly on debt ratios but more of a 
subjective assessment of internal debt in respect to the arms-length price and indeed its 
outright authenticity as a loan as opposed to some other form of payment that would not 
necessarily be entitled to the same level or relief. Such technical variations do provide 
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opportunities for exploitation by MNEs who may seek to architect their financial contracts 
between group entities in a manner that allows them to exploit favourable tax treatment 
consistent with the way in which such entities are funded and capitalised. Exploiting such 
differences through intra-group financial contracts is often difficult for the tax authorities to 
challenge even when such arrangements are made transparent. There is an element of 
commercial legitimacy to structuring the financial arrangements between entities under the 
current accounting system in a manner that supports the ability of “commercial enterprises 
the freedom to act and plan and make their plans secure by contracting with each other”78. In 
many ways THINCAP arrangements perfectly represent the conflict between what a MNE 
agrees as the financial contracts it agrees itself between its cross border entities, the jus 
dispostivum, and the Member State rules that apply in the event that an arrangement appears 
to have breached an accepted norm or ratio threshold, the jus cogens.   
 
THINCAP laws to date have not attempted to impose specific terms on intra-group funding 
arrangements and there is little evidence of a move towards any harmonised form of 
THINCAP EU wide set of laws. There is a very mixed set of rules that attempt to either limit 
THINCAP excesses through ratio capping, enhance disclosures through documentation or 
pre-arranged agreements with the relevant tax authorities, or simply implemented the blunt 
tool of arms-length pricing once the arrangements are disclosed. The OECD has promoted the 
fact and circumstances approach of arms-length pricing
79
 while, as outlined earlier in this 
chapter, the EU Member States have favoured applying debt / equity ratio thresholds and 
capping. The common issue at hand, however, is how to challenge the undercapitalisation of 
a MNE by determining the true nature of its financial contracts.  As EU law is evolving this 
may no longer be as straightforward as simply applying rather subjective arms-length pricing 
rulings as the legal toolkit available to Member States is ever increasing with advances in 
TRPRICE laws and oversight, the progression towards ever increasing data transparency and 
the introduction of Member State GAAR’s, all of which grant tax authorities with a plethora 
of means to assess the authenticity of THINCAP arrangements.   
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2.2.5 Double Taxation Treaties 
 
A double taxation treaty, hereafter referred to as 'DTT', exists to ensure that where a 
transaction creates a tax liability in one country, a MNE does not incur a similar tax charge 
arising in its country of incorporation or residency. The DTT is underpinned by the concept 
of a Permanent Establishment, hereafter referred to as ‘PE’, denoting a specific place of 
business that gives rise to a corporate tax liability in a particular Member State jurisdiction. 
The requirements of what constitutes a ‘PE’ within the scope of a particular DTT depends on 
what interpretation a particular Member State places on that term, in context of the text of 
that DTT. 
 
The EU Treaty stated vaguely that “Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the 
Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives” 80. The implied purpose of this provision is to ensure that cross-border 
activities are not compromised compared with national activities. According to the 
Commission, “discrimination and double-taxation resulting from the transnational character 
of an activity is inconsistent with the Internal Market”81. The principle issue is that DTT’s are 
designed to address double-taxation problems but in the case of divergent interpretations and 
similar problems no higher treaty forces them to find a solution. The existing network of 
bilateral tax treaties between Member States goes some way towards meeting these objectives 
although it is questionable whether these tax treaties sufficiently address the Internal Market 
requirements. Irrespective of the technical arrangements agreed between Member States in 
their DTT’s, a number of core principles of EU law provide the legal basis upon which 
treaties may be enacted, interpreted and enforced. These non-discrimination rules form part 
of long standing OECD Model Tax Convention
82
 that provides specific grounds that cannot 
be relied upon by a state to discriminate for the purposes of corporate taxation. These range 
from discrimination on the grounds of nationality
83
 to discrimination on the grounds of PE
84
.  
Specific provisions are now also outlined for ensuring accommodation of intangibles.  
                                                     
80
 Consolidated version of the European Treaty [2012] art 4, OJ C326/15 
81
 Commission, ‘Company Taxation in the Internal Market’ COM(2001) 582 Final, 284 
82
 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (2014) 
83
 Ibid, art 4 
84
 Ibid, art 5 
 38 
 
DTT’s offer MNEs a broad set of prospective tax reliefs that may include reduced 
withholding taxes on dividends, interest and royalties and foreign tax credits. Such relief is 
intended to benefit worthy MNEs who have a commercial arrangement that is consistent with 
the objectives of DTT’s as set out by the Member States party to a DTT. The risks relating to 
improper usage, however, exist and Member States have enacted various means to ensure 
abuse is identified and addressed. Such policy initiatives reflect a myriad of complexities 
relating to the relationship between Member State anti-avoidance rules and a DTT, specific 
anti-abuse rules found in DTT’s and the provisions for identifying and combating aggressive 
tax avoidance arrangements that leverage DTT’s.  
 
2.3 Aggressive Tax Planning Arrangements 
 
The notion that MNEs in the EU can operate in a borderless environment fundamentally 
challenges many of the historical assumptions regarding territorial Member State tax systems. 
Taxing corporate income derived from activities within a Member State’s boundary forms the 
basis of source system accounting but the combined factors of EU Internal Market 
integration, globalised trade and mobility of capital infers that the ability of Member State 
legislators to pursue domestic tax policies regardless of supranational considerations have 
significantly diminished. Technological advancements, the growth of digital trading and the 
use of sophisticated financial transaction structures have all provided dual challenges in 
protecting the EU tax base and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
The trend towards increased transactional significance of intangible assets and intellectual 
property is a reflection of the shift to a more knowledge based economies. Intangible assets 
include patents, know-how, trademarks, branding, licenses, contractual rights or royalties and 
are much more difficult assets to apply arms-length pricing assessments to in order to validate 
TRPRICE arrangements
85
. A growing reliance on intangible assets, and the absence of any 
theoretical valuation models for such assets means that the rights afforded to MNEs by 
Fundamental Freedoms incentivises TRPRICE based profit shifting to lower tax Member 
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States. Similarly from a CFC perspective, Member State CFC rules generally consider 
intangibles to reflect passive income making them particularly susceptible to tax in their 
residence jurisdiction, so either encourages MNEs to shift intangibles to more tax friendly 
locations or relocate establishments where intangibles reside to low tax jurisdictions. 
Intangibles provide for specific challenges when assessing profit shifting. The identification 
of an intangible transaction is a different process to the one requiring price determination 
consistent with arms-length pricing, however both approaches may require a different 
approach based on the “facts and circumstances of a given case”86.  These difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that intangibles evaluated for the purposes of TRPRICE may not 
necessarily be consistent with the application of accounting rules in MNE statutory returns. 
Likewise, the TRPRICE computation for an intangible may be different when evaluated 
singularly than when it is combined within an arrangement alongside other transactions, 
whether they are tangible, intangible or combined. It is also important to emphasis the 
connect between a more simplistic accounting or balance sheet entry relating to an intangible 
and the value created from it as it is the value creation that forms the basis of a proper 
assessment of its commercial legitimacy, in tax arrangement terms, between source and 
residence country. The enhancement to value of an intangible transaction is subjective and 
there is limited case law to provide direction in terms of evaluation criteria.  
 
Member States have responded by tightening up the TRPRICE and CFC taxation rules 
relating to intangibles
87
 but remain challenged by both the resources demanded by tax 
authorities to trace down and price up intangible transactions, as well as achieving 
consistency in a complex and diversified set of intangible-based transactions or arrangements. 
Proponents of unitary taxation
88
 point out the benefit of a formulaic apportionment of income 
factors, including intangibles, to better identify and tax intangibles in the residence country.  
Similarly international initiatives have been at the forefront of initiatives to stem the impact 
of intangibles related profit sharing with the OECD leading the charge. Recognition of the 
issue was underpinned in action eight of the OECD BEPS proposal that focuses on revising 
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TRPRICE guidelines relating to “hard-to-value”89 intangibles by establishing standards tools 
to “address the use of information asymmetry between taxpayers and tax authorities to 
undervalue intra-group transfers of intangibles”90.  In response, the EU has proposed to 
instruct the Joint Transfer Pricing Forum to review and update TRPRICE to include more 
economic analysis, leveraging MNE systems and improving TRPRICE administration
91
.   
 
Digital transactions and the opportunities afforded to MNEs in profit shifting offer an 
additional dimension, reflecting a new internet mode of delivering services and products. It 
raises the prospect of introducing the concept of virtual PE’s and there are both proponents92 
and critics
93
 of a separate taxation regime to tackle tax avoidance for the digital economy. 
Identification of a taxable presence is challenging, with a particular reliance on 
geographically mobile intangibles and novel commercial models that means it is not always 
clear how and where MNEs create value. The EU Commission has responded in the 
establishment of a ‘High Level Expert Group on Taxation of the Digital Economy’94 but has 
yet to make any substantive proposals other than to express a view that there “should not be a 
special tax regime for digital companies”95 and that “general rules should be adapted so that 
digital companies are treated in the same way”96.   
 
The term “stateless income”97 has become a common term used in the context of EU direct 
tax and refers to “income derived by a multinational group from business activities in a 
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country other than the domicile (however defined) of the group’s ultimate parent company, 
but which is subject to tax only in a jurisdiction that is neither the source of the factors of 
production through which the income was derived, nor the domicile of the group’s parent 
company”98 The “Double Irish Dutch Sandwich”99 arrangement enacted by Google and 
Starbucks is an example of such stateless income tax planning. This is a classic ‘treaty 
shopping’100 concept, a term used to express a MNEs propensity to exploit inconsistencies in 
DTT’s to avoid taxation by engineering conduit transactions between carefully chosen 
subsidiaries to receive dividends, interest or other investment income at low or zero 
withholding rates. This reflects numerous segments of the EU tax abuse challenge. It 
represents a scheme for US-based MNEs to avoid punitive corporation tax rates in EU 
markets by selling its products from an Irish subsidiary. To further reduce the low tax rate 
charged in Ireland, the firm transfers patents to a subsidiary in a haven economy with a zero 
rate, in the case of Google in Bermuda, and strips income out of Ireland through royalty and 
license payments. To avoid withholding taxes, the money is then channelled through a 
conduit in the Netherlands, exploiting the absence of withholding taxes under NL law. The 
US MNE then circumvents the application of US CFC rules by founding a second Irish 
affiliate managed by the Bermudian subsidiary, exploiting that the firm is tax resident in 
Ireland under US law and tax resident in Bermuda under Irish law. The scheme leverages 
both loose Dutch DTT’s driven by FDI objectives, generally inattentive TRPRICE laws to 
commercial opportunities, and disconnect between US and EU legal provisions that have 
accommodated the arrangements. In the examination of this particular arrangement, Kahale
101
 
usefully differentiated the structuring from the re-structuring of arrangements to take usage of 
DTT’s, the latter being friendlier towards identifying non-commercial purposive reasoning. 
Judicial challenge to these types of arrangements has historically centred on beneficial 
ownership of income or the application of anti-avoidance rules and principles relating to 
specific rules and Limitation of Benefits provisions, hereafter referred to as ‘LOB’, in DTT’s. 
The OECD is expected, as part of the BEPS proposals, to be enacting a new US style LOB 
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rule as part of the proposal due in 2016 aimed at ensuring DTT benefits are for the sole use of 
the parties to the DTT and cannot be leveraged by third parties as part of a treaty shopping 
exercise.  
 
The term ‘beneficial ownership’102 is relevant to evaluating tax avoidance and relates to an 
entity that enjoys the benefits of income ownership but who has little title, control or custody 
over the income. The notion of beneficial ownership implies that the beneficial owner of a 
transaction such as a royalty payment can qualify for taxation at source exemption, but as is 
often the case regarding these sort of intangible transactions it is not always clear who the 
beneficial owner is for tax assessment purposes. It challenges the traditional boundaries 
between legal ownership and beneficial ownership inferring that there is a distinction 
between a transaction for the ultimate legal owners benefit as opposed to one which is for the 
benefit of an intermediary such as an entity in a more tax friendly Member State jurisdiction. 
The law is required to determine the difference between rightful recipient under Member 
State law and beneficial owner under a DTT. Ultimate legal owners therefore rely on DTT 
provisions and any assessment is less a technical one but more of a potential tax abuse one 
requiring a substance over form judgment to be formed in the context of the object and 
purposes of the DTT. At one level these become arms-length principle TRPRICE 
assessments and at another level they become more binary allocative decisions, but in either 
instance these may become easily challenged. It is entirely feasible that there is 
interchangeability between the beneficial ownership and anti-avoidance rules, each informing 
one of the other in different circumstances. A court is just as likely to conclude a ruling on 
beneficial ownership citing reliance on anti-avoidance provisions
103
, as a ruling on anti-
avoidance relying on the beneficial ownership principle
104
. Either way, the challenge for the 
EU is to achieve a position where the concept of beneficial ownership may be interpreted in a 
consistent manner to both ensure legal certainty and to ensure a robust check on potential 
MNE abuses within the context of Fundamental Freedoms.   
 
One consequence of the use of DTT’s is the widespread proliferation of exploiting 
differences in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument under the laws of different Member 
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States to achieve double non-taxation. These may relate to direct mismatches between two 
Member States or indirectly via a third party jurisdiction. Clearly in conflict with the notions 
of those attributes that underpin the EU Treaty such as competition and fairness, they 
represent a common abusive arrangement that has attracted the specific attention of the 
OECD in recent years
105
. ‘Hybrid mismatches’106 have the potential to arise under a number 
of different circumstances. They provide a more difficult issue for the EU as addressing 
abuses is most likely to require changes to relevant legislation in each Member State. 
Although this may be enacted through a Directive to eliminate payment hybridity through 
prohibiting deductible payment exemptions or elimination of deductible allowances in more 
than one Member State, there is an opportunity to supplement this through a more centralised 
approach persisted through changes to the OECD Model Tax Convention. This was reflected 
in the BEPS recommendations that would disallow hybridity when seeking to obtain the 
benefits of DTT’s in a manner contrary to their original objective. It is similarly unclear 
through all the recent OECD publications as to whether the approach to mitigate hybrid 
mismatches is better tackled through the proactive neutralisation of mismatches through DTT 
changes or the centralised setting out of guidelines that would require the reversal of a tax 
benefit if challenged by a Member State, possibly with penalties. The inherent dispersed 
nature of this problem suggests that some of these reforms will require ongoing co-ordination 
of information between Member States, accommodation of specific measures to address dual 
resident entities as well as some element of motive or purpose test to ensure there is no 
adverse consequences to unintentional usage of DTT arrangements.  
 
 
2.4 Abusive Tax Conduct 
 
The study of EU corporate tax abuse is not just limited to the amalgamated outcome of the 
forms of tax arrangements highlighted in this chapter. It reflects a much deeper rooted form 
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of conduct that has become endemic in recent years as a consequence to many independent 
factors of influence established from commercial pressures and opportunity, political inertia 
and the institutional environment. Extending the notion of abusive behaviour to corporate 
taxpayer behaviour under EU tax law is far from simple. Historically, abusive behaviour as a 
legal form has its origins embedded in the widely adopted fraus legis principle that suggests 
“a person cannot rely on the recourse to the law when he in bad faith hopes to gain the benefit 
of his subjective right”107. This principle has been applied in different ways to limit tax 
liabilities, although Italy is the only known Member State in our sample Member States to not 
maintain the fraus legis principle in tax matters. Member State law provides a few further 
insights into abuse of rights when considered more generally. The most pertinent being 
French law, which is clearest in terms of its application to tax law. Fraude a la loi states that 
an abuse would occur if “a person performs a legal act or places himself in a specific legal 
situation with the intent to avoid or to circumvent otherwise applicable mandatory 
provisions”108. Broadly similar legal norms are evident in the German Rechtswidrige and in 
the Italian Violazione di norme di legge.  
 
The abuse of rights doctrine is not yet universally considered to be a general principle of EU 
law. It is only likely to be applied in limited circumstances and its doctrinal characteristics 
mark it out as more of a hybrid moral-legal tool with all the ambiguous legal consequences 
that stem from such notions. A principle can only be considered to be a general principle of 
EU law if it can be consistently extracted out of Member State laws and achieve a normative 
constitutional significance at EU level. It needs to demonstrate universality with a minimum 
ascertainable legally binding content. Recognition of the doctrine in EU tax laws, CJEU case 
law and increasing codification in civil law codes supports the view that it is at least a general 
principle of EU tax law. However, the fact that there is little common agreement of the 
doctrine’s boundaries and meaning in different contexts and its inapplicability across a range 
of more diverse EU law suggest there is some way to go before it is considered a more 
general principle of EU law.    
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The concept of tax abuse in the UK was advanced recently in a UK Supreme Court ruling
109
 
which found a VAT tax scheme abusive, noting that the abuse principle applied only if there 
is an element in the arrangement facilitating a tax advantage that has no independent 
“commercial rationale”110, a description differing from the lack of “normal commercial 
operations”111 or devoid of “economic reality”112 or “economic links”113 used in previous 
cases to differentiate substance from form.  The importance of this UK case is not to be 
underestimated as this outcome was despite the fact that the principle of abuse of law, derived 
from civil law jurisprudence, is little known to UK Common Law. Lord Sumption laid out a 
two dimensional test to ascertain abuse, namely that an arrangement must result in a tax 
advantage that is contrary to VAT harmonisation
114
, and furthermore must be considered 
objectively in that it must be clear that an “essential aim” of the transaction is the 
procurement of that tax advantage. The Supreme Court concluded that an arrangement 
designed to prevent double taxation had been exploited so as to prevent any taxation at all. 
On this occasion the Supreme Court ruled that the ‘commercial objective’115 was enough to 
explain the particular features of an arrangement, differentiating between an objective 
assessment of the aim of arrangement from the actual intention of the parties involved. 
Significantly greater emphasis was placed the aim of the arrangement rather than the actual 
intentions of the parties, the latter being more difficult to ascertain and open to challenge.   
Furthermore the scale of the tax advantage associated with the aim of the arrangement was 
deemed an important objective factor in the assessment of a potentially abusive tax 
arrangement.   
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2.5 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates not only the diversity inherent within the common 
tax avoidance practices but also the considerable diversity in the approaches adopted by 
Member States in implementing anti-avoidance laws. Technical tax rules in a given 
jurisdiction have limited effect in the resolution of tax abuse either at Member State level or 
consistently across the EU particularly in light of the emerging trends in digital commerce 
and proliferation of intangible transactions that generate a different dimension to the same 
problem of EU corporate tax avoidance. In any disparate group of Member States with 
different political heritages, legal orders and tax base priorities a non-harmonised set of anti-
avoidance laws are inevitable. The analysis highlights the challenge facing any reform in this 
field in the adoption of a common solution for materially mitigating such diverse tax 
avoidance practices. On a positive note, the highlighting of variability and inconsistencies in 
the application of such Member State laws suggests, beyond tax harmonisation, the issue may 
require reform above and beyond changes to individual Member State tax laws if a consistent 
and credible solution is to be formed.  It also highlights the challenging complexity inherent 
in individual EU legislative provisions for closing out tax avoidance practices that reflect the 
local interpretation for protection of EU Fundamental Freedoms, jurisdictional legal norms 
and precedence, and experience in addressing specific tax avoidance cases presented to 
Member State authorities in the past. 
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Chapter Three: Tacking EU Tax Abuses - The Scholarly Debate 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The complex nature of EU direct tax anti-avoidance and its relationship with EU 
Fundamental Freedoms demands “generativity”1 allowing a synthesis of the body of 
knowledge available and permitting a new perspective on the issues requiring redress. Tax 
avoidance has attracted hundreds of research papers but very few have incited successful 
legal reform in the arena of EU direct tax avoidance. The boundaries of this research subject 
cross accounting, tax law, public law, international law, economics and politics domains. 
Bearing this in mind, this analysis of the scholarly debate will focus on applying a set of 
relevant model ideals to a small number of notions relevant to understanding what is believed 
will be foundational concepts in understanding and defining EU direct tax anti-avoidance law 
reform. The first concept is reflected in Legal Origins Theory that suggest that from a 
neoclassical law and economics perspective law is a function of the “incentives it sets for 
welfare-maximising conduct”2 inferring that law is principally directed towards social 
engineering. Generating a long-term social contract between corporate taxpayers and the 
communities they serve is fundamental to reform. The second concept also relates to Legal 
Origins Theory that suggests that legal rules are driven by economic, political and legal 
system context
3
. Legal institutions are a function of the legal and political system inferring 
that laws may shape economic behaviours, including tax conduct, the enforcement of which 
is more effective through the judicial system than by the blunt tools of EU or Member State 
regulation. The third concept connects the moral dimension to the issues at hand, and Legal 
Positioning Theory
4
 that claims tax conduct may be linked closely to economic models of 
self-interest. Such self-interest infers that calculated behaviours, possibly emulated through 
game theory, encourages corporate tax planning decisions based on combinations of 
behavioural, normative and subjective beliefs as articulated in the Theory of Planned 
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Behaviours
5
. The relevance, importance and corollary of these models to the reform proposal 
shall be considered and underpinned by supporting scholarly material set out in this chapter. 
Through an understanding of the literature and its relationship with established models, it 
provides context regarding the issues requiring consideration in recommending a reform 
proposal to address the prevalence and challenges of tax abuse within EU law.      
 
 
3.2 Research Evidencing Tax Avoidance Practices 
 
There is considerable theoretical literature based around the concept of tax avoidance, most 
of which seems to be a derivative of tax evasion research, primarily attributable to the fact 
that the drivers of tax avoidance remain the same namely to minimise or eliminate tax 
liabilities. In fact “the conceptual distinction between tax evasion and tax avoidance hinges 
on the legality of the taxpayer’s actions”6. Tax avoidance is a relatively aged concept7 but 
political and academic interest in it, particularly in relation to the EU corporate taxation, did 
not evolve until the 1970s as a result of the formation of the EU and its handling of taxation 
matters. Such research by Kolm
8
 and Richupan
9
 are good examples of this early academic 
research. Genschel and Schwartz
10
 identified rising corporate taxation and widening cross-
border tax differences as primary reasons triggering material movements of taxpayers and 
bases across the EU. Hanlon argued that tax avoidance is usually “highly idiosyncratic and 
determined by a number of factors and interactions”11, not all of which can be measured. 
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Erle
12
 placed more emphasis on more fundamental drivers stating that corporate taxpayers 
may have to support a multitude of tax strategies, depending on their tax philosophy.  
 
One practical difficulty for the tax authorities across the EU has been to identify and quantify 
tax avoidance practices. Given the prospective materiality of corporate tax avoidance 
practices in the EU, some academics have made efforts to identify and assess those factors 
evidencing tax avoidance practices. In accounting terms, the term book-tax differences 
represent a cash effective tax rate, hereafter referred to as CER. Hanlon
13
 identified such 
book-tax differences as being the prime reflector of tax avoidance or tax aggressive 
behaviour. Earlier research by Mills found that MNEs with large book-tax differences, 
measured on the tax return and using deferred tax expense from the financial statements, are 
more likely to be investigated by tax authorities
14
. Wilson found in a US study that book-tax 
differences are larger for MNEs accused of engaging in tax avoidance than for a matched 
sample of non-accused MNEs
15
. Other researchers such as Plesko
16
, Manzon and Plesko
17
, 
and Desai
18
 all examined book-tax differences in the search for tax avoidance evidence. 
Further data was assessed by Mills et al
19
 and Plesko
20
 who used tax return data to reinforce 
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the correlation. The evidence from all these studies suggests that book-tax differences capture 
some element of tax avoidance. It appears that there are no standard accounting practices for 
capturing such information and it is difficult to track and quantify across EU boundaries. 
 
One could observe that the commonality in the aforementioned research by Mills et al and 
Plesko is that they focus on annual measures of avoidance. It is not clear whether the same 
MNEs are continually avoiding taxes or whether the tax avoidance is more of a transitory 
behaviour triggered by a specific set of circumstances. Research by Dyreng, Hanlon and 
Maydew
21
 found that an event such as the disinvestment of a business may attract certain tax-
favourable practices by MNEs not typically attracted to implementing regular tax avoidance 
practices. In any event, whatever the driver, Loretz and Moore stated “one of the perpetuating 
forces of tax competition is based on the desire of MNEs to reduce the burden of taxation on 
profits. This force is not only responsible for shifts of capital across borders, but also 
motivates the multitude of strategies that firms adopt to lower their CER” 22. This illuminates 
not only the fundamental market forces driving optimal taxation planning but also the 
recognition that it drives capital movements to lower tax jurisdictions as well as other 
loophole exploitation associated with tax avoidance planning.  
 
Robinson et al 
23
 highlighted two main factors accelerating the notable rise in book-tax 
differences in recent years. Firstly, MNEs tend to organise their tax departments as profit 
centres rather than cost centres. Secondly, the trend towards corporate tax functions focusing 
on planning rather than compliance. It was concluded that these two factors alone had a 
material impact on the propensity of a company to engage in corporate tax avoidances 
practices, placing emphasis on how a MNE is organised and what its priorities are will 
determine its appetite to practice tax avoidance. Whether these are a function of the longer-
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term organisational culture with in a MNE or the short-term managerial direction they should 
be considered drivers of behaviour.   
 
Consistent with Harre’s Legal Positioning Model, Desai and Dharmapala24 found that MNEs 
offering greater equity incentives to management engaged in more tax avoidance practices. 
Another angle to this research has been to look at the behaviours of certain industry groups. 
Loretz and Moore found that “firms' tax planning decisions, similar to their other operational 
decisions, are made in a competitive environment. Various stakeholders of the firm can 
observe tax payments and evaluate these against the relevant peer group, which creates 
interdependencies in the tax planning activities of firms”25. This introduces an interesting 
angle to the motivational forces behind tax avoidance, promoting the importance of peer 
pressure and recent examples include financial transactions purporting to avoid taxes across 
London based UK investment banks such as Barclays
26
 and Goldman Sachs
27
. Frank et al.
28
 
introduced the concept of the “Simultaneous Equation Model” which positively correlated the 
tax aggressiveness of a company with the general financial aggressiveness of a company. The 
more aggressive a company is in pursuit of profit, the more likely it is to engage in corporate 
tax avoidance arrangements. Manzon and Plesko
29
 focused more on investigating whether 
MNEs characteristics are associated with tax avoidance based on organisational, cultural, and 
geo-political or activity factors.  
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Rego
30
 found that company size was an important determinant as large MNEs have more 
resources to optimize their tax planning, which would imply a lower CER.  Furthermore, 
large MNEs are expected to be investigated more often by national tax authorities, creating 
higher political costs of tax planning for larger MNEs according to Zimmermann
31
 and Omer, 
Molloy and Ziebert
32
. Larger organisations tend to be more profitable and Wilkie
33
 discussed 
the importance of the profitability on the propensity to engage in tax avoidance practices. 
Graham and Tucker
34
 analysed forty-four tax avoidance cases and identify firm size and 
profitability as determinants of MNEs which are using tax avoidance. A contrarian view has 
been expressed by Desai and Dharmapala
35
 who found that tax avoidance has no association 
with firm value but rather on the level of institutional ownership.  
 
The correlation between corporate governance and tax avoidance is well researched, but 
Desai and Dharmapala focused on how corporate governance affects the response of MNEs 
to changes in corporate tax rates noting that when governance is weak, an increase in a 
jurisdiction’s tax rate results in more diversion lowering corporate tax revenues36. New forms 
of corporate governance have promoted internal controls and self-scrutiny. Owens
37
 points 
out that these have not been tax focused, but the role of the board of directors has bought tax 
avoidance activities into the boardroom. Again, consistent with Harre’s Legal Positioning 
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Model, Desai and Dharmapala
38
 chose to extend the theories in Slemrod
39
 and Desai et al
40
 
by correlating the effect of incentivised compensation and governance structures on tax 
avoidance, surmising that there was a negative correlation between equity-based 
compensation and tax avoidance.  
 
The impact of ownership patterns on tax avoidance was researched by Desai and 
Dharmapala
41
. Concentrated ownership, examined in Chen et al
42
, typically nurtures tax 
avoidance practices because a controlling owner benefits more financially. Conversely, these 
MNEs may avoid fewer taxes because these long-term concentrated holders have a longer 
horizon and may be more sensitive to the total costs of avoidance arising from reputation 
effects and suspicions of diversion from minority shareholders. Leblang argued that MNEs 
with more multinational activity generally have more tax planning opportunities
43
. Similarly, 
Rego reports evidence that suggests the scale of international operations leads to more tax 
avoidance opportunities resulting in lower effective tax rates
44
. A trend towards increasing 
intangible capital transfers has also had an impact despite the more traditional issue of 
tangible capital that has been most sensitive to differences in jurisdictional tax rates. Studies 
by Grubert and Mutti
45
 and Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon
46
 found conclusive correlations 
between FDI and inter-country differences in tax rates. The ability to shield taxes on royalties 
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under the foreign tax credit system and income shifting opportunities create an incentive to 
exploit intangible assets developed by the parent company abroad. Even though part of the 
return on intangibles abroad is paid out in royalties to the parent, the evidence suggests that 
the foreign subsidiary retains a significant portion. This tax induced income shifting as 
initially identified by Grubert and Mutti
47
 and further endorsed by Grubert suggests that the 
location of intangible income and the allocation of debt among high- and low-tax countries 
“account for all of the observed differences in profitability across high- and low-statutory tax 
countries” 48. Such differences in declared profits may be attributable to various tax planning 
activities. A study by Altshuler and Grubert
49
 indicated that income shifting relating to 
intangible capital has increased markedly in recent years, a fact confirmed by the EU 
Observatory on Infringements of IPR that found 40% of EU economic activity is generated 
by intellectual property right intensive industries
50
. 
 
The literature highlighted in this chapter has a particular significance for this thesis. There are 
themes inherent within much academic analysis of corporate tax abusive behaviours, namely 
the role of accounting, management incentivisation and behaviours, and the nature of cross-
border trade, particularly in intangibles that nurture opportunities for tax abuse. When 
compared with the approaches more commonly adopted in recent years in mitigating tax 
avoidance practices, little consideration has been given to the influencing factors highlighted 
by the aforementioned academics. Chapter two demonstrated, for example, the limited 
Member State provisions attempting to directly influence behaviours or alter statutory 
accounting rules that have been identified by academics as core influencing factors. Despite 
the importance of the literature highlighted, it remains unclear how we can explain the 
variation in tax avoidance very well either across jurisdictions or across tax avoidance 
practice types. This affords a further research opportunity, as do exploiting research gaps 
relating to the role of the political economy and the influence of political ideology and culture 
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driving tax avoidance behaviours. Similar opportunities to research empirical evidence 
identifying why MNEs do not pursue tax benefits more aggressively than practicing tax 
avoidance would prove similarly useful.  
 
 
3.3 EU Tax Avoidance Research 
 
The research evident in the assessment of comparative direct taxation in the EU is notably 
limited. Even at a general level academic opinion differs widely. Sceptics such as McLure
51
 
stated “the grand illusion of a single European wide direct tax system illuminating all 
European inefficiencies and assist all Member States in maximising their relative advantages 
is commonly accepted as utopian”. Other academics such as Loukota52 see the steps towards 
the harmonisation of EU corporate taxation as not only a logical idea but also the only 
realistic policy solution available that will evolve over time. 
 
To appreciate the context of the EU necessitates an assessment of both the literature relating 
to both the theoretical background to the basic mechanics of the EU direct tax system as well 
as a more focused impact on tax policies in the sample set of Member States relevant to this 
thesis. Zodrow and Mieszkowski
53
 developed a model to understand the background to EU 
corporate taxation avoidance issues. The model is rooted around a set of countries sharing an 
international mobile tax base. It necessarily implies that the tax policies of EU Member States 
are interdependent and so EU Member State’s tax revenue depends on the other EU Member 
States tax rates and enforcement procedures. Consistent with La Porta’s hypothesis that laws 
shape economic behaviours, the model predicts this interdependency to trigger a “race to the 
bottom”54 in taxation as each country tries to attract mobile tax base from the other. This 
baseline model has subsequently been extended in various forms by Bucovetsky
55
, Wilson
56
, 
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and Kanbur and Keen
57
 all of whom focused on country size, implying that if all EU Member 
States were of equal size there would be balanced tax competition, whereas as jurisdictional 
sizes vary the smaller EU Member States have stronger incentives to cut tax rates than the 
larger EU Member State. Wilson references the advantage of smallness in EU tax 
competition
58
, exemplified by the policies adopted by Member States such as Ireland and 
Cyprus. A further angle researched against this model relates to the domestic factors 
constraining individual EU Member States from approaching corporate taxation policies and 
avoidance mitigations in a consistent manner. While it is commonplace to assume EU tax 
competition is completely dominated by national tax rate choices, researchers such as 
Hallerberg and Basinger
59
 and Hays
60
 have noted that, in reality, Member States are 
contingent on constraints and countervailing pressures which, according to Swank and 
Steinmo
61
, and Ganghof
62
, prevent law changes due to competitive pressures. 
 
Bankman
63
 noted how a proliferation of tax avoidance increased tax risk for corporate 
taxpayers and tax authorities in Member States adding uncertainty about the application of 
tax law, particularly as there are many areas where the law is under-developed and where 
political consensus has not been attained. Consistent with La Porta’s Legal Origins Theory 
theorising that legal institutions are driven by political systems, Bernauer and Achini
64
 
identified the principal actors involved in EU direct corporate taxation, notably the CJEU, the 
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European Parliament, hereafter referred to as ‘EP’, civil society organizations, Member 
States, the Commission and Business. Coherent corporate tax collaboration is made more 
difficult by the business community not being a unitary body of opinion, and their 
preferences for EU tax coordination may vary according to whether a MNE is exposed to 
significant cross border activity or the sector within which it operates. The forces of Member 
State Casus Foederis demonstrate how the EU is intrinsically pulled towards the concept of 
unitary action but is compromised by political divergence. The EU is a political system in 
which “actor constellations”65, a concept developed further by Radaelli and Kraemer66 who 
associated EU direct taxation with a territory of high political transaction costs.  
 
According to The Centre for European Policy Studies it is clear that the Internal Market has 
highlighted the role of tax rule distortions making the need for corporate tax reforms more 
pressing
67
. It was research by Smith
68
 that noted the corporate tax reform agenda witnessed 
more urgent visibility at EU level at the end of the 1990s. Economic integration within the 
EU has crystallised tax obstacles to genuine cross-border and MNE economic activity in 
several areas, such as TRPRICE, DTT’s, dividend taxation, and exit taxation according to 
Radaelli and Kraemer
69
. In the EU, cooperation in indirect taxation has been evident utilising 
Treaty provisions, but it was Majone that pointed out the fact that there are no specific Treaty 
provisions for direct taxation, therefore prompting Member State initiatives to combat tax 
avoidance and solutions for addressing tax problems suffered by MNEs doing business across 
jurisdictions either based on “general single market provisions in which unanimity applies or 
have to go off the beaten track of the Community method”70. 
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It is interesting to note that there is significant academic literature regarding EU tax 
competition but little on EU tax cooperation, similarly noted in more widely scoped research 
by Vito
71
, and differentiation between the approaches to tax avoidance mitigation taken by 
various Member States. Further research by Eberlein and Kerwer
72
 and Heritier
73
 provided 
further evidence in the importance of cooperation in the area of direct EU corporate taxation, 
providing a set of comparisons between the classic Community method and the more 
contemporary modes of governance. Radaelli and Kramer
74
 exemplified this further by 
observing the continuum of developments that had nurtured EU corporate tax reform through 
forums such as the Working Group on Common Consolidated Tax Base
75
 and the Transfer 
Pricing Forum and the Arbitration Convention on Transfer Pricing Disputes
76
.  
 
Radaelli
77
 similarly provided insight into the notion that the EU has pursued different goals 
over time initially focused on providing tax neutrality in the single market to fighting harmful 
tax competition, and, more recently, creating the pre-conditions for comprehensive corporate 
tax reform at the EU level. It was Tanzi
78
 and Avi-Yonah Reuven
79
 that both recognised that 
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globalisation was contributing to the degradation of domestic tax systems. The CJEU has 
widely been credited in academic literature as the driving force of change in harmonising 
corporate tax policies and behaviours across Member States. Radaelli and Kraemer noted that 
the CJEU focuses on tax regulations and entire taxes that provide either overt or covert 
discrimination in national tax systems with attacks on the exercise of Freedoms in the Internal 
Market
80
. Although exceptions are justifiable in accordance with protecting the public 
interest, Member States are under an obligation to prove that any tax policies implemented to 
protect such public interest are “appropriate, necessary, least onerous, and proportionate”81. 
All of these drivers support La Porta’s view that legal rules are driven by economic, political 
and legal system context. 
 
Academic research relating to specific tax avoidance practices and their relevance to specific 
EU countries is limited. One key theme in the limited research available relates to not only 
technical difficulties in coordinating consistent policies to mitigate against avoidance 
practices but also diverging ideology. For example, Ruding
82
 pointed out that France and 
Germany were unambiguous in their intention to look at tax base coordination only under the 
condition that it is discussed in the context of tax rate harmonisation. The UK, conversely, 
focuses more on the technical solution of common tax base coordination. These differences 
again appear largely political. 
 
 
3.4 The Role of the CJEU and National Legislatures in Tax Avoidance Law making 
 
Case law resulting from the challenge to corporate tax avoidance behaviour would suggest 
that the CJEU continues to play a pivotal role in providing direction and promoting 
consistency of application of direct taxation across EU Member States. As stated by Pistone 
“the CJEU is trying hard to remove cross-border direct tax obstacles, whenever they arise and 
whatever price we may have to pay in terms of the structure and consistency of our national 
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tax systems” 83. Further research by Pistone stated that the Commission lacks the actual 
support by the Member States to introduce effective measures of tax co-ordination or 
harmonization
84
. Others such as Sorensen
85
 produce a more balanced view that reflects upon 
a situation that the impact of tax coordination or harmonisation would vary across EU 
Member States both in terms of national government revenues and the consequential tax 
behaviour by resident MNEs. 
 
Legal scholars are finely divided about whether the CJEU has proactively pursued a discreet 
political agenda towards tax harmonisation or whether the CJEU’s actions represent a more 
straightforward motive for protecting Fundamental Freedoms according to Graetz and 
Warren
86
.  In contrast to La Porta, research by Pitsone
87
 rejected the political dimension but 
acknowledged its role in creating a unique form of European international tax law. He 
concluded that the overarching objective of the CJEU is to ensure the tax treatment has 
achieved consistency aligned with the objectives of the Internal Market, as well as ensuring 
conflicts among EU Member States have been resolved. Radaelli and Kraemer stated that 
direct tax CJEU jurisprudence was too complex to form robust conclusions regarding an 
economic model or political orientation
88
, noting the distinction between EU research that 
focuses on CJEU case rulings and alignment with the internal market, whilst most non-EU 
research concentrates more focus on jurisprudence that exhibits a much more distinct political 
orientation. 
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Between 1998 and 2008, over 100 individual tax provisions or tax laws in their totality were 
struck down by the CJEU
89
. The legal pressures of CJEU jurisprudence become more 
poignant when Member States or MNEs suffer large revenue losses as a consequence of a 
ruling. In addition, they are also capable of generating imbalances in the overall tax system 
according to Radaelli.
90
 What can prove irksome to many observers is that the CJEU rules 
that a tax law is incompatible with EU law but fails to provide guidance on how such a tax 
law should be re-drafted. In this sense, the CJEU offers a negative influence, in that it can 
only rule against national provisions and cannot legislate substitute EU law according to 
Griffith and Klemm.
91
 As a consequence to the rather ad hoc CJEU jurisprudence, and the 
resulting uncoordinated responses to their rulings by Member States, the role of the CJEU 
remains unpressured and the impact in its totality in the context of EU law could be described 
as erratic according to Gammie.
92
 
 
It is common practice for both MNEs and Member State tax authorities to conduct risk 
assessment exercises to see whether current or proposed tax rules would survive a CJEU 
challenge according to Griffith and Klemm.
93
 Various government initiatives have been set 
up in the past, both in the UK and in Germany in 2005 to reflect upon CJEU judgements and 
assess how CJEU decisions can be mitigated in the direct tax arena. Consistent with La 
Porta’s model, Radaelli and Kraemer94 suspect that there is more inter-governmental 
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coordination outside involvement of the Commission than is visible. Gammie
95
 identified a 
number of areas in which CJEU rulings are likely to influence Member State tax policy. He 
highlighted various common arrangements that allowed MNEs to manipulate dividend 
policy, noting the general trend for Member States, such as UK and Germany, to outlaw 
imputation systems to avoid manipulation of dividend taxation that has historically been 
achieved through rules favouring investment in domestic equity that granted preferential 
treatment of domestic shareholders. An interesting angle of thought was similarly made by 
Gammie regarding EU trends in residence-based taxation noting how the concept is 
becoming increasingly obsolete for EU MNEs operating in an Internal Market. A rather bleak 
assessment was made by the researcher regarding the effectiveness of Member State tax laws, 
concluding that the discriminatory aspect of CFC means they will be outlawed over time, and 
that TRPRICE, despite the merits of various Member State tax rules, is unlikely to be 
enforceable while accounting practices promoting these practices are allowed to persist.  
 
There is a vast commentary on the role of the CJEU in EU tax law, and the consensus view is 
that it has played a modest role, over a long period of time in normalising national rules 
through ruling against tax laws rather than promoting a common tax framework. This is 
inherent to its judicial role although the complexity involved in many of the cases has meant 
that it has been difficult to provide clear and concise messages that are commonly understood 
across Member States. History has demonstrated that following a particular ruling follows a 
similar case with a slightly different dimension that offers forth a slightly different 
interpretation. There is an overwhelming message in the literature available that the CJEU is 
a necessary check and balance but is unlikely to be the source of any solution to EU tax 
avoidance practices, perhaps only offering a policing role against ongoing national tax rule 
changes and challenges.   
 
3.5 The Role of Tax Authorities 
 
Literature relating to tax authorities response is largely theoretical and less focused on the 
specific or comparative assessment of EU Member State tax authority responses. Braithwaite 
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and Ayres
96
 promoted a theory based on the notion of an enforcement pyramid. This 
compliance pyramid reflects a taxpayer behavioural model and assumes that the majority of 
taxpayers willingly comply with the tax system and therefore can be managed through light-
touch methods prompting cooperation and trust. Conversely, taxpayers at the top of the 
pyramid are those prompted to actively engage in tax evasion and is addressed through more 
punitive deterrence and criminal penalties. Taxpayers in the centre are generally compliant 
but may opportunistically exploit ambiguous areas in the law. To the tax authorities the tax 
evaders and those taxpayers in the centre area represent a risk and imply that that it will be 
efficient for the revenue authorities to focus efforts on improving the likelihood that 
taxpayers within these zones will comply with the revenue authority’s view of the true 
intentions of the national law. The emphasis that Braithwaite and Ayers placed on the middle 
part of the pyramid suggests that it is data, and transparency to that data, that is required to 
resolve avoidance rather than intelligence which is more suited to addressing direct evasion. 
Attention to the middle part of the compliance pyramid is consistent with the influential 
research of Hasegawa who found that whenever taxpayers are offered opportunities for 
disclosure they will seize it
97
  
 
Braithwaite noted that national law reform is the first “circuit-breaker needed to push those in 
the middle bulge down into the white base of the triangle” 98 but further actions are needed to 
manage this problem including the building of cooperative relationships between taxpayer 
and tax authority. This focus on an enhanced cooperation approach within a context of 
escalating regulatory options is an interesting hypothesis. Taxpayer profiling using risk 
ratings to decide where to focus resources to achieve maximum compliance with what is 
available is a concept pioneered by Braithwaite and Ayres
99
. Such risk centric regulation 
emphasizes analysis leading to targeting, as noted by Baldwin and Black.
100
 If such a theory 
was applied EU wide to corporate income tax we could witness the use of assessments that 
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would include taxpayer-reported information, data from other EU agencies and Member State 
tax authority intelligence to identify potential compliance risks. Braithwaite and Ayres noted 
that applying different approaches to different taxpayers according to certain predefined 
criteria enables tax authorities to use their limited resources efficiently but also creates a risk 
that different taxpayers are treated unfairly risking claims of inequitable tax authority 
behaviour. 
 
Akin to more general models on tax, research by Reinganum and Wilde
101
 applied the 
principal-agent theory further in the context of tax avoidance behaviours. The assumption 
was that the statistical likelihood of a tax investigation into MNEs arrangements is dependent 
on either levels of reported income or similar reported financial data in the statutory accounts, 
and that tax authorities are likely to work with investigation thresholds implying a form of 
evaluation against metrics indicating tax avoidance. Shleifer
102
 took this theory further by 
implying that a degree of peer group comparison was factored into these tax authority 
thresholds. In both cases the inference was that there would be a correlation between either 
the tax authority’s policies or procedures or their unofficial investigative behaviours and the 
MNEs inclination to shift profits. In the UK Freedman et al.
103
 analysed similar theories and 
found that UK tax authorities are comparing the reported income of MNEs within a peer 
group in order to prioritise investigations, supporting the policy of introducing a risk rating 
for the biggest MNEs based on a combination of organisational features and past tax 
behaviour. 
 
Research by Scharpf, however, offered an entirely different angle to interrelationships 
between actors engaged in co-ordinated negotiation through the use of so called “co-
operation games”104 inferring that tax conduct is driven less by the more traditional market or 
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hierarchical co-ordination and governance but by more “self-organising networks”105 of co-
operative relationships between actors. In the context of this research it would relate to 
commercial or industry networks. This arguably conflicts with the findings of researchers 
such as James
106
 who claim EU tax authorities regularly engage in negotiated tax settlements 
between tax authorities and MNEs, resulting in so called “sweat-heart deals”107 but his 
research nevertheless does highlight the complexities of more informal actors interactions 
and behaviours when attempting to identify and rationalise corporate behaviours.   
 
 
3.6 CFC Research 
 
The location of a holding company and its impact on taxable income resides at the centre of 
much academic literature focusing on the challenges that exist between the conflicts between 
Member State sovereignty and respect for the principles underpinning the EU Treaty. 
Billgren
108
 focused on a historical analysis of CFC legislation implemented initially in 
Germany in 1972. Research by Eden and Kudrle
109
 analysed the behaviours of Member 
States who have enacted tax avoidance rules in isolation and noted that many of these 
jurisdictions have relied on supplementary exchange of information to ensure they are more 
workable.  
 
Billgren identified the main objectives driving CFC legislation as the desire to prevent the 
erosion of national tax bases as MNEs increasingly benefit from tax competition across 
Member States
110
. Similarly, Lang identified the objective of CFC legislation as avoiding 
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“the loss of tax revenue because of domestic MNEs allocating their profits to MNEs residing 
in tax havens” 111. Gresik noted the importance of globalised trade and its impact on the ease 
upon which MNEs are able to transition activities form one jurisdiction to another, and 
claimed that “this flexibility not only helps transnationals minimize the cost of taxes and 
regulations imposed by national governments but it can also aid them in pitting one 
government against another”112. Breaking down barriers for transitioning physical activities 
as noted by Gresik supplemented with the ease upon which MNEs are able to create 
accounting entries favourable to a MNEs tax liability, in a combined manner, has resulted in 
accelerated tax abusive arrangements. 
 
Examining drivers for CFC legislation, Bohm et al
113
 stressed the importance of tax 
uncertainty and politics, suggesting the negative effect of tax uncertainty on investment is 
closely related to the market power of the firm. Using empirical evidence from German based 
MNEs they concluded that the effect is exacerbated if there is imperfect competition in the 
market.  The political dimension was researched by Stasavage
114
 as well as Bittlingmayer
115
 
who concluded that MNEs operating in an environment characterised by regulatory 
uncertainty and political focus are less likely to exploit tax avoidance practices than those 
MNEs operating in a low profile unregulated area of commerce. Sinn,
116
 and Keen
117
 both 
focused on the differences between source and residency based taxation. Mindful that 
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corporate tax is effectively accounted for on a source country basis, De Mooij and 
Ederveen
118
 identified two options for implementing profit shifting, namely that they can 
shift profit generating activities to low-tax jurisdictions or shift book profits there. This seems 
obvious but the complexity arises when one considers that profit shifting is more sensitive to 
corporate taxation than FDI
119
, diluting theories supporting the influence of investment over 
tax rates as a determinant of profit shifting. Billgren stated that “for the prevention of abuse 
to be a justified ground the legislation in question must have the sole purpose of preventing 
wholly artificial arrangements and the arrangement in question must have the sole purpose of 
tax abuse” 120. A similar view was expressed by Lang who went further by proclaiming that 
“since not only wholly artificial arrangements but also economic structures are qualified as 
abusive by CFC legislations, anti-abuse does not seem to be a valid justification of CFC 
legislations” 121. Similarly there is no evidence that a loss of revenue is a valid justification 
for a CFC restriction, and likewise, anti-abuse does not appear to offer a possible justification 
because most CFC legislations are also applicable to minority participations and minority 
shareholders do not have the influence to create wholly artificial arrangements.   
 
Radaelli
122
 and Kemmerling and Seils
123
 highlighted the positive impact of implementing soft 
law interactions with hard law, and the associated impact on the shaping of the Code of 
Conduct for Business Taxation
124
 as identified by Kowalczyk
125
.  Other research in this area 
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referenced the impact of CFC legislation on national sovereignty, Avi-Yonah
126
 argued that 
CFC rules do not offer any constraints on national sovereignty and do not imply double 
taxation since the taxable profits belongs to the residence country. This credible defence was 
further elaborated by Hartley who stated that Member States retain the right to “create and 
enforce anti-abuse provisions that prevent wholly artificial arrangements aimed at 
circumventing the national tax legislation an in line with the principle of proportionality” 127. 
Sandler claimed that there is “an implicit consensus today that CFC rules are a legitimate 
instrument of “pushing the boundaries” of the territorial limits on residence taxation” 128.  
 
Academic literature in this field has achieved coverage regarding the drivers of the CFC 
policies adopted by EU Member States as well the impact of tax planning behaviour by 
MNEs. Regarding drivers, case study evidence promoted by Rixen
129
 and Ganghof
130
 found 
that certain Member States have been reluctant to engage in unilateral implementation of 
anti-avoidance rules as they are concerned about becoming uncompetitive vis-à-vis 
jurisdictions with more tax friendly regimes. This has not prevented, however, some 
jurisdictions pursuing such unitary action, a point highlighted by Ganghof regarding 
Germany’s unilateral measures to impose a penalty regime on capital income of German 
banks accused of assisting customers to avoid tax. Such an approach has been developed 
further in recent FATCA regulations
131
 to impose withholding tax, hereafter referred to as 
‘WHT’, penalties on banks facilitating potential tax avoidance. In terms of the impact of tax 
planning behaviour, research by Grubert and Mutti,
132
 and Huizinga and Laeven,
133
 both 
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provided the most compelling evidence that the taxable profits of subsidiaries in low-tax 
jurisdictions are generally considerably higher than in high-tax jurisdictions for large MNEs 
in the EU. Limited literature relating to the cross-EU Member State co-ordination of CFC 
mitigation is evident with only Rixen
134
 and Palan et al
135
 analysing CFC bilateral 
cooperation and concluded that such cooperation is entirely limited to information exchange.  
This work was taken further by Genschel
136
 who concluded that “multilateral cooperation is 
most advanced where it encompasses both tax harmonization and information exchange” 137. 
They noted that harmonization has been more common among other corporate taxes such as 
VAT where competitive pressure is low rather than where competitive pressure is high. 
 
The complex relationship and interdependencies between tax abuse and tax competition has 
generated significant commentary. Keen
138
 found that unilateral action by Member States for 
enacting tax avoidance laws reduces tax abuse and increases competitive pressure on FDI, 
encouraging MNEs in higher tax jurisdictions unable to shift profits by physically re-locating 
economic activity. Multilateral cooperation aimed at tackling targeted corporate tax 
competition was deemed to have a broadly similar effect according to Genschel and 
Swartz
139
, who concluded that international tax arbitrage has prompted the both tax 
cooperation and tax competition depending on the circumstances. Little academic 
commentary targets the qualitative aspect of information exchanges or on the specific 
arrangements agreed between certain Member States when the exchange is either bi-lateral or 
at best limited to a selection of jurisdictions.  The impact on mitigating tax abuse will be a 
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function of the “depth and automaticity of exchanges”140 although other academics such as 
Gresik
141
 rejected the impact of information exchanges concluding that MNEs control and 
manipulate the data they offer to tax authorities.  
 
Academic CFC commentary is characterised by the proliferation of research in the field of 
CFC origins, causes and the influence of political inertia, typically focussing on 
administering the issue rather than attempting to level-set it within the context of direct tax 
avoidance law and a credible solution. There is little evidence of comparative analysis of EU 
CFC rules and their material impact across EU Member States offers disappointment. CFC 
rules are in abundance across Member States and they are no less significant than any other 
type of rule in attempting to address tax abuse conduct. Such rules do, however, attract the 
attention of lawmakers specifically in the context of EU Fundamental Freedoms and to this 
extent offers rewards for the academically ambitious in assessing the integrity and 
consistency by the CJEU relating to rulings in this regard.  
 
 
3.7 Group Relief Research 
 
An EU group entity was defined by Agundez-Garcia as “a group of related MNEs whose 
members are tax residents and operate in at least two different Member States of the EU” 142. 
There are legal and economic interpretations regarding the meaning of a consolidated group, 
with legal approach offering simple and clear boundaries defined by the ownership test. 
Ownership thresholds for consolidation are particularly difficult. The concept of Group Relief 
is fully consistent with the economic principles underlying the internal Market in the 
consolidation of MNE group income and then allocating it by means of an agreed 
apportioning formula. The definition of a consolidated group was also studied by McLure
143
, 
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Hellerstein and McLure
144
, Sørensen
145
, Weiner
146
 and Fox et al.
147
 among others. Empirical 
studies have supported the impact of group relief. Grubert and Mutti,
148
 Hines and Rice
149
, 
Klassen and Schackelford
150
, Mintz and Smart
151
 and Altshuler and Grubert
152
all found 
empirical evidence supporting profit and loss shifting. Specific examples have been cited by 
Weichenrieder
153
 who proved German MNEs shifting profits to Ireland’s low-tax jurisdiction, 
and Blasch and Weichenrieder brought to light a relationship between the corporation tax in 
the home country and the associated net of tax profitability of its German subsidiary
154
. 
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Group Relief literature is dominated by focus on the FA concept. Various methodologies 
have been promoted representing different formulas and different factor weightings providing 
variations on FA outcomes and, as a consequence, on the MNE corporate tax liability. 
McLure,
155
 and Anand and Sansing
156
 experimented with different FA formulas and 
demonstrated the impact on MNE corporate tax liabilities. Agúndez-Garcia
157
 and 
Weninger
158
 analysed alternative FA systems and the different apportionment methodologies, 
concluding that each single FA results in distortions to the tax liabilities of MNEs. 
Oestreicher
159
 compared and contrasted alternative methodologies for computing corporate 
income under separate accounting, FA and a process oriented system of income 
determination and found that each methodology exhibits benefits and challenge. Shackelford 
and Slemrod
160
 discussed the US centric revenue effects of a unilateral introduction of FA but 
could easily be related to the EU context. They found that the tax liability of MNEs would 
increase. Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb
161
 discuss the revenue effects of introducing FA in 
the EU factoring in cross-border loss relief concluding that it nurtures a decrease in the 
overall tax revenues of the EU Member States concerned.  
 
Despite the conceptual difficulty in evaluating the intra-EU rather than inter-EU impact of 
Group Relief rules as aggressive tax planning, there is little academic doubt about its role in 
profit shifting. Extensive analysis by Lang, Hellerstein and McLure, and Gordon and Wilson 
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offers comprehensive research into the FA concept. There is no consensus on what the right 
formula is and how a federated EU environment could possibly nurture a consistent set of 
group allocation rules to mitigate abusive practices. Omissions in research in this field relate 
to the impact of different forms of firm construction in the EU and the associated impact on 
FA, as well as the correlation, use and influence and relative materiality between Group 
Relief rules and other tax avoidance practices such as THINCAP and TRPRICE.  
 
 
3.8 TRPRICE Research 
 
There is a plethora of academic literature on TRPRICE, both theoretical and empirical. 
Theoretical work on TRPRICE by MNEs considers managerial and economic incentives in 
shifting profits. Bespoke CFC legislation and the development of TRPRICE regulations 
within the EU acknowledges the notion that Member States are reluctant to devolve their 
legislative rights, preferring to “act unilaterally, with some tacit coordination organized by 
the OECD, to meet the growing challenges of international double non-taxation”162. Member 
States are challenged with continuously amending their TRPRICE rules to respond to new 
schemes and behaviours evidenced by MNEs, and this is reflected in the diversification and 
frequency of changes across the EU. Tax avoidance rules relating to TRPRICE that have 
been implemented unilaterally attract legislative complexity in an attempt to cover all 
loopholes but in reality are rarely effective
163
. Langbein,
164
 Bird and Wilkie
165
 and 
Picciotto
166
 all studied TRPRICE in detail, covering theoretical and empirical perspectives 
and found all concluded that in practice Member States are pursuing bespoke strategies of 
unitary model taxation rather than the more traditional arm’s-length pricing approach.  
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The theoretical TRPRICE research focuses on the modelling of the impact on MNE tax 
liabilities when an MNE sets a single transfer price for inter-entity transfers. The empirical 
econometric studies on TRPRICE focus largely on the tax impact on the over- or under-
invoicing of intra-firm cross-border transactions. This leans toward quantifying the 
incremental profitability of MNEs sited in low tax jurisdictions as opposed to high tax 
jurisdictions, and it is unsurprising to note that academics such as Clausing
167
 confirm that 
cross-jurisdictional transfer prices are set by MNEs to achieve a declaration of lower declared 
profitability in high tax jurisdictions and disproportionately higher profits in low-tax 
countries. It is not, however, without peculiarities and inconsistencies as highlighted by 
Grubert
168
, and Karkinsky and Riedel
169
 who claimed certain transaction types relating to 
intangibles such as patents and brands are more aligned to TRPRICE than tangibles since 
accepted market prices do not exist for benchmarking purposes. 
 
Research by Klassen, Lang and Wolfson,
170
 Harris,
171
 Swenson
172
 and Gupta and Mills
173
  
regarding TRPRICE attack the characteristics of tax accounting, assessing how EU Member 
State tax rate differentials prompt TRPRICE manipulation and tax avoidance. A different 
emphasis was pursued by Emmanuel and Mehafdi
174
, Cravens and Shearon
175
 and Cravens
176
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whose efforts centred tax rules as but only one of the environmental factors impacting 
TRPRICE. Other research by Swenson,
177
 Van Mens and Porquet
178
 and Douvier
179
 
correlated TRPRICE practices to the fiscal policies in different Member States. There is also 
research defining the relationships between the types of MNE and the propensity to 
manipulate transfer prices. Conover and Nichols
180
 identified company size as an important 
driver in the utilisation of TRPRICE to shift profits, confirming that large MNEs are more 
likely to shift profits through TRPRICE than smaller equivalents. Jacob
181
 confirmed that 
MNEs with the highest number of intra-entity transfers had both the most compelling 
commercial incentive as well as the greatest number of practical opportunities to shift profits 
using TRPRICE. Corporate tax affects where a MNE steers FDI, how it sells its offerings, 
how to finance arrangements and the level of a transfer price according to Mueller et al
182
 and 
as such these tax considerations collectively judged offer an hefty influence on the choice that 
MNEs adopt
183
. 
 
Academic opinion appears to be divided regarding whether minimizing corporate taxes 
through the use of TRPRICE should be considered abusive. Statistical research undertaken by 
Baker,
184
 Dawson,
185
  Hansen et al,
186
 and Mehafdi
187
 all concluded that the primary scope of 
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TRPRICE is to reduce taxation and should necessarily be considered abusive. On the 
contrary, professional research by Ernst and Young
188
 in the UK found that MNEs use 
TRPRICE as a tax optimization strategy with no commercial inhibitions as they are widely 
considered to be legal and non-abusive. 
 
Research by Vann outlined three key structural issues in TRPRICE rules incentivising tax 
avoidance, namely that the current rules for ascertaining whether the determinants defining 
whether a MNE is present in a country or not for tax purposes are unacceptably limited, the 
TRPRICE rules permit MNEs to structure intra-entity contracts speculatively based on an 
inappropriate market analogy, and lastly that the rules over-emphasis risk and not enough to 
resources and assets when apportioning tax revenues
189
. There is much debate regarding the 
merits of source versus residency tax. It has been argued that as the source tax will generally 
be low, the residence tax rate on the income will mean that investment choices of the MNE 
will be little influenced by the source tax rate according to Vann. The argument for residence 
based corporation taxation was made by Kaplow
190
 and the argument for source based 
corporation taxation was made by Graetz
191
. PE rules provide direction on allocating profits 
between jurisdictions while the arm’s-length principle defines the proper defendable and 
widely understood method to calculate jurisdictional profit. TRPRICE tends to imply that the 
tax base is heavily dependent on the jurisdiction in which income is allocated under the 
TRPRICE rules. When observed in the context of the influences of CFC and DTT’s, Vann 
noted the close correlation between these concepts and TRPRICE concepts stating that “many 
countries adopt CFC rules to deal with deferral of tax by shifting income to MNEs with 
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headquarters in low tax countries. The regimes are typically targeted at mobile passive 
income and TRPRICE” 192. 
 
EU Member States have adopted different strategies for addressing TRPRICE practices in a 
number of ways. Gordon and MacKie-Mason
193
 placed emphasis on the deferral justification 
suggesting that corporate tax should only be applied to retained profits attributable to 
shareholders in a Member State. This is not an accepted accounting practice and the norm is 
that income of MNEs is principally taxed in the Member State where economic activity gives 
rise to it occur. Whether the deferral justification could address TRPRICE practices has been 
discussed, such as by Clausing.
194
  Studies by Grubert and Mutti,
195
 Huizinga and Laeven
196
 
and Weichenrieder
197
 all concluded a positive link between TRPRICE practices and increased 
reported profitability. As an example, Huizinga and Laeven analysed a sample of Europe 
MNEs and found that the German corporate tax base would have risen 14% if there had been 
no tax incentives to shift profits to other Member States through TRPRICE. The results of 
this study were similarly concluded by Harris et al
198
 who found evidence of income shifting 
via TRPRICE between low tax and high tax countries by US MNEs and a consequential 
positive impact on the profitability reported by those US MNEs.  
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The difficulties facing EU Member States is that, according to Tomkins and McAuley
199
there 
is “no clearly established theory…to indicate what an appropriate transfer price for enforcing 
goal congruence should be which is also practically satisfactory”. The problem was also 
highlighted by Vancil
200
 who concluded “the issue [of TRPRICE] remains a perennial puzzle 
for academicians, while practitioners continue to cope”. Similarly, Vann stated that 
“TRPRICE is the dominant international issue as compared to company and shareholder or 
residence and source taxation” 201, suggesting that of all the corporate tax avoidance practices 
the TRPRICE remains the largest challenge to national governments. The size of the problem 
has witnessed widespread comment. Fuest and Riedel stated that “while the shifting of 
income out of developed countries is a widely debated issue, empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of the problem and on the factors driving income shifting is scarce. There are, 
however, a growing number of empirical studies on corporate profit shifting in OECD 
countries. Many of these studies use appropriate data and sophisticated econometric methods, 
and the results offer valuable insights into corporate profit shifting” 202.  Although there is 
plenty of evidence that international organisations such as OECD
203
 and Commission
204
 have 
developed provisions and guidelines on the formulation of transfer prices this is by no means 
the only approach.  
 
The academic arguments promoted by a large proportion of the researchers conclude that 
TRPRICE forms part of a tax solution strategy that warrants merit. There are little academic 
conclusions to the contrary. The formation of the EU itself nurtures TRPRICE and offers 
little release from the conclusion that it is anything but abusive in the majority of 
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circumstances. Vann offers the strongest academic reasoning behind the motives and 
materiality of TRPRICE that impact Member State tax revenues and its links to legislation.  
The CFC research linking TRPRICE to deferral taxation by Vann, and Gordon and MacKie 
Mason, offers an interesting angle but little insight as to how this may contribute to a credible 
solution. Vann rightly concludes that successfully addressing TRPRICE offers the largest 
prize to Member States in terms of mitigating tax revenue losses, but although mitigating tax 
avoidance more generally now resides firmly on the agenda of the OECD no proposal yet has 
the academic credentials it will eventually demand. 
 
3.9 THINCAP Research 
 
The issue of THINCAP arises when “debt financing is excessive by reason of the relationship 
between the borrowing and lending MNEs, in which case interest payments are disallowed to 
the extent that they exceed the arm’s-length arrangement” according to Devereux et al.205 
From a comparative perspective, von Brocke and Perez
206
 pursued an empirical study 
comparing the growth of THINCAP rules in Germany and the UK. Repeatedly, both 
jurisdictions have been subject to challenge on the THINCAP rules and have had to amend 
rules in response to CJEU rulings. Further research by Brocke and Perez showed the knock 
on impact on rule changes in one Member State on the rules in another Member State, 
highlighting the influence German THINCAP rule changes had on Italian THINCAP laws.  
 
Theoretical assessments of THINCAP are principally based around the notions of CEN and 
capital import neutrality, hereafter referred to as CIN.  In respect to CEN, Doernberg
207
 
commented “a tax system meets the standard of CEN if a taxpayer’s choice between 
investing capital at home or abroad is not affected by taxation”. Schön stated that CEN 
“requires that, from the position of the investor, the tax burden for foreign and domestic 
investment is equal and therefore does not distort the decision of whether to invest here or 
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there” 208. International tax competition renders CEN as non-existent today. Schön argues that 
CEN would be “most easily achieved when the country of residence of the investor taxes his 
or her worldwide income while the country of source fully waives its jurisdiction over 
income connected with its territory”209. Source-based taxation is more widely adopted than 
residence-based taxation, and it would be reasonable to assume few jurisdictions appear 
willing to voluntarily sacrifice taxable profits through the adoption of a more punitive 
methodology. Gordon and Wilson
210
 and Razin and Sadka
211
 argued against source-based 
taxation although his argument seemed inconsistent when he went on to blame CIN for 
nurturing the development of THINCAP laws. Schön claimed CIN could be a useful tool for 
measuring profit shifting as “the concept of CIN starts from the perspective of the host 
country of an investment and compares the tax burden for domestic and foreign investors”212. 
Doernberg caveated this by stating “this standard is satisfied only when all firms doing 
business in a market are taxed at the same rate”213.  
 
Debt ratios are a useful barometer of THINCAP materiality. Research by Desai et al
214
and 
Schwarz
215
 found in correlation studies a direct and near linear correlation between increases 
in the corporate tax rate in a source country and increases the debt ratio of subsidiaries in that 
country. In terms of reducing global tax liabilities, Desai et al
216
 conclusively proved that 
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MNEs leveraged subsidiaries in jurisdictions with high corporate tax rates with more debt 
than subsidiaries in jurisdictions levying low corporate tax rates. Interestingly, and perhaps 
not unsurprisingly, it was similarly proven that internal inter-entity debt was more responsive 
to high tax rates than external debt, inferring that there is a propensity for subsidiaries in high 
tax jurisdictions to be capitalised with external loans supporting the allegation of 
manufactured profit shifting. More focused research by Mintz and Weichenrieder on 
German-based MNEs made similar conclusions in that subsidiaries of German MNEs 
incurred more debt in high-tax jurisdictions than they did when reporting activity out of low-
tax jurisdictions
217
.  
 
Beyond a trend, quantification regarding the materiality of profit shifting has generated 
mixed opinions. Desai et al concluded that only a small sub-section of MNEs shifted profits 
stating that “estimating the sensitivity of capital structure to tax incentives has proven 
remarkably difficult, due in part to measurement problems. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that several studies find no effect or unexpected relationships between tax incentives and the 
use of debt” 218. Conversely, Haufler and Runkel opined that the evidence that high income 
tax rates motivate additional debt is “conclusive” and “widespread” 219. Desai et al220 studied 
the leverage of thousands of MNEs owning thousands of related MNEs during 1982, 1989 
and 1994, focusing on corporate entities investing abroad, concluding that such MNEs 
increased debt in response to high tax rates in response to tax incentives.  
 
It is generally accepted that THINCAP rules permits a Member State tax authority to evaluate 
a MNEs balance sheet to ascertain whether a CFC’s structure is overly leveraged. According 
to Von Brocke and Perez, “the majority of these THINCAP rules established the existence of 
safe harbours in order to force related MNEs to apply normal market conditions in their intra-
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group transactions
221”. Lund et al agreed with this notion, stating “specific rules aimed to 
discourage thin capitalization often require that the debt-to-equity ratio meet a specific ratio 
in order for the MNE to be allowed to deduct interest expenses” 222. Lund et al furthermore 
stated “in recent years, there has been a tendency for some countries to base their rules on a 
MNEs operations, and more and more countries are introducing so-called interest limitation 
rules and earnings stripping rules”223. In respect to our sample Member States, Germany and 
Italy have adopted this approach. Furthermore, it was claimed that debt-to-equity rules were 
rendered inadequate, stating “it was very simple for MNEs to circumvent the limit established 
by debt-to-equity ratio by increasing the equity of the financed subsidiary in a manner 
sufficient to push down as much debt as necessary”224.  
 
A number of other points may be raised regarding THINCAP rules. THINCAP policies 
although implemented nationally are very much formed in alignment with the legislation 
adopted in other Member States. Van Saparoea noted how a “Netherlands legislator has been 
investigating the possibility of introducing new legislation that is similar to that applying in 
Germany”225, and how “the Italian parliament introduced new interest limitation rules 
inspired by the new German rules”226.  Researchers to date have not differentiated between 
whether this is attributable to tax competition, alignment with CJEU rulings, and the pursuit 
of perfection in closing loopholes or a combination thereof. Irrespective of the driver, these 
alignments are not so significant so as to break down the different approaches adopted by 
different Member States.  
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In Germany THINCAP rules were widely amended following Lankhorst-Hohorst
227
 with the 
objective to apply to a wider set of transaction types. Research discovered that “Germany has 
attempted to create an attractive tax jurisdiction by widening its tax base in the Corporate Tax 
Reform Act of 2008”228. Becker et al 229 found that “the main goals of the German Tax 
Reform 2000 were to improve the competitiveness of MNEs in Germany, to foster 
investment, to increase Germany’s attractiveness to foreign investors and to adapt the 
corporate tax system to the rules of the EC common market”. With regard to debt-to-equity 
ratios, Germany has shifted attention to limiting interest expense deductions through the 
enactment of the General Interest Disallowance Rule. Such provisions have been widely 
welcomed with Bagel and Huning
230
 stating that “the scope of the new rules is far broader 
than the former THINCAP rules, as any third-party debt financing is included”.  
 
The UK has legislated against highly leveraged financing structures for the last 25 years and 
in response to the Thin Cap GLO
231
, the tax rules were modified several times. According the 
von Brocke and Perez “the CJEU concluded that even prior to 1995 and, in any case, between 
1995 and 2004, when interest was paid by a resident MNE in respect of a loan granted by a 
related non-resident MNE, the tax position of the former MNE was less advantageous than 
that of a resident borrowing company which had been granted a loan by a related resident 
company”232. Historically, in cases whereby interest expenses were re-characterized as 
distributions, the UK rules differentiated it tax treatment based on whether the lender was a 
UK taxpayer or not. In response the CJEU determined “the UK thin capitalisation rules 
contravened the Freedom of Establishment clause in Article 43 of the EU Treaty”233 From a 
definition perspective, tax authority guidance states that in tax terms “a UK MNE, which may 
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be part of a group, may be said to be thinly capitalized when it has excessive debt in relation 
to its arm’s-length borrowing capacity, leading to the possibility of excessive interest 
deductions”234. The UK regulations are much more simplified than was previously the case 
underpinned by standardised provisions that deny tax relief for interest expenses that exceed 
a MNEs arm’s-length debt capacity.   
 
Other academic assessments have focused on the interpretive metrics used by the CJEU in 
assessing THINCAP rules. The Commission stated that “Certainty is desirable to assist 
business planning, but also to provide a degree of revenue certainty for administration; for 
example, if the rules governing loss-offset are unclear then neither business nor government 
can predict tax payments and revenue”235. THINCAP rules suffer like many tax law 
provisions in that they offer uncertainty and are often implemented inequitably across 
industries and jurisdictions. Member States may cite the Rule of Law benefit principle to 
support THINCAP regulations, arguing that inter-entity loans are manufactured to shift profit 
from where it is actually earned, and where the state provides services, to low-tax 
jurisdictions that provide minimal state support. Likewise, academics are united in their belief 
that taxes should be neutral, avoiding discrimination in favour or against certain corporate 
taxpayers. For example, Musgrave and Musgrave
236
 said “taxes should be chosen so as to 
minimize interference with economic decisions in otherwise efficient markets”237. This was 
also endorsed by Doernberg
238
 who stated “the inspirational goal for a tax system in general 
is the implementation of a tax-neutral set of rules that neither discourage nor encourage 
particular activity”239. The weakness of THINCAP rules is that inter-entity loans are a 
common bona-fide commercial practice. It is very challenging to disprove the legitimacy of a 
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THINCAP transaction without reviewing the underlying details of the arrangement. Research 
by Webber reflected this stating an effective THINCAP law should constrain MNEs from 
incurring excessive inter-entity debt solely for the purpose of reducing taxation. However, it 
should allow MNEs to incur debt, and take a tax deduction, when such debt is a normal part 
of a MNEs business model
240
. 
 
The academic research evident relating to THINCAP may broadly be placed into three 
categories. First, the impact of tax rates and tax rules on THINCAP practices. Such 
commentary offers a largely consensus view that across the EU the higher the tax rates and 
the weaker the rules the higher the propensity to leverage debt ratios for tax optimisation 
purposes. Second, research by Lund and Van Brocke and Perez offer a unique EU centric 
view on how EU Member States have reacted to THINCAP practices, identifying how 
Member States such as UK, Italy and Germany have responded but the weakness in the 
research is its lack of follow through evidence to measure their success as it is observational 
rather than empirical in nature. The final element of the research offers the most valuable 
contribution to our search for a solution. Although academics are united in their opinion that 
the various measures enacted by Member States have had limited impact on THINCAP 
practices, the identification of such measures, specifically comprising debt to income ratios, 
debt to balance sheet ratios, and interest limitation rules such as arm’s-length metrics have 
proved a useful measure for tax authorities to gauge abuse levels. Despite these efforts there 
is limited academic recognition of the inherent legal legitimacy of such financial 
restructuring. 
 
3.10 DTT Research 
 
In the EU, despite the fact that options exist for preventing double taxation on a unilateral 
basis there has been a proliferation of EU DTTs. The Avoir Fiscal decision usefully set out 
the CJEU’s view on DTT instruments and has upheld the notion that the primacy of EU law 
may not be compromised by the specific provisions of DTT’s and their inherent principle of 
reciprocity.  The Bouanich
241
 case established that DTT’s were held to be part of Member 
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States laws and therefore must comply with the primacy of EU law.  Since DTT’s are 
unlikely to provide comprehensive transactional coverage in the Internal Market it has not 
been possible to completely eliminate double taxation through DTT instruments. Furthermore 
the simplicity of such arrangements is often compromised when different internal transfer 
price mechanisms are applied between different Member States
242
. These points form the 
basis of much DTT literature. 
 
There is considerable general literature in the field of EU DTT’s. Toumi243 claimed DTT’s 
are not fit for purpose as a means of preventing harmful tax competition. Kofler and Mason
244
 
confirmed the notion that double taxation was inefficient and contrary to the principles of the 
Internal Market. The implementation of various formulas and provisions relating to double 
taxation exemption or credit reliefs based around source and residence based taxation 
methodologies complicates what should be a fairly vanilla concept.  According to Terra and 
Wattel
245
Avi-Yonah
246
 and Rixen
247
 both concluded that such complexity was compounded 
by the multitude of implementation options, namely Member Static tax law, international 
DTT’s and by EU law. Member State DTT’s do not typically attract detailed tax rules but 
rather focuses on  segmenting the tax bases of participant jurisdictions and assign accordingly 
so that domestic rules may be applied to secure an appropriate share of the tax base. 
Effectively, helping to “coordinate divergent national tax laws”248, the legal constructs upon 
which a DTT is built rejects the tax base as a global concept, but instead implants a 
jurisdictional arrangement. Their popularity is predicated on the basis that DTT’s secure 
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Member State taxation rights of their share of the tax base, or what Vann termed 
“sovereignty-preserving cooperation”249. 
 
The Carroll Report
250
 symbolised a watershed in DTT advances in the EU. Its reference to 
arms-length pricing was assessed by Langbein
251
 who claimed the Carrol Report’s 
assumption that arm’s-length pricing was “the accepted norm” was misguided as it fails to 
recognise distributive conflicts. Picciotto viewed arm’s-length pricing as a “natural solution 
capable of de-politicizing the distributive conflict inherent in the avoidance of double 
taxation”252 even though FA and separate accounting offered qualified alternatives. Brauner 
claimed  “the OECD Model treaty is practically the infrastructure of the current bilateral 
treaty-based system”253 although its useful was highlighted by Avi-Yonah254 who set out how 
the OECD Model Convention principles and rules restrict bi-lateral negotiations when 
forming DTT’s to a common set of norms thus constraining unilateral tax rule making. 
 
The significance off DTT’s to this research is that MNEs often choose to use DTTs in 
accessing benefits associated with other tax planning practices such as CFC. Although 
variations in tax rules persist among Member States, DTT’s are an effective tool for 
exploiting these. Cyprus or Ireland are examples of low-tax jurisdictions that choose to 
exercise their legal right not to impose punitive rates of high tax to reap their, arguably 
rightful, share of the EU tax base, but to increase their revenues from the “commercialization 
of their tax sovereignty”255, giving up what we outlined in Chapter Five as their de facto 
sovereignty. Such behaviour by these “renegade states”256 aimed at attracting economic 
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development restricts their flexibility to model their tax systems and can be seen to be 
entering into a strategy of “provocative dependence”257  
 
 
3.11 Abuse of Rights Research 
 
The term abuse of rights is enigmatic, attracting diversity of opinion with regard to its 
meaning and legal grounding. Despite this there is useful set of literature and evolving case 
law to assist observers in the appreciation of its importance in assessing abusive behaviour in 
the context of the law. It is from this that we may distil an established set of circumstances 
consistent with that defined as abuse
258
. According to Greggi
259
 the notion of avoidance is 
strongly embedded to the concept of abuse of a right. An abuse, according to the Roman law 
tradition, represents the exercise of a right inconsistent with the “general principles of 
correctness, good faith or even with the basic rules of ethics”. Therefore the definition of 
avoidance is not purely legal, but it depends also on other disciplines which influence it”260. 
Despite the authoritative attempts in tax literature to promote the concept, the view advocated 
by Vanistendael
261
 is that the CJEU should formally acknowledge the notion of abuse in 
direct tax law so as to be consistent with the ruling in the Halifax VAT decision. 
 
McCarthy noted that the body of EU case law dictating the circumstances in which abuse 
may be present is continually refining
262
. In the absence of a national abuse provision 
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prescribing those circumstances, he stated that the purpose of the doctrine is to catch cases 
where either a MNE is attempting to rely on a European legal right to circumvent or displace 
national law, or a MNE is looking to gain a financial or other advantage by way of an abusive 
use of EU law. The former situation is particularly relevant to direct tax, where taxpayers 
seek to rely on a fundamental EU freedom to influence the domestic tax treatment arising 
thereon. 
 
McCarthy also noted how the Commission has sought to restrict the scope of the doctrine, to 
prevent excessive curtailment of traders’ rights263. Harris264 and Douma and Engelen265 
promoted a view regarding the French and Netherlands approach respectively regarding 
abuse of rights. Harris concluded that the French approach presumes that agreements are real 
and economically balanced and that the taxpayer does not have a legal right in a manner for 
which it has not been designed. In contrast the Netherlands view is that an abuse of rights is 
the ultimate prognosis and an interpretation can only be applied if all other methods of 
interpretation have been exhausted. In EC Commission v Italy
266
 the Commission argued that, 
“… the principles of effectiveness would be observed only if cases of rejection of repayment 
claims were exceptional and maintains that the exercise of rights derived from the Treaty 
cannot be impeded by general measures based on a presumption of abuse of rights”267. 
According to McCarthy the key EU institutions responsible for formulating the doctrine show 
a shift from a subjective to objective interpretation
268
and Cerioni discussed the question of 
whether circumvention can arise without abuse
269
. He suggests that it can, and concludes that 
in the area of direct taxation, the direct access to benefits provided by EU law are generally 
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detrimental to Member States interests and so implementing abuse of rights into EU law may 
be best granted through national anti-abuse clauses. When exercising rights granted under 
Fundamental Freedoms, it is similarly considered detrimental to Member States and utilising 
abuse of rights as a justification for constraining the Freedom of Establishment requires proof 
based on a rule of reason approach. Academics such as Ceroni and Greggi infer that the 
notion of abuse is used instead of that of avoidance of a legal provision. Taken further this 
implies abuse of law could epitomise tax avoidance in those jurisdictions where abuse of law 
is an accepted principle. Despite the differences, the common ground of all these issues relies 
on interpretation. Dealing with tax avoidance or with ‘abuse of law’ still depends nowadays 
both on the interpretation of statutory law and on the constitution, where applicable, of a 
Member State. One final view expressed by Greggi was that in EU law qualifying avoidance 
is even more complex as EU law is deprived of any influence by other systems of values, the 
only general principles to rely on are the Fundamental Freedoms and the non-discrimination 
principle both enshrined in the Treaty. That is why when in recent cases the Court had to rule 
on the abuse of law it did its best to find principles or values to build the concept on. 
  
The apparent lack of extended research in this field is arguably a representation of its 
perceived limitations in offering a credible contribution to a solution to corporate tax 
avoidance practices. Interestingly, public opinion in this sphere increasingly focuses on the 
abusive nature of tax avoidance and its adverse impact on stakeholder rights more generally, 
if not necessarily denoted so directly as such. A paucity of academic research in relation to 
the correlation between tax avoidance practices and abuse of rights is curious, therefore, 
particularly given the proliferation of references to such a concept in CJEU rulings. Abuse of 
rights is a theoretical and subjective concept but if over time a consensus emerges and it 
becomes a more accepted concept worthy of more rigorous scrutiny in the context of 
Fundamental Freedoms and EU direct tax law then a lack of commentary beyond that of 
Greggi, McCarthy and Cerioni will look like a weakness.  
 
 
3.12 The Completeness and Influence of Scholarly Anti-Avoidance Tax Research 
 
More generally, however, a number of observations may be made regarding research 
completeness in the field of corporate tax avoidance. Analysis demonstrates that avoidance 
literature generally is readily available, particularly in relation to the types of tax avoidance 
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methods practiced by MNEs in a general sense, as well as the impact of tax factors such as 
tax rates and the tax base on FDI along with the factors driving MNEs to engage in tax 
avoidance at the outset. All of these are important as many tax factors reside at the centre of 
the proposals promoted to combat avoidance in the recent past. The mechanics of tax 
avoidances are well documented and CJEU jurisprudence is similarly well covered but there 
is little material on the wider impact on tax avoidance practices generally whereby CJEU case 
law that makes rulings in one area of the law could not be adopted, where similar 
characteristics persist, to cover broader practices in the field of direct tax law.  
 
Areas of research that offer academic consensus relate to TRPRICE and CFC. The drivers 
and mechanics are well understood and there appears consensus that these two practices offer 
the greatest opportunity to the CJEU for effectively outlawing in terms of discriminatory 
abuse of EU Fundamental Freedoms.  Most academic debate is witnessed in the area of abuse 
of rights. There are certainly divergences evident with respect to the interpretation and usage 
of the concept in the area of direct law, with stark differences between those who see no role 
for it in direct taxation matters and others who view it as central to the entire ethos of 
managing out tax avoidance practices. Similarly, the impact of CJEU rulings on national 
sovereignty seems to divide academic opinion too. Thoughts distinctly contrast between those 
who see a limited role for the CJEU who has no other agenda than to simply uphold Treaty 
freedoms, to those who see it as a European political instrument for harmonising direct tax 
matters under the guise of Treaty freedoms. In terms of tax avoidance concepts the academic 
literature relating to CFC is broadest and analysed in most depth in the context of Member 
States while the poorest coverage relates to DTT’s. 
 
Poor coverage is evidenced in the role of tax authorities in mitigating tax avoidance 
measures. Focus tends to be on the role of the national courts but the implementation of tax 
audits and their reach, frequency and effectiveness could play a larger role in tax avoidance 
mitigation particularly if co-ordinated across EU boundaries through intelligence sharing and 
consistency of enforcement practices. Corporate social responsibility in the area of direct 
taxation is covered but it is limited, and it surprising to see how ethical business practices that 
can be nurtured and encouraged over time feature so lightly in coverage terms both form a 
causal perspective or in solutions literature. Behavioural science, beyond that guided by 
corporate governance process, has also been absent from any literature, as it seems fair to 
conclude that MNEs behave in certain ways according to their environment, cultural norms, 
 92 
and incentives and disincentives available to them. There is similarly some commentary 
regarding the role of institutions such as the OECD and EC but little regarding how they can 
serve a purpose in defining a common way forward in the future.  
 
It appears clear that there is an emphasis on traditional academic study in this field, 
attempting to look at the problems associated with tax avoidance practices in a particular 
location, usually with reference to national tax laws and associated CJEU cases impacting 
those laws. There is a notable dearth of academic material cross-referencing national law 
changes, CJEU rulings and MNE tax management practices across the EU as a whole and 
how commonality in issues and approaches could provide the necessary input into a workable 
solution for the EU as a whole. The solutions promoted in the research available appear to be 
either legislative in nature such as General Anti-Avoidance Rules, hereafter referred to as 
GAARs, or through long-term changes to the role of the EU in the domain of direct taxation 
generally. Mainstream ideas such as the national implementation of GAARs or the promotion 
of a common solution focusing on a harmonised outright outcome, such as a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base, hereafter referred to as ‘CCCTB’, rather than the 
addressing the root causes or processes that over time may nurture harmonisation in its own 
way, are proposed. Consideration needs to be made regarding the geo-political changes 
embracing the EU currently, as well as economic forces globally that will put pressure on EU 
economies, and therefore politicians, to ensure that EU business is efficient as possible in the 
battle for global competitiveness. The search for a common way forward through using both 
existing relevant scholarly research as well as plugging the gaps in those areas that are not 
only missing but material in finding such an answer present an opportunity and a challenge to 
develop solutions for the future. 
 
Among the various research perspectives the most influential publications that relate to the 
foundational concepts introduced at the beginning of this Chapter emanate from the 
aforementioned works of De Simone, Hasegawa, Braithwaite and Scharpf. De Simone set out 
for the first time in detail an inferred relationship between accounting standards and profit 
shifting behaviours, highlighting how accounting is the primary driver towards profit shifting 
incentivisation and facilitation. Her research, with an empirical focus in the context of the EU 
advocated increased transparency as a means of reducing the impact of IFRS accounting 
standards on profit shifting outcomes. This correlates with the subjective norm behavioural 
element of Ajzen’s theory that reflects the widespread perception of tax conduct acceptability 
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resulting from accounting opportunities, and also La Porta’s theory that links an established 
system such as accounting standards to economic behaviours. Hasegawa similarly conducted 
an empirical study on how public disclosure influences reported taxable income, noting how 
taxpayers will declare higher profits when they are required to disclose more data. He 
introduced an econometric means to analyse tax disclosure data and dismissed in full claims 
that loss of privacy and proprietary costs of tax disclosures are a commercial burden on 
MNEs. His study, although Asian centric, offers significant insights into the concept of how 
enhanced accounting disclosures may impact EU jurisdictional profit shifting, conclusions 
consistent with that promoted by Ajzen linking economic self-interest to commercial conduct 
and La Porta’s premise that a law promoting enhanced disclosures is welfare enhancing as the 
commercial negativities commonly used to dismiss disclosures appear non-vexatious. Both 
Braithwaite and Scharpf offered theoretical perspectives. Braithwaite placed great emphasis 
on the influence of the judiciary system and as a consequence MNE decision-making is 
largely driven by a risk-reward assessment, consistent with La Porta’s theory that links the 
legal system to economic behaviours. He hypothesised that law reform in the area of anti-tax 
avoidance rarely works top down as it generates exploitable loopholes, and so placing the 
emphasis on bottom up taxpayer disclosure and the compliance model it keeps the law 
dynamic. Scharpf’s game theory hypothesises that individuals and institutions know all 
possible actions and how the actions combine to yield a particular outcome. By using basic 
game theory to understand public policy conflicts he suggests a number of important points if 
applied to the remit of this research. Tax outcomes are likely to stem from interactions of 
actors such as tax authorities, Member States and the judicial system, which are heavily 
influenced by the institutional setting, consistent with La Porta’s Legal Origins theory. Such 
actor centred institutionalism is driven by the salience of the actors and their interactions, 
consistent with Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behaviour. Such a theoretical basis places much 
emphasis on normative behavioural intentions and control beliefs providing robust academic 
reasoning for proposing reform on the basis of nurturing behavioural changes. 
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Chapter Four: Institutional Stakeholders in the Tax Avoidance 
Debate 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Any reform of the EU tax system will demand the agreement and ongoing support of a wide 
range of institutional stakeholders. Evidence of lengthy battles has been seen between the 
advocates of tax planning competing against the defenders of the national tax bases’ and EU 
Fundamental Freedoms, supplemented by the forces of political parties and special interest 
groups. MNEs in their pursuit of shareholder profits through placing emphasis on contractual 
or judicial interpretation of tax rules rather than fiduciary responsibilities of their Officers, 
sometimes referred to as the nexus of contracts approach
1
, have been constantly challenging 
the boundaries. Such conflicts arise between the defenders of the national tax system, namely 
Member State legislatures and their tax authorities, and the CJEU as custodian of EU 
Fundamental Freedoms.  
 
This chapter does not attempt to provide a normative stakeholder behavioural model but 
rather a practical foundation, based on observable behaviours, for the assessment of two 
specific dimensions to stakeholder impact on the EU tax avoidance debate. Such dimensions 
relate to the contributions and impact of these institutional entities on the EU tax avoidance 
landscape, specifically relating to policies, practices and behaviours, along with their 
contributions to the solution debate aimed at resolving the conflicts currently under review. 
The stakeholders under review promote differing interests, priorities and approaches in the 
EU tax avoidance debate and these need to be both identified, critiqued and balanced in the 
context of their likely impact and contribution to the debate going forward. This analysis 
provides the academic substance in the quest for a solution, the importance of which is 
underlined by the fact that any solution capable of a successful implementation needs to 
factor in the likely response from the relevant stakeholders who are likely to influence both 
the initial adoption and continued successful implementation of the proposal. 
                                                     
1
 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, (Harvard University Press, 
1991) 
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4.2 The Role of the EU Judicial Institutions 
 
4.2.1 The EU Institutional Framework 
 
The propensity to forge a centralised role for the EU in direct taxation affairs has been largely 
shaped by the CJEU. In recent years the CJEU has focused its attention on reviewing and 
ruling on the compatibility of Member States tax laws with the EU Treaty’s Fundamental 
Freedoms. Prima facie, the impact of the EU on the income tax systems of Member States 
appears significant, with some commentators such as Waele
2
 suggesting its involvement in 
direct tax matters worthy of being called “unexpected”3 and “underestimated”4. From a 
historical perspective, the EU construct promotes the dismantling of any tax obstacles that are 
contrary to the internal market ideal, because, according to Feldstein
5
, taxes are an important 
determinant of economic behaviour. Research by Benassy-Quere
6
 et al found that cross-
border movements of capital are responsive to differences in the effective tax burden that 
may result from differing ways in which activities are taxed in two different countries 
exemplified by tax differentials between regulatory regimes, or from different tax treatment 
by one country of similar domestic and cross-border activities. 
 
In the direct tax area there is neither an explicit prohibition of direct tax discrimination nor an 
explicit mandate the CJEU to act in this area. Unsurprisingly, the CJEU has been modest in 
removing direct tax disparities, in part because any EU action can be adopted only by 
                                                     
2
 Henri de Waele, ‘The role of the European Court of Justice in the Integration Process: A Contemporary and 
Normative Assessment (2010) Hansel Law Review Working Paper, 
<http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf9/Vol6No01Art01.pdf> accessed 6 April 2012 
3
 Ibid, 18 
4
 Ibid, 8 
5
 Martin Feldstein,  ‘Effects of Taxes on Economic Behaviour’ (2008) 61, National Tax Journal, 131 
6
 Agnes Bernassy-Quere, Lionel Fontagne and Amina Lahreche-Revil, ‘How does FDI react to corporate 
taxation’ (2004) CEPH 
<http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/pdf/2004/161204/lahreche.pps#257,1,How Does FDI React 
to Corporate Taxation? Old and new results> accessed 12 November 2011 
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unanimity, creating a “legislative vacuum”7.  Such a constraint is unlikely to be removed 
near-term because Member States consider corporate income taxes as one of the last 
sovereign policy opportunities at their disposal, despite some Member States advocating 
during the negotiations over the EU Constitution and its successor, Reform Treaties, the 
introduction of qualified majority voting, hereafter referred to as ‘QMV’, or more latterly 
double majority voting, hereafter referred to as DMV, in the tax area
8
. 
 
Direct corporate taxation and the laws governing its boundaries remains the sovereign 
prerogative right of Member States or by DTTs for cross border activities. When exercising 
their taxing powers, Member States rely on OECD principles which focus on allocating the 
tax jurisdiction between states and avoid double taxation, without necessarily including the 
free movement
9
 and non-discrimination
10
 guarantees embedded within the EU integration 
process. These guarantees potentially generate much space for misinterpretation. In the 
context of EU direct taxation, prospective discriminatory action, such as CFC legislation does 
not constitute discrimination of non-residents as the foreign CFC is not treated less 
favourably. It is the domestic shareholder that has a potential case for discrimination. The 
prevention of alleged abuses are achieved via a proportionality test that offers the CJEU a 
way of mitigating such tax avoidance practices. Interpretive consideration may be given to 
“imperative reason of public interest11” or the “rule of reason”12. 
 
The EU is mandated to rule on whether a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligations 
under EU law, and is empowered to bring an action against that Member State before the 
CJEU. The Commission has used its authority to sue Member States on tax matters in cases 
                                                     
7
 Lilian Faulhaber, ‘Sovereignty, Integration and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the Proper 
Balance, (2009), Harvard Law School <http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/new-
folder/faulhaber.pdf> accessed 1 May 2011 
8
 Institute of Directors, EU Reform Treaty: a guide for IoD members, (2007), EU Policy Comment, 
<http://www.iod.com/MainWebSite/Resources/Document/policy_paper_EU_reform_treaty.pdf> accessed 22 
January 2011 
9
 Consolidated version of the European Treaty [2010] arts 28, 49, 43, 56, OJ C83/47 
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 Ibid, art18 
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 Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v. BundesmonopolverwaltungfürBranntwein [1979] ECR 649 
12
 Cees Peters and Margaret Snellaars, ‘Non-discrimination and tax law: structure and comparison of the various 
non-discriminatory clauses’ (2001) 10, EC Tax Review, 13 
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such as Avoir Fiscal
13
 and is influential through ruling on tax matters that demand Member 
States to change their domestic tax laws to the extent that they do not conform to the EU 
Treaty provisions. The historic context of the role of the Commission has been significant. In 
the early 1990s the Commission focused on matters relating to general tax practices in 
relation to the governing and efficiency of the Internal Market. Initial advances were made in 
reducing tax barriers through the Merger Directive
14
, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
15
 and 
the Arbitration Convention on dispute resolution in TRPRICE
16
. Furthermore, tax 
competition deemed detrimental to the efficient workings of the tax system was assessed by 
the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs in a report
17
 that recommended Council endorsement 
of the proposed guidelines for restraining such harmful tax practices and formed an 
institutional body for their effective implementation in Member and non-Member States. 
Following this the European Council focused on tax competition, the consequences of which 
led to a Commission report
18
 advocating a Code of Conduct on harmful tax competition, tax 
harmonisation and elimination WHT on group inter-entity payments of interest and royalties. 
A further report
19
 published by the Commission focused on corporate direct tax across the EU 
and concluded corporate taxation should remain a national matter and only on issues 
concerning cross-border activity impacting the Internal Market should the Commission 
attempt to provide direction. Such direction would take the form of targeted measures relating 
to such instruments as Directives on dividends and mergers
20
, cross border loss relief
21
 and 
TRPRICE
22
.   
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The role of the CJEU is well established, if not contentious. Diligent control over the 
interpretation and application of EU law in the context of their enactment by Member State 
national courts remains a core competence. Disputes arise regularly that witness preliminary 
ruling requests so that national courts achieve direction on the interpretation or application of 
the relevant EU law
23
. The resultant EU law from such rulings is legally isomorphic to the 
EU Treaty itself. CJEU rulings are binding on Member States and their laws must be 
amended accordingly. Non-compliance with CJEU rulings is a violation of EU law.  Beyond 
Member States, the CJEU also has the authority and validity to provide preliminary rulings 
on the interpretation of the EU Treaty, on the legitimacy of administrative actions taken by 
the other EU institutions and central bank, and on the EU law provisions enacted by the 
council
24
.  
 
4.2.2 CJEU Case Law 
 
The corporate tax laws across Member States have historically been formulated in total 
isolation on the notion that EU law offered a sovereignty exception for income tax 
legislation.  In the Avoir Fiscal
25
 and Schumaker
26
 cases, the CJEU asserted its authority in 
the domain of direct taxation in relation to the judicial oversight of direct taxation laws and 
their compliance with EU law. Such judicial oversight requires the Court to assess the 
compatibility of Member State tax laws with EU Fundamental Freedoms, namely the free 
movement of workers
27
, the Freedom of Establishment
28
, the free movement of capital
29
, and 
the freedom of services
30
.  
 
This chapter will assess the impact of the CJEU rulings within the context of the specific tax 
avoidance practices outlined in this thesis so far. In doing so an analysis of the judgements 
and their impact on both national tax laws and on the behaviour of MNEs in response to the 
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 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the European Union [2010] art 267, OJ C83/164 
24
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26
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28
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judgements and legislative changes is conducted. The principal judgements shaping CFC 
practices in the EU have largely been based around two key rulings, namely Vodafone
31
 and 
Cadbury Schweppes
32
 (hereafter referred to as ‘Cadbury’). In Cadbury, the CJEU held that 
UK CFC legislation is only valid to the extent that it may be applied within the boundaries of 
EU law that prohibits MNEs entering into wholly artificial arrangements designed to 
circumvent national tax laws. Although the CJEU was clear that the decision to establish 
subsidiaries in Ireland for the sole purpose of leveraging a favourable tax rate did not 
represent an abuse of the right of establishment
33
 it was not, nevertheless, relevant that the 
Irish tax policy was regarded as harmful under the EU Code of Conduct or that it may 
represent illegal state aid. State aid has a political dimension and is addressed through 
separate provisions
34
, thus substantiating the view that the Cadbury decision to establish 
subsidiaries in Ireland to benefit from low tax rates was neither an abuse of Fundamental 
Freedoms nor an abuse of legitimate national tax provisions. 
 
The second part of the judgement concluded that the UK CFC legislation did represent a 
blatant abuse against the Freedom of Establishment. This was based on the premise that the 
CFC regime only applied to a UK MNE owning an interest in a MNE that was a CFC under 
the UK rules and did not apply to circumstances where a UK MNE owned an interest in 
another UK MNE or in a foreign MNE that was not subject to a low level of taxation that 
brought it within the CFC legislation. The CJEU held that each Member State had a 
sovereign right to decide on tax rate levels, but Member States could not treat their resident 
MNEs differently depending on the tax rate in other Member States where they may establish 
subsidiaries
35
. The CJEU stated that EU law could not be used by EU nationals improperly to 
circumvent national legislation, but “profiting from tax advantages available in another 
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Member State could not deprive a person of the right to rely on provisions of the EU 
Treaty”36. 
 
Of crucial importance is the Cadbury consideration of whether the restriction on the Freedom 
of Establishment applied with reference to UK CFC legislation could be justified under the 
EU Treaty as a means to defy tax liabilities. As such, the Court held that a Member State 
measure restricting the Freedom of Establishment may be justified in circumstances where it 
relies on wholly artificial arrangements, with the objective of minimising tax regularly due, 
and where it does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that purpose
37
. In applying the 
motive test it concluded that the arrangements did not represent a wholly artificial 
arrangement. This case crystallises the dilemma facing the CJEU, with pressure to balance 
the rights of Member States to protect their tax base from manufactured and potentially 
abusive cross-border transactions with the rights of EU MNEs wishing to conduct their 
arrangements in the Member State of their choice. 
 
The CJEU ruling has resulted in a legislative enhancement to national procedures across EU 
Member States. In Germany as a direct consequence of the Cadbury ruling, legislation 
amended CFC rules demanded evidence from MNEs that there is genuine commercial 
activities
38
 and that any such cross-border activities were compliant with the anti-avoidance 
measures inherent within the Mutual Assistance Directive
39
. Further changes relating to 
amending the definition of a low tax jurisdiction were enacted, as were rules relating to 
ownership thresholds and income classifications. In Italy, CFC rules
40
 were amended to apply 
to non-residents residing in a country not listed as a tax haven if the non-resident is subject to 
an ETR lower than 50% of the Italian rate and more than 50% of the non-resident’s income is 
passive income. Additional effective tax tests are undertaken as are business test relating to 
source of income, both of which are aimed at avoiding wholly artificial arrangements. 
 
                                                     
36
 Ibid paras 35-36 
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In the case of Germany and Italy, the changes, although complex and procedurally different 
in nature, were enacted to reflect the spirit of the Cadbury ruling by assuming that a MNE 
with a subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction is innocent unless proven guilty rather than the 
other way around. Such a change necessitates a Member State proving a wholly artificial 
arrangement against a taxpayer rather than assuming it can tax profits with limited purposive 
testing. The UK spent considerably longer following the Cadbury ruling formulating new 
rules enacted in the Finance Act, 2012
41
. Unlike the direction followed by Germany and Italy, 
if a taxpayer, under UK rules, falls outside the prescribed exemptions they will need to 
provide evidence as to why any non-UK subsidiary is exempt from the charge
42
. 
 
The facts of the Vodafone case are similarly well documented. Vodafone has a subsidiary in 
Luxembourg and HMRC raised an enquiry into whether it was a CFC, an allegation objected 
to by Vodafone whom argued that the UK CFC legislation defied EU law and should be 
dismissed. The principal objection was based around what was believed to be an unlawful 
restriction on the Freedoms of Establishment and Movement of Capital. The UK court held 
that it was not possible to interpret the CFC rules in line with the opinions granted by the 
CJEU in Cadbury and suggested that a CFC charge would only arise where there was 
evidence of artificial arrangements akin to that seen in Cadbury.  
 
Prior to changes enacted in response to this Vodafone 2 judgement in the Finance Act 2012 
treaty protection from the UK CFC regime for EU subsidiaries were considered on a case-by-
case basis and each subsidiary had to be able to demonstrate that it is a genuine economic 
establishment and not a wholly artificial arrangement. A subsequent attempt to appeal by 
Vodafone to the Supreme Court
43
 failed on the basis that the regulation under scrutiny had 
been interpreted by the CJEU in SGI
44
 that “the correct application of Community law is 
obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt”45. The UK government acknowledged 
the material impact and relevance of the Cadbury judgement for justifying CFC tax law 
changes, and has referenced the significance of the SGI and Thin Cap GLO judgements on 
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formalising the relevance of justification and proportionality in shaping the CFC legislative 
text
46
.    
 
The principal CJEU judgements shaping Group relief practices have largely been based 
around the Marks and Spencer
47
 case outlined in Chapter Two and the Autologic
48
 case. The 
former ruled that a MNE group relief system prohibits the use of a parent entity to deduct the 
losses of its subsidiaries established abroad under any circumstances is incompatible with EU 
law
49
. The Autologic case set out the procedure relating to making cross-border relief claims 
under EU law
50
. In Marks and Spencer, the CJEU held the rules to exhibit discrimination but 
deemed the provisions justifiable, placing emphasis on the importance of proportionality, 
concluding that non-compliance would be evidenced when the MNE had “exhausted the 
possibilities available in its state of residence of having the losses taken into account for the 
accounting period concerned….for previous accounting periods and that there was no 
possibility for those losses to be taken into account ….for future periods”51. An evaluation of 
CJEU decisions was made by Lang
52
 where he identified a number of concepts that the CJEU 
were focusing on in these assessments, namely “Comparable Situation53”, “Grounds of 
Justification
54” such as fiscal cohesion, and “Proportionality55” in light of transferring the 
burden of proof
56
, risk of tax avoidance
57
 and less restrictive measures
58
. Comparability has 
become an important criterion for the CJEU in assessing compliance with rights associated 
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with Fundamental Freedoms, stating that “not only must comparable situations be treated 
alike, but different situations must also be treated differently”59.  Common terminology is 
beginning to pervade many CJEU rulings with respect to possible grounds of justification, 
namely the requirement to counter tax avoidance or the risk of tax avoidance
60
. 
 
The CJEU has taken a proactive approach to resolving other group relief cases, notably 
Autologic
61
 which provided guidance on the procedure to be followed in making cross-border 
group relief claims under EU law. Representing a multitude of group structures, this case 
promoted consideration of various categories of consequential claims centred on the denial of 
relief in contravention of the Freedom of Establishment that the refusal of group relief
62
. The 
CJEU has provided a number of other less high profile rulings relating to the subject of cross-
border losses. In Futura
63
 the CJEU held that a source state may tax non-residents solely on 
income from domestic sources only in circumstances where resident taxpayers do not receive 
preferable treatment. It held that “The Court has repeatedly held that the effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision constitutes an overriding requirement of general interest capable of 
justifying a restriction …“64. In Bosal Holding65 the CJEU, not unsurprisingly, held that a 
Netherlands provision that allowed gross interest incurred by a parent entity associated with 
the participation only to be deducted by the parent entity if the subsidiary had taxable profits 
in the Netherlands impeded the Freedom of Establishment. In Oy AA
66
  the CJEU upheld 
Finnish tax law that permits the deduction of taxes relating to financial transfers within the 
same group on the basis that the two MNEs in question are established in Finland. It is 
justified by virtue of the provisions on Freedom of Establishment, particularly with reference 
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to the objective of not compromising the right of a Member State to exercise competence 
over tax matters and to prevent tax evasion. 
 
In Papillon
67
 the CJEU found further breaches of the Freedom of Establishment. The Court 
examined the French tax consolidation rules, which precluded a French parent entity from 
forming a group consolidation with multi-tiers of French subsidiaries established in another 
Member State. However, it was ruled that it could be justified by the need to ensure the 
coherence of the tax system
68
, though that coherence could be achieved by less restrictive 
measures. In X Holding BV
69
 the CJEU examined cross-jurisdictional conflicts when it ruled 
that a Netherlands tax rule that allowed a Netherlands parent to form a group with its 
domestic subsidiary but not with its Belgian subsidiary was tantamount to discrimination 
conflicting with the Freedom of Establishment. Emphasis was placed on the principle of 
proportionality and the need to secure a “balanced allocation of tax jurisdiction”70.  
 
The principal CJEU judgements relating to THINCAP are Lankhorst-Hohorst
71
 and Thin Cap 
GLO
72
. The Lankhorst-Hohorst case similarly ruled against an MNE on grounds of infringing 
the Freedom of Establishment. The case found that a German entity had sustained gross 
interest entries relating to a Netherlands parent entity in excess of the German debt-to-equity 
ratios. Initial rejection by the German tax authorities was followed up by a broader CJEU 
ruling on whether the German THINCAP provisions were discriminating against foreign 
owned MNEs
73
 since the rules treated subsidiary MNEs differently according to whether their 
parent MNEs were located in Germany or elsewhere. It stated that this “constituted an 
obstacle to the Freedom of Establishment which is, in principle, prohibited by Article 43”74. 
Further examination of whether the German rules formed a legitimate aim as being “justified 
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by pressing reasons of public interest
75”, found that the rules could not be justified on the 
basis that they combated tax avoidance through THINCAP. The case was important for this 
research as it addressed the question of a national versus EU perspective on taxation. 
Andersson
76
 stated that “CFC rules are perhaps the most extreme version of a nationalistic 
approach to taxation”77 and it will be interesting to see in future whether the principles 
applied in a case relating to one tax avoidance practice may be applied to the others. The 
Lankhorst-Hohorst case reiterates the underlying ethos in EU law that a Member State tax 
system has to be formed in full accordance with EU law and consistent with the approach 
adopted by other Member States to ensure an efficient Internal Market. 
 
A conclusion is drawn in relation to the rulings associated with many of the aforementioned 
cases that Member States have primarily been trying to counteract tax avoidance directly 
rather than on focusing strategic changes to the EU corporate direct tax system. The CJEU 
passes judgement on specific cases but, despite its constant cross-referencing to previous case 
law, rarely makes reference to how a judgment could be used as a basis for contributing 
towards a particular body of emerging case law to form a robust framework for Member 
States to enact legislative change. Over time, the Court may experiment with a more 
proactive direction aimed at achieving advances in Member State tax systems that supports 
the Internal Market more effectively. All of the aforementioned cases illustrate that there is a 
quantum of tax case law that has been developed over the last twenty years that forms an EU 
legal order provides strong direction to Member States. It may be concluded that the 
approach the CJEU has taken to reflect the conflicting tri-partite pressures to safeguard 
Member State sovereignty, promoting the protection of Fundamental Freedoms and 
advancing the EU mandate in direct tax matters to nurture the Internal Market. A broad 
cyclical pattern was identified by Terra and Wattel
78
who suggested the CJEU was reluctant to 
apply EU law in the 1980’s only to see the period from early 1990s until 2005 evidencing a 
more proactive stance for applying internal market principles in the direct tax area. Since 
2005 the Court seems to have returned to a more prudent phase, exemplified by cases such as 
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D. v. Inspecteur case
79
, ACT Group Litigation
80
 and FII Group Litigation
81
, all of which 
evidenced a much more measured, reasoned and balanced consideration between the 
competing national and European power bases. 
 
Although Member States are competent in the direct taxation area, they must exercise that 
competence in accordance with Community law
82
. This rule endorsed in this Schumacker 
case has been repeatedly emphasised in the textual judgements of subsequent tax decisions 
such as Asscher
83
, Futura
84
, ICI
85
 and Compagnie de Saint Gobain
86
.  There is no specific 
reference that from a direct tax case law perspective, the EU Treaty does not promote a 
sovereignty exception for corporate income taxation. This implies that the way in which both 
the home and host Member State tax cross-border income flows between EU subjects must be 
constitutionally robust and that direct tax measures can be tested on their compatibility with 
EU law in general and the private sector rights to free movement and non-discrimination in 
particular. One area of interest relates to exit taxation. In light of the settled direct tax case 
law on prohibited exit and access restrictions
87
, it is clear that any higher taxes imposed on 
cross border activity as compared to similar domestic activity constitute prohibited 
discrimination irrespective of whether imposed by the home state on taxpayers who want to 
be economically active in another Member State, or by the host state on those seeking access 
to that market. Incorporated into the aforementioned settled cases regarding prohibited exit 
taxes are cross-references to matters such as the definition of taxable income items, 
exemptions, deductible expenses, tax rates, tax credits, and tax procedures. The challenge for 
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the CJEU is to remain consistent in how it uses taxation parameters into its decisions relating 
to different national taxation rules. 
 
Researchers such as Isenbaert
88
 broadly justify the role of the CJEU in direct taxation matters 
while others such as Prats
89
 argue that the CJEU has gone beyond its constitutional role and a 
new process of reviewing taxation matters needs to be established. Azoulai
90
 placed emphasis 
on political activism by interest groups such as The Bruges Group
91
 who focus on the view 
that the CJEU is attempting to re-organise the tax base of Member States at the same time as 
attempting to remove their taxing authority. The notion that the CJEU can actually currently 
take away taxing powers
92
 is not deemed to be a defendable argument. The complexity 
associated with differentiating between taxing powers specific to Member State sovereign 
rights with the ability to supervise all aspects of Member State tax rules which is a power 
granted to the EU as well as Member States is further compounded by the authority provided 
to the CJEU to assess and rule on the legal constitutionality on their legislative enactment by 
Member States. In this sense, the CJEU is not regulating the taxing powers of the Member 
States or initiating EU tax legislation. The point of contention arises when the CJEU treads 
across the boundaries of ruling on matters relating to protecting the internal market against 
the taxing sovereignty of the Member States. The proposition in some CJEU cases that there 
should be an agreeable equilibrium between the protecting the parameters of the Internal 
Market with the taxing revenues  of the Member States has been deemed impractical
93
 and 
conflicts with other cases that state that preventing of revenues could not be considered as a 
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bona fide reason justifying discrimination
94
. Unconstitutional behaviour can never be 
justified by the argument that complying with the law would be too expensive, particularly as 
the Member States have all the domestic and EC regulatory powers at their disposal to ensure 
that income tax legislation and tax treaties comply with EU law. 
 
One criticism lodged against the CJEU is that the Court’s rulings on direct tax case law are 
inconsistent
95
 although this may be considered “inevitable for any supreme court that decides 
on a casuistic basis”96 to maintain an internal market in which the equipoise forces of CIN 
and CEN need to prevail. The CJEU, however, does not rule directly on CIN and CEN in its 
income tax case law, instead more generally focusing on tax neutrality through ensuring the 
tax rules of one Member State do not discriminate against cross-jurisdiction transactions 
compared to domestic transactions. Other academic criticism of the CJEU has focused on its 
case law being unintelligibly complex
97
. Hellerstein et al criticised CJEU case law as being 
"woefully complex"
98
. In terms of the impact on Member States and their reactions to CJEU 
rulings a mixed set of responses are evident in terms of legislative responses. For example, in 
the Daily Mail
99
 and Werner
100
 cases, the CJEU has demonstrated a propensity to implement 
checks on Member State adoption of rulings even though these have often been shrouded in 
ambiguity in relation to previous case law ruling. The remit of the CJEU has similarly 
attracted criticism, as exemplified in the Thin Cap Test Claimants case
101
, which supported 
limiting access to non-EU MNEs to EU legal benefits. Furthermore, the CJEU has, according 
to Van Thiel, limited itself to investigating whether “contested tax measures constitute 
discrimination….and has [therefore] consistently avoided applying an MFN view of the EU 
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Treaty in its corporate income tax case law, therefore effectively placing tax treaties above 
the law”102.  
 
In order to assess the specific impact of the CJEU in relation to specific tax avoidance 
practices this research examines the case law precedents pertinent to key corporate tax 
avoidance practices in respect to the way in which Member States allocate tax jurisdiction 
between them by means of tax treaties. Leading cases such as Gilly
103
 exemplify how the 
Court has been mindful not to go too far. In particular in its approach to tax treaties, decisions 
in cases such as ‘D’104 demonstrate how the court, without any logical reasoning, appears to 
be replacing its traditional individual rights-based perspective with a broad acceptance of 
what Member States may wish to agree bilaterally. This seems to suggest that the CJEU is 
nurturing an unhealthy precedent in advocating disrespect for the basic concepts in EU law 
and potential distortions to the internal market. Other notable cases relating to the impact of 
EU law on DTT’s between two Member States are Amid105, Commerzbank106, Halliburton107, 
ACT Group Litigation
108
 and Elisa S.A
109
. 
 
Further Freedom abuses have been investigated by the CJEU. In Avoir Fiscal
110
 it was held 
that French tax law denying French entities of foreign company credits available to French 
MNEs
111
, as well as the offsetting tax advantages to non-residents were deemed 
discriminatory
112
. There is evidence of other cases relating to the free movement of capital 
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notably Holböck
113
 and OJ
114
. Similarly there have been CJEU cases relating to establishment 
of commercial operations in the context of freedom of primary establishment notably Daily 
Mail
115
, Centros
116
, Überseering BV
117
 and Inspire Art Ltd
118
. CJEU cases relating to freedom 
of secondary establishment include Commerzbank
119
, Halliburton
120
, ICI
121
, Amid
122
, 
Baars
123
, Keller Holding
124
 and CLT-UFA S.A
125
.  
 
The CJEU has repeatedly ruled
126
, with reference to the Treaty freedoms, that the Member 
States should comply with EU law and accordingly adapt their laws. Experience shows that 
the Member States do not volunteer to take actions themselves, preferring to defer changes, 
and justify their approach by arguing that even if a breach of EU law was evidenced it should 
be allowed on grounds of general interest, such as “fiscal coherence” 127, “effectiveness of 
fiscal supervision”128 and the “prevention of tax avoidance”129 The general lag between CJEU 
rulings and national legislative change may, on occasion, be attributable to the lengthy 
legislative change process, but probably also due to an unhealthy apathy regarding some 
rulings. 
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The CJEU has provided a number of rulings relating to the subject of dividend taxation. In 
Lenz
130
 the CJEU ruled that the principle of cohesion could not be a justification for 
discriminatory taxation of dividends, as this principle is to be applied on a bespoke basis 
dependant on the level of the shareholder or the distributing company. This principle was 
held in this case irrespective of the circumstances whereby the distributing entity was resident 
in another Member State in which the corporate tax rate is lower compared to the home state. 
In Manninen
131
 the CJEU upheld Treaty provisions establishing the right of the EU to 
preclude provisions whereby the right to a tax credit was excluded unless dividends were paid 
by a MNE incorporated in the same Member State as the beneficiary. In ACT the CJEU made 
a judgement on dividend relief, noting that if domestic dividends were “subject to an 
exemption system and non-domestic dividends were subject to the imputation system then 
there was no inherent conflict with the Freedom of Establishment and the free movement of 
capital” 132. This distinction, however, was subject to two caveats, namely that the tax rate 
applied to non-domestic dividends should not be higher than the rate associated with 
domestic dividends, and the tax credit should be at least equal to the amount paid in the 
Member State of the entity making the distribution, up to the limit of the tax charged in the 
Member State of the company receiving the dividends
133
. Other notable CJEU cases relating 
to discriminatory taxation of dividend issues are Baars
134
, X and Y
135
, Verkooijen
136
, De 
Baeck
137
, Bouanich
138
, Denkavit
139
 and Manninen
140
in that they all ruled on how Member 
State tax laws infringed the free movement of capital.  
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In Amurta
141
 the CJEU held that the differing Netherlands tax rules relating to the dividend 
WHT exemption in domestic and non-domestic circumstances was not consistent with the 
Freedom of Capital. This infringement could be justified only if it can be demonstrated that 
the provisions of an applicable tax treaty neutralize the taxation of dividends in the country of 
the recipient
142
. In Netherlands
143
 the CJEU ruled that the Netherlands exemption for 
dividend WHT is contrary to EU Treaty provisions, and in Italy
144
 the CJEU ruled that Italy’s 
discriminatory tax treatment of dividends violated EU law and the EEA Agreement, but that 
the treatment was justified in the case of the EEA. In Spain
145
 the CJEU held that Spain’s 
rules on an exemption from WHT on dividend distributions, rules requiring non-resident 
MNEs to have a higher shareholding threshold than that imposed on resident MNEs to 
achieve tax relief on dividends, fail to satisfy Spain’s obligations under Article 56 of the EU 
Treaty. 
 
The CJEU has also provided a number of rulings relating to the subject of withholding taxes, 
hereafter referred to as WHT, and net taxation of services. In Epson
146
 the CJEU ruled in 
favour of levying a WHT on profits distributed to parent MNEs in other Member States for a 
certain time period. In Gerritse
147
 the CJEU ruled that tax deductions for costs should be 
consistent between resident and non-resident taxpayers. In Scorpio Centro Equestre
148
 the 
CJEU decided that the Freedom to Provide Services does not impede a Member State tax 
provision that allows the deduction of expenses to be perpetrated by a non-resident entity as 
these expenses are directly linked to the income generated by those MNEs activities in 
Germany. The condition for deduction that such expenses must exceed half of that income is 
deemed as an unjustified restriction of that freedom. 
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The CJEU has also provided a number of rulings relating to the subject of WHT on interest 
and interest deductibility. In Truck Center
149
 the CJEU ruled that EU Fundamental Freedoms 
do not preclude a national WHT on interest payments towards non-resident MNEs, while 
exempting from that WHT interest payments towards resident MNEs, the income of which is 
taxed in the corporate income tax of those Belgian beneficiaries. In Portugal
150
 the CJEU 
ruled against national WHT provisions that differentiated treatment relating to interest relief 
between non-resident and resident financial institutions. In relation to abuse of rights, in 
Kofoed
151
 the CJEU held that it is not possible to rely on Danish legislation containing 
provisions prohibiting against abuse of rights or related tax avoidance practices if it 
conflicted with the provisions of the Mergers Directive
152
. In Cartesio
153
 the CJEU concluded 
that without a common legal understanding regarding the terms upon which a MNE may 
benefit from exercising the Freedom of Establishment, it was a matter of national law to 
define which MNEs might rely upon the Freedom of Establishment in Article 43.  
 
There have been some unusual CJEU cases in relation to the duty of the authorities to review 
decisions that turn out to rest on an interpretation of EU law, which has later been rejected by 
the CJEU. Examples of such cases are Larsy
154
 and Kühne & Heitz
155
. Cases relating to 
claiming recompense for punitive taxes served for violating EU law include Edis
156
 and 
Weber’s Wine World157. Such cases provide a disruptive taxation environment for MNEs, 
reflecting an unsettled position in certain taxation matters between the CJEU rulings and its 
implementation at Member State level. Whether this uncertain environment caused by CJEU 
decision reversal serves as a general deterrent to MNE tax planning or a mere specific 
irritation in certain circumstances is difficult to ascertain. 
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The Court has acknowledged Member States' traditional approaches toward tax avoidance 
and towards their own preferences as to how to “shape inter-jurisdictional equity”158. This has 
effectively been developed through the aforementioned exceptions adopted in case law. An 
informal anti-avoidance doctrine now exists that allows Member States, on a case by case 
basis, to deny EC benefits to taxpayers who try to use “wholly artificial constructions”159 
without “economic link”160 or “economic reality”161 to obtain undue tax advantages, an 
approach that is broadly parallel to the basic anti-avoidance rules in all Member States. In 
doing so it has abandoned its own more principled decision based on justifications explicitly 
stated in the Treaty, evolving an approach whereby a European anti-avoidance concept has 
emerged that serves as a tool that may be enacted by Member States local courts without 
unduly burdening the internal market. 
 
4.2.3 The Impact of CJEU Case Law 
 
Two different views prevail on the impact the CJEU has had on direct taxation law. One 
view, represented by Mohamed
162
, states there has been little material progress being made in 
adopting the EU tax harmonisation despite the empowerment for EC initiatives to advance 
“the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member 
States as directly affect the establishment and functioning of the common market”163, an 
important element for ensuring the lawful legitimacy of Commission based directives relating 
to direct taxation. Conversely, a view promoted by Cseres
164
, is that because the Member 
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States affected by CJEU rulings have to incorporate the ruling in its legislation and all other 
Member States with similar provisions must check and, if necessary, adapt their legislation, 
the CJEU could be viewed as a champion of harmonisation. In this respect, the Commission 
has nurtured this through providing counsel to Member States on how to incorporate CJEU 
case law into their domestic tax laws
165
. 
 
The CJEU has evidenced consideration of ‘proportionality’, a principle grounded on the 
assumption that tax avoidance laws must consider the balance of different interests 
commensurate with the purpose of the legislation. It would be both inequitable and 
unworkable in an Internal Market for Member State tax authorities to be granted unlimited 
rights in resolving tax issues even though their tax base is within their sovereign jurisdiction. 
Public law cannot be compromised through unbalanced judgements that compromise the 
relationship between Member States and their tax subjects. In this sense MNEs require an 
element of certainty protecting them from excessive scrutiny. Judicial reasoning has 
correlated proportionality with other principles through case law, notably the construction of 
wholly artificial arrangements
166
, the need for fiscal supervision
167
, and fiscal coherence
168
. 
Some justifications have been rejected in the past. For example, a loss of tax revenue is not 
deemed an acceptable justification in relation to overarching public interest
169
. Similarly in 
Bosal
170
 the CJEU rejected the Netherlands supposition that discriminatory action may be 
warranted by "erosion of the tax base going beyond mere diminution of tax revenue"
171
. 
Despite these ambiguities, the principle of proportionality has considerable weight in factual 
and normative assessments underpinning EU law case law judgements, although more recent 
case law
172
 has placed firmer emphasis on the principle of wholly artificial arrangements. 
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Proportionality requires that tax avoidance rules measures be “appropriate, necessary, and 
reasonable”173. Initial focus centred on false transactions in VAT cases such as Halifax174, 
and then extended to direct corporate taxation such as Scheuten Solar
175
. The CJEU has also 
extended attention to the concept of sham transactions, when legal and economic 
relationships demonstrate that the principle aim of the transaction is to obtain tax 
advantages
176
. The responses by EU Member States to sham transactions have differed 
markedly. Only Germany and Italy have specific legislative provisions whilst France and, and 
more recently UK, rely more generally on GAAR provisions.  In the Netherlands, a dedicated 
sham doctrine exists that has potential civil law and criminal law consequences. In the first 
instance, a repentance arrangement may be made in which the company taxpayer corrects the 
arrangements and tax due once under investigation. If not the Netherlands authorities may 
raise criminal sanctions under the category of tax evasion
177
.  
 
Tax avoidance measures must be rigidly tight for enabling it to meet and deliver against the 
purpose intended by the legislators but similarly must be accommodating enough to support 
CJEU scrutiny and interpretation in relation to its compliance with the EU Treaty. 
Furthermore, such adaptability needs to accommodate Member States periodic amendments 
to their laws to accommodate the diverse set of tax avoidance transactions enacted by MNEs. 
Legal integrity requires an established legal construct of EU law and practices and Member 
States have the best opportunity to shape local laws off clear and unambiguous CJEU case 
law judgements that relate to a type of behaviour rather than a specific transaction. In practice 
the CJEU is engaged for passing judgements not only on the permissible legality of Member 
State legislation in relation to EU Treaty by a MNE in dispute with local tax authorities in 
that Member State but also by the tax authorities themselves who wish to engage the CJEU in 
assessing the legality of a MNEs transactions in relation to local Member State tax laws.   
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Member State tax laws may, to an extent, be shaped around the limits established by the 
consistent approach taken by the CJEU in reviewing cases presented to them for a ruling. By 
understanding the assessment process, Member States can test their proposed tax avoidance 
measures in advance before adopting them in law. Initial analysis by the CJEU establishes a 
view on whether there is a reasonable possibility of tax avoidance in an arrangement. Once 
established, the CJEU may initiate a full interpretation of interpreting the MNEs 
arrangements in the context of applicable tax rules. In Halifax
178
 the CJEU noted that a 
national court must set out what is actually meant by substance and the meaning of real 
transactions
179
 before a referral to the CJEU. This approach is consistent irrespective of 
whether it is a special tax law instrument such as a decree, a general provision such as a 
GAAR, a tax law, or a civil law measure. In the case of conflicts between tax law and civil 
law, the Member States have a complex landscape for the CJEU to consider when deciding 
cases. In Italy, “civil law is the starting point for any assessment, followed by the legal form 
which prevails over the economic substance”180. Legal certainty promotes the prevalence of 
legal form in Italy implying there are elements of tax law that differ from their meaning in 
civil law. In France civil law concepts are significant, however in direct corporate income 
taxation the local courts are willing to look at the goal and purpose of a law in order to justify 
another meaning of a civil law term in a tax provision with taxpayers relying on a favourable 
administrative interpretation of tax statutes in contesting a tax matter, even if the 
interpretation is contrary to law
181
. In Germany, civil law is similarly the starting point of an 
assessment by local courts unless tax law explicitly or implicitly makes deviation possible. 
The legal basis of taxation resides with the constitutional provisions guaranteeing a legal 
basis for any act of administration
182
. The Court and tax administration are, furthermore, 
obliged to qualify the transaction rightfully.  
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One precedent set by the CJEU in many cases
183
 in steering Member State behaviour in 
regard to initiating tax assessments is that tax avoidance rules cannot be applied simply 
because there is a speculative belief that tax avoidance has occurred or may occur, or there is 
a desire to restrict a MNE from exercising a tax beneficial arrangement. As a consequence, 
the CJEU now sets out a path of judicial reasoning with respect to how a Member State can 
implement its tax avoidance rules. Such reasoning is challenged to be both effective and 
appropriate for ascertaining the tax obligation, and most significantly, avoid degradation of 
other legal rights, a doctrine that can be evidenced through all CJEU judgements. One 
constraint of the CJEU is its lack of authority to force a Member State to introduce new 
legislation to remedy a breach of a fundamental freedom. It sets out in its judgments whether 
a tax rule is either compatible or incompatible with a fundamental freedom after which the 
Member State may change its tax regime to ensure that the particular freedom is not 
breached. Member States generally have a good track record in updating its legislation in 
such circumstances. In France, Italy and Netherlands exit tax rules were amended within a 
year in response to the National Grid Indus
184
case. Member State responses in other cases 
have not been so timely, such as the UK’s response to Cadbury case185 in enhancing CFC 
rules. The CJEU remains sensitive to the charge of usurping the role of national courts so it 
focuses on laying forth principles that would align a national law to EU law rather than 
assuming an authoritative corrective role in forcing changes in national law. This leaves 
scope for ambiguity, and although in some cases the principles laid down by the CJEU are 
clear, a principle may be defined so vaguely that the national court has little in the way of 
meaningful guidance.       
 
A number of specific examples may be cited regarding CJEU case law that has widely 
impacted tax avoidance laws in most EU Member States but not provided an absolute level 
playing field. For example, in Cadbury
186
 the resulting ruling in the UK Court has not 
evidenced CFC legislation enacted in some Member States or consistent adoption in those 
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jurisdictions with CFC rules.  Similarly in the area of cross-border dividends, conflicting 
rulings are evident. In Staatssecretaris
187
, Anneliese Lenz
188
and Manninen
189
 little was 
achieved to promote consistency in associated tax rules.  
 
Other examples may be cited regarding CJEU case law that have caused ongoing ambiguity 
in its interpretation by EU Member States and therefore have remained inconsistent in its 
application in national legislation. One such specific domain relates to exit charges. An exit 
charge arises when a MNE seeks to relocate an entity from one Member State jurisdiction to 
another. Favourable relief relating to unrealised gains is often provided by certain Member 
States in such situations and as a consequence most jurisdictions have established rules to 
prevent their abuse. The question of proportionality applies to exit charges, ensuring due 
balance and consideration is given to the MNE in providing economic justification of the 
arrangements. Few Member States, notably the UK, provide for such specific proportionality 
in their exit charge relief rules.  
 
Although the CJEU has granted general favour for exit charges in “the preservation of a 
reasonable allocation of taxation rights amongst EU Member States although further EU level 
co-ordination to align national exit tax rules to be compatible with CJEU rulings is 
required”190. The contention has often been raised that such rules introduce a possible 
infringement to the Freedom of Establishment. In Lasteyrie du Saillant
191
 and N
192
 it was held 
that an exit charge on unrealised gains upon relocation to another Member State was contrary 
to the principle of Freedom of Establishment. Conversely in National Grid
193
 it was held that, 
in relation to Netherlands exit charges that it is not contrary to EU law to charge tax on 
unrealised gains upon a MNE exiting its country of tax residence but that it is 
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disproportionate to require immediate payment of that tax at the time of such exit. There 
remains no settled case law in this area with national legislative provisions varying widely.  
 
Another example of the CJEU presiding over contradictory rulings is in TRPRICE. In 
Lankhorst-Hohorst
194
the CJEU held that German TRPRICE rules regulating cross-border 
transactions between related parties were contrary to the principle of Freedom of 
Establishment. Since these tax regulations were not applied consistently between related 
German entities, they discriminated against forming an establishment in another Member 
State. In Thin Cap GLO
195
, Advocate General Geelhoed suggested that UK pre-Lankhorst-
Hohorst THINCAP rules were not, in principle, illegal. The CJEU opined that the intention 
of the legislation was to counter the opportunity for multinational groups to shift taxable 
profits by financing subsidiary entities with loans between jurisdictions depending on the 
relative tax rate. In principle, the CJEU considered that this was a perfectly acceptable anti-
abuse measure accepting that the arm's-length principle is a bona-fide point for initiating any 
assessment regarding whether a transaction is abusive.  
 
Further observations may be highlighted. Recent CJEU rulings evidence debate around the 
extent to which Member States can provide for anti-avoidance legislation without providing 
clear guidelines on what constitutes the behaviours associated with abusive tax avoidance 
versus economically justified arrangements. This was demonstrated in SGI
196
where the CJEU 
supported cross-border TRPRICE tax rules if they were more punitive than their domestic 
equivalents, but only where the legislative provisions specifically referenced and proved 
abuse through wholly artificial arrangements. It seems difficult to assess precisely whether 
the Member States' responses to CJEU judgements have contributed to the absolute uniform 
application of EC tax law in corporate taxation. A review of case law suggests increasingly 
aggressive and complex claims have tested the boundaries of the case law, and there is now a 
substantial body of case law that varies in its application regarding legislative outcome. There 
can be little doubt that a substantial number of corporate tax rules that had until recently been 
accepted by MNE taxpayers are liable to be impacted by the Fundamental Freedoms, 
particularly in relation to discrimination against inward-facing investment by non-residents, 
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or obstacles hindering outward-facing investment activities of residents. A good number of 
the aforementioned cases suggest that the CJEU remains willing to consider a Member 
State’s needs for fiscal supervision and look beyond the issue of discrimination to broader 
policy issues perhaps reflecting a discomfort within the CJEU regarding the reach of its 
decisions in international tax policy. The case-by-case assessment does little to promote the 
certainty required by Member States and MNE taxpayers, and what remains surprising is that 
whenever a judgement is made against a Member State’s laws it rarely suggests an alternative 
solution. 
 
The CJEU recognises that some restrictions are directly attributable to the presence of 
differing Member State tax systems, which are outside the competence of EU law. This is 
particularly relevant for matters relating to tax rate differentials and restrictions relating to 
allocation of taxing rights. These are best addressed by EU legislation and not by judicial 
intervention. In this sense, the CJEU’s jurisdiction is well established and well placed to play 
a central role in the support for any future reforms, notwithstanding the ongoing conflict 
between Fundamental Freedoms and national tax sovereignty that infers a far from settled 
landscape.  
 
 
4.3 The Role of Non-Judicial Institutions and Behaviours in Tackling Tax 
Avoidance 
 
4.3.1 MNEs 
 
A number of recent studies
197
 have articulated the way in which efforts by MNEs to 
understand and manage tax risk can increase shareholder value and it is for this reason that 
MNEs go to strenuous efforts to re-arrange their tax affairs in the most optimal manner 
consistent with enhancing profitability. The primary goal of any MNE is to maximise return 
on capital and therefore MNE officers cannot dismiss the impact of taxes and tax planning. A 
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KPMG report
198
 found that 72% of all MNE respondents in a survey considered reducing 
corporate tax as a key driver to increasing the value of a MNE. Despite public anger 
regarding such activities, investors rarely seem to generate similar agitation regarding MNEs 
tax planning approach, perhaps focusing more on stable financial returns than tax risk. This is 
even more surprising when one considers the strong interrelationship between the success of 
a MNE and its reputation. Paying corporate taxes on a source basis relating to the Member 
State within which it operates is considered to be part of corporate social responsibility. It is 
only once a MNE suffers public reputational damage or legal challenges that raise the issue’s 
importance to shareholder attention. The Henderson report
199
 considered corporate tax 
matters as the principal risk and uncertainties facing MNEs and has the potential to affect a 
MNEs future development, performance and position.  
 
A moderation or, at best, elimination of tax avoidance activities to meet local and EU rules is 
generally accepted to give desirable social consequences, but if a MNE has a desire to go 
beyond compliance, it has to temper this with responsibilities to its shareholders, employees 
and customers. A MNE will typically always take compliance with the law as its starting 
point, and then build out a managerial case for whether they wish to reach out beyond the 
spirit of the law by developing its own code of tax planning conduct. Research by Slemrod
200
 
found that managerial styles are an important factor influencing levels of tax compliance. A 
broad range of managerial attitudes relating to subjects such as social responsibilities to 
personal tax avoidance all impacts the extent to which a senior manager directs tax planning 
within his MNE.   
 
The economic psychology of how managers within MNEs decide whether to comply with tax 
regulations or whether to attempt to reduce their tax liability has been the subject of much 
research notably by Fischer, Wartick and Mark
201
, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein
202
, Kirchler, 
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Holzl and Wahl
203
 and Wenzel
204
.  The conclusions of this research would provide a useful 
input for tax authorities to better understand corporate behaviours and would establish a more 
robust plan for ensuring that the relationship between corporate taxpayers and tax authorities 
nurtures the maximum voluntary compliance possible. Of note is the absence of any clear 
academic steer towards how these economic psychological assessments have impacted 
corporation behaviours to other corporate taxes and the extent to which managers think that it 
is appropriate to attempt to avoid these taxes. Similarly there appears to be little research on 
MNE decision paths to avoiding tax, most of which remains veiled in secrecy within large 
MNEs. The impact of corporate tax avoidance behaviour from a tax authority’s approach, be 
it financial deterrence or persuasion, is also unclear across European jurisdictions, and 
whether a MNE reacts more positive to a legislative directive as opposed to a non-statutory 
directive also demands further research.  
 
Continued judicial reference to legal vagary such as the ‘boundaries of law’205, and the ‘spirit 
of the law’206 remain problematic. Various stakeholders including most importantly the MNE 
taxpayer raise issues regarding their meaning, and it is of little assistance from a law 
perspective to assess corporate behaviours based on these ambiguous phrases. These vagaries 
are exposed well when one considers the way in which Freedman
207
 identified tax-planning 
behaviour who proposed that MNEs might be judged to exhibit elements of behavioural risk 
as well as structural risk. The former relating to how a MNE uses the spirit of the law to 
defend actions and the latter relating to defence of actions based on best practice corporate 
governance and transparency. In this way, structural risk refers to a more institutionalised 
way of managing activities that have a positive tax outcome for the MNE that is well 
established and this should be distinguished from the more short-term decision making 
behaviours typically associated with abusive tax planning. 
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. 
4.3.2 National Tax Authorities 
 
Member State tax authorities play a pivotal role in the exercise of identifying, investigating 
and punishing MNEs who abuse tax avoidance practices. They conduct their activities within 
the specific remit of the local legislature and are frequently party to local court judgements 
associated with cases that evidence attempted exploitation of tax avoidance loopholes. These 
local rulings may or may not reflect the outcomes of CJEU judgements.    
 
The tax authorities have increasingly been subject to debates about their role in shaping 
corporate tax avoidance law through their influence in promoting cases for review by both 
local and CJEU judicial channels. The complex landscape demands consideration of the 
behavioural drivers of not only tax authorities but also the taxpayer response too. As such, if 
the views of society as to what is acceptable behaviour in the field of corporate tax are 
changing corporate taxpayers in particular may need to consider their actions more carefully 
in order to avoid the risk to their reputations and the risk of increased tax authority focus. The 
tax authorities similarly too need to consider their actions and policies carefully in light of the 
impact these can have on voluntary compliance.  
 
One criticism levelled at Member State tax authorities is the limited amount of bi-lateral co-
operation between themselves in the mitigation of tax avoidance practices. The absence of a 
common and established multilateral exchange of tax intelligence among Member States 
combined with a lack of capacity of tax authorities to even monitor pan-European MNEs 
effectively was noted by Sorsa
208
.  Webb
209
 promoted the improvement of information among 
Member State tax authorities as a key action for closing out tax avoidance practices. Research 
by Hanlon
210
 suggested that what is missing is clear commitment and accountability of 
authorities, and a lack of co-operative skills, concluding that the mechanisms enabling large-
scale tax avoidance also make commitment and co-operative skills of authorities difficult to 
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achieve. Pan-European tax avoidance schemes are likely to demand unparalleled consensus 
across Member States.  
 
As this analysis of the role of the CJEU has highlighted, tax authorities across Member States 
have consistently seen their authority undermined by CJEU judgements, arguably weakening 
their resolve in challenging MNEs that are perceived as challenging the accepted frontiers of 
the law. The cost and manpower required to investigate innocuous MNE tax planning 
activities are high and it requires constant re-evaluation of the likelihood of a successful 
outcome for the tax authorities in light of CJEU judgements before embarking on such an 
investigation. This provides for an unsettled environment for the tax authorities to operate its 
tax avoidance investigation activities. A number of high profile MNEs operating across 
Member States are in receipt of particularly bad publicity relating to tax avoidance and this is 
raising additional public pressure on the tax authorities to initiate tax avoidance activity 
assessments. With a given amount of resource, a Member State tax authority is likely to 
allocate its resources to those areas of either highest risk or those areas in which it has the 
highest probability of success. In the UK, the disclosure regime
211
 was introduced to identify 
in advance those tax avoidance schemes worthy of tax authority review and clearance. The 
disclosure regime does not attempt to set the boundaries of tax avoidance, but rather set out 
the characteristics of a scheme that are purportedly common of a tax avoidance arrangement.  
Bland
212
 found that such disclosure schemes have impacted taxpayers behaviours but not to 
any underlying taxpayer intent. Given most manufactured schemes are common to certain 
industry types specific transactional loopholes they tend to have concentrated demand. To 
supplement this formal disclosure, a more general disclosure regime has been enacted by the 
UK so ‘that companies put in place a formal tax policy that sets out their high level tax 
strategy, operating principles and guidelines and that this policy is approved by the board of 
directors’213. The significance of this is that it is the first known attempt to correlate the 
propensity to engage in tax avoidance and a MNEs governance system, a point that is 
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important for this research solution and representative of a view supported by various 
lobbying groups such as the Tax Justice Network in the UK.  
 
Across all EU Member States the increase in enforcement levels is involving heightened 
examination of large corporate taxpayers. Tax authorities are making particularly rapid gains 
in their understanding and challenges to cross-border structures
214
.The growing sophistication 
of tax enforcement enabled by better communication and cooperation among tax authorities, 
enhanced in 2011 when several countries including Germany formally endorsed the OECD’s 
Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
215
. Mutual assistance 
agreements appear to be gaining even more international support providing as it does the 
multilateral information exchange vehicle that the G20 and OECD have struggled to develop 
in the last decade. Certain tax avoidance practices continue to attract the attention of all EU 
Member State tax authorities. TRPRICE will continue to be a core focus of every tax 
authority, as well as the abuse inherent in utilising certain international structures reflecting 
the increased pace of restructuring by MNEs as a reaction to the 2008 economic crisis. The 
use of losses similarly is witnessing tax authority focus particularly reflecting the large stock 
of losses hanging over from the economic crisis as highlighted by successive OECD Forum 
on Tax Administration reports.  
 
In respect to the sample Member States of this research, the French tax authorities have stated 
their focus as being on PE issues and cross-border tax schemes particularly fighting against 
financial flows between a French company and a foreign entity deemed to have no substance. 
In Germany, key enforcement programmes include measures to address TRPRICE and intra-
group financing, restructuring and transformation. In Italy key enforcement programmes 
focus on TRPRICE, CFCs, PEs, abuse of law and capital donations. In UK, the general 
approach of tax enforcement is based on a risk-based strategy to tax compliance and 
enforcement. It estimates the total tax gap and then breaks this total down by taxpayer 
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segment, specifically by tax, size and nature of the taxpayer and behaviour. It develops a 
tailored compliance and enforcement strategies for each segment. For large MNEs HMRC’s 
approach is based on building relationships with businesses to provide certainty on the tax 
outcome of significant issues, proportionate engagement, and clarity through effective 
consultation and dialogue. HMRC identifies large businesses it regards as low risk and 
implements a light touch approach, releasing resources to be directed to higher risk MNEs. 
The High Risk Corporate Programme
216
 takes a collaborative approach to planning and 
board-level engagement with the largest MNEs, and has been used to resolve a significant 
number of material long-outstanding disputes, with settlements totalling more than GBP9 
billion since 2006
217
. This is supported by an Anti-Avoidance Board
218
 established for 
defining the delivery plan for HMRC’s anti-avoidance strategy. HMRC has been a leading 
proponent of the enhanced relationship approach. Core elements are a risk-rating system, 
which takes account of MNE systems for managing their own tax risk, support for MNEs 
regarded as low risk, including advance rulings and clearances on request, and targeting of 
HMRC resources on significant tax compliance risks.  
 
 
4.3.3 Professional Organisations 
 
Professional tax intermediaries have played a part in shaping the tri-partite relationship 
between MNEs, the local tax authorities and legislators. The “tax agents….represent a 
significant number of large companies”219 and have long been associated as “key players in 
the rules avoidance industry”220. Their level of influence in respect to promoting, validating 
and formally auditing tax avoidance should not be underestimated. Most significantly, in the 
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sphere of public debate and political dogma surrounding corporate tax avoidance there is 
little evidence of hostility towards their undue influence. Such influences are typically 
enacted through the use of lobbyists and other influential stakeholders to shape tax avoidance 
rules consistent with their clients’ tax planning requirements. This lobbying sometimes 
attempt to influence directly the EU tax laws, such as Deloitte lobbying changes to the UK’s 
2011 legislative proceedings on changes to corporate tax avoidance
221
.    
 
It has suggested that professional organisations are part of “the modern enterprise culture that 
persuades many to believe that bending the rules for corporate self-gain is a sign of 
commercial acumen”222. These organisations have no duty to disclose the advice provided to 
their clients on tax planning and are not held accountable for any such advice. The pursuit of 
profitability has an inherent prospective conflict with any public duty to avoid abusive tax 
planning. Such a conflict infers that for the large accounting MNEs the “emphasis is very 
firmly on being commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on 
being public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state”223.  Even an association with 
the early high profile US based corporate tax abuse cases of Worldcom
224
 and Enron
225
 has 
not deterred continued involvement in this area of global tax planning from some of the 
major accounting and auditor organisations.  
 
From an academic perspective the matter has been well represented. Broad condemnation of 
the approaches adopted by some of the professional organisations are well documented with 
academics such as Sikka claiming that “the involvement of accountancy firms in developing 
and selling tax avoidance schemes contrasts sharply with their expressed claims of ethical 
conduct and social responsibility”226 In many respects this is tantamount to organised tax 
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avoidance and raises serious questions about the CSR credentials of such organisations. 
Again, there is little correlation between CSR and accounting practices as highlighted by 
Christensen and Murphy
227
. Furthermore, there is little research correlating the taxing 
properties of a given Member State and the behaviours of the accountancy profession.  
 
 
4.3.4 Political Influences 
 
The socio-political context at any given time has the potential to be a powerful force in 
shaping of Member State tax policies and associated enforcement tactics adopted by their 
respective tax authorities. The EU tax law activities of the CJEU are relatively immune to 
such pressures as the role, in principle, should be limited to preliminary rulings in context of 
adherence to the EU Treaty irrespective of populist opinion of the EU population or its 
politicians. The rapidity associated with the impact of such socio-political factors on 
legislative changes at a national level can be such that they form one of the most potent 
forces for change. 
 
As the global economy proceeds through a period of austerity following the fiscal crisis of 
2008 EU Member States have adopted different strategies for propping up their public sector 
finances, with a particular emphasis on varied measures to increase corporate tax revenues 
through specific targeting of industries or through the closure of tax avoidance loopholes. The 
current environment is characterised by fragile financial systems, high public deficits and low 
or negative economic growth, providing fertile ground for self-perpetuating pessimism and 
propagation of populist anger condemning large MNEs avoiding corporation tax. Recent high 
profile publicity associated with Vodafone
228
 and Starbucks
229
, Amazon
230
 and Google
231
 in 
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2012 are good examples. To date, politicians appease this public opinion by joining the 
chorus of disapproval but no actual changes in legislation have been proposed, opting instead 
to pressure MNEs to stay within the spirit of the law. This is less likely to reflect inertia and 
more a reflection on the known complexity of closing out tax avoidance practices tactically 
deployed by MNEs across the EU whilst remaining within the boundaries of the law. 
 
The popular demand for decisive and timely action to curtail corporate tax avoidance 
practices has not been forthcoming even in those Member States advocating a political 
agenda most hostile to corporate behaviour such as France, but a number of distinct policy 
responses may be noted. In 2011, as a result of public and political pressure, a majority of the 
’EP’ came out in support of a Financial Transaction Tax at EU level, specifically targeting 
the tax revenues associated with EU financial institutions
232
 although this remains a 
contentious policy pursuit among many Member States. Specific tax rules for combating tax 
avoidance at Member State level have, in recent years have focused on the aforementioned 
GAAR’s. GAAR provisions have been enacted in the UK in 2013233 and the HMRC GAAR 
guidance explicitly states carefully that “the GAAR is designed to counteract the tax 
advantage which the abusive arrangements would otherwise achieve”234. There is, however, 
no evidence yet of enacting such a policy at EU level endorsed through Treaty powers. A will 
by political stakeholders to bring closer fiscal union through the delivery of a more 
coordinated and harmonised tax policy is also evidenced by Germany and France announcing 
plans in 2011 for a common corporate tax base and ensuring better alignment of tax rules 
relating to tax treatment of losses
235
. In their own right, these differences between regional 
and peer-to-peer coordination of policy are increasingly creating friction between Member 
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States and uncertainty to MNEs. The political desire for singular or collaborative Member 
State responses to tax avoidance appears to be increasing at a time when the EU institutions 
are flexing their muscles too. From a political standpoint, countries throughout the region are 
striving to find the right balance between a tax system that attracts investment with one that 
generates the revenue needed to meet obligations and fund services consistent with the 
principles of the EU Treaty As stated by Hagen the challenges have mainly to do with “fiscal 
policy remains a national competence for EU member states, but under several constraints 
and subject to a variety of procedures….to achieve certain Community goals whilst 
safeguarding the sustainability of the member states’ public finance"236 
 
Pressure groups lobbying EU Member State legislators and tax authorities have played a role 
in corporate tax policy making. Historically focussed on lobbying at national level, but in 
recent years this has witnessed more energetic efforts directed towards EU institutions to 
reflect the gravity of influence
237
. The quantum of lobbying effort in evidence would suggest 
it forms a powerful voice in the corridors of EU institutions as the EU constitutes “a 
promising political opportunity structure for organized interests”.238. The effectiveness of 
such pressure groups on shaping tax policy depends on a number of factors, particularly the 
accessibility to policy makers themselves and the number of policy-making stakeholders in a 
particular area of corporate tax law. The diversity of the EU policy-making process across the 
EU has nurtured differing approaches to be adopted by these lobbying organisations. 
Guéguen
239
 divided lobbying strategies into positive, negative or reactive strategies. Negative 
strategies generally consist of direct opposition to Commission proposals, while positive 
strategies focused on active promotion of a change in policy or law delivered through a wider 
variety of EU institutions in a spirit of partnership and credibility. Reactive strategies, on the 
other hand, focus on specific initiatives to promote a particular course of actions. Member 
State responses to regulating these influences differ. In Germany there are formal rules 
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governing conduct, while in France there is a mandatory registration system only, and in Italy 
there are no rules at all 
 
Whatever the drivers or influences, EU Member States, without exception, are taking a 
tougher stance on enforcing laws to help ensure that taxes owed are actually paid, as well as 
putting in place new legislation and processes to close off existing leakage of revenue. 
Reports by Ernst and Young
240
 and PWC
241
 in 2012 all claimed tax authorities are evidencing 
less tolerance and are becoming increasingly reactive to complaints by pressure groups or 
media publicity that allege corporate tax avoidance. It seems not unrealistic to expect this 
political dynamic to become more pronounced in the near-term and for tensions between 
corporate taxpayers and tax authorities to increase. In fact, 74% of senior management in the 
EU surveyed by Ernst & Young
242
 agreed or strongly agreed that tax controversy will become 
more important to their MNE over the course of the next two years. This is perhaps 
unsurprising, as 97% of senior managers concurrently stated in the same survey that they 
expected to increase their focus on tax risk associated with their cross border activities, 
representing a concern regarding the ongoing threat to tax efficient structures afforded to 
them by the EU Treaty. In parallel tax policy makers were canvassed and it was found that 
nearly 81% expect some or significant growth in national anti-avoidance tax rule changes.  
 
In the context of our sample EU Member States, France has been the most active. Typically 
characteristic of left-of-centre governments, the French agenda in recent times has targeted 
policy on increasing revenues rather than reducing expenses and this has illuminated the 
focus on tax avoidance mitigation. The worldwide tax consolidation regime has been 
abolished and a corporation tax surcharge increased the ETR to 36.15%. Political pressures in 
Europe has witnessed Germany moving to the fore in terms of negotiating packages for 
Greece, the Financial Stability Facility and European Stability Mechanism, illuminating the 
public perception of the need to protect tax revenues from corporate abuse. Initial high profile 
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support for the CCCTB evidenced Germany’s appetite for change, as did its support for the 
Financial Transaction Tax. The German coalitions in recent times have been strong 
proponents of tax information clauses across the EU, and recent political manifestos have 
included advances in developing a guarantee of single rate corporate taxation above and 
beyond the more common DTT arrangements. Volatile political circumstances in Italy have 
not curtailed advances in promoting further anti-avoidance tax measures. A political desire to 
attack tax abuse at two levels has resulted in empowering tax authorities to target the most 
material tax abuse using prescriptive evaluation criteria alongside a desire for major change 
in the Italian tax system by abolishing the specific five-year restriction for tax losses and 
providing for a carry forward with no time limits
243
. The politics of Member States drive 
many of these changes, not only in tax anti-avoidance rules but also in relation to the tax base 
more generally.  For example, Member States like France has targeted attacking MNEs more 
broadly through raising the corporate tax rate for all MNEs with revenues over €250m whilst 
Italy has been more targeted focusing on attacking those industries likely to reap most 
political capital alongside generating a healthy revenue stream.   
 
In the Netherlands, the government published the Fiscal Agenda in 2011, largely targeting 
raising additional revenue through a financial institutions tax but also in enlarging the 
corporate tax base, aimed at resolving issues relating to the Bosal-gap in the corporate 
income tax. No other specific anti-avoidance measures are currently proposed akin to those in 
other EU Member States. In the UK, the political trend has been driven by a coalition 
government focusing specifically on reducing the corporation tax rate. This has been 
subsidised by increasing a bank levy despite the political desire to avoid participation in the 
FTT. There is continued refocusing of the CFC regime on artificial depletion of UK profits. 
Increased focus on international cooperation and information exchange between tax 
authorities, as well as improved funding for local HMRC enforcement, particularly relating to 
corporate tax avoidance. 
 
The political desire to enact tax avoidance measures remains as strong as ever across all 
sample Member States. The magnitude of change is varying across jurisdictions but the 
direction of change appears to be broadly similar. The relative inertia witnessed in the last 
decade to EU institutions attempting to closeout loopholes have been met with improved 
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political rigour. Consistent with research by March and Olsen
244
, one could suggest that long 
periods of political inertia common to EU coalition governments can often precipitate a crisis 
and sudden policy change. There remains a generally positive political appetite and 
acceptance to absorb and adapt to EU driven changes to tax avoidance mitigation whether 
through directives, initiatives, or CJEU judgements.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The analysis in this chapter has shown how the multiplicity of stakeholders and the strength 
of their interactions, influences and priorities can materially impact both the cause and effect 
of direct corporate tax abuse with the EU. The manner in which institutions such as the CJEU 
and EC operate and their interactions and influences with Member State courts and tax 
authorities have an impact on the direct tax environment. The interactions between Member 
State courts and tax authorities with MNEs, and the interactions between MNEs and their 
advisors have a similar impact on the level and nature of tax abusive practices evidenced in 
any jurisdiction. All these stakeholder interactions are somewhat fragmented, neither 
exhibiting complimentary nor necessarily cooperative interactions. The strength of influence 
afforded to the CJEU and EC is considerable and the significant impact on shaping the 
direction of Member State anti-avoidance laws is not underestimated. Recognition, however, 
is given to the prospective longevity of these stakeholder influences, accepting that the tax 
abuse issue is ripe for reform and that the relative strength of stakeholder influence over time 
may change. The EU is as much a political entity as an economic one and it is this crucial 
point that renders any controversial reform relying on political consensus difficult to attain. 
The multiplicity of stakeholders is not a unique complication but the outcome from the 
analysis in chapter shows that the design of any solution proposal will demand changes in 
institutional or taxpayer practices so any fragmentations in their interactions or influences are 
addressed to ensure effective adoption of any reform.   
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Chapter Five:  Limitations on Member State Sovereignty in 
Tackling Tax Abuses 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
National sovereignty may be defined as the jurisdictional right to self-governance, 
representing “final and absolute authority”1, uninhibited by any “rules, regulations or 
policies”2 enforced by “an external authority”3. In the context of the EU this concept is 
particularly important and generates highly charged reactions to any political intrusions or 
threats to such sovereign authority. For the purposes of this research, it is relevant to examine 
the autonomy retained by Member States in their corporate taxing rights with the extent to 
which a broad and growing political community, developing a “legal community”4 creates an 
interaction of law and politics forming an instrument of self-governance in a supranational 
entity. From the outset, the EU integration concept has threatened restrictions on national 
sovereignty through the systematic development of EU institutions being empowered to 
establish directives and regulate Member State laws via case law judgements under the 
premise of protecting EU Fundamental Freedoms. Since the outbreak of the EU debt crisis 
the region has taken unprecedented measures, including the implementation of a fiscal treaty
5
 
that may result in further pressure to centralise the command and control over direct taxation 
by EU institutions.   
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5.2 Sovereignty Drivers 
 
National sovereignty in the area of tax law has been diluted by a small number of key drivers. 
The increasing impact on domestic tax legislation of rulings of the CJEU has principally 
driven this erosion, interpreting directly applicable general principles included in the EU 
Treaty as previously detailed. In particular promoting non-discrimination and the right to 
establishment have led this charge of authority. Other EU institutions such as the 
Commission have been instrumental in directing changes in state rules which although not 
directly related to direct taxations has added further credibility to the role of the Commission 
in shaping the business environment beyond the powers of Member State legislators. The 
Commission has similarly claimed competence in some treaty negotiations with the aim of 
avoiding double taxation and this has been met with support and “a constructive attitude from 
Member States”6. Although this has not led to an EU Model Tax Treaty or positive 
harmonisation resulting from the eradication of double taxation its impact is important. 
 
From an academic perspective, there is little contention that Member States have the legal 
right to tax corporate profits derived from domestic sources and the international profits of 
domestic MNEs although in practice different Member States frequently advocate different 
policies and approaches, often based on the political environment at a given time. Palan 
found that tax sovereignty is concerned with the autonomy of a Member State to tax its 
jurisdiction
7
. The researcher recognised two different styles of sovereignty, namely de jure 
sovereignty and de facto sovereignty. De jure tax sovereignty was denoted as the “legal 
freedom of action”8 to impose taxes while De facto sovereignty represents the potential to 
achieve the Member State’s tax policy objectives.  
 
The EU legal order is based around a high dependency order of the Member States for both 
its existence and effective functioning. Historically there has been a strong unity ethos among 
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most Member States
9
, endorsed through national legislatures and judiciaries implicitly 
acknowledging the notion that EU law takes precedence over national law and it is 
specifically this point that underpins the transfer of constitutional power to the EU
10
. The 
effective operation of the EU internal market demands strong links between Member States 
in order to accomplish common objectives across a broad array of political and economic 
issues and this has encouraged this unity ethos to strengthen over time. Despite this 
collaboration, certain areas, such as taxation, remain formally excluded from the EU policy 
agenda
11
 representing the conflicting forces shaping the legal order into what we see in place 
today.   
 
Consideration to what is termed the direct applicability principle
12
 represents an important 
concept that implies that MNEs have as much of a stake in terms of legal rights and legal 
obligations as other stakeholders such as Member States, the CJEU and the Commission.   
Despite the fact that the EU judicial system has supported and managed the direct 
applicability of EU law notwithstanding the issue that is faced is in situations whereby EU 
law generates a legal conflict between an MNE and Member State tax law. There is no formal 
judicial provision for promoting the primacy of EU law over Member State law and there 
seems little consensus on either the need or appropriateness of formalising this doctrine since 
the practical existence of EU law is premised on the basis that it is superior to Member State 
law. The impact on Member State sovereignty is broader than this suggests. Not only is EU 
law effective in changing Member State law in the immediate aftermath of a judgement, it 
also has the effect of limiting laws thereafter. It limits the effectiveness of current Member 
State law where deemed unlawful and by inference impacts the direction of any law or legal 
rule in that part of the law going forward. The legal significance of this rule of precedence is 
that Member State law which conflicts with EU law no longer applies. It has therefore been 
left to the CJEU to define more clearly the role of EU law in shaping the boundaries of 
Member State sovereignty in direct taxation law, a point that has generated much debate. 
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Lord Denning was a fierce proponent of the role of the CJEU in compromising sovereignty 
when he stated, “Our sovereignty has been taken away by the European Court of Justice. It 
has made many decisions impinging on our statute law and says that we are to obey its 
decisions instead of our own statue law…Our courts must no longer enforce our national 
laws. They must enforce Community law”13 
 
The conclusion of the CJEU in many of the aforementioned cases relates to the non-
compliance under EU law of a tax avoidance rule that is being enforced by a Member State. 
Such case law of the CJEU results in two substantial problems for the Member States with 
respect to sovereign powers. First, there is Member State obligation to reflect the conclusions 
of a judgement into its own legislation, although it is clear that the CJEU has not provided 
any substantive guidance to Member States about how to incorporate tax law into their 
national laws. Furthermore, all other Member States with comparable provisions are under an 
obligation to verify or align their provisions in accordance with the CJEU ruling. In this 
respect it has invoked a harmonisation process in the area of direct taxation, which, although 
not fully anticipated at the outset by Member States, has met with surprisingly little resistance 
in recent years. Second, there is an adverse impact on fiscal sovereignty too. As the EU 
assumes legislative primacy in the area of direct tax, the Member State control over national 
budgets diminish as tax avoidance rules protecting national tax revenues are outlawed by the 
CJEU as breaches of EU law.    
 
Opinion remains divided about whether these shifting boundaries eroding national 
sovereignty in tax matters is a positive step forward. On the one hand it serves a positive 
purpose in levelling the tax landscape across jurisdictions in the interests of promoting EU 
harmonisation. On the other hand it can have the effect of creating a plethora of opportunity 
to MNEs for exploiting tax avoidance practices. Direct tax avoidance is an EU issue but there 
is no single EU institution entitled to solve tax avoidance issues, therefore supporting the case 
that taxation remains “firmly in the hands of national governments”14Although the EU has 
little formal control over taxation, Member States do not have complete autonomy over direct 
tax matters either. The concept of tax sovereignty may therefore be considered a rather 
ambiguous concept despite the fact that sovereignty appears to be relied upon with 
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considerable frequency by Member States guarding against unwanted policy proposals 
intruding on such grounds. Sovereignty may be assed either in terms of what is raised by 
taxes, or “the functional role of the nation-state”15, or in terms of how and on what terms it is 
raised, or “the governance values”16. As a concept sovereignty may be assessed in many 
different ways. From a regulatory perspective, the EU may be viewed as having developed a 
regulating command over Member State’s taxing decisions even though it has no taxing 
power.  From a political dimension, the EU is devoid of political responsibility to re-
distribute taxable income among Member States but more aligned to promoting matters of 
internal market integration. From a judicial standpoint, the CJEU has a commanding 
oversight over what it considers to be EU law, or rather the compatibility between Member 
State law and EU law. There can be little doubt over the influence of the CJEU in recent 
years. Research has demonstrated that “a comprehensive dataset comprising all secondary tax 
legislation of the Commission and the Council of Ministers, and the entire tax jurisprudence 
of the [ECJ] from 1958 to 2007 shows a significant quantitative growth of EU tax legislation 
and jurisprudence”17.   
 
5.3 Sovereignty Constraints in Resolving EU Tax Abuses 
 
EU tax law, akin to every other aspect to EU law, cannot be described as either a collection of 
EU treaties and directive, nor can it be considered an appendage to Member State legal 
systems. EU law resides as a fundamental concept within the EU construct as it remains the 
sole guarantee that EU law is not diluted by interaction with national law. Obvious conflicts 
arise when attempting to balance the demands of the internal market promoting consistent 
application of law across jurisdictions and the Member States desire to retain autonomy over 
the tax base, tax rates, tax allowances and other similar baseline activities in the area of direct 
taxation. 
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The role of the EU form as a platform for shaping the legal landscape for tax matters derives 
its authority from the EU Treaty, although not referencing any specific mandate to direct 
taxation itself. The EU Treaty focuses on the “Principle of Sincere Cooperation” that 
establishes the general relationship between the EU construct and its Member States
18
. It 
states, “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the 
Treaties. The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the EU. The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the EU’s tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the EU’s 
objectives”19. 
 
Debates in public law regarding sovereign rights introduce a number of issues pertinent to 
this thesis. Sovereignty is a concept that is as relevant to the Member States as it is to the EU 
institutions and the institutional authorities residing with them. At Member State level, the 
concept of sovereignty may be distinguished between that of the legislature as opposed to the 
Member State as a whole.  Overarching legal authority for the provision of laws resides with 
the legislature rather than the state itself. If such an analogy is applied to the EU context of 
direct tax laws, the sovereign conflict is not in fact how it is commonly stated between the 
EU and its Member States but in fact between the EU institutions capable of having a law 
making role such as the EC and CJEU and the Member State legislatures. The EU construct 
relies on Member States voluntarily giving up some sovereign rights to the EU legal system. 
This is undisputed and forms the basis of the EU legal system and the fulfilment of many of 
the aims of the Internal Market. The practical limitation of this is that, notwithstanding the 
fact that any Member State reserves the theoretical right to exit the EU at any point, there is a 
grey area between accepting limitations in sovereign rights that are explicit and agreed 
upfront at point of joining with the subsequent loss of sovereign power in those areas that 
Member States had no intention or expectation of losing because of the EU’s competence in 
enforcing the EU Fundamental Freedoms.  
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The conflict between the perceived surrender of sovereignty and the “democratic deficit”20 
that evolves is a longstanding and widely debated issue. The relevance to this thesis is its 
influence on differentiating what would or would not be an acceptable solution to Member 
States. Political ambitions to retain taxing powers must be offset against the interpretive 
autonomy granted to the CJEU in exercising judgement over compliance of national laws 
with EU Fundamental Freedoms. It would be futile to argue against such autonomy that is 
underpinned by Treaty provisions accepted by all Member States. Objections are typically 
based on a political basis or on grounds of jurisdictional infringement. Direct corporate 
taxation is implemented at Member State level to raise public funds for the public good yet 
the EU has an equally determined right to ensure consistent application of Member State laws 
for the good of the efficiency of the Internal Market.      
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Despite the intrusions into sovereignty by the CJEU, and irrespective of its different 
perspectives, it is argued that sovereignty has not been lost in an absolute sense but rather 
subjected to demarcation between institutions that all form part of a unified EU internal 
market. This reflects the transition from a collection of sovereign state to the European state 
as represented by the Internal Market. An alternative view was promoted by Wallace who 
stated “Sovereignty has not been transferred to a state-like federation…but sovereignty is 
increasingly held in common: pooled among governments, negotiated by thousands of 
officials through hundreds of multilateral committees, compromised through acceptance of 
regulations and court judgements which operate on a principle of mutual interference in each 
other’s domestic affairs”21. Furthermore he stated that, “European States can do little without 
the acquiescence and approval of their neighbours”22. This latter statement by Wallace 
probably represents a more fragmented but more accurate representation of the sovereignty 
impact of the EU in direct taxation. It is an inherently untidy and inefficient system “built on 
sustaining the illusion that governments can themselves provide their voters with benefits 
                                                     
20
 Wieler et al, ‘European Democratic and its Critique’ (1995), 18, West European Politics, 3, 4 
21
 William Wallace, The Sharing of Sovereignty: the European Paradox ( Political Studies Association, 
Blackwell,1999), 209 
22
 Ibid 
 142 
which can in practice only be won through common action with others”23. This perhaps 
provides a much more measured view on the sovereign impact of changes attributable to the 
EU construct, promoting a more complex relationship between an extended set of EU 
stakeholders beyond a more simplistic pull between the EU and Member States. Member 
State autonomy to shape their legal systems has been eroded and implies that future 
autonomy to integrate legal changes at national level will be limited unless there is broad 
consensus across the EU. This necessarily implies that any further progress in achieving 
national authority in this regard will require collaborative support, sustainable only on the 
basis that they are underpinned with support from a broad set of fellow Member States to 
challenge the authority of the EU institutions. This is an important observation in the 
formulation of a suitable solution proposal in this area of law. 
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Chapter Six: A Litany of Failed Schemes 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter does not aim to review in detail all solution options previously promoted and 
debated. There is ample material on the subject so this analysis will focus on why they have 
failed and what may be learnt from their construct in proposing a more effective solution. The 
method adopted to assess compliance with the rule of law will take the form of a benchmark 
assessment against the widely stated rule of law definition advocated by Bingham
1
. The 
importance of this is such to ensure an assessment can be made against proposed reform 
proposals in light of its perceived alignment with the rule of law. Legal theory serves to 
validate or otherwise the usefulness of each solution. Until Bingham’s advocacy the rule of 
law interpretation was dominated by Dworkin
2
, Hayek
3
 and Dicey
4
. Bingham’s interpretation 
has been used because it has eight explicit sub-rules
5
, all of which are relevant to the 
assessment of internationalist tax law reform.  
Bingham stated “all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, should 
be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, taking effect in the future and 
publicly administered in the courts”6. Extending this further, Bingham noted that “law must 
be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable”7 [Bingham Principle 
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One], ensuring that judicial authorities do not reshape the law in a radical manner beyond its 
original focus. Furthermore, “questions of legal right and ability should ordinarily be resolved 
by application of the law”8 [Bingham Principle Two] to protect judicial rulings from arbitrary 
decisions, and the equality of law was fashioned through the principle that “the laws of the 
land should apply equally to all, save to the extent that objective differences justify 
differentiation”9 [Bingham Principle Three]. Bingham promoted the good faith exercise of 
powers by public officers in a manner “consistent with the purposes in which the powers 
were conferred” [Bingham Principle Four], representing a fundamental principle of public 
law. Unlike any definition promoted by Dicey or Dworkin, protection of fundamental human 
rights featured in the sub-rules [Bingham Principle Five], as did the provision of state 
resolution of “civil disputes, which the parties themselves are unable to resolve”10 [Bingham 
Principle Six]. Similarly, “adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair” 
[Bingham Principle Seven] and “the rule of law requires compliance by the state with its 
obligations in international law as in national law”11 [Bingham Principle Eight].  
Acknowledging that academics have historically offered a spectacularly divergent set of rule 
of law definitions and assessments, ranging from procedural and argumentative ideas
12
, 
judicial and legislative accountability
13
, political and individual morality
14
, rights
15
, 
substantive perspectives
16
, to expressions of determinacy and certainty of outcome as guiding 
conduct
17
, the scope of this thesis will initially be to limit the assessment to those specific 
rules advocated by Bingham as his synopsis summarised into eight principles is well suited to 
the notion of EU direct tax abuse law reform. The rule of law reflects the influence and 
authority of law and even though EU Member States represent nomocratic jurisdictions with 
a broadly common heritage of legal traditions and ideals, a rule of law assessment needs to 
reflect upon the demands of the formalist and substantive characteristics of the proposed 
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reforms. This is to ensure that, from a legal reform perspective, the reforms have lawful 
authority, are morally sound, passed and enforced in the correct manner, and the content of 
their provisions are good and just.  
There are, of course, many alternative rule of law definitions ranging from those of Dworkin 
that focused on the moral dimension and interpretative aspects of laws rather than legal 
systems and legal discovery, and Dicey who focused on equality before the law and access to 
Courts
18
. Hayek focused predominantly on the predictability of law and superiority of law
19
. 
These are all sound bases for defining the rule of law but not as focused as Bingham for the 
purpose of addressing the specific challenges regarding the legal context of EU tax law 
reform. Bingham’s rule of law principles combine a number of different aspects prevalent in 
other definitions promoted by other well-known legal philosophers. For example, Raz 
promoted the concept of legal positivism
20
, so disliked by Fuller
21
, emphasising the role of 
institutions and the importance of setting formal checks against the arbitrary use of 
institutional state power in order to promote principled adjudication. Raz
22
 placed great 
strength to substantive legal norms such as accessibility to the law, akin to some of 
Bingham’s principles, rather than notions of legality. Whereas Bingham’s approach is to 
focus on traditional principles with an ethos of more substantive reasoning underpinning the 
rule of law, Raz insisted that the function of the rule of law is to facilitate legal rules, i.e. 
legislation, with the underlying doctrines of the legal system. Ultimately it provides harmony 
in its outcome that implies a law ceases to become enforceable, and therefore consistent with 
the rule of law, when it becomes unjust by selectively afflicting undue pressures on sections 
of its subjects. Rawls’ theory of justice23 is an interesting concept given the moral dimension 
to resolving MNE tax abuse. He perceived fairness as a basic fundamental right demanding 
protection and noted how the redress of social and economic inequality requires economic 
resources should be allocated to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Unfortunately 
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despite the merits of this approach it is not comprehensive enough to warrant application to 
reform proposals in this thesis. 
 
There are features of this proposal that render Bingham’s definition of the Rule of Law 
particularly relevant and stand to reason justifying its basis for the assessment and 
benchmarking of EU direct tax law reform proposals.  First, the notions of fair exercise of 
powers and discretion are considered. Unlike Dicey who emphasised the curbing of 
discretionary governmental action and absolute restraint on arbitrary use of institutional state 
power in any area of the law, Bingham carefully balances the prescription of the fair exercise 
of power conferred in good faith for the purposes intended [Bingham Principle Four] 
reflecting the need for measured and consistent law making and enforcement across EU and 
Member State institutional offices, with a warning against outright discretion in the context of 
determining legal rights and liabilities [Bingham Principle Two]. He does not infer a 
challenge to the notion of reasoned opinions, based on the application of law, as being so 
necessary in the application of EU direct tax law abuse cases presented to the judiciary for 
resolution but rightly leaves the door open to subjective assessments of whether such legal 
rights and liabilities were exercised against a more substantive set of normative principles 
such as proportionality and substance over form. The nature of direct tax law and its 
interaction with Fundamental Freedoms creates a grey area of legal rights and liabilities 
outlined by Bingham that will require case-by-case assessment and a balance between the 
application of rules and discretion. To endorse a fair exercise of powers through the exercise 
of the law to achieve this is important. Second, the notion of fair state adjudication [Bingham 
Principle Seven] is important since “adjudication promotes purposive reasoning by inviting 
the decision to be justified by reference to a general rule, standard or principle”24. In the 
context of differentiating and determining unacceptable tax abuse from acceptable tax 
mitigation all judicial administrators of the law will rely on a degree of purposive reasoning 
to justify a ruling irrespective as to whether a reform proposal is rule-based such as targeted 
and specific anti-avoidance rules or formulary apportionment of income and tax, or an 
interpretative based reforms such as a legislative anti-avoidance principle. Bingham is not 
unique in highlighting the importance of this but he raises it to the fore. Third, the notion of 
equal application of the law pervades Bingham’s literature [Bingham Principle Three] and 
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has particular relevance to EU direct tax reform. In today’s commercial world MNE’s are 
formed in varying sizes, across different industry types exercising diverse operating models. 
Similarly from a Member State perspective there is a need to consider the establish doctrines 
of Most Favoured Nation
25
 and National Treatment
26
 that are intended to ensure equal 
treatment of taxpayers across EU jurisdictions consistent with the ethos of the Internal 
Market. In the absence of similarities in taxpayer behaviours, commercial trading patterns 
and Member State tax laws the protection of this principle is imperative to reform success. In 
contrast to Dworkin who promoted a more rights-based theoretical basis for the rule of law, 
Bingham’s focus on more principle-based values in law. This approach is more suited to tax 
law reform in the EU internal market where subjectivity relating to legal taxing rights 
prevails as a consequence of MNE’s abusing Fundamental Freedoms, often demanding 
judicial determination of commercial purpose that is easier to achieve through the application 
of principles than rules. Forth, the significance of dispute resolution is highlighted [Bingham 
Principle Six]. In an EU legal construct with non-homogenous Member States legal systems 
operating different anti-avoidance tax rules it will be important to have consistent, fair and 
accessible access to dispute resolution mechanisms. The EU direct tax abuse issue generates 
winners and losers generating high monetary stakes for both MNEs and Member States so an 
effective dispute resolution procedure is critical. Fifth, there is now universal agreement on 
the importance of human rights [Bingham Principle Five]. It was in the preamble of the EU 
Treaty that promoted the “principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law”27, establishing that those areas of human rights, 
so notably absent from much legal philosophy literature, sit comfortably alongside the 
challenges facing EU law in the context of direct tax abuses. Similarly and uniquely the 
concept of alignment to international law is elevated to the fore [Bingham Principle Eight]. 
The inherent nature of the EU political and economic system systematically nurtures a heavy 
reliance not just on international law but on EU supranational law but in the context of direct 
tax law where the tensions relating to sovereignty become acute and a balance is required 
between public international law and supranational law in matters specific to tax abuse. 
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More generally, Bingham’s promotion of more formal definitions of the rule of law based on 
core normative principles such as clarity and predictability, equality of application and 
procedural fairness are useful when assessing a wide range of dimensions to legal reform 
proposals in the areas of tax abuse. Bingham places great emphasis on the value of 
predictability, as did Dicey, Hewart and Hayek
28
, but is a particular poignant topic in the 
unresolved conflicts between Fundamental Freedoms and EU direct tax avoidance. One of 
the most important aspects that corporate entities need from the law is predictability in the 
conduct of their businesses, and Bingham emphasises the importance of such predictability. 
However, what differentiates Bingham from all others is not only the universality of the 
principles he sought to underpin the rule of law but also the two principles relating to the 
protection of human rights, in relation to the potential liabilities against MNE officers 
responsible for disclosing corporate data, and compliance with international law obligations, 
in relation to the challenge of incorporating a direct law reform proposal into a developing 
supranational EU legal system heavily influenced by established international law and 
developing EU and Member State law.  
 
The reason why it is so important to benchmark against the rule of law is a function of the 
legal indeterminacy resulting from variability in commercial circumstances and the 
developing law in the field of anti-abuse direct tax law abuse. The nature of the problem that 
needs to solved demands legal doctrines that permit both national judiciaries and the CJEU to 
justify a ruling within a given margin. A decision on an alleged corporate tax abuse can be 
achieved either side of an argument in many instances within the context of a body of legal 
rules. Only when doctrinal principles are applied can such discretion, so disliked by Bingham 
and Dicey, be applied in way that modern commercial reality demands. Overall, Bingham 
steers clear of the Dworkin approach by combining some selected formal procedural 
definitions, broadly consistent with the procedural goals set out by Fuller
29
 that provide 
functional efficiency of the law, with a strong substantive set of principles, broadly consistent 
with some of those set out by Dworkin who focused on the values enshrined in the law that 
provides a universal set of definitions that could be widely seen as internationally accepted 
jus cogens. What works for the institutional EU and Member State administrators of the law 
is perhaps more aligned to the formal procedural aspects of the rule of law whereby this may 
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need to be balanced with the demands of the MNE taxpayer who relies more heavily on the 
substantive aspects of the law. Any reform proposal therefore needs to combine traits 
consistent with both aspects to the rule of law in order to reflect the demands of the EU direct 
tax issue under scrutiny. Bingham is best placed to do provide this. 
 
 
6.2 Solutions under Formal Consideration 
 
The policy challenge for formulating any solution involves balancing the multiplicity of 
conflicting targets and interests. An approach to defining the solution target is important, with 
opportunities for targeting constraints against the taxpayer directly as well as opportunities to 
provide enhanced enforcement powers to tax authorities. Such opportunities may focus on the 
underlying economic activities themselves, or from a legal perspective, the tax rules 
themselves.  There are many commentators such as Hampton and Christensen
30
 who promote 
the notion that tax avoidance can be resolved in a centralist EU framework whilst the more 
traditional view is that implementation of national measures that protect sovereign rights are 
more appropriate. There are no shortage of solution options being promoted by various 
stakeholders in the corporate tax avoidance debate – what is important is not to assess the 
economic merits of a solution but rather to assess their feasibility in the context of EU legal 
boundaries, precedents and the general socio-political environment. 
 
Dual forces, not necessarily acting in unison or with common objectives, are driving the 
current solution agenda. On the one hand, Member States in response to public anger and 
economic necessity are attempting to patch up as many loopholes in their tax laws through 
the implementation of Targeted Anti-Avoidance Rules, hereafter referred to as ‘TAARs’ or 
through abuse of rights or similar GAAR-like provisions. These are typically implemented 
unilaterally but there is evidence of Member State collaboration in certain areas of direct tax 
law
31
. On the other hand, EU-wide initiatives are at various stages of maturity. Some 
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proposals such as the consultation on non-double taxation
32
 have not yet resulted in any 
formal proposals while others have been discussed and negotiated by Member States at 
length for some time such as the CCCTB and EU GAAR. The Commission has assumed a 
leading role in gathering support from Member States in the formulation of corporate tax 
avoidance policies or regulations for consideration, although none of these have been enacted 
into law in recent years consequential to the constraints associated with the consensus 
required inherent with DMV.   
 
Legislative solution proposals, taking the form of either EC sponsored initiatives agreed by 
common consensus for implementation across all Member States or at individual Member 
State level to either introduce unitary or collaborative tax harmonisation rules to counteract 
tax avoidance or to strengthen existing national instruments by extending and harmonising 
the coverage and scope of existing laws. Legislation may explicitly provide for purposive 
interpretation or remain literal in form, targeting specific tax avoidance practices or being 
more general in its scope. It may police the form and substance of transactions or it may be 
directed towards an accounting based solution. The proliferation of non-legislative solutions 
include an improved environment encouraging CSR, nurturing behavioural changes by 
MNEs in response to the public anger challenging aggressive tax planning, the strengthening 
of corporate governance, information sharing and exchange of best practice and financial 
reporting and disclosure solutions. Structural solutions relate to fundamental shifts in the tax 
system such as changes in the EU tax base, new institutional powers in the command and 
control of the EU corporate tax system, changes to the EU direct tax law making process, 
changes to EU judicial powers of oversight and law making in corporate tax law, and 
implementation solutions challenging existing institutional channels of change into more 
novel routes for consideration.  
 
 
6.2.1 Legislative Solutions 
 
6.2.1.1 CCCTB 
 
At the forefront of the EU’s agenda for harmonising direct corporate taxation with the aim of 
addressing the most potent tax avoidance tactics is the CCCTB. Successfully implemented in 
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the United States, the CCCTB now “represents one of the most fundamental changes in 
corporate taxation attempted within the EU”33. The CCCTB represents a consolidated set of 
accounting rules that MNEs operating across Member State jurisdictions would use to 
calculate their taxable profits, replacing the separate accounting of MNEs in each Member 
State of operation to a system of consolidated accounting. A centralised EU accounting 
model would be implemented under this system whereby a MNE would apply a common 
methodology for calculating corporate income tax as opposed to aligning with the differing 
rules associated with each Member State in which they have reported economic activity.  
Corporate taxation would then be apportioned to each Member State according to pre-defined 
apportionment formulas. A MNE would disclose a single set of statutory accounts to 
represent the group activities at an EU level and would be the responsibility of the group’s 
parent company forming the group with its subsidiaries or PE’s.  
 
In 2011, the Commission finally published a Directive proposal
34
 detailing the CCCTB, 
setting out a number of anti-abuse rules, largely centred on the anti-abuse principles set out in 
an earlier Commission communication
35
. It applies a two-pronged approach to combat 
perceived abuse through a GAAR
36
, and specific anti-abuse rules to target identified 
problems
37
. The response of the selected countries has been mixed. The UK submitted a 
reasoned opinion to the Commission objecting to the proposal on the grounds that the 
CCCTB goes “beyond the means necessary to achieve the proper functioning of the internal 
market and so breached the subsidiarity principle”38. The Netherlands has submitted reasoned 
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opinions expressing concerns over the subsidiarity aspect of the proposal although without 
substantiated evidence other than reference to the negative impact on GDP of the EU as a 
whole
39
. Its response raised concerns over the apportionment criteria ignoring key items such 
as intangibles and financial assets, and concerns about the proposed rule that the country of 
the EU group level holding is responsible for overseeing the enactment of the CCCTB. Italy 
has expressed no concerns about subsidiarity and is currently supporting the proposal
40
. In 
contrast, Germany has come out against the proposal favouring a mandatory common 
corporate tax base without consolidation
41
. Germany proposes a single mechanism for 
computing taxable profits from all MNEs in the EU where each Member State would retain 
its taxing rights at its own domestic corporate tax rate on the taxable profits declared of 
MNEs resident in its territory, calculated under new common rules. Germany rejects the 
consolidation part of the proposal since such a method would erode Germany’s tax revenue, 
as it believes it would be a net loser in the apportionment of profits in a consolidated 
system
42
. France has been a vocal proponent of the CCCTB proposal as it stands to be a net 
tax revenue benefactor from the CCCTB
43
. In light of France and Germany mobilising efforts 
to harmonise their tax rates it is evident that France is in favour of moving towards a common 
tax base and rate and this has been acknowledged by the Commission
44
.  
It seems unlikely that the CCCTB can be implemented effectively based on the current 
proposals, particularly if implemented on an optional basis. A parallel system of CCCTB and 
                                                     
39
 Gerdi Verbeet, ‘Reasoned Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive concerning a Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/netherlands/2011/com20110121/
com20110121_tweedekamer_opinion_en.pdf> accessed 20 December 2012 
40
 Michel Aujean, ‘CCCTB - The Essentials and the Path Ahead’ (2011) 
<http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_BE/be/insights/newsletters/tax-quarterly/issue44-june-
2011/64eb16a6167b0310VgnVCM3000001c56f00aRCRD.htm> accessed 22 January 2013 
41
 Feargal O’Rourke, ‘CCCTB Dead or Alive’ (2011) 
<http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_ccctb_dead_or_alive_the_latest_developments.pdf> accessed 21 
January 2013 
42
 Ibid  
43
 Matthew Gorman, ‘The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: what does the future hold?’ (2012) CMS, 
13 
44
 Commission ‘Report on the Proposal for a Council directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base 
(CCCTB) COM(2011) 121 
 153 
non-CCCTB Member States could not work efficiently, with potentially the same MNE 
operating different corporation tax modus operandi depending on whether it is based in or out 
of a CCCTB jurisdiction. Given the current optional nature of the proposal, MNEs would also 
be obliged to study in detail the various current systems and regularly review their decision 
whether to opt into the system or not. An all-encompassing corporate tax base involves a lot 
of detailed aspects that are unlikely to find much consensus across Member States. Many of 
these difficulties are not just technical, but also represent deeply rooted ideological tax policy 
divisions. This cultivates a view that it would be mightily difficult to envisage how Member 
States could reconcile many of the issues that this type of corporate base formulation raises in 
the near future. Moreover, the CCCTB requires a formulary allocation mechanism that is 
different from the arm’s-length TRPRICE methodologies that Member States’ currently 
employ
45
. The Commission regards the ability to consolidate losses as one of the CCCTB 
initiative’s main benefits46 but this loss consolidation is not possible without an allocation 
mechanism. Because the CCCTB would apply to almost all types of EU MNEs, the revenue 
impact of these decisions would be immense. Member States will find it difficult to reach 
agreements on these issues given the high economic stakes involved and MNEs will only 
support such a proposal if its cost for complying with the proposals is favourable in respect to 
the resulting cost of additional taxation resulting from closure of avoidance opportunities. 
The principal objections to a CCCTB centre on its infringement on national sovereignty and 
subsidiarity
47
. Subsidiarity, in this context, advocates that any EU originated decisions should 
be consistent and as effective from a policy outcome perspective with decision options 
available to the individual Member States. To achieve subsidiarity such EU actions must be 
proportional to the steps required to achieve the objectives of the EU Treaty. Given the fact 
that a Member State rarely pursues a tax avoidance strategy on its own, such deadlock and 
non-participation is nurtured further at EU level by concerns regarding subsidiarity. The 
CCCTB faces severe political impediments. Advancing the ideals of the CCCTB has been 
from the EC resulting from pressure from the CJEU rather than from MNEs. The EC may 
struggle in itself to mobilise such a wide impacting change initiative. Despite the 
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collaborative formation of the CCCTB proposal with Member States, the involvement of the 
business community has been limited and may yet, despite subsidiarity objections from some 
Member States, still prove to be the source of its dilution or failure. The inequitable economic 
cost implications of implementing the CCCTB generally between different Member States 
presents a tangible risk to support irrespective of the rather unqualified gains in closing out 
certain tax avoidance practices. Despite its comprehensive scope, it could be a challenge for 
Member States to harmonise their own tax policies with the EC proposal, since so many 
aspects of these plans remain unclear, with expectations of materially different impacts on the 
Member States taxation revenues. While a number of objectives are repeatedly emphasized in 
all EC initiatives such as enhancing transparency, the EC has yet to state what the ultimate 
level of coordination should be, ensuring a clear path of reform for curtailing tax avoidance in 
the context of achieving all the other tax objectives inherent within its text. Until it is clear 
what the specific terms of a CCCTB would entail in respect to types of MNE income, and its 
relationship with other parts of the tax base there is clearly much work to do for it to become 
a credible proposal. 
From a scholarly perspective the CCCTB has attracted widespread commentary. In relation to 
research relating to how the CCCTB would address TRPRICE or group relief issues, 
Spengel
48
 concluded that a CCCTB can only assist in resolving group relief abuse if it is 
supported by an agreed minimum corporate tax rate. Panayi suggested that although the 
CCCTB would facilitate elimination of intra-group arrangements, TRPRICE would remain 
relevant under certain conditions and claimed that CCCTB objectives were too broad and 
needed to focus on a narrower scope to have any chance of success
49
. Confusion prevails 
around the underlying benefactor of the CCCTB with Panayi observing that it was unclear as 
to whether the CCCTB was favouring the taxpayer by reducing compliance costs and 
unifying the rules regarding pan-EU profit and loss consolidation basis or whether it was 
aimed at benefiting Member States through minimising TRPRICE and group relief 
50
. Further 
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research by Davies
51
 concluded that the CCCTB would fail in its objective to eliminate 
TRPRICE to manipulate tax bases as this would result in additional distortions as MNEs 
manipulated the factors used in the formula to shift profits from low tax locations, a view 
more widely endorsed in earlier research by Hines
52
 and Riedel
53
. This was further 
commented on by Andersson
54
 who stated that the thresholds for consolidation come with the 
advantage of administrative simplicity but does not factor in the problem of commercial 
manipulation. 
Nerudova opined that CCCTB will not fully address group relief abuse until rules are defined 
concerning dual thresholds, consolidation rules and the rules around moving in and out of a 
group. Tightly defined rules are important as Member States currently deploy “different 
group taxation schemes, and there are also states with no group taxation rules or methods of 
consolidation” 55. Spengel and Wendt56 found that some common rules would be required to 
resolve some the taxation abuse practices it seeks to mitigate. Intra-group losses would 
demand common rules regarding loss carry forward. Potential conflicts may arise from an 
accounting perspective. For example, source taxation, although aligned to the CCCTB, 
cannot be implemented with separate accounting. The need for harmonised accounting rules 
in some form of an Accounting Directive as a pre-requisite to implementing the CCCTB was 
also advocated by Lang et al
57
.  On this point, further research by Neilsen, Raimondos-Mller 
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and Schjeldrup
58
similarly placed strong emphasis on the effects of separate accounting and 
FA on asset allocation and TRPRICE when tax rates change. They found that a MNEs 
average tax rate decreases in many cases if they switched from separate accounting to FA. 
Roeder
59
 made a more fundamental critique of the notion regarding the consolidation element 
of the proposal, noting that consolidation would fail to address the problems associated with 
arm’s-length pricing and that an enhanced Common Corporate Tax Base without 
consolidation is the optimal approach for reducing tax obstacles inherent within the internal 
market. Herzig and Kuhr
60
 highlighted the lack of political feasibility and no linkage to 
financial accounting as being the principal factors behind its likely failure to mobilise 
policymakers, but they too referenced the suitability to pursuing a CCCTB to address some of 
the fierce political opposition evident in the debate to date. The political angle of CCCTB 
adoption was researched by Fuest who focused commentary around the efficiency and 
fairness of the tax system resulting from a CCCTB implementation, noting that “more 
evidence of significant economic benefits [from introducing a CCCTB] would be a pre-
requisite to achieving widespread support” 61 for the proposal. A slightly different political 
perspective was offered by De Wilde
62
who concluded that based on the response to the 
CCCTB from the national governments, and the risk to substantial parts of the EU tax base 
becoming immobile, it could prompt Member States to respond by using the tax rate to 
protect their revenue interests and this would provide an additional dimension to complexity 
in understanding the material impact on mitigating the tax avoidance practices it seeks to 
address. 
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A concluding assessment of CCCTB scholarly commentary suggests the proliferation of 
earlier research focused on the general merits and challenges of the CCCTB in relation to 
how conceptually it would resolve general tax arbitrage concepts such as TRPRICE and 
group relief, particularly in a comparative context with other instruments such as GAAR’s. 
More recent research, following more detailed consultations between the Commission and 
Member States and the publication of the EC Directive proposal
63
 has attempted to address 
more detailed challenges around the how proposal would practically work in the context of 
specific tax system anomalies of individual Member States, in the context of various tax 
system externalities such as accounting rules, as well as in regard to alternative ways of 
trimming down the proposal to make it more manageable in the context making it more 
amenable to securing at least enhanced cooperation. Little scholarly research appears evident 
with regard to articulating a successful implementation proposal for the CCCTB, as arguably 
the biggest challenges are not centred on the merits of the tax proposals per se but rather the 
way in which it may be adopted transitionally rather than in its totality. The largest piece of 
prospective EU tax law change demands a defined implementation path possibly through 
transitional phasing that addresses the concerns that have been well researched and 
documented to date and this remains a clear gap in research commentary. Similarly, there is 
little research on the likely corporate behavioural impact of a CCCTB. Extending beyond the 
conceptual aspects of the CCCTB would suggest a need to understand how various 
stakeholders would react and the impact on its tax avoidance mitigation objectives. Without a 
view on this it becomes difficult to assess the merits of a solution and such a research gap 
suggests there is some way to go before we fully understand the likely feasibility of this as an 
instrument to curb EU tax arbitrage. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the CCCTB offers a useful contribution in a number of 
ways. A harmonised tax base relies on a single set of accounting principles and a common 
approach for offsetting losses. This would deliver a fair and equitable system of computation 
but is complex and likely to impact the economic decision process of MNEs and so may be 
challenged as not being decision neutral. The concept of a common accounting system has 
strong merit and it seems difficult to explain what forces are in place preventing this from 
being implemented in its totality across all Member States. International Financial Reporting 
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Standards is the only recent example of success in this domain. The concept of consolidation 
cuts neatly across Member State boundaries to allow MNEs the ability to level out pan-
European tax base inconsistencies and therefore reduces the incentive to shift profits across 
such boundaries. FA furthermore, introduces a novel way of allowing MNEs the means to 
apportion profits across Member States based on certain predefined apportionment criteria. 
The principle is entirely fair and equitable, relatively straightforward and addresses many of 
the drivers of tax avoidance practices and so this point alone merits further consideration. 
 
It is submitted, however, that the CCCTB is not a viable solution. The method and scope of 
consolidation inherent within the CCCTB proposal presents a particular issue. One key 
element to resolving tax abuse in the EU is to eradicate intra-group transactional profit and 
loss. The principle whereby a resident MNE forms a group entity with all its qualifying 
subsidiaries located in a Member State will prove unworkable as it will nurture MNEs to 
manipulate the legal consolidation thresholds. A further fundamental issue relates to the 
effectiveness of the FA and the weighting factors. If the formulas and weighting are defined 
in a specific and complex manner there exists the possibility of abuse particularly as it would 
be unlikely to be equitably applied across all industry types. The FA mechanism furthermore 
may generate uncertainty for the MNE as it is likely to be subject to reduced tax avoidance 
resulting from TRPRICE but there is some reason to believe that it may not prevent the same 
tax avoidance effect through corporate manipulation of the apportionment formula, 
particularly if corporate tax rates continue to remain divergent. Political inertia is setting in 
for this proposal which is attributable to the perception that it compromises their fiscal 
sovereignty, evidenced by the fact that ten member states have objected based on 
compromising the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. On this basis alone, and 
irrespective of the merits of its consolidation and apportionment model components, it will 
fail as a solution option. The optional nature of the CCCTB similarly presents problems in 
terms of implementation completeness and would provide Member States with the burden of 
having to manage a CCCTB computation as well as their own national tax computations. 
 
In terms of its compliance with the Bingham rule of law definitions, the CCCTB relates 
poorly to the demands of being intelligible, clear and predictable. The consolidation and FA 
definitions may be well defined in a legal sense but offer MNEs too much scope for working 
around to make them robust. The CCCTB does provide a clear type of dispute resolution path 
and although one could reasonable expect proper adjudicative procedures to be in place by 
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Member States it remains unclear what the outcome of this would be on all parties involved. 
On the positive side, there are neither adverse implications on human rights nor any adverse 
prospects for Member States to affront international laws in the pursuit of a CCCTB solution. 
So from a rule of law point of view the CCCTB would only be partially compliant with the 
Bingham criteria. 
 
One alternative but related policy option promoted by a subset of Member States in the form 
of the Eurozone Euro Plus Pact and one that is being fervently discussed in academic circles 
relates to a derivative form of the CCCTB and is known as the Consolidated Common Tax 
Base, hereafter referred to as ‘CCTB’. The CCTB adheres to the basic model of ensuring 
consistency in the EU tax base but significantly omits the consolidation and allocation 
elements of the CCCTB. This substantially eliminates the concerns expressed by many 
Member States relating to the CCCTB and provides a harmonised tax base capable of 
addressing many of the tax avoidance activities that Member States seek to address. In effect, 
the current national tax codes calculating taxable income across Member States would be 
replaced by a single and common set of tax rules, embracing a set of tax base metrics for 
consideration such as depreciation rules, inventory valuations, production costs, double 
taxation and loss relief. The Centre for European Economic Research has promoted a model 
approach for calculating and comparing effective average tax burdens for MNEs located in 
different countries and a study by Oestrecher et al
64
 concluded that for a “large company the 
effective tax burden increases in all countries except Cyprus and Estonia”65. Even for smaller 
MNEs the effective tax burden rose but to a lesser degree. The component contribution that 
each element of the tax base contributes to the increased tax burden is difficult to define but 
the depreciation rules drive the most material impact
66
. There are complex and time related 
interdependencies between components that make any generalised statements around tax rule 
component impact difficult to state. 
 
A more favourable assessment may be concluded from the Bingham rule of law assessment 
in regards to the CCTB. The CCTB relates positively to the demands of being intelligible, 
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clear and predictable. The CCTB similarly provides a clear type of dispute resolution path 
within the context of a mandatory EU implementation and one could reasonable expect 
proper adjudicative procedures to be in place by Member States. Any concerns regarding 
uncertainty of outcome from such procedures are much more limited in the absence of the 
consolidation and apportionment concepts inherent within the CCCTB. There are neither 
adverse implications on human rights nor any adverse prospects for Member States to affront 
international laws in the pursuit of a CCCTB solution. So from a rule of law point of view the 
CCTB would be fully compliant with the Bingham criteria based on the proposals currently 
under review by Member States. 
 
Furthermore, there is evidence that many states are willing to embrace the concept of a CCTB 
policy with countries such as Germany publically supporting such a proposal
67
. Political 
viability is not to be underestimated and when combined with a solution that closes out 
economic distortions and tax planning abuses, it is not difficult to see why this is a 
compelling solution. Considering the constraints of QMV, this diluted version of the CCCTB 
merits consideration. The longevity associated with debating the CCCTB proposal suggests a 
healthy appetite to negotiate a feasible solution to corporate tax abuses but Member States 
participants have never really overcome the fears around uncertainty, equitable tax sharing 
and potential revenue losses associated with consolidation and FA of the CCCTB. The CCTB 
would unquestionably addresses income shifting with broader tax bases leading to an 
aggregated higher effective tax burden across the EU and mitigate these concerns. The only 
key challenge will be whether it can implemented consistently and quickly enough across 
Member States on its own merit and with broad support across sovereign powers and their 
corporate taxpayers.  
 
6.2.1.2 GAAR 
 
A GAAR is a complementary instrument to more specific anti-avoidance legislation that a 
Member State may utilise to ensure that economic transactions are not artificially or 
improperly generated for the purpose of avoiding tax. A GAAR would usually have 
embedded within its wording a sentiment that a jurisdiction is seeking to achieve relating to a 
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philosophy or approach based on the terms substance over form
68
, or abuse of law
69
. GAARs 
differ from anti-avoidance tax rules based on general legal principles as they are codified and 
stated in legislation but differ from specific anti-avoidance rules as they are not focussed on 
being applied to specific situations. In the absence of a GAAR, it is left to the judiciary in 
dealing with abusive practices to decide whether a form succeeds or fails by applying the 
normal principles of statutory interpretation to tax rules. 
 
A GAAR does not represent a unified or customised set of concepts and presumed outcomes. 
In some instances a GAAR may simply serve to legitimise a discretion that the courts are 
already exercising
70
 or it may be establishing a more robust legal basis for assisting judicial 
rulings in attempting to curb tax avoidance practices. If a GAAR does not cover other 
corporate taxes then it leaves the possibility to shift elsewhere so the most effective form 
would be wide ranging in reach and perhaps unspecific to allow the judiciary to establish 
rulings across a wide range of circumstances. In establishing the need for a GAAR any 
jurisdiction would need to form a clear perspective on what it would likely curtail and what 
the economic impact of that would be. 
 
The measures set out in a GAAR are usually fairly consistent but what distinguishes a GAAR 
from other legal doctrines is the relative importance or emphasis they place on certain forms, 
such as contracts, legal entities or arrangements. For example, in Germany special 
importance is given to the abuse of the legal forms that lead to a certain arrangement while in 
the UK the GAAR places emphasis on a business purpose test
71
. One key challenge Member 
States would have in effectively implementing such a solution relates to addressing the 
questions about what legal form is considered inappropriate in the eyes of the GAAR. 
Introducing a subjective element to a tax avoidance provision arguably continues to create 
uncertainty, a view substantiated in research by Troup
72
 who objected to the concept of a 
GAAR as shifting responsibility for determination of tax liability away from the legislature to 
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the judiciary, since it required a body other than the legislature to consider what the 
legislature would have intended. In his view a GAAR can never achieve certainty so must 
always be wrong in principle but accepted the principles must be viewed with an open-
mind.
73
 
 
Merely stating that a form is artificial or improper does not necessarily infer that it is illegal. 
Unless the GAAR establishes a firm comparison benchmark differentiating between an 
economic objective and the associated legal means it is likely to fail. One further problem 
relates to the potential continued conflict between a GAAR and EU law as shaped by the 
CJEU. The CJEU interprets anti-avoidance tax laws in Member States from the perspective 
of adherence to Fundamental Freedoms which may or may not conflict with the tax norms 
purported to be protected by a Member State’s GAAR. Given the potential subjectivity in a 
GAAR the CJEU may be a powerful force in its interpretation as applied in the context of an 
EU specific tax avoidance case. This has the potential to undermine the effectiveness of a 
Member State’s GAAR at any point in time.  
 
Among the selected countries, only the Netherlands does not have any formalised GAAR set 
out in legislation. In France, wide ranging abuse of law provisions
74
 prohibits fictitious 
transactions and legal structures aimed at avoiding, among other taxes, corporation tax. In 
German, similar wide-ranging anti-abuse provisions
75
 exist akin to what a GAAR would 
regularly cover. The provisions provide for defining a tax abuse structure although it does not 
prohibit the use of fiscally advantageous structures if there is at least one economic reason for 
the structure. If an abuse of law, transactional structure is ignored for tax purposes, with the 
tax liability defined as if a regular transactional structure had been utilised. In Italy, a limited 
GAAR exists
76
 to ensure tax authorities are empowered to ignore “acts, facts and transactions 
intended to circumvent obligations and limitations”77 provided under Italian tax law. It only 
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applies if such acts, facts or transactions are included in limited list of transactions or events. 
It is not a true GAAR because it only constrained by a limited list of circumstances.  
 
The Netherlands has no specific GAAR provisions at all but restrict its policy provisions to 
include the assessment of substance over form when assessing transactions. Artificial 
transactions may be ignored by the tax authority through a determination of the facts rather 
than the form. The abuse of law provisions relate to an interpretation method developed in 
case law where the spirit of the law is decisive, rather than the exact wording but can be used 
only as a last resort. The UK is the latest EU Member State to adopt a wide-ranging GAAR 
aimed at abusive transactions
78
.  In the UK, a study was initiated to consider whether a 
GAAR could deter and counter corporation tax avoidance, mindful of the need to retain a 
certain tax regime that is attractive to businesses and keeping costs for businesses and HMRC 
to a minimum
79. This demanded a complex analysis, factoring the UK judiciary’s current 
approach to statutory interpretation of tax statutes, similar approaches and outcomes 
elsewhere around the world, academic commentary and guidance, and projected benefits in 
the event that such a principle was adopted. It concluded that a GAAR would not be effective 
means for the UK tax authorities to attack tax avoidance due to the fact that it would imply a 
risk of eroding stability and certainty but did acknowledge that it would benefit the tax 
authorities where it specifically targets abusive schemes, ensuring more clarity where 
currently the judicial risk of stretched interpretation results in ambiguous precedents being set 
out for businesses.  
 
The European Commission is recommending a common unified GAAR across all Member 
States, recently stating that "Member States should adopt a common General Anti-Abuse 
Rule, under which they could ignore any artificial arrangement carried out for tax avoidance 
purposes and tax instead on the basis of actual economic substance”80. There are arguably 
two different approaches that policymakers could consider in the formulation of an EU 
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GAAR. Either target the taxation of activities based on their economic substance and effects 
or test the arrangement as if it did not take place. In the former approach, it is necessary to 
apply a number of substance tests to ascertain the honest characteristics of an arrangement. 
The real economic substance doctrine provision provides for an assessment relating to a 
transaction that does not have any value other than to create tax losses in which case it would 
be disregarded. It embraces the concepts of sham transactions, substance over form and 
business purpose. On the basis that an MNE have an incentive to generate transactional labels 
to manufactured economic activities, and therefore concealing the real benefactor 
jurisdiction, courts will be challenged to determine the objective underlying suspicious 
truncations. Such suspicions may only materialise into proper tax investigations if the tax 
authorities have a meaningful way of assessing whether there are legitimate reasons for 
structuring a given set of transactions. Even once these challenges are addressed, the courts 
are faced with a further difficulty in ascertaining how a taxable profit should be computed for 
an arrangement once the invalid transactions are stripped out.  
 
There will always be the risk that courts will wrongly declare a legitimate tax planning 
activity as an abusive transaction. Simply looking at the tax benefit to an arrangement 
provides limited insight as a more thorough assessment of the distinctions between subjective 
and real substance will be necessary. It is questionable whether CJEU interpretation of 
subjective and objective substance behaviours would be any less complex than the current set 
of case law originating out of national courts but a settled set of acceptable and non-
acceptable behaviours could be formed in a short time-frame, backed up with an interest and 
penalty regime. The alternative way to regulate a GAAR would be to apply a series of tests as 
if they did not exist to ascertain the outcome. By understanding and measuring against the 
metrics that are being used to quantify the outcome, an adjustment can be made to the 
transaction route by eliminating those elements that are in dispute in order to identify their 
materiality. A number of different tests would likely to have been completed to represent the 
various metrics. A number of offensive transactions that generate a material impact in the tax 
liability of a MNE may be disregarded for tax purposes, therefore requiring a MNE to think 
carefully about embedding transactions with no substance into a transaction route.  
 
There are some clear advantages that could be reaped from an EU GAAR. Mitigating 
aggressive forms of tax avoidance as a result of the ability of Courts to judge not only the 
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authenticity of transactions but also to pass judgment in light of alignment to the spirit of the 
legislation would be a step forward. The challenge would be in relation to national 
legislation, which may differ in spirit and therefore present different results to the same tax 
questions across different jurisdictions. All aggressive and artificial forms of TRPRICE and 
CFC where clear breaches of reasonable behaviour are evidently breached would be tackled 
by a EU GAAR. Any transactions that are proven to have no substance under the 
aforementioned criteria would be candidates for exclusion and a reclassification of the 
transaction route granted, thereby enabling the scope for TRPRICE and CFC abuse to reduce 
substantially. Member State tax authorities would, in theory, retain a means to enable 
enforcement of both the letter and the spirit of the law. Since a General Anti-Avoidance 
Principle effectively outlaws transactions whose sole purpose is to reduce tax liabilities, this 
permits transactions to be reclassified from a legal arrangement of tax avoidance into the 
illegal activity of tax evasion, better defining the transition in legal form from civil to 
criminal law. In contrast, an EU wide GAAR would not address a number of tax avoidance 
issues. Mild and responsible tax planning, and general forms of tax avoidance consistent with 
a taxpayers right to “order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under the appropriate Acts is 
less than it otherwise would be”81 would still prevail. It is similarly unlikely to address 
THINCAP abuses apart from the most aggressive forms, as well as Group Relief abuses that 
would similarly continue. Repeated attempts at challenging the GAAR would still likely to 
occur because if a GAAR is successfully imposed there is no penalty to the taxpayer other 
than paying the tax due, with little incentive to not taking a chance in creating further abusive 
transactions to circumvent the tax in a slightly different manner at a later date. An absence of 
any GAAR penalty regime offers the taxpayer continued opportunities with little downside 
financial risk beyond any tax due if a transaction or set of transactions are re-classified as 
abusive.    
 
In its own right it is difficult to envisage how a GAAR could be anything other than a, 
perhaps useful, compliment to a tax avoidance solution rather than a solution in its own right. 
For the purposes of this thesis, GAARs offer a useful contribution in that they provide a 
framework for outlawing transactions that are deemed to be tax abusive. Their proliferation 
globally suggests they form a use in the battle against tax abuse but this may reflect the ease 
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upon which they may be formed an implemented rather than the benefit they reap. They 
short-circuit the ongoing dependency on detailed tax rule changes that are arguably so 
burdensome in some Member States that they are on the verge of destroying any remaining 
order in the corporate tax system. Inherent unease at any proposal attempting to mitigate tax 
avoidance through the judicial interpretation of what is or isn’t consistent with the spirit of 
the law doesn’t make for a robust and politically feasibly solution that could be relied upon 
for addressing a material number of tax avoidance practices. 
 
In terms of its compliance with the Bingham rule of law definitions, the GAAR solution 
relates poorly to the demands of being clear and predictable due to its provision for judicial 
interpretation. The rule may be well defined in a legal sense but offers the judiciary 
substantial scope for interpretation to make it unpredictable when applied to different 
corporate transactions. The GAAR could in theory provide a clear dispute resolution path and 
although one could reasonable expect proper adjudicative procedures to be in place by 
Member States these are entirely at the discretion of Member States themselves with no 
oversight by the EU in these matters. On the positive side, there are no adverse implications 
on human rights as there are no known repercussions on the MNE directors themselves in the 
event of a disputed GAAR action, nor any adverse prospects for Member States to affront 
international laws in the pursuit of a GAAR solution since any GAAR statement is likely to 
be sufficiently vague to challenge any international laws. So from a rule of law point of view 
the GAAR would only be partially compliant with the Bingham criteria. 
 
A GAAR is unlikely to succeed at EU level simply because of the complexities of having to 
apply the same principle to similar transactions against differing jurisdictional tax rules. The 
growth of anti-abuse rules across Member States exacerbates the complexity of this solution. 
It is difficult to envisage how the EU could agree to a common GAAR proposal even though 
there is a common set of anti-avoidance judicial doctrines emerging across the world. The tax 
ethos and tax bases are divergent in many respects and what may be considered avoidance in 
one jurisdiction may not be considered in another jurisdiction. Certainty would be replaced 
with subjectivity, and any MNE adversely impacted by a GAAR judgement that conflicts 
with a fundamental freedom is open to challenge through the CJEU. The differences between 
GAAR principles and numerous case law doctrines are remarkably immaterial but what is 
apparent is the importance or emphasis given to a particular element of those principles can 
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differ materially. For example, the UK GAAR stresses the importance of a business purpose 
test while the German GAAR focuses on the abuse of law. The CJEU conversely focuses on 
the abuse of Fundamental Freedoms. In this respect the GAAR concept will not form a 
solution to this research solution as it provides for a problem of interpretation since a MNE 
would be challenged by interpreting a certain GAAR provision in a way that may conflict 
either with the intended purpose of a national law or by an CJEU case law judgment both of 
which are stressing differing objectives. This generates uncertainty and forms no credible 
basis for a comprehensive anti-avoidance solution across the EU. 
 
6.2.1.3 General Anti Avoidance Principle 
 
In spite of the concept of a GAAR taking shape in certain jurisdictions and increasingly 
active discussions emerging at national and EU level regarding the feasibility of a GAAR, it 
is quite clear that the judicial system in the EU has been unable to develop a coherent anti-
avoidance rule or principle. Consequently, initial academic research promoted by Freedman
82
 
promoted the concept of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle, hereafter referred to as 
GANTIP, that would differ from a GAAR in that it would “create a legislative principles 
based framework to guide the actions of taxpayers and revenue authorities and give the courts 
authority to develop a legitimate principle through case law”83 although there is no evidence 
that this has been adopted for even high level policy consideration across any of our sample 
EU member countries.The essence of GANTIP, which is a national solution based on a 
principle rather than a rule, is that national tax authorities “would be able to challenge and 
declare null and void any scheme where the primary purpose was an artificial contrivance to 
avoid tax rather than representing a genuine economic transaction”84. Taking the objectives 
of a GAAR to a next level, the GANTIP aims to assault only the most material cases of tax 
abuse ensuring that anything peripheral is deemed legitimate tax planning. Therefore the 
advantage of a GANTIP that is embedded in national law is that it does not require 
substantial volumes of legislation to tackle tax abuse through tax avoidance as and when it 
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arises, retrospectively. It would highlight commonality in addressing tax avoidance across 
Member States through various national rulings perhaps encouraging harmonisation of tax 
legislation over time. It has the possibility to be adopted widely across numerous Member 
States with no identifiable objections even though its impact will vary according to national 
tax law and possible variations in national interpretation across national courts. 
 
Such an instrument of law should be considered and judged as a legitimating and regulatory 
device for use by Member States and not an exercise in precise rule making. The primary 
driver is to ensure transactions represent substance in accordance with national legislation, 
which in itself has been shaped through not only national law making, but also supplementary 
amendments to conform to CJEU judgments ensuring adherence with EU Fundamental 
Freedoms. To this effect it is a smart secondary device aimed at regulating tax avoidance at 
national level appeasing any fears regarding surrender of national sovereignty and ensures the 
enforcement powers of the GANTIP remain at national level too. One of the major issues to 
be resolved with both the GAAR and the GANTIP is its relationship with the underlying law.  
That relationship would be made much simpler if all Member State legislation were to be 
principles based legislation as its implementation would be seamless, avoiding all the 
ambiguities regarding a mix of rules based and principles based legislation. Rules are capable 
of undermining the effectiveness of principles. Such a landscape across Member State tax law 
is unlikely to be evident for some time, if ever, so although the case for some time the 
argument for a GANTIP remains legitimate, it’s effective implementation remains 
questionable. 
 
A principles based approach is not without its issues. Providing the baseline intentions and 
purposive statements could be made by the legislators in the text of legislation itself, or it 
could be assessed and settled through the judicial system. Thus it is not clear where the 
source of legislative intentions would be stated or defined. Complexity in the tax systems at 
Member State level means that it may not always be possible to state what the legislation 
intended, as well as the point that if enacted at national level it may not necessarily generate a 
uniform playing field as the drivers behind anti-avoidance laws in each jurisdiction may vary. 
One pertinent reason for its lack of adoption to date probably relates to the fact that 
legislation would need to be enhanced with clear objectives, without which the rule of law 
would depend on subjective interpretation by local judiciaries. On a similar note, its adoption 
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has not been assessed at EU level as this is largely a national solution that would not be 
conducive towards being implemented across jurisdictions whilst anti-avoidance rules remain 
under the remit of individual Member States. Furthermore, conflicting dilemmas between the 
intention of a Member State anti-avoidance law and the Fundamental Freedoms would not be 
resolved by national GANTIP’s.  
 
The academic reasoning behind a GANTIP, and indeed all principles based legislation, is that 
by replacing rules based tax legislation it gives national tax authorities and judicial bodies the 
power to interpret legislation purpose. Opinions differ on the connection between principles-
based legislation and purposive interpretation. Avery Jones
85
 argued that principles and 
purposive interpretation are one of the same in that legislative purpose is implicitly embedded 
within a principle. Some national courts may be unfamiliar or apprehensive about ruling on 
principles based legislation but common law is based on exactly that and so there should be 
little reason why this should be problematic. The Renton Committee
86
 argued that purposive 
statements added little value to legislation as they are too frequently qualified by subsequent 
rules that may be aligned or in conflict.  Some Courts have similarly been known to be 
apprehensive in the use of purposive legislation such as the Privy Council in 1996 which 
stated “Quite often the benefits of a “purposive” approach are illusory, since the purpose 
which is used as a point of reference merely reflects the contention of one or other of the 
parties about what the words ought to mean”87. 
 
It is true that the legislative purpose may be found in a principle. It could be argued that many 
leading cases in EU tax law identified in Chapter Four have reflected a robust role of the 
judicial system in assuming considerable discretion in the interpretation of rules. A GANTIP 
implementation would allow further empowerment to be assumed by the legislature and 
judiciary in relation to the taxpaying MNE and although this may be appealing to the current 
wave of public opinion it could raise concerns about the fundamental alteration of the balance 
of power between the Member States and their taxpayers.  
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In terms of its compliance with the Bingham rule of law definitions, the GANTIP, assuming 
it takes the form of a solid statement of principle(s), relates satisfactory to the demands of 
being intelligible and clear but poor in its requirement to be predictable. A GANTIP offers 
too much scope for interpretation and its reach is far broader than that would be the case 
under a GAAR to make this anything but unpredictable. Akin to the GAAR, the GANTIP 
could be assumed to offer the opportunity for a Member State to implement a clear dispute 
resolution path and proper adjudicative procedures. On the positive side, there are no adverse 
implications on human rights and it is unlikely that a statement of principle would ever be 
drafted that would challenge international laws. So from a rule of law point of view the 
GANTIP again would only be partially compliant with the Bingham criteria 
 
The GANTIP offers a useful contribution to the solution debate as it introduces a previously ill-
defined distinction between the role of tax principles and tax rules. Sympathetic appraisal of the 
GANTIP stems from the view that many forms of mainstream tax avoidance would be subject to 
rigorous challenge by Member State tax authorities such as instances whereby income is shifted or 
reclassified. For the purposes of this research it is not seen as a viable solution for broadly similar 
reasons behind rejecting the GAAR. There is a certain irony in promoting a solution based on a 
statement of principle being identified in the legislation that aims to clarify a purpose. For the most 
part, legislation is generally fairly well understood in its purpose, with the only areas of uncertainty 
relating to those elements of legislation where it is highly technical. Even in these situations a 
GANTIP would be unlikely to assist. It is similarly only a narrowly focused solution that may be 
applied at national level with little prospect of a harmonious principle being adopted across all 
Member States. Any attempt at either achieving an agreed GANTIP for EU wide adoption let alone 
the prospect of understanding which judicial body, CJEU or Member State judicial functions, would 
be most authoritatively placed to assume responsibility for interpretation renders this solution as 
unworkable. 
 
6.2.1.4 TAARs 
 
A TAAR represents an anti-avoidance instrument deployed by Member States and may be 
defined as “a specific and very detailed rule… added… to tax legislation….that frustrates one 
kind of avoidance transaction or another”88. It “represents a middle route between the 
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applications of a general anti-avoidance rule, whether legislated or judicially created, and the 
use of detailed technical measures to counter every transaction that is considered 
unacceptable”89.  
 
The proliferation of TAARs across Member States suggests that these have been the simpler 
approach to attempting to resolve specific avoidance schemes in a particular jurisdiction at 
any one point in time. Varying degrees of coverage and complexity are evident across 
Member States in the deployment of TAARs in national law although the search for more 
general and comprehensive measures to counteract ongoing avoidance suggests that there is 
consensus on their limited value, providing support in only certain circumstances to tax 
authorities who have been instrumental in demanding detailed and specific tax avoidance 
rules as a tool for cracking down on offensive tax avoidance activities. 
 
The concept of targeted rules implies that legislators can predict impending offensive 
transactions, otherwise a set of TAARs need to be substantiated with a GAAR provision. If 
legislators could foresee all varieties of tax avoidance, they would pass specifically targeted 
rules to frustrate those endeavours and not bother with any further efforts to resolve 
avoidance activities either individually or bi-laterally with other Member States or the EC. 
The most specific of rules will always have borderline cases. TAARs are typically very 
specific and detailed. Unfortunately the more specific and detailed a tax system’s rules 
become, the more ways people find to circumvent those rules
90
. One failure of the TAAR 
provisions stems from the fact that a TAAR may end up being so specific that it results in the 
need for further detailed legislation to counteract consequential avoidance activity. This 
merry-go-round of continual catch up frustrates the tax authorities, whose discretion is 
impaired through the implementation of TAARs, and the cost of tax planning and resulting 
uncertainty is a burden on business. The value of certainty is placed highly on discussions in 
the corporate tax arena. Ironically, one could argue that TAARs increase certainty for MNEs 
in specific areas as they articulate the line of acceptable behaviour for a given transaction or 
scheme. On the other hand, the fact that a TAAR rarely closes all loopholes suggests that 
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there is a high degree of uncertainty associated with TAARs as MNEs constantly assess ways 
of circumventing the rules.  
 
Again, a review of a TAAR in the context of the Bingham criteria provides interesting 
conclusions. In terms of its compliance with the Bingham rule of law definitions, the TAAR 
satisfies well the need to be clear, intelligible and predictable. By definition a more targeted 
rule is precise and limits scope for misinterpretation by either the corporate taxpayer or the 
judiciary. Assuming a TAAR is embraced within the context of regular tax legislation at 
Member State level there could be every reasonable expectation that it would benefit from a 
clear dispute resolution path and proper adjudicative procedures. There are no obvious 
adverse implications on human rights and it is unlikely that a targeted rule would ever be 
drafted that would challenge international laws. So from a rule of law point of view the 
TAAR, on the face of it, looks reasonably compliant. Where it potentially fails is in relation 
to some other legal interpretations regarding the rule of law. Some commentators have taken 
Bingham’s criteria regarding clarity and predictability to the next level. Dicey speculated that 
the rule of law demands “the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed 
to the influence of arbitrary power”91 implying that the rule of law demands a clear, 
comprehensive and assertive legal statement rather than a series of “isolated commands92”. 
This does not sit particularly comfortable with the concept of a TAAR but upon review 
perhaps this rule of law requirement is a little less relevant than first meets the eye. If a legal 
problem relates to specific and complex commercial transactions practiced across 
jurisdictional boundaries that are deemed to be inconsistent with a tax rule then surely a 
comprehensive legal statement is rendered meaningless. A targeted problem naturally favours 
a targeted solution but a more straightforward assessment may assume that its simple lack of 
broad coverage renders it as a partial solution and to that extent not worthy of full strategic 
tax policy consideration. One may view the promulgation of TAARs as part of a general tax 
policy whereby specific schemes are targeted with precision and those cases of abusive 
behaviour that might defeat a TAAR warrant the implementation of a GAAR as a back-up. 
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One option open to Member States is to formulate more purpose-based TAARs with the 
focus on setting boundaries around the commercial intentions behind enacting a transaction 
rather than the boundaries around the specific details of such a transaction. There are clear 
examples of this in Member State law, such as the latest debt buyback anti avoidance rules in 
UK
93
. This legislation advanced earlier provisions that stated that the targeted anti-avoidance 
rule on debt release schemes apply “rules about impairment losses and release of debts in the 
case of companies connected with other companies”94. A similar example can be evidenced 
in France whereby a specific withholding tax of fifty per cent
95
 is imposed on dividends and 
interest it can be demonstrated that the relevant transaction does not have the main purpose or 
effect of localizing such income in a non-cooperative country promoting a lower tax rate. It 
begs the question in the context of all these purposive TAARs whether a more rounded 
solution could not be more effectively deployed under the authority of a purpose-based 
GAAR that would cast a wider net and necessitate fewer legislative provisions in national 
law. In the absence of any purposive reasoning, a TAAR would demand notes accompanying 
the legislation detailing the framework for application of the provision by the taxing 
authority.  
Despite these advancements towards purpose based TAARs, they are not generally 
considered to be the Member States weapon of choice in respect to tackling avoidance, and 
the consensus regarding their usefulness being limited to a complementary set of provisions 
only as such renders the analysis of their worth as a strategic solution necessarily short, 
notwithstanding the fact that consideration needs to be made of their current proliferation in 
the context of such a strategic solution. For this reason alone, and in spite of its favourable 
reflection in light of the rule of law assessment, this solution is rejected as a feasible solution 
either as part of a solution or in its totality. Consolidating TAARs into a harmonised set of 
targeted tax rules across all Member States would be difficult to achieve in a reasonable time 
period, if at all. Akin to the GAAR If a serial tax abuser was faced with a series of TAARs 
there would always be opportunities to circumvent the rules either discretely and indirectly, 
or directly in a challenge to the CJEU if they were felt to be inconsistent with any EU 
Fundamental Freedoms that sit at the heart of all tax abuse activities. 
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6.2.1.5 Other Legislative Proposals 
 
Member States have, over time, advanced a comprehensive, if not fragmented, set of anti-
avoidance legislation that attests to the difficulty in formulating a credible set of legislative 
provisions to address tax avoidance. Furthermore, various soft law initiatives from 
institutions such as Commission and OECD have added to that mix of legislative provisions, 
none of which is necessarily formulated with a view to resolving the entire problem or indeed 
necessarily have any objective appreciation as to how much of a given problem it will 
ultimately achieve or contribute towards a EU wide solution. Despite the colour that this mix 
of legislation offers, we can identify a few specific themes that are worthy of identification 
and analysis across our sample set of Member States. This is primarily looking at from the 
perspective of the source of legislation, the scope and content of the legislation and the target 
of the legislation. The source of legislation may be Member State or EU based although at 
present it remains firmly within the remit of the former. The scope and content of legislation 
varies from initiatives focusing on business transactions, corporate governance to accounting 
standards. The target of the legislation can similarly vary from MNEs, tax avoidance scheme 
promoters, accounting and audit MNEs to any other intermediary potentially considered a 
stakeholder in the tax avoidance process.  
 
With regards to other key legislation at a national level, there is evidence of disclosure 
legislation as well as legislation aimed at curtailing specific promoted schemes. Aimed at 
combating pre-planned tax avoidance schemes, they are capable of capturing more broadly 
defined tax avoidance activity. Scheme disclosure regulations permit an upfront attack by 
providing tax authorities with relevant and timely data that ensures organised abuse may be 
addressed at the earliest stage feasible. The popularity of promoter penalty regimes similarly 
serves to act as an effective deterrent to organised abuse and come with significant financial 
penalties to deter such practices. The UK has been the pioneer of this legislation in the EU 
and its provisions enacted in 2006 were aimed at providing HMRC with an early warning 
system regarding potentially abusive corporation tax arrangements. The legislation
96
 defines 
a tax arrangement as one where a tax advantage is sought, where that tax advantage is 
expected to be the main benefactor of the arrangement and comes into the description of a 
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hallmarked scheme. Reinforced with a penalty for scheme promoters this approach has been 
successfully implemented by HMRC, with 40 schemes being successfully challenged 
between 2010 and 2012 according to a report by the National Audit Office
97
. This report also 
raised concerns about a spectacular 41,000 unresolved scheme cases that have not been 
reviewed suggesting that although the legislation is conceptually sound the practicalities of 
enforcing it are burdensome, perhaps reflected in the “very long timescales involved in 
investigating, litigating and resolving avoidance cases, with the oldest cases dating back to 
the early 1990's”98 It may also be a reason why no such similar scheme is existence across 
other EU jurisdictions.  
 
There are other legislative solutions available to tax policymakers at a national level. Akin to 
all national legislation, of course, the effectiveness of such statutes is dependent on how 
many other Member States follow suit. Some Member States such as France and Germany 
are currently working closely together on harmonisation of rates and rules to present a 
heavyweight precedent for other Member States to follow in their stride. Research by 
Murphy
99
proposed promoting legislation for revising the source and residency principles. 
Obliging MNEs to file statutory accounts identifying the ownership of revenue generating 
assets ensures visibility to identify variations between the reporting jurisdiction and the 
jurisdiction in which they are physically located. It necessarily follows that the tax liability 
should correlate to the jurisdiction in which the entity is actually located to correctly compute 
a residence based tax liability. The other angle to Murphy’s research proposed to simplify the 
tax system by “elimination of corporate allowances and reliefs”100 available to be used either 
in their entirety, to MNEs operating in certain industries where abuses are more widespread, 
to MNEs who are using such allowances or reliefs with no obvious correlation to their 
underlying business or just to those MNEs that have the resources to avoid tax. A consensus 
may emerge to simplify, reduce or eliminate such ad hoc allowances and reliefs in statutes 
across all Member States and replace with direct intervention by the government in those 
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parts of the Member State economies that demand the pursuit of certain economic objectives. 
There are, however, many other forms of tax system reforms aimed at addressing reliefs and 
allowances. For example, research by Griffith, Hines and Sorensen
101
 and Mooij and 
Devereux
102
 advocated the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE) system whereby MNEs 
are allowed to deduct an imputed normal return on their equity from their corporate income 
tax base rather than interest deductions on their debts. Variations of this are reflected in the 
Allowance for Shareholder model advocated by Brys
103
, as well as the Comprehensive 
Business Income Tax model advocated by Cnossen
104
. These have been implemented in part 
or in full by various countries over recent decades targeting principally the ill effects of 
THINCAP, neutralising double taxation and the mitigating distortions between new equity 
and retained earnings. However, the key constraint is that these reforms are less attractive 
when implemented unilaterally and require more substantial and broader adoption for them to 
be effective alternatives of sourced based corporation tax systems.  
 
If fundamental reform of the tax system attracts limited enthusiasm then accounting reform is 
an alternative approach. Although the CCTB has harmonised accounting reform at its heart, 
there is a specific and separate candidate for legislative consideration at both Member State 
and EU level relating to rationalisation and improvement of the proliferation of accounting 
standards and disclosure rules that have been enacted at all levels of the EU economy. 
Interestingly the driver behind such changes have largely been the MNEs themselves who 
have sought common levels of principles, rules and disclosures across jurisdictions to enable 
them to operate on a more levelled basis, supported and recognised by governments, 
accounting bodies and audit firms. Although such diverse support has possible different 
driving forces, the impact of accounting standards have been to expose tax avoidance 
stakeholders to a potentially powerful weapon in their fight against aggressive tax planning 
by making it transparent how the correlation between accounting standards and potential tax 
avoidance practices are linked. The link, for example, between International Financial 
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Reporting Standards, hereafter referred to as IFRS, accounting policies and TRPRICE is 
widely documented. For example, Fris and Gonnet
105
 claiming that the adverse balance sheet 
impact of adopting IFRS accounting policies encourage TRPRICE. Disclosure is a useful 
corollary to accounting standards and adds an extra dimension to regulate MNEs standards by 
exposing them to public scrutiny.    
 
When a Member State employs a separate accounting tax system, it, in effect, protects the 
income-producing activities taking place in its jurisdiction. There are implications when a 
MNE operating across the EU attempts to assign some of its income to a specific jurisdiction. 
Under the separate accounting system, the transactions are measured in accordance with the 
tax base and the tax accounting conventions of the jurisdiction to which it is attributed. 
Similarly, the activity is appraised separately from related transactions carried out by the 
same MNE in different Member States. Accordingly, every separate accounting system has 
its own TRPRICE rules for segregating integrated transactions occurring in more than one 
Member State. The harmonisation of tax accounting rules and associated reporting 
disclosures is one such way of mitigating these anomalies that encourage TRPRICE. 
 
A proposal
106
 promoting “country by country reporting, requiring all MNEs to report sales, 
profits, and taxes paid in all jurisdictions in their audited annual reports and tax returns”107 
has been advanced. Such information has traditionally been difficult to collate by the tax 
authorities, and would be resolved by country by country reporting identifying where 
corporations are located and what they do, how much business they do in each state as 
measured by an agreed financial metric, and how much tax they pay in each and every 
Member State that they have a presence. It would “hold companies to account and force them 
to change their behaviour under the glare of public, regulator and investor scrutiny”108. In the 
current environment MNEs typically “publish segmented information in their public accounts 
that breaks their business transactions down by product or business lines”. There is no 
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obligation or indeed any commercially motivated reason to publish data on a geographical 
country by country basis even though corporate entities are taxed in this way. Statutory 
reporting based on being a unified entity does not correlate with the way in which they are 
taxed. MNE subsidiaries constituting a group entity are taxed individually making it difficult 
to establish a view as to whether any abuses of law are taking place. Proposals being 
promoted by organisations such as The Global Reporting Initiative
109
 and the Publish What 
You Pay campaign
110
 seek to enhance transparency about the contribution made to different 
Member State jurisdictions. An existing EU directive
111
already provides a valid starting point 
for the EU to begin exercising some authority in these areas. 
 
Similarly at EU level, the EP passed a resolution to urge the International Accounting 
Standards Board, hereafter referred to as ‘IASB’, to move beyond the current voluntary 
accounting guidelines and invoke a mandatory, more rigorous set of standards and reporting 
disclosures, including on a country by country basis
112
. Accounting reform has the prospect 
of exposing, and potentially addressing if implemented with rigour, TRPRICE and group 
trading relief.  There are three possible solutions to consider. First, empower a body such as 
or EU to grant the IASB regulator status, with all the necessary funding, remit and 
enforcement powers mandating it with the regulation of audit and accounting firms to ensure 
such standards and disclosures are met. Such a regional or global mechanism was identified 
by Ville-Pekka who stated “national legislation insufficiency in economic globalisation 
makes room for some global mechanisms and their distribution, which is conducted by 
powerful anti-tax forces”113. Second, EU lobbying for ensuring Member State governments 
legislate for the mandatory implementation of accounting standards, tightened up to prevent 
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TRPRICE, deferred taxation and other similar loopholes. Third, a solution promoted by 
Murphy suggests that in the absence of harmonised accounting standards, MNEs should be 
required to  disclose “the consequence of differing accounting systems on the calculation of 
group taxation liabilities” 114, and supplemented with “disclosure of tax avoidance 
arrangements giving rise to tax deferral”115 as part of any statutory disclosure. This latter 
softer solution approach assumes a behavioural change on behalf of MNEs as they respond to 
such public disclosures.  
 
Any advancement in harmonised accounting standards and reporting disclosures needs to be 
unilaterally agreed at EU level or beyond rather than on a bilateral basis as is the case 
currently between a MNE and Member State. Large corporate organisations typically retain 
the sort of financial accounting data being requested so the cost of implementation would be 
minimal. Consistent adoption across the EU of a common standard means there can be no 
claims of unfair competitive disadvantage. As a note of caution, reformation of accounting 
rules and reporting does not solve all our corporate tax avoidance issues either directly or in 
their totality. It is the scale and volume of tax avoidance that it struggles to address rather 
than the complexity. For example, THINCAP would not be impacted by such reform in itself. 
Of course accounting standards can expose THINCAP, but it cannot be made effectively 
illegal without both challenging the validity and practice of the OECD arms-length principle 
and challenging MNE group debt arrangements, which is difficult without impacting the 
corporate rights and structures of modern business. Similarly for TRPRICE, accounting and 
disclosure reform can expose and highlight to the tax authorities TRPRICE arrangements but 
it still requires intervention and enforcement by the national tax authorities to pursue and 
resolve. Only a common legislated penalty regime aimed at MNEs pursuing aggressive 
TRPRICE arrangements across EU substantiated by a well-resourced set of tax authorities 
would be capable of reducing TRPRICE avoidance practices.    
 
For the purposes of this research, the accounting angle to a solution proposal has strong 
merit. One could reasonably assume that any solution alluding to resolving tax avoidance 
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through the use of tax law changes or changes to the tax system itself are fraught with 
complexity due to the unanimous and consensual nature of approval required and the time 
that it would take to achieve this if at all. Tax law solutions themselves, by nature, are 
focused on resolving the tax issue directly. An accounting solution attacks this from the 
perspective of exposing the avoidance. The challenge relates to whether exposing the 
avoidance is sufficient for other forms of resolution to then take hold such as triggering 
Member State tax investigations, adverse publicity resulting in moderating tax abusive 
behaviours, or perhaps enforcement via a GAAR or GANTIP executed at EU level.  
 
Legal attestations offer an assurance that compliance has been attested to by an individual. 
There is evidence of successful implementation of such an approach in other jurisdictions, not 
necessarily in relation to tax abuse but in relation to financial controls and disclosure, 
116
and 
in relation to regulatory compliance within the financial services industry
117
. In relation to our 
sample set of Member States Germany has legal attestation requirements associated with its 
German Corporate Governance Code
118
 as does France with its Financial Security Law
119
 and 
Netherlands with its Tabaksblat laws
120
. The pertinent text in Sarbanes Oxley states that the 
signing CEO and CFO must confirm that they are "responsible for establishing and 
maintaining internal controls and have designed such internal controls to ensure that material 
information relating to the MNE and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such 
Officers by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic 
reports are being prepared”121. In the Capital Requirements Regulation the pertinent wording 
states that an Officer of the MNE must make a disclosure when there is a “material breach of 
the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions governing 
activities of institution”122 
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In the case of Sarbanes Oxley there are civil
123
 and criminal
124
 provisions to the legislation 
and it is this point that provides the researcher with both the most compelling and potentially 
potent weapon against tax abuse behaviour but one that also provides the most difficult aspect 
to implement in the context of the EU Treaty. It has to be questioned whether a legal 
attestation is viable in the criminal context since how can a criminal charge be bought against 
an Officer of a MNE if an attestation contravenes a rule or principle but is consistent with a 
fundamental freedom promoted by the EU. The European Court of Human Rights would be 
the perfect judicial forum for such a challenge by a convicted Officer. Note from a Sarbanes-
Oxley perspective such legal challenges have been made against the constitutionality of the 
legislation largely based on a lack of severability clauses but these to date have been 
unsuccessful
125
.  
 
Akin to many other solutions a legal attestation is not a solution in its own right but warrants 
further strong consideration as a useful enforcement point as part of a broader solution. From 
a corporate perspective, the prospect of a criminal conviction ensures that such legislation has 
the upmost attention of any responsible MNE Officer. In relation to the Bingham rule of law 
criteria the solution concept stands well placed. The legal statement outlining attestation 
requirements are likely to be entirely intelligible, clear, and predictable. Legal rights 
associated with a challenge would be accessible through the application of the law and any 
attestation requirement is unlikely to break any international legal obligations. The only area 
of uncertainty would relate to its protection to fundamental human rights. Irrespective of how 
the attestation requirement is worded it is always going to be open to potential challenge if 
the attestation challenges any aspect of EU Fundamental Freedoms. The nature and specific 
wording of the attestation is therefore of critical importance. If it pertains to a general 
statement around conformance with a purposive statement inherent within a GAAR it would 
arguably be set up to fail as it would be open up the attestation to a legal challenge based on 
subjective interpretation of the GAAR if such an interpretation was deemed to be inconsistent 
with a EU fundamental freedom. If it pertains to conformance to more specific rules 
associated with a TAAR or a specific tax rule again this provides a useful level of assurance 
to the Member State but again is open to legal challenge if a consequence of a TAAR or other 
                                                     
123
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US), 2002, s302 
124
 Ibid, s906 
125
 Free Enterprise Fund v Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [2006] 561 US 
 182 
specific rule is deemed inconsistent with an EU fundamental freedom. In this case it could be 
argued that the TAAR or other tax rule under scrutiny is inconsistent with a EU fundamental 
freedom and not the legal attestation itself. As long as the tax rule is bona fide in terms of EU 
Fundamental Freedoms then so should the legal attestation associated with it. If the legal 
attestation provides the right level of attention to corporate compliance the barometer of 
success regarding its usefulness to deal with tax avoidance more generally is then placed on 
the effectiveness of the rule itself. If such a requirement for a corporate legal attestation was 
placed on an accounting rule or similar that was not a tax rule but indirectly had the effect of 
ensuring corporate behaviours were changed to have the effect of mitigating tax avoidance 
then this would be a useful tool for consideration. For example, thresholds could be set 
requiring explicit pre-clearance by either Member States or a EU institution for excessive tax 
avoidance baselined against specific criteria as identified through country-by-country 
reporting regulations. Such a concept warrants consideration in formal solution proposals. It 
relies on legal self-attestation against a rule, which in itself is not inconsistent with the EU 
Fundamental Freedoms as it relates to pre-clearance rather than adherence to a given 
threshold.  
 
6.2.2 Non-Legislative Proposals 
 
Alongside statutory measures a number of other policy directives that have a non-legislative 
basis are evident such as corporate governance codes and corporate social responsibility 
codes. Promoting good corporate governance remains at the centre of the debate for taxation 
and many other areas of corporate and governmental practice where behavioural and 
organisational factors are a material determinant of corporate tax planning and government 
policymaking respectively. Tax governance has two clear elements. First, it relates to the 
role, interaction, modes of governance and the framework in place to share and advance 
policy ideas between Member States and supranational organisations such as the EC and 
OECD when devising and regulating tax systems. Second, it relates to how corporate bodies, 
namely MNEs, conduct themselves in tax matters, specifically around controls and 
accountability. This distinction was further researched by Radaeilli and Kraemer
126
 who 
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suggested that in respect to tax policy one had to consider “a set of governance arenas rather 
than a single entity”, identifying Member States, EC, tax authorities and MNEs as being the 
players in such a governance arena.  
 
In regards to the EC, there have been various communications in recent times, some directly 
targeting tax governance
127
, and others, amongst others, targeting specific tax avoidance 
issues such as TRPRICE
128
, tax fraud
129
, tax co-ordination
130
 and double taxation
131
, and 
others more general
132
 in nature. There is little doubt that the EU is making assertive efforts 
to provide authoritative guidance to Member States and their tax authorities and resident 
MNEs in the domain of corporate tax. As they stated, “the EU and its partners have a strong 
common interest at this time in promoting tax cooperation and common standards on as wide 
a geographical basis as possible….to work together to encourage and support the move that 
has now started towards a broader acceptance of international standards of tax 
cooperation”133. Proactive initiatives emanating out of the Commission, notably the EU Code 
of Conduct Group codes of conduct, have gone some way towards enhancing the EU formal 
governance environment through promoting cooperation arrangements and implementing 
ECOFIN resolutions.  
 
Through the evolution of corporate governance codes and various Member State legislation 
there is evidence of a movement towards a common definition of a harmonised view on what 
constitutes the accepted principles and practices of corporate governance.  In light of a 
burdensome corporate governance framework across many jurisdictions, MNEs take account 
of the nature and standard of corporate governance when architecting schemes to shift profits. 
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Only the UK
134
 evidences any efforts to align corporate income tax laws with corporate 
governance legislation and policy guidance. It could be argued that Member States promoting 
corporate governance best-practice is attributable to differences in law rather than variations 
in recommendations that stem from the various governance codes across jurisdictions. 
Member State laws relating to corporate governance tend to reflect national attitudes and 
tolerances, whereas codes of conduct tend to express a common view on good practice.  
 
All Member States have various codes of conduct that supplement the various regulations and 
laws governing corporate practice both in the MNE itself as well as in relation to its 
relationship with other bodies such as the State and its tax authorities. The EC has referred to 
the current EU corporate governance systems as a “patchwork of arrangements”135. Codes of 
conduct have a mixed review, with some critics such as Bratton and McCahery
136
 arguing 
their worth is limited and “vulnerable to challenge”137, while other such as Baccaro138 
pointing out the benefits, stating “international codes of conduct contribute to bring order to 
the unruly world of private codes of conduct”139.  Others such as Painter-Morland140 claim 
that MNE codes of conduct are “mere window dressing,,,[and that]… their western biases 
highlights the lack of stakeholder engagement in the code development processes” but that 
they can be made to work if integrated with a state guided ethics orientated programme of 
CSR. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, an enhanced EU wide corporate governance framework 
remains an interesting solution proposition. Arguably a robust set of corporate governance 
principles that are specifically focused on overseeing corporate tax or accounting practices 
that are established and monitored at EU level are a useful starting point. There is no specific 
institutional body in place that is well served currently to do this at EU level and it is hard to 
see how easily achievable it would be to attain consensus on these governance rules across 
such a diverse set of Member States operating in a complex tax and accounting environment. 
A light governance solution may incorporate the establishment of a single forum with 
representation from all Member States for discussing and managing consensual agreements 
regarding tax avoidance rule changes or responses to tax abusive practices. A more 
heavyweight governance solution may focus on responsibilities for incorporating matters 
such as nurturing formal tax and economic co-ordination and relationships between Member 
States, generation of tax rule Directives, tax recovery processes, managing political dialogue 
in levelling the tax avoidance rules across Member States or formulating a formal rule or 
principle akin to that described earlier in the chapter that is negotiated and implemented at an 
EU level. Some of these governance practices have formed part of the ECONFIN remit to 
date but could be further enhanced by either a more narrowly focused effort on promoting 
measures relating to specific tax avoidance practices or by folding into a separate institutional 
function under the same EU framework that has a higher profile and more robust mandate to 
deliver change proposals to the Commission for consideration in a Directive. Despite these 
options this research will not be taking this solution option any further. Tax avoidance is a 
complex matter in the EU and akin to other forms of non-legislative proposals the governance 
solution is useful and interesting but far too weak and open ended to be considered even a 
significant solution let alone a total solution. The magnitude of change required in a 
measured timescale against a backdrop of highly protected EU Fundamental Freedoms deems 
a governance solution as unfit for purpose. 
 
To date Member States have not formally demonstrated a willingness to extend the 
boundaries of their corporate governance codes relating to tax matters from voluntary 
compliance to either civil or criminal sanctions. In accordance with the legality principle, it is 
common for Member State law retain a clear dividing line between these two laws for 
addressing tax offenses, broadly defined by the perceived boundaries between evasion and 
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avoidance. A study by the Commission
141
 identified all 35 corporate governance codes in 
place at that time across Member States had no civil and criminal sanctions relating to any 
matter. Some codes such as the UK Corporate Governance Code make no reference at all to 
tax
142
; others such as the German Corporate Governance Code
143
make reference indirectly, 
detailing specific procedures relating to corporate Supervisory Committees for compiling, 
auditing and authorising financial statements including all tax related transactions but have no 
formal civil or criminal sanctions. Arguably the EU and individual Member States have an 
opportunity to criminalise commonly agreed regulations relating to tax avoidance practices 
that don’t necessarily impede the exercise of EU Treaty freedoms but are generally agreed to 
constitute tax planning abuses. Tax avoidance is not illegal and so what could be incorporated 
into a solution is a shifting in the boundary between what constitutes tax evasion and what 
constitutes tax avoidance. Tax planning arrangements reviewed by a judicial function can 
only be classed, upon failure, as ineffective for tax purposes, not illegal. Such arrangements 
and the law governing their legality can have a material impact on the commerciality of a 
business’s relationship with its trading partners. 
 
For the purposes of this research, CSR offers a useful contribution to the solution debate in 
that it leverages the dual powers of good corporate citizenship with public admiration, and all 
the commercial consequences of, a positive socially responsible corporate image. It denies 
any solution of the need to collate consensus around formal tax law changes and it sits at the 
heart of the arguments from proponents of the benefits attributable to corporate behaviours on 
tax avoidance practices. From an academic and practical perspective it cannot be considered 
to be anything more than an interesting complimentary element to a solution rather than a 
solution that is able to hold its ground in its own right. On this basis it is rejected as a formal 
policy approach but socio-political trends will likely retain life in this concept as a useful 
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contributor to the wider behaviours associated with attempting to avoid the adverse impact of 
publicity associated with tax abuse behaviour.  
 
We can distil useful conclusions from some aspects to these proposals and in particular 
review the likely impact from some of the components of the recent OECD BEPS proposal, 
identified in itself by Panayi
144
 as the single most important advancement of a tax avoidance 
initiative for some time. This OECD report sets out a number of principles, the most pertinent 
of which to this research, promote an international tax system whereby the payment of tax 
payments are consistent with the jurisdiction in which the payments were made as well as the 
principle whereby taxable income is better aligned to income with activity through 
consideration of substance. Neither of these are particularly new solution concepts but it is 
the first time that these have been promoted as a formal policy proposal from the OECD. 
Challenges will ensue regarding transitioning such a policy proposal to a formal solution 
implemented by an institutional body with the authority to implement successfully across all 
Member States factoring in the scale and complexity of the undertaking as well as the need 
for generating consensus amongst all participating countries. Success will be dependent on 
Member State adoption of all the components promoted in the proposal within a similar 
timeframe. A failure to do so will mean there would be little incentive for individual Member 
States to enact the policy components in isolation as this will place domestic MNEs at an 
unfair competitive disadvantage to those located in Member States that haven't adopted the 
policy components. A review of literary commentary on the OECD proposal suggests there is 
strong public support for the measures, however it is unlikely that governments will act 
against the interests of their domestic MNEs should public favour wane in the future
145
. 
Historically governments have struggled to reach consensus on international tax measures. 
For example the aforementioned CCCTB first proposed in 2001, would address some of the 
issues that the BEPS Report identified, but has yet to be implemented due to lack of 
consensus among EU countries. Similarly the EU's plans to introduce a Financial Transaction 
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Tax which had strong public support in recent years was subsequently postponed due to lack 
of consensus among EU countries on its scope. 
 
Elements of the OECD proposal are worthy for consideration in this research proposal. It 
highlights the necessity for an effective dispute mechanism
146
, which is consistent with the 
rule of law notion defined by Bingham when related to the provision of a fair adjudication 
procedure and timely means to resolve disputes. It similarly highlights the need to address 
specific tax avoidance issues with specific measures implying that there is no one solution 
that addresses all avoidance issues in one hit. For example the proposal to address CFC via 
the harmonisation of Member State rules and limiting TRPRICE through enacting limitations 
on base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments. Changes to the Model 
Tax Convention
147
 are proposed to address the artificial avoidance of PE status as is the 
proposal to resolve TRPRICE through the alignment with a value creation concept. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
The analysis has demonstrated that in recommending a reform proposal there are many 
considerations. At what level should a solution be pitched? Should the policy proposal seek 
to focus on leveraging commonality or addressing divergences? Upon which actor’s 
shoulders should be given the responsibility of defining and eliciting consensus approval for 
a policy proposal? Which actor is best placed to implement such a solution proposal 
successfully? The lessons learnt for previous proposal failures provide a useful starting point 
since there are three common factors that pervade all these solution proposals and it on these 
point specifically that consideration needs to be made in our search for a solution.  
 
First, there is a distinct lack of implementation authority underpinning all of these proposals. 
The distributed way in which the EU is organised from a political perspective and the 
sovereign protection afforded to and rightly protected by Member States with regards to 
direct tax makes defining and implementing an effective centralist solution no easy matter. 
                                                     
146
 OECD, ‘Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), 23 <Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting by companies, the OECD> accessed 19 July 2013 
147
 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014)  
 189 
The actual process of institutionalising the process of securing agreement and then 
empowering an authority to implement a proposal or set of proposals suggests such an 
approach is difficult to enact. The relationship between the key EU institutions themselves 
remains in a considerable state of uncertainty underpinning such institutional instability in the 
policy making process. In theory the EC could publish a treaty or code of conduct but such a 
process requires unanimous agreement before unified implementation across Member States 
can take place, suggesting a more discreet and indirect solution perhaps somewhat distant 
from direct reference to direct taxation itself may be more feasible. Alternatively, the EU 
institutions could overcome limitations in direct tax policy legitimacy by stimulating what 
Radaeilli calls “policy transfer by isomorphic process”148. Acknowledging constraints in 
implementing EU wide supra-national policies, Radaeilli advocates the use of policy transfer 
that relies on the advocacy of public policy in one jurisdiction and then centralised action to 
encourage the transfer of such public policy to a wider set of jurisdictions. Aside from the 
political and cultural constraints on making this effective we must acknowledge the absence 
of any centralised or hierarchical EU policy process. The EU gives the appearance of being 
more of an activist than a legitimate policy maker. All of the EC proposals appear to focus on 
resolving tax environment differences in Member States through harmonisation rather than 
identifying positive commonality in the tax environment that can be  
 
Second, one senses that the solutions proposed to date are all rather one-sided. The derivation 
of solution proposals appear to target either the Member State legislators themselves or are 
sponsored by organisations pertaining to raise solution proposals with an emphasis on 
increasing corporate direct tax revenues or at least closing off specific tax avoidance practices 
rather than harmonising the tax base or tax rules. Such an approach may be interpreted as 
more confrontational towards the taxpayer seeking increased revenues rather than necessarily 
targeting a fairer harmonisation of direct tax rules that may ultimately have the same effect. 
Direct tax rule changes in the EU, whether sovereign states like it or not, need to secure, at a 
minimum, acceptance by corporate taxpayers. This is not formal approval but a general 
acceptance across the populous EU corporate taxpaying community that any changes are fair, 
clear, unambiguous and consistent with EU Fundamental Freedoms. Such a demand may on 
the face of it seem unusual but all of the formal proposals to date have not even secured 
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unanimous support of the Member State community let alone clarity on the response by the 
taxpayers themselves. If a proposal does not secure taxpayer approval a given population of 
such a taxpayer is always likely to seek out gaps and anomalies to work around what may be 
considered penal.  
 
Thirdly, the solutions promoted to date are generally competent at identifying the cause of 
issues and in some cases making policy proposals for addressing such issues but there is 
virtually no reference focus on the mechanics of actually overcoming the significant 
constraints regarding a decision making and practical implementation procedure. The 
decision making process in the EU regarding direct tax changes are far from clear. In the 
absence of addressing such complexities regarding enactment of direct tax changes into the 
EU the search for a workable solution will be fruitless. The EU is arguably one the most 
complex multi-tiered systems of government ever formulated, with a treaty empowered 
centre supplemented by sovereign systems of governments around the edge. From a direct tax 
avoidance perspective we need to understand whether a technocratic or political based 
solution is more appropriate. The EC may promote proposals but these are viewed as 
technocratic unless they are endorsed and agreed politically by all Member States. If the EC 
formulates proposals by non-political Officers then this may undermine the whole public 
policy formulation process from the outset. Formal direct tax rule initiatives embedded into 
an EU Treaty may be less effective politically than promoting informal norms and adopting 
the public policy transfer notion previously discussed. Policy making at EU level operates at 
what has been academically referred to as ‘super-systemic’, ‘systemic’ and ‘meso’ levels149. 
Adopting a direct tax policy at super-systemic or supranational EU level, encapsulating all 
the vital politically treaty-challenging concepts is challenging enough. Few public policy 
initiatives at this level are successful, and none at an EU direct corporate tax level aimed at 
curtailing tax avoidance. At the next level is systemic policy change, which places a reliance 
on institutionalised co-operation or intergovernmental bargaining. It is at this level that is 
dominated by the public policy proposals to date. The mechanics for policy proposals exist at 
this level but the policy enactment fails. At the policy shaping level, or ‘meso’ level, the EU 
institutions have been successful such as the previously discussed role of the CJEU 
advocating opinions in relation to direct tax rulings nurturing effective tax policy across the 
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EU. What seemingly appears a simple analysis is quite telling in terms of public policy 
success in terms of direct tax policy solutions. Target a super-systemic public policy change 
and the force of resistance inherent within the multi-tiered system of government within the 
EU and it will probably fail.  
 
The implementation of EU direct tax policy has a number of policy implementation options. 
Any solution may be instigated on a unilateral basis as a single Member State solution that 
gains tractions and as a policy is transferred over time more widely to larger parts of the EU. 
A solution may be instigated either bi-laterally or multi-laterally between two or more 
Member States with a long term objective to transitional adoption by a broader set of 
Member States. Conversely, a supranational EU initiative could be sanctioned at a super-
systemic or systemic policy level in a unified manner but this has been the hardest challenge 
to date. The EU as a political system struggles to implement unified public policies in respect 
to direct tax for reasons already explained. It more generally lacks the monopolistic public 
policy powers that individual Member States have although it has public policy attributes, 
which any solution relating to this research will need to exploit. In the absence of a 
monopolistic force of advocating direct tax policy changes, the EU is to assume a 
compensatory role in a steering capacity in the sense of getting Member States to change 
their behaviours as suggested by Hix
150
. Further research by Laffan claims the EU can offer 
little more than a “challenge to the national political systems because they are confronted 
with the need to adapt to a normative and strategic environment that escapes total control”151 
suggesting that the cohabitation of two policy making systems at Member State and EU level 
make formal public policy in the direct tax domain difficult to instigate at EU level.  
 
The other dimension to consider is the fundamental approach to the policy proposal. There 
remains a stark choice between advocating a policy starting from exploiting similarities 
versus closing out differences. Irrespective of where a solution proposal emanates, the policy 
maker has the choice as to whether to build out consensus from a set of common policy 
measures across the EU in the hope that over time these will be more broadly adopted and 
such consensus can be exploited to broaden out the reach to address other matters of tax 
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avoidance. For example, the recent step change in tax transparency and exchange of 
information appears to be universally accepted as a means of exposing tax behaviours 
relating to tax avoidance by MNEs not just in the EU
152
 but internationally
153
. Could this be 
exploited to across the EU to tax avoidance activities and could such as policy, over time, be 
extended down to the specific levels of tax avoidance activity? Formulating consensus within 
an EU institutionalised forum with the stated aim of nurturing agreement on addressing tax 
rule changes for mitigating tax avoidance issues is an approach with merit that acknowledges 
the limitations of EU level power over direct tax policy but would of course imply a lengthy 
and uncertain path to close out the most material gaps in tax policies across Member States. 
Alternatively, rather than building out consensus, the focus may be simply on identifying the 
largest tax policy gaps or at least those pertaining to being relevant to the most material tax 
avoidance activities and seek harmonisation and closure. The differences in tax policies 
represent differences in opinions, priorities and approaches from Member States and this in 
itself is a significant challenge in itself but of course would reap the biggest prizes in closing 
out tax avoidance. The contrast between these two approaches is subtle and represents a 
fundamental variation in the manner upon which the issue is being addressed.    
 
The analysis in this chapter has demonstrated a number of key points. No scheme 
implemented to date at either Member State level or at EU level has been able to address 
materially either a single tax avoidance practice or tax avoidance practices in their totality. A 
number of schemes that have failed in their attempts to secure an agreed path to 
implementation demonstrate the level of challenge and complexity in securing reform, 
particularly given the effort demonstrated to date by both international and EU bodies in 
attempting to find such a credible solution. There is evidence of transitional thinking away 
from the focus on more bespoke Member State tax law reform or EU wide tax harmonisation 
to broader schemes such as the OECD BEPS proposal that embrace a much wider set of 
initiatives representative of the complexity inherent within the tax abuse issues prevalent in 
the EU. The litany of failed schemes may be a product of their disagreeable content or 
construct to the wide range of influential stakeholders whose support would be required; but 
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this chapter also demonstrates that the failures may well represent a more fundamental point 
regarding a lack of common agreement on the target of such schemes. Most schemes focus on 
invigorating the enforcement of Member State tax rules or to nurturing equitability in the 
outcome of the tax base distribution among Member States. Few schemes focus on regulating 
the source of the tax abuse, namely the corporate taxpayer and on changing behaviours that 
contribute towards decisions that are made resulting in tax abuses. In the assessment of these 
previously failed schemes we can infer from the above conclusions useful contributions in the 
formation a more credible solution proposal.      
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Chapter Seven: The Quest for an Effective Solution 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis to date has established that the law relating to combating abusive corporate tax 
practices is in need of reform. There is a clear set of economic, political, moral and legal 
issues with the abusive conduct of MNEs relating to their tax abuse activities, often under the 
guise of exercising their right to EU Fundamental Freedoms. Solutions have been tried both 
nationally and internationally and these have not been effective, and others have been 
proposed but have not seen sufficient support to achieve implementation into law. On this 
basis alone, a fresh approach is required and such a change demands a change above and 
beyond the recent solutions adopted or proposed by Member States and other EU and 
international organisations. It is therefore proposed that EU law requires reform and the 
following two chapters establish a solution proposal substantiated by a critical analysis of its 
features against a set of legal conditions and metrics to endorse its credentials as a robust 
proposition.  
 
This quest for an effective solution deviates from the approach more commonly adopted in 
mainstream tax avoidance proposals to date by providing for a hybrid scheme combining 
features of established legal doctrines and practices as well as new concepts. The underlying 
objective is to limit deductions capabilities in high tax Member States as well as reduce 
freedom to transfer income to lower tax Member States. Any successful solution needs to 
address the conflict between safeguarding the allocation of Member State taxing powers, with 
the need to protect EU Fundamental Freedoms. There are no relevant EU laws in place to 
address this conflict. Although there is a need to respect the conditions necessary to enforce 
EU Fundamental Freedoms and to reconcile with the conditions acceptable for a MNE to 
mitigate its tax liabilities, ultimately any design should support extensibility beyond EU 
borders. There is consensus on the need to better manage the conflicts within the internal 
market. This chapter aims to establish that it is possible to develop a solution that would 
prove effective and durable, and to propose a reform scheme that could implement that 
solution.     
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This solution proposal takes the form of a multi-dimensional scheme based around financial 
accounting disclosures and attestations implemented through an EU Financial Accounting 
Directive.  Such a Directive would ensure consistent EU-wide disclosure requirements based 
around a set of specific reporting disclosures such as revenue by country and tax paid by 
country, more commonly referred to as country-by-country reporting, hereafter referred to as 
‘CCR’. The objective of CCR would be for MNEs to provide the relevant tax authorities, and 
the judicial system where referred, with a level of transparency that would assist them in 
understanding the economic structures of transactions and hence a better insight into whether 
any such structures could be considered anomalous and possibly abusive.  CCR would be 
supplemented by a set of EU-wide metrics defining thresholds that form part of statutory 
financial reporting. The purpose of these thresholds is to provide parameters against which a 
tax authority would be interested in understanding the underlying economic activities 
contributing towards what would be considered an anomalous disclosure. The MNE would 
have to request pre-approval or provide explanations regarding any such anomalous breaches 
in order to satisfy the requisite tax authority that no further investigations regarding abusive 
behaviour is necessary. A threshold breach without pre-clearance would mandate an 
explanation in the annex to the financial accounts and if considered unsatisfactory would 
possibly trigger an investigation; but this decision would be at the discretion of the national 
tax authority. The Directive would set a target level of investigations for breaches to ensure 
lower tax jurisdictions benefitting from profit shifting are encouraged, but not necessarily 
mandated, to provide for a given level of investigations.  
 
The final component underpinning the Directive would be an attestation requirement. An 
attestation, in this context, refers to a legally constituted sworn testimony in annual financial 
accounts, as mandated through an EU Directive, made by an Officer of a MNE affirming to 
the accuracy and integrity of supplementary statutory financial reporting data. The proposed 
legal attestations should be mandatory and made against the statutory financial accounts. 
Typically made by the CFO, the Officer would authenticate the accuracy and completeness of 
the submission in accordance with the Directive’s requirements and to ensure that no data has 
been supplied to misstate real economic activity in a given country and to keep intentionally 
within the boundaries of the threshold reporting boundaries.  
 
Attestation failures could be attributable to a number of outcomes, namely incomplete or 
misleading statements of affirmation of compliance, the absence of any explanation for 
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threshold breaches that were not pre-cleared, and the disclosure of transactions that turn out 
to be wholly artificial in nature. Such attestations serve to ensure strong due diligence and 
governance over published data and to place legal accountability on an individual rather than 
a corporate entity, typically in the form of criminal liability. The legal liability construct 
definition would be important and would be set out in the Directive although these would be 
for guideline purposes only. Each Member State would be expected to establish its own 
penalties on the attesting Officer for an attestation breach. It would be expected that there 
would be a sliding scale penalty regime established to reflect both the severity of the breach 
and the frequency of breaches. Less material one-off breaches may attract a fine, but 
continued breaches may attract director disqualification. Only in the event of evidence of 
continued breaches that have a material impact on the tax revenues of a Member State would 
criminal liability be considered as a recommended course of action. This ensures that only in 
the most extreme violation circumstances that have been pursued repeatedly over time against 
the direction of the tax authorities or Courts would criminal liability be enacted.   
 
Provision of criminal legislation as part of this reform proposal is intended to punish and 
deter violations of tax abuse, attracting narrow and precise boundaries to avoid ambiguity. 
Historically reform proposals have centred on civil actions to seek recompense for financial 
harm caused to the Member States’ tax bases. At face value these tend to attract broader 
boundaries typically suited to case by case analysis of tax abuse. The primary objective of 
this reform proposal, however, is to advance a social consensus that over time will see the 
righteous majority conform to standardised non-abusive behaviour rather than to take the 
profit out of the crime. This Dworkinian link to morality better helps frame the permissible 
from the possible in relation to tax abuse and demonstrates to society that MNEs must take its 
basic moral code seriously. It is an indelicate legal tool but its power derives from such 
characterisation. The form of criminal liability as a last resort legal outcome would be at the 
discretion of each Member State jurisdiction but would likely take the recommended form of 
strict liability since this is an effective means to deter and penalise conduct which a State 
believes is wrong, and a conduct which cannot be excused for by personal reliance on third 
parties (reliance) or misinformation (causation). The political effect of the application of 
strict liability reinforces popular acceptance of the law and so the EU Directive would be 
expected to set out guidelines as such. Defences would typically be expected to be based 
around due diligence, reliance and constructive knowledge and such defences would be 
enunciated directly in the Member State legislation. Due diligence would enable a defence 
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based on evidence of express oversight and control over the data published, and reliance 
would be based around access to data and formal internal controls to ensure adherence to the 
Directive’s requirements . A defence of constructive knowledge would be based not around 
actual facts known by the Officer but rather the facts that he should reasonably know in the 
course of his duties as a MNE Officer. Recommended judicial proceedings would be based 
around summary trial with a penalty of director disqualification or financial fine in the event 
that a Court was able to prove misrepresentation liability.   
 
Attestations do have legislative precedence in United States legislation
1
, with a similar set of 
defence mechanisms identifiable in other legislation
2
. There is no expectation that this 
attestation requirement provides a guarantee against either identifying or mitigating breaches 
of lawful actions but is meant as a behaviour inducing provision that places responsibility and 
accountability on an Officer to certify the data submission relating to threshold metrics in the 
Directive. This in itself is a powerful tool for ensuring compliance given the criminal law 
provisions in place to address mis-statements of statutory financial data. The Directive should 
mandate the handling of attestation failures to be accommodated within the jurisdiction of the 
criminal law system of each Member State within a short period of time with safeguards 
against procedural abuse through the definition of formal guidelines set out in the EU 
Directive that would be expected to be followed by local legislation. An appeals process 
would reflect the standard judicial appeals process in each Member State, not necessitating 
any EU or independent appeals channel. An attestation would be expected to nurture 
improved internal controls and reliability of financial reports.  
 
Despite the advocacy of criminal provisions in relation to non-technical violations of 
attestations, some constitutional perspective is required. There are limits to the EU’s 
jurisdiction in relation to criminal law. The EU Treaty
3
 explicitly reserves to Member States 
the right to administer criminal law and the associated administration of justice. Various 
cases
4
 evidence support for this, confirming that criminal law resides outside the 
competences of the EU. It is submitted that such evidence does not preclude Directives from 
                                                     
1
 Sarbanes Oxley (US), 2002, s404 
2
 Securities Act (US), 1933, s11-12 
3
 Consolidated Version of the European Treaty [2012] art 82, OJ C326/49 
4
 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005 ] ECR I-5285 
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promoting criminal penalties to be legislated for by Member States as a necessary measure 
for countering serious wrongdoing. Case law does provide further direction in respect to the 
boundaries of EU criminal law jurisdiction.  For example some cases
5
 have upheld that the 
EU has no competence for establishing the nature of the penalty regime to be applied as this 
is the remit of the Member State themselves. The CJEU is in no position to impose specific 
criminal penalties but the proposed Directive may set out in quite clear terms a suggested 
criminal penalty regime for adoption. Case law
6
 has suggested that violations of EU law 
should be punished in a manner akin to the legislative provisions in place for comparable 
violations of Member State law. By inference this eliminates the ability of the EU to 
harmonise criminal laws but again does not prohibit recommended courses of action in an EU 
Directive.  
 
Collectively the thresholds and attestations locked into a CCR reporting solution shall be 
termed “Enhanced Disclosure and Attestation”, hereafter referred to as ‘ED&A’’. None of 
these components are unique; but their collective usage to address this is novel. Central 
collation of ‘ED&A’ statistics by the Commission from Member States will serve as a 
measure of compliance and will provide useful analysis for ascertaining the impact on 
abusive tax behaviours that will form the basis of measuring success. This thesis rejects 
traditional tax law centric instruments to one that attempts to effectively address the 
underlying factors driving aggressive tax behaviours. The focus will not be on the root 
causes, namely tax rate differentials and loopholes in tax laws, both of which are legitimised 
through the EU Fundamental Freedoms, but rather the corporate tax strategizing behaviours 
that result from these root causes. The unique legal wrapper of the EU Fundamental 
Freedoms that legitimise many aggressive tax avoidance activities makes it a tough 
challenge.   Just because the tax system is broken doesn’t necessarily imply that it requires a 
solution targeting the tax system directly itself.  Emphasising a solution on corporate taxpayer 
behaviours rather than the underlying direct tax system is a targeted response that avoids it 
being promoted as a direct tax system change, and so avoids all the resultant barriers to direct 
tax changes inherent within the EU as provided for by the EU Fundamental Freedoms.  
 
                                                     
5
 Case C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECR I-9097 
6
 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece [1989] ECR 2965 
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7.2 Solution Assumptions 
 
Based on the lessons learnt from previous failed schemes or proposals, a number of 
fundamental assumptions are advocated to underpin the reasoning behind the features of the 
recommended solutions. 
 
The first assumption is that it will be politically impossible to get all Member States to agree 
multilaterally to a direct taxation law proposal as there is no political consensus or EU wide 
regulatory obligation in place to facilitate such changes. If a proposal attempts to challenge 
the boundaries of existing tax law precedent as established by the CJEU, or attempts to 
harmonise the tax law rules or general tax law operating environment it will fail unless a 
paradigm shift occurs, closing out ideological differences of opinion across a substantial 
number of Member States.  The likelihood of attaining political consensus for a broader 
proposal outside the immediate remit of direct taxation arguably has a better chance of 
success.  
 
The second assumption is that any proposal must respect the concept of national sovereignty. 
Promoting a centralised EU solution will only become effective if the rights of Member 
States are acknowledged and provide a degree of autonomy for its enactment into law and 
law enforcement. National tax laws will remain and accounting disclosures must offer 
Member States interpretive flexibility within the context of their local rules. 
 
The third assumption is that there is no obvious institutional entity or agreed process 
currently within the EU that is empowered to enact changes across Member States in the area 
of direct tax. On the face of it this may not represent such a material setback as such a 
mechanism is likely to demand a cycle of negotiation, consensual agreement, implementation 
governance and legal backing to ensure that it is agreeable to all Member States with 
practical foundations and robust legal authority.  
 
The fourth and final assumption is that a proposal directed at addressing the issues identified 
in this thesis will need to exploit successful precedents identified with other, not necessarily 
directly related, laws and legal practices. On the one hand a unique problem could infer the 
need for a unique scheme, since experimenting with new legal doctrines or policies is 
unlikely to survive the challenges associated with implementing tax accounting law changes 
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with the EU environment. On the other hand embellishing the existing tax system with 
changes or schemes that have failed to gain traction or work to date similarly does not bode 
well. 
 
7.3 The Proposed EU Directive 
 
The objectives to the proposed ‘ED&A’ Directive differ markedly from the existing 
Accounting Directives. EU Accounting Directives are primarily focused on protecting 
shareholders and third parties
7
 whereas the objective of this ‘ED&A’ Directive would be to 
mandate disclosures for the protection of Member State tax revenues. The proposed ‘ED&A’ 
requirements should be applied to all listed and large non-listed MNEs across the majority of 
industry categories that are registered within the EU. Leveraging analysis of the European 
Classification of Economic Activities, referred to as ‘NACE’, by Beer and Loeprick8, the 
focus would be on all industry groups except those that are characterised by a high proportion 
of assets attributable to intangibles and industry groups with a complex production process 
incorporating cross-industry activities. The proposal would be for only six of the forty 
industry groups to be excluded, namely health, entertainment, publishing, petroleum, legal 
and accounting and other services.  Intangibles reduce the value of the profit shifting data 
because the allocation and pricing of assets offer a high degree of flexibility that grants 
opportunities for tax minimalisation. Industry groups considered complex would be included 
at a later stage only once the more vanilla industry groups had been included in the scope of 
the Directive.   A large listed MNE would be defined in the proposed Directive as being one 
with gross revenues exceeding a monetary threshold, in the region of €50M or a balance sheet 
of more than €43m, thresholds consistent with threshold definitions of the EC9.  It would also 
be applicable to listed and large non-listed MNEs registered outside the EU that have an 
operating interest and revenues in one or more Member States. In this latter instance, the 
international MNE registered outside the EU would be obliged to provide each Member State 
                                                     
7
 Council Directive 78/660/EEC, art 54(3)g 
8
 Sebastian Beer and Jan Loeprick, ‘Profit Shifting: Drivers and Potential Countermeasures’ (2013) 
<https://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Events/conferences/doctoral_meeting/2013/bee
r.pdf> accessed 14 July 2014 
9
 European Commission, Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 
124, 36 
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tax authority in which it operates with the relevant ‘ED&A’ data and testimony relevant to 
the activities pertinent to each Member State for review and potential challenge. 
 
Unlike most EU Directives, Member States will have little leeway regarding flexing details 
around specific rules and legislative procedures to be adopted. This Directive would demand 
consistent application across all Member States. Managed by the Commission, a preliminary 
timetable would be published outlining a consultation period followed by an implementation 
schedule. Since the ‘ED&A’ requirements will be provided by an EU Directive, Member 
States must transpose them into national law and this would need to be consistent across all 
jurisdictions. Practically, implementing the proposed Directive in its totality may be counter-
productive in the first instance. Ensuring a robust case is delivered for CCR as a first 
necessary phase would be the preferred approach with a secondary phase extending the 
disclosures to threshold metrics and attestations. This proposal constitutes a completely new 
EU MNE transparency regime that will demand a timed phasing to secure success in a tough 
environment for implementing a new Directive. The objectives and wordings of the Directive 
would require specific attention. Existing tax laws are often indeterminate and judicial 
discretion over time has been necessary to clarify these laws and in effect created new laws. 
This proposed EU Directive aims to limit such judicial discretion by reference to specific 
wording that determines which legal principles are most consistent with existing laws and so 
best justify the laws already in place, a concept originally promoted by Dworkin
10
.  Reference 
to its objectives should be limited to accounting best practice and the merits of CCR reporting 
rather than an attempt to emphasise addressing tax avoidance. Threshold metrics will be 
expressed as a means for Member State tax authorities to have visibility to information that 
infers abusive profit shifting behaviour to better prioritise local investigations rather than 
being a tool for seizing tax revenues per se. This Directive should be identifiable first and 
foremost as an accounting Directive akin to the EU Accounting Directive
11
 rather than a 
Direct Tax Directive such as the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
12
, Merger Directive
13
 or Mutual 
Assistance Directive
14
. As a consequence the implementation path will be much less 
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 Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1986) 
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 Council Directive (EC) 2013/34/EU 
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contentious, particularly if reinforced by a regularly structured and inclusive approach to 
drafting the Directive and subsequent consultation period. To support a phased 
implementation would be an upfront impact assessment for each phase, the content of which 
would be akin to that deployed as part of the most recent EU Accounting Directive
15
 and 
would serve as a favourable approach for Member States and all other relevant stakeholders 
to attain enough information to offer considered opinions on the impact to their jurisdictions 
or interests. In addition a more all-encompassing impact assessment will be required up front 
prior to any consultation period to secure enough support upfront for the concept of ‘ED&A’ 
in an EU Directive. A credible political and economic case for such a proposal is vital and 
this may partially reflect tax avoidance mitigation but emphasis is to be made on the merits of 
nurturing a single market with a common set of more transparent accounting data and the 
strengthened governance around published financial data. 
 
The reasoning behind this EU Directive proposal is that a EU centralized policy should be 
based upon the financial disclosure and consequential control of abusive tax avoidance 
activities rather than on corporate tax laws. National governments need the policy consensus 
and associated authority to monitor MNE accounts at a more granular level to ensure that 
they are applying taxation rights at the right income source. A coordinated EU policy has the 
effect of reducing fiscal competition between Member States and the policy implementation 
can be achieved across all Member States outside the constraints of unanimous consensual 
approval associated with direct tax initiatives. Acknowledging that no proposal to date has 
succeeded at EU level in addressing the problems identified in this thesis, it is submitted that 
a mainstream proposal such as CCR that is encased with other policy initiatives to underpin 
its credentials, namely thresholds and attestations, is a compelling policy option for 
consideration.     
 
7.3.1 Country by Country Reporting 
 
Presently no financial standards and only limited legal provisions for publication of 
geographic data exist, and there is no requirement to do so on a country-by-country basis. 
The only notable provisions relate to certain industry domains
16
. Despite statutory reporting 
                                                     
15
 Council Directive (EC) 2013/34/EU 
16
 Ibid 
 203 
disclosure being based around the concept of a set of unified entities, MNEs are not 
necessarily taxed in this way. Each group entity is taxed separately ensuring that any outsider 
observer wishing to establish the economic integrity of an establishment will face a real 
challenge to understand the absolute economic activities underpinning the associated tax 
liabilities.  
 
An economically integrated EU arguably favours an integrated financial accounting system. 
Such convergence to a common set of uniform accounting standards and reported on a 
country-by-country basis would progress forward with exposing irregularities in corporate 
financial statements of MNEs operating across Member State jurisdictions. Member States 
would be much better placed to start challenging MNEs on excessive tax abusive activities as 
revealed against a set of proposed threshold metrics that would form part of the Directive’s 
financial reporting standards. Acknowledging listed EU MNEs have been obliged to submit 
financial statements in accordance with IFRS since 2005
17
, this proposal simply aims to 
supplement IFRS accounting standards with a tax template addendum to the financial 
statement outlining specific country by country data, but fully reconcilable with consolidated 
legal entity accounts as per formal accounting submissions. 
 
The objective of CCR is to enable Member States to have the requisite data to scrutinise 
corporate practices with regard to potential claims of tax abuse activities. This objective 
demands a political driven solution through an EU Directive rather than one promoted by a 
global or regional professional financial accounting body. Strategies relating to the closing of 
tax loopholes in national and international law have been fraught with having to address the 
inherent complexities of balancing economics, politics, ethics and administration
18
 In the 
light of limited demonstrable progress over the last two decades in mitigating tax abuse an 
alternative approach is warranted. MNEs would be naturally encouraged to pay a tax level 
consistent with its economic activity within any jurisdiction although it is acknowledged that 
the materiality of this is both hard to predict at inception. Public disclosure would add 
pressure for MNEs to be more accountable and the administrative efficiency of tax collection 
would be enhanced.  
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It would be expected that much of the financial information demanded by CCR would be 
readily available to most MNEs who engage large finance divisions to substantiate such data 
for internal management information purposes. A plethora of transparency initiatives in 
recent years have endorsed this approach even though their remit has to date been rather more 
limited than this solution proposes to advocate
19
. The concept of CCR and the likely impact 
on MNEs operating in the EU has been examined by the Commission
20
 and the OECD has 
similarly considering country-by-country reporting as part of a tax transparency initiative
21
. 
Furthermore, as part of a consultation exercise in January 2014
22
, the OECD set out a detailed 
and credible proposal for a CCR template for MNE population as part of its annual financial 
submission. All of these consultations and assessments demonstrated that CCR should be 
extended to financial reporting and tax reporting. CCR is not a tax policy measure or tax rule 
but a financial disclosure rule that circumvents the need for unanimous approval from 
Member States. This kind of disclosure serves to enhance the efficiency of the administration 
of tax collection and of detecting abusive tax arrangements. If CCR proves to be successful in 
limiting tax abuse at all, the expected benefits should exceed the related MNE compliance 
costs.  
 
Designing a complete and credible CCR solution will rely on data to identify potentially 
aggressive tax activities. CCR would require a MNE to disclose data specific for each 
country. Firstly, a global overview of the MNEs legal entity structure and operating model 
demanding the name of each Member State in which it operates and the names of all its 
subsidiary entities in each Member State in which it has a subsidiary or branch of any legal 
entity, referred to as an ‘establishment’23. Secondly, financial sales and expenses data for 
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each establishment, represented by a breakdown of financial data differentiating group sales 
data and sales to other entities along with a breakout of profit and labour costs. Net income 
before tax for each legal entity in each country in the MNE group would be derived from 
individual legal entity statements. This data would be grouped according to the financial 
metric facilitating a legal entity view of all financial statistics, by a country breakdown hence 
providing the necessary information to easily calculate threshold metrics. A statement of tax 
on profit or loss per country would be derived from corporation tax receipts as per definition 
in Member State tax system, based on the actual cash figure paid with a footnote identifying 
and explaining any deferred tax. No other tax payments would need any reference, as they are 
not as material from a tax abuse perspective. Thirdly, country metrics would take the form of 
a series of statistics relating to value and maintenance costs for all tangible and intangible 
assets by country, number of employees by location, research expenditure by country, 
marketing expenditure by country, residence of senior management, and revenues by country 
residence of customers.  
 
None of these three sets of data are particularly novel but form the generally accepted data 
requirements associated with CCR reporting
24
. To provide a country perspective on the 
global affairs of a MNE would be the ultimate aim but as an interim measure enforcing this at 
EU level is a highly credible first step. There would be clear transparency on the relative and 
absolute amounts of economic activity in a given jurisdiction along with the contribution 
made by the MNE to the Member State economy through corporation tax payments. A 
consistent set of standards for information disclosure will make MNEs accountable to their 
shareholders and to Member State tax authorities. Such standards are “surprisingly ignored in 
most corporate codes of conduct”25 and would “establish a stronger basis of trust between tax 
authorities and business which would greatly improve tax compliance”26 
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Numerous options exist for implementing CCR into financial reporting. Mindful of the 
technical limitations of formally amending financial accounting practices and standards, this 
proposal promotes utilisation of standardised tax templates as an addendum to financial 
statements. Neither consolidated accounting nor individual financial accounting standards are 
helpful in supporting the objectives of CCR.  Consolidated accounting provides accounting 
data for a group of corporate entities as a single reporting entity and it is impossible to 
identify intra-group transactions. As such, this netting out of profits and costs within the 
group entity would be difficult to trace from source to destination, and challenging to 
reconcile in an accounting hierarchy. Furthermore apportioned deferred tax reporting would 
not accommodated on a country-by-country basis as it is based on future tax charges whose 
uncertainty is driven by different treatments across different countries. Individual financial 
statements present different issues. Local GAAP rules drive out financial reporting norms for 
Member States and so will offer little value for comparative purposes. But furthermore 
financial accounts do not properly reflect taxable or provide credible estimates for the true 
valuation of assets. Book-tax-differences between Member States reflect country-specific tax 
laws. Tax deductions relating to, for example, inter-company dividends, foreign source 
income and non-deductible expenses obscure the true taxable income. 
 
Disclosure of CCR financial data in a separate annex to the financial statement avoids the 
complexities associates with amending common accounting standards. A standardized 
template with respect to data content and determinations is relevant to the viability of the 
solution. The disclosures should be both mandatory and public. Auditing of the annexed 
template should not be mandatory but recommended. It is acknowledge that there would both 
be some direct and indirect costs to MNEs complying with the requisite ‘ED&A’. Existing 
financial accounting systems may need to be upgraded to conform to CCR reporting and 
these costs are neither predictable nor necessarily proportional to either the size of the 
organisation or industry domain. The more complex a business, the higher the probable cost. 
It is entirely plausible that larger MNEs can distil the required information from the data they 
routinely collate. Critics of such a solution may point to the more indirect costs associated 
with the competitive disadvantages of publicly disclosing commercially confidential 
information. To avoid MNEs hiding behind this weak argument presents the case for 
mandatory disclosure. It offers no competitive disadvantage to those MNEs disclosing CCR 
details since it is of only passing interest to a MNE how a competitor business is structuring 
its business. The reason for aggressive profit shifting is to minimize tax payments rather than 
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conceal business transaction flows. The right of the tax authority to have transparency in 
financial accounts upon which it has responsibility for competently taxing is no less 
important than the right of a MNE to leverage Fundamental Freedoms to execute profit 
shifting for minimizing tax liabilities. 
 
It is not unrealistic to expect CCR to provide the requisite data either demanded or of general 
interest to a broad set of stakeholder groups that will strengthen the aim to monitor abusive 
practices. This information is not limited to just financial reporting but will also provide 
insights to corporate governance and responsibility, actual tax payments, and cross-border 
transaction flows between Member States. Despite the fact CCR does not directly inform 
stakeholders about whether a MNE has or has not adopted an aggressive tax position it does 
provide transparency and a useful level of accountability to justify financial flows and 
transaction structures. Encouraging a behavioral change in respect to MNEs is a positive step 
and over time a financial accounting solution is much more likely to attract success than a 
direct tax solution proposal which requires unanimous approval.   No tax secrecy laws exist 
within the EU although any eventual global rollout of this solution may encounter such 
issues. Public disclosure may seem excessive but a necessary part of the behaviour-inducing 
element of the solution strategy. One academic study
27
 found that MNEs do not generally 
report higher profits once tax returns become confidential, although this was more common 
for larger MNEs than non-listed private equivalents. There is, of course, the danger that 
publicly disclosed CCR is misinterpreted and has a detrimental impact on a MNE but 
professional analysts will be always be able to interpret financial information in a measured 
manner to avoid malicious claims being made against MNEs.   
 
Longer term adoption of CCR by the global financial accounting bodies would be a useful 
but need not in itself rely on endorsement by International Accounting Standards, hereafter 
referred to as IAS, and FASB. Conceptually CCR is a generally accepted financial 
accounting doctrine but the appetite for the size of such a project for these accounting bodies 
to formally adopt it as a standard is not yet evident and as this solution does not propose to 
embed this into financial accounting standards it remains non-critical. In time it could be 
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expected to absorb such a project but it will probably require more localized regional 
adoption to provide the necessary impetus to initiate such a project by the accounting bodies.   
CCR is becoming an acceptable standard, and is consistent with the recent recommendations 
of the OECD BEPS report
28. It delivers the OECD recommendations to require ‘taxpayers to 
disclose their aggressive tax planning arrangements’29, to ‘make it harder to transfer profit 
streams with intangibles’30, to ‘counter harmful tax practices’31, and to ‘limiting base erosion 
through interest deductions’32. It also achieves the OECD BEPS objective of ‘using a 
multilateral instrument to implement an international consensus more quickly’33. 
Acknowledging the inertia associated with consensual EU level changes on direct tax, and 
with embedding bi-lateral arrangements between countries, an EU adopted instrument would 
form an international standard that both other major economies and the financial accounting 
standards bodies may find increasingly difficult not to consider akin to the OECD aspirations 
when it architected multilateral standards such as IFRS for accounting and Basel II and Basel 
III banking prudential regulations. 
 
7.3.2 The Thresholds 
 
A set of threshold metrics would be detailed in the EU Directive and requiring mandatory 
adoption by each EU Member State. A voluntary proposal embedded within EU Contract 
Law would not have the necessary clout to ensure universal adoption and would deprive the 
proposal of the consistent application that is essential to its success. Thresholds require 
consistent application across all Member States. Defining thresholds at EU Member State 
level is unlikely to work because the ones with most to win may well set the most aggressive 
thresholds, whereas those with the most to lose would be likely to define only weak threshold 
limits. Thus, there would have to be a consistent application across Member States even 
though there may be economic reasons for threshold variations between Member States. The 
thresholds would apply directly to MNEs and any financial disclosure outside the threshold 
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boundaries in annual financial reporting would infer a higher likelihood of aggressive tax 
planning and therefore contravene the CFO attestation unless pre-cleared. No MNE would 
have to fear threshold breaches attributable to genuine economic activity as such economic 
substance could be articulated to the relevant tax authority.  
 
Thresholds disclosures to national tax authorities would nurture informed decisions as 
exemplified by Fuest and Riedel who stated that “attempts to assess whether and to what 
extent MNEs in developing countries engage in international tax evasion and tax avoidance 
activities have long been hampered by a lack of appropriate data”34. The underlying focus 
should be that the EU Directive targets transparency around controlled transactions, driving 
threshold breaches to transaction level reporting where required and its annexed 
incorporation into statutory financial reporting. Artificial transactions impact distribution of 
profits within a country but it is the combined set of transactions in their totality contributing 
to that distribution that need to be included within the threshold analysis. There are a number 
of threshold metrics that should form the basis of reporting obligations of a MNE operating in 
the EU. This proposal will set out three specific sets of thresholds that could be considered by 
the EC when drafting the EU Directive. Pre-clearance or explanations around breaches would 
be applied on a consolidated legal entity basis within a MNEs organisational financial 
reporting hierarchy at country level. This is required to avoid a single legal entity breach 
resulting in multiple pre-clearance assessments as the thresholds were breached higher up the 
MNEs reporting hierarchy. The threshold adoption would form part a secondary phase of 
implementing the Directive and would be mandatory along with the associated attestations. 
Pre-clearance of breaches would be encouraged but accepting that this is not always practical 
these could be explained as part of the CCR submission in the statutory accounts. Any local 
investigations into breaches would be discretional to the Member State, as would the criminal 
measures associated with an acute attestation breach. 
 
Threshold variability to reflect different circumstances specific to a range of situations 
relating to economy size, MNE total capitalisation, industry category or MNE development 
stage is rejected. Apart from the unnecessary complexity there is little credibility in the 
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context of this proposal for such variations, particularly given the accommodation of pre-
clearance explanations which are highly likely to roll over from one year to the next where 
appropriate, the non-excessive threshold levels, and to the fact that these statistical 
disclosures are primarily for transparency purposes to assess further any irregular behaviour 
that may be deemed as tax abusive. In most instances circumstances relating to varying the 
ratio thresholds against industry averages introduce a level of complexity and ambiguity that 
would render the threshold unworkable.  
 
The thresholds make a bold step towards not only setting some realistic boundaries defining a 
benchmark level against which the concept of abuse with regard to conduct could be 
measured, but also uniquely leveraging the data provided in CCR reporting. Breaches would 
either relate to a genuine anomaly for good economic reason or in the pursuit of a tax 
advantage granted through the exercise of EU Fundamental Freedoms. Evidence of artificial 
conditions engineering a tax advantage would infer combined abusive intention and outcome 
implying an abuse of fundamental freedom rather than just tax abuse. Such a concept 
originally highlighted by Cerioni
35
 warrants merit in particular reference to the form of this 
proposed solution. Rarely does CJEU case law reference abuse of Fundamental Freedoms 
directly but this solution approach leverages the rulings in the Cadbury and Marks & Spencer 
cases. Such a paradigm should be capitalized further in the examination of financial 
accounting threshold breaches applied to ‘ED&A’ particularly in light of its non-reliance on 
any form of direct tax law change necessitating unanimous Member State approval. 
 
7.3.2.1 Threshold Set 1 
 
A proposed set of ‘Comparative Profits’ threshold metrics, a derived concept from the 
Comparative Profits TRPRICE method evidenced in US
36
 aimed at making the effects of 
TRPRICE, CFC and Group Relief somewhat more transparent, would involve utilising CCR 
data by assessing a MNEs country by country profitability in relation to a set of relevant real 
economic factors. These economic factors would be used to determine a formulary measure 
of reasonableness relating to a MNEs profit submission in relation to its real economic 
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activity. The desire for common comparability derives from the need to ensure a taxable 
profit level indicator accurately denotes the actual profitability of the underlying economic 
activities. Avoiding the complexities of transaction level TRPRICE analysis, this solution 
proposes that a MNEs profit should be consistent with a set of economic parameters relevant 
to the type of business undertaken by the MNE. The MNE would be required to apply 
economic parameters to its net profit in each country and explain any deviations from a set of 
pre-defined thresholds in the Directive. The profit threshold formula would be based on net 
profits of all controlled and uncontrolled tangible and intangible transactions in their totality. 
Accepting the computation of net profit is skewed for comparative purposes by Member State 
tax rules and reliefs, the country level net profits would be basis for this assessment.  
 
The objective of these threshold metrics is intended to determine an acceptable range of profit 
levels that would satisfy the arm's-length requirement. Firstly a Profit / Sales threshold would 
be to set at 1:0.6 ratio of net profit to total value of sales to customers in a given country. If a 
MNE were making a net profit in a country with a value that exceeded 40% of the value of 
sales in that country it would exceed the threshold. If this was breached the MNE would be 
required to provide a detailed transaction level breakdown of controlled versus uncontrolled 
transactions, declared and expressed in net value. The 1:06 threshold is low enough to avoid 
routinely profitable business in a given country being caught in unnecessary disclosure but 
high enough to expose any unusually high profits that are not attributable to customers in a 
given country. The residency of a customer is routinely available data and statutory 
consolidated financial reporting would already have underlying transaction level data if 
required. With the emergence of the Internet economy facilitating web sales, it is realistic to 
surmise that an entity may be disproportionately involved in the economic activities in 
another Member State than the taxable liability suggests. These are deemed uncontrolled 
transactions and would therefore attract little attention from the tax authorities. 
 
Secondly, a proposed Profit / Employee threshold metric would be proposed for 
understanding the relationship between the a MNEs net profit in a given jurisdiction as a 
percentage of its global profits versus the number of employees resident, permanent or 
interim and paid through that country expressed as a percentage of total global employees. 
Focus on ensuring this metric relates to the geographical location of an employee as well as 
the jurisdiction through which the employee is paid will prevent abuse. This again would be 
measurable at country level. A moderate threshold level of 40% is proposed so that a group 
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that derives a significant portion of its income from a Member State that employs a 
disproportionately small number of group employees would breach the threshold. Setting the 
threshold at 40% will ensure that a MNE will breach if there is a differential between the two 
ratios of greater than 40%. The threshold level is not meant to be a scientific formula with 
deep-rooted statistical meaning but rather a measured metric that can be used broadly for 
identifying any significant profits generated in a Member State that has a disproportionately 
low level of employees. Many distributed business models that have an extended supply 
chain across many locations may exceed this threshold but such a breach would be 
explainable and acceptable if for good economic reason. For example, where there is a high 
concentration of product development or research employees that are in a different Member 
State from that in which income is generated. Again the objective is to expose unexplainable 
breaches that have no underlying economic substance that may represent tax abuse 
warranting investigation by the Member State tax authority.   
 
Thirdly a Profit / Pass-Through Threshold would be applied. This would be a threshold that 
would require a declaration in the Member State where net profit is declared on any pre-sale 
controlled transactions within a controlled supply chain within the EU that has more than 
three pass-through transactions between Member States with a corporate income tax 
differential between the highest and lowest of more than 25%. It is of no interest to capture 
endless genuine pass-through transactions between Member States with immaterial tax 
differences. Acknowledging the desire to retain tax competition, the Member States would be 
offered a relatively straightforward tool to identify potentially abusive pass-throughs that 
have little economic purpose than to abuse such tax competition. Setting a threshold of three 
or more pass-throughs seems a relatively modest number on the basis of normal MNE 
economic behaviour in a community of 28 Member States, and a 25% tax rate differential 
between the relevant Member States represents a percentage that sensibly represents a 
differential below which would not regularly encourage a tax abusive pass-through.  
 
These comparative profit thresholds will prove effective, as it does not require an exhaustive 
list of indicators to imply abusive practices. The threshold data will not itself expose whether 
there are insufficiently bona fide commercial reasons for the taxable profits but it will expose 
the data to imply economic anomalies that warrant tax authority investigation. This threshold 
data provides a mechanism for uncovering circumstances whereby incorporation is 
inconsistent with the physical establishment of the CFC and where genuine activities 
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associated with financial reporting are being carried out. Furthermore, it exposes 
circumstances where there is an imbalanced correlation between the location of genuine 
economic activities and the physical location of its employees.   
 
7.3.2.2 Threshold Set 2 
 
The next metric demanded by the proposed Directive would be known as the ‘Tax 
Dispersion’ threshold, which is based around a simple statistical delta between tax expenses, 
and taxes paid in a given country. Leveraging some of the pioneering research by Kolay et 
al
37
 in this field of consolidated tax spreads, this concept utilises the CCR reporting proposed 
in ‘ED&A’ and aims to capture the impact of a wide variety of tax deductions that are 
specific to a Member State such as depreciation, investment tax credits, foreign tax credits 
and stock option deductions that could be used by MNEs instead of debt to reduce their 
income in a given jurisdiction.  
 
These are becoming a more common tool for tax avoidance as they do not require the use, 
and associated cost, of complex financial transactions to restructure the capital structure of a 
MNE to support debt leverage activities, they can be used to exploit the tax rules without 
impacting the underlying publicised income statement. Such a tax dispersion ratio would be 
implemented at country level and not at a consolidated entity level. A simple metric is not 
without issue, such as the possible anomalies generated by timing differences between tax 
accounting accelerators and deferrals, and those MNEs investing in early stage development 
that will rightly locate its investment in tax favourable locations. It is not the purpose of this 
metric to capture such lawful and bona fide activities. The purpose of the tax dispersion ratio 
is to expose the specific usage of tax reliefs in a given country and make the recipient 
accountable for any tax expenses that appear inconsistent with the underlying arrangements 
in the relevant Member State. In other words, the exam question is whether tax reliefs are 
being abused by a MNE solely for reducing tax liabilities that reflect no underlying economic 
substance. 
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A proposed tax dispersion ratio would in effect set out the effective difference between book 
and tax income. Expressed as a percentage, it should be set in the region of +20% so that if 
tax expenses exceed 80% of taxes paid in any Member State it would require explanatory 
notes in the ‘ED&A’ statement. This dispersion ration would need to be published annually 
in the ‘ED&A’ statement alongside a 5 year rolling history of the ratio for year-on-year 
comparisons. The basic premise is that the higher the threshold the lower the amount of tax 
paid and the higher the probability of tax expense abuse and although this may appear to be a 
rather blunt statistic no such data is published currently and it provides a useful insight into 
country level accounting not previously alluded to in any literature to date. It would expose 
any blatant artificial transactions aimed at abusive use of tax relief not relevant to the income 
generated in a country on which taxes have been paid.  
 
7.3.2.3 Threshold Set 3 
 
A proposed set of ‘Debt Leverage’ threshold metrics would have the objective of identifying 
abusive THINCAP through the use of interest deductions. Not directly leveraging CCR but 
more ensuring transparency at a non-consolidated entity based country level, it would be a 
mandated set of data requirements requiring any MNE registered in a Member State to 
publish data that would provide indications regarding the nature and extent of debt leverage. 
Identifying the extent to which every legal entity registered within a jurisdiction is balancing 
the benefits of debt against the costs of debt is an important metric. The benefits of debt far 
outweigh the estimated costs of debt
38
 and so it is of significance to Member State tax 
authorities’ transparency around the capital structure of MNEs registered within their 
boundaries. This threshold set should be based around an absolute annual disclosure of a 
long-term debt-to-total capitalisation ratio calculation, a comparative long-term debt-to-total 
capitalisation ratio over a 5-year period for comparison purposes, a legal entity to group 
entity equity ratio, and an interest to earnings ratio.  
 
The Long Term Debt to Total Capitalisation ratio is an established metric derived from 
dividing total debt by shareholders equity. For the annual ratio disclosure it would be 
recommended to set this at a level of about 60% with a de minimis threshold of somewhere 
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between €1m and €2m. This proposed threshold level has been reached by careful 
consideration of two factors. Firstly a de minimis threshold ensures small interest payments 
that routinely form part of business activity would not be in scope. Debt payments above this 
level represent significant flows justifying transparency and, where necessary, explanation. 
The 60% threshold itself is derived from international data and averages based on empirical 
analysis by researchers that found for EU countries typical ratios vary between 28% in UK, 
47% in France and 48% in Italy
39
. Less comprehensive but more contemporary analysis 
suggests the ratio has risen in recent years with many of the largest MNEs in EU evidencing a 
ratio of 50-75%. Historically higher ratios have been attributable to economic or industry 
specific factors
40
 but as tax rules relating to interest deductions evolved it is suggested that 
high levels of debt in tax relief friendly jurisdictions have encouraged the use of debt to 
minimise tax payments.  
 
There is no ‘right’ level of debt so to an extent it is a subjective metric but it could be inferred 
from a tax perspective that high debt in jurisdictions offering favourable interest deduction 
relief in tax law may reflect artificial transactions with no economic substance rather than 
genuine exploitation of such lawful tax reliefs. In instances where a breach of this threshold 
has not been explained and pre-cleared, an explanation in the ED& A template annex to the 
statutory financial accounts would be required. Circumstances that are not fully transparent or 
explained would likely encourage a more detailed probe by the relevant Member State tax 
authority. 
 
Specific details to ensure practical implementation should be considered. For example, 
certain parameters such as debt tenure would mean that short-term debt below 3 months is 
not included. Specific industries such as entities operating in financial services should be 
excluded where their balance sheet activity can reflect substantial client activity rather than 
solely the MNEs own transactions. As is the case with all such debt ratios the definition of 
debt would need to be carefully crafted to ensure it captures the right debts, with optionality 
around the inclusion of deferred taxes as debt, preferred stock rather than capital and 
operating liabilities such as accounts payable and accrued liabilities, contractual obligations 
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or other forms of financing that may not normally appear on the balance sheet. It is the 
recommendation of this proposal to not provide for any limitations to the definition of debt in 
the threshold calculation and to let the discretion lie with the MNE to calculate and 
subsequently explain if required.  
 
The 5 Year Long Term Debt to Total Capitalisation ratio provides a view to the Member 
State tax authorities of the ratio trend that a given MNE is exhibiting over a longer time 
horizon, highlighting any specific sudden changes that may be attributable to certain debt 
leverage arrangements that are put in place, and to provide a mapping tool to some of the 
other CCR data such as income and expenses that may provide a more comprehensive view 
on corporate tax planning behaviours. A MNE evidencing a rising long term debt to total 
capitalisation ratio at the same time as a falling tax dispersion ration as set out above infers 
that a MNE was replacing the diminishing favourable impact of tax relief with substituted 
debt relief. Unlike the annual long-term debt to total capitalisation ratio no such threshold 
would be set against changes in the ratio on a year-by-year basis relating to the 5-year 
comparative computation.  
 
 
The Legal Entity to Group Entity Debt / Equity ratio serves to identify the relative debt to 
equity that a given legal entity has in a given jurisdiction relative to that accounted for at 
group MNE level. The objective of this metric is to highlight those legal entities that are 
consuming the highest levels of debt in a group MNE structure in order to ascertain whether 
there is a loading of debt into those legal entities resident in jurisdictions that grant more 
favourable tax relief on debt. Such disclosures would offer the tax authorities the evidence to 
focus on those MNEs potentially abusing THINCAP rules for the purposes of tax 
minimisation rather than to reflect a purpose with economic substance. If the ratio between a 
legal entity’s debt / equity ratio and the group level debt / equity ratio is above 1.5 then it 
would require pre-clearance or explanation in the disclosure. If a given legal entity has a 
debt-to-equity ratio that is 50% larger than the group debt-to-equity ratio then it will demand 
pre-clearance or explanation. Explanations inferring potential artificial transactions would 
likely prompt further investigation.  
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The Net Interest to Earnings ratio indicates the ability of a MNE to pay interest on 
outstanding debt relative to earnings. Published at a consolidated accounting level the 
objective would be to provide more granular disclosures at country level. The ratio is 
calculated by dividing a MNEs EBITDA in a given year by the MNEs interest expenses in 
the same period. The lower the ratio, the more a MNE is burdened by its debt expense 
relative to earnings. THINCAP practices relating to the financing of debt for wholly artificial 
means implies that the Net Interest to Earnings ratio will be lower in jurisdictions offering 
favourable tax treatment for interest deductions than others. Certain THINCAP practices 
regarding utilising tax efficient financing transaction types for raising finance will be 
acceptable but those practices involving artificial transactions for which, upon investigation, 
there is no obvious economic reason relating to the underlying business may be considered 
abusive. This ratio will be required for disclosure relating to every legal entity registered in 
each Member State. If the ratio is likely to be below 1.0 for any legal entity it will require 
explanation and pre-clearance. Non-pre-cleared ratios below 1.0 will be subject to 
prospective scrutiny by Member States. 
 
A ratio disclosure indicates an excessive level of debt to equity implies potential tax abuse 
worthy of investigation or explanation on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore a comparison 
between the equity percentages of any MNE subsidiary entity to that of the MNE group 
worldwide would similarly evidence possible excessive debt. Where the metric indicates the 
amount of net interest paid by the MNE goes beyond a certain threshold of the earnings 
before interest and taxes, hereafter referred to as  ‘EBIT’, or of EBITDA then it similarly 
implies potential tax abuse worthy of investigation or explanation. 
 
 
7.3.3 Attestations 
 
In the context of this proposal attestations refer to a requirement for a MNE Officer to 
formally testify as part of the MNEs annual financial statement that the accounting results 
and supporting data comply with the requirements of the proposed Directive. A short 
statement with specific attestation assertions serves to affirm that the financial disclosures are 
complete and accurate, that operational and financial controls are in place to support the 
integrity of the data provided, and that there has been sufficient due diligence to support the 
data submission. A supporting narrative statement of observations, exceptions and 
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conclusions resulting from the due diligence would also be submitted. The EU Directive 
would promote a common language approach to convey consistent and mandatory elements 
of the attestation. The MNE should be accountable for the submission of the attestation, and 
the attesting Officer personably accountable for the content and outcome of the attestation. 
Fines or penalties would prevail over MNEs who fail to provide attestations, as enacted 
through Member State legislation in the adoption of the Directive’s provisions. Failure by the 
attesting Officer to provide a complete or accurate attestation would entail potential criminal 
law liability, again to reflect the provisions in Member State legislation. 
 
The common language would cover two key points. Firstly, the accuracy of the financial 
statements being submitted as to the completeness and integrity of a MNEs financial 
statement with respect to country by country reporting and associated declaration of threshold 
ratios data in its operating Member States. It would include a carefully phrased text 
confirming that the ‘contents of the statement are materially correct and complete’, and 
contain no ‘false or misleading material statements’ Secondly that the ‘ED&A’ data has been 
compiled in ‘good faith’ and include no cross boundary transactions that may be considered 
‘wholly artificial’ utilised for the ‘sole’ purpose of mitigating corporate income tax payments.   
These words are carefully chosen as established legal terminology. The term ‘false or 
misleading’ material statement has successfully applied to the disclosure filing attestations in 
US legislation
41
. In the case of the Dodd Frank legislation the attestation is made on behalf of 
the MNE and the civil law penalty is revoking MNE registration if persistent misstatements 
are evident, although criminal provisions are available to prosecutors against the individual 
attesting Officers. This solution proposal is to make the attestation liability a criminal one 
that is placed on the MNE Officer rather than the MNE. The Directive would be expected to 
set out guidelines on what would constitute materiality. Layering accounting standards onto 
Member State tax laws provide a degree of uncertainty and inconsistency about how a MNE 
would be minded to represent a transaction that implies a level of subjectivity in statutory 
disclosures. In the context of this proposed scheme, there are two components of materiality. 
On the one hand, any accounting disclosure would be considered material if it would have an 
impact on a decision by the Member State tax authority in which it has made the disclosure.  
On the other hand, materiality refers to the assessment of accounting judgements made by the 
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MNE Officer. Clear evidence of an intention to mislead the Member State tax authorities, 
whatever its magnitude, should be considered material. The onus is on a qualitative 
disclosure rather than the setting of any quantitative tolerance level. On this point, degrees of 
tolerance are EU provisions are not typically embedded into EU Directives, other than the 
First Directive that states that in situations where there is evidence of “a failure to disclose”42 
appropriate penalties or sanctions may be enforced.  
 
Clarity is required to ascertain whether misleading or false accounting disclosures equate to 
non-disclosure of accounting data. False accounting disclosure implies an element of fraud 
whereas non-disclosure is an act of defiance and so this proposed scheme aims to address 
both potential delinquencies. Ascertaining whether an accounting disclosure is false or not 
demands reference to specific Member State rules as well as EU case law. The CJEU has 
stated without ambiguity that Member States should ensure disclosure violations are dealt 
with in an “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”43 manner. ‘False’ claims that contain 
facts that are found to be untruthful will likely be held to be misleading. A statement that 
does not contain untrue facts but is incomplete because of the omission of certain facts that 
are relevant to the Directive’s requirements would typically be considered to be misleading 
too. Truthful claims that are likely to lead to a false impression may be held to be misleading. 
In such circumstances, given its relevance to tax law, it will likely to require an assessment of 
the financial data on the grounds of whether it represents a “wholly artificial arrangements 
which do not reflect economic reality” as demonstrated in Cadbury44. Under such 
circumstances the burden of proof will lie on the attesting Officer. Once the MNE has 
submitted a financial statement in which the facts are stated, an assessment by the tax 
authority may oblige the CFO to prove its assertions, as well as providing evidence on which 
the CCR financial data and associated thresholds were based. This is likely to be accounting 
based evidence.  Once provided the tax authority then takes the burden of proof and cannot 
pass it back to the MNE unless it can demonstrate sufficient doubt on the evidence presented 
by the MNE to suggest false or misleading disclosures. The distinguishing feature of these 
attestation requirements is that there is specific text in the attestation wording that will 
provide better clarity around exactly what they are attesting to and to reference to case law 
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precedent in the evaluation of cases under judicial review. Introducing criminal liability to 
such attestations provides for a powerful instrument of behavioural change.  
 
Non-cleared threshold breaches would demand a detailed causal explanation. In the event of a 
threshold breach the MNE Officer who has attested to the disclosures would be held to 
account for this explanation. If under further scrutiny the reasons given explaining such a 
breach were found to be false, either by the tax authority in the first instance, or by the further 
judicial referral or appeal then the attesting Officer would be potentially held to account for 
the submission in the criminal courts. The higher the personal criminal liability, the higher 
the likely impact on corporate conduct
45
. Such cases would be rare but the threat itself of 
such a liability is the driver for changes in behaviour. It would be unnecessary to extend this 
legal attestation requirement to a MNEs auditor but the underlying MNEs attestation may 
encourage such back-to-back attestations in order to satisfy the attesting Officer that 
sufficient third party due-diligence has taken place over the commitments being declared in 
the financial statements. Given it would be part of the statutory financial accounts this annex 
should be included at least within the scope of the auditors opinion.  It remains a thought 
provoking concept that a MNE would be encouraged to ask an auditor to attest that its 
accounts do not reflect any of the activities regularly promoted by such auditors in the first 
place that may threaten a MNEs compliance with CCR and the new threshold metrics. 
 
Evidence in the recent usage of attestations across a broader range of law and procedures 
suggests that it is more usual for their application relating to specific legal compliance to 
internal controls
46
 or against being party to illegal acts
47
. Other attestations may have no legal 
determination
48
. There is no reason why this concept cannot be extended to attesting to 
enhanced disclosure and reporting, a breach of which may suggest but not necessarily 
confirm illegality. An attestation may be used as a pre-judicial tool to regulate corporate 
taxpayer behaviours and not necessarily as one which specifically formalises conformity to 
legal activities. As a tool for encouraging compliance rather than as an instrument to 
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differentiate legal and illegal behaviours, the attestation is made for the purposes of 
confirming accurate and complete disclosure. Any threshold breach without pre-approval is 
of secondary consideration. In such a scenario the MNE Officer may disclose and attest to a 
threshold breach without pre-clearance in confidence if it was conducted with justifiable 
economic substance with no evidence of attempting to escape “tax normally due on the 
profits generated by activities carried out on national territory”49. If upon further investigation 
it were found that the threshold breach was indeed executed for reasons other than a valid 
economic purpose then the MNE Officer would have to justify the breach to the satisfaction 
of the local tax authority to avoid a judicial challenge. The reasoning is that such a judicial 
threat in itself would encourage every MNE Officer other than the bold and reckless to keep 
within the boundaries of acceptable economic reasoning. Clearly the SGI
50
 and Thin Cap 
GLO
51
 judgments provide a sound basis for articulating the importance of the concepts of 
justification and proportionality, supporting the reasoning for this approach as well. Any 
judicial challenge would be able to utilise these established concepts in ascertaining the 
legitimacy in using economic structures for the purposes of avoiding tax that resulted in a 
threshold breach.  
 
The concept of economic purpose and abuse of tax law through wholly artificial 
arrangements has been demonstrated to be well established in CJEU case law. This proposal 
extends the concept from an abuse of tax law to an abuse of Fundamental Freedoms. 
Accepting that EU law cannot be relied upon for addressing abusive tax avoidance behaviour, 
the case of Emsland-Starke
52
 is useful for more generally determining the objective and 
subjective criteria for assessing such abusive conduct in respect to this proposed solution. 
From an objective perspective, it ruled that conduct under scrutiny should not conflict with 
the original intention of the provisions, and there should be no evidence of an intention to 
achieve an improper advantage from such provisions. Therefore it necessarily follows that if 
a MNE Officer attests to the completeness and accuracy of a financial statement and an 
investigation resulting from the breach of a non-cleared threshold relating to CCR reporting 
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is found to expose abuse then such an Officer would be criminally liable in accordance with 
the Directive’s attestation requirements. 
 
The concept of EU mandated corporate criminal liability is well established. It has been 
introduced in most Member States facilitating judicial sanctions on corporate entities for 
criminal acts or the criminal acts of its Officers. An exception to this would be in Germany 
where imposing corporate criminal liability would conflict with the basic principles of the 
German Criminal Code. This hasn’t prevented Germany from instigating regulatory action 
against German MNEs resulting from criminal conduct through the imposition of fines that 
produces the same criminal liability. The EU Treaty sets out specific provisions relating to 
how a Directive may define criminal offences, common rules on the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions
53
 particularly when there is “a cross-border dimension resulting from 
the nature or impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common 
basis”54. A recent EU Directive on criminal sanctions for market abuse55 extends the concept 
of criminal sanctions to corporate individuals rather than the corporate entity.  
 
In the context of our sample Member States, France was the first jurisdiction to introduce the 
concept of corporate criminal liability in 1994 but recently updated in 2005
56
. The law states 
that the criminal liability of a corporate entity does not preclude any individual who may be a 
perpetrator in the corporate entity from being held criminally liable, although a corporate 
entity’s liability does not automatically result in liability for any of its directors or Officers. 
Penalties in France on corporate Officers include imprisonment, fines and prohibition of 
office. Italy enacted its corporate criminal liability in 2001
57
 replacing tort law with criminal 
provisions. Under this law, a corporate can be criminally liable for false financial statements. 
The liability of its Officers is completely independent of the corporate entity’s liability and 
would have to be separately defined under Italian law. Punishments include fines, 
disgorgement of profits and business activity prohibitions.  In the Netherlands, there is a 
long-standing legal provision relating to fiscal criminal offences relating to corporate entities 
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and their Officers.  The UK and Netherlands has a long-standing acceptance of corporate 
criminal liability. Since 2009 these criminal laws
58
 have provided for fines applicable to both 
the entity and its Officers. Any Officers can be prosecuted who can be shown to be 
perpetrators of an offense if held accountable for neglecting to take proper measures to 
prevent misconduct or misstatements. The judiciary has the power to implement fines on 
Officers and on the corporate entity as well as prohibiting business activities or placing it into 
temporary administration. In the UK, recent legislation
59
 establishes a clear mandate on the 
judiciary to hold corporate entities criminally liable for inciting criminal acts or breach of 
duty, but there is also legislation
60
 providing for Officer criminal liability where neglect is 
proven. In the latter case, fines, disqualifications from office and imprisonment penalties are 
available. Finally in Germany, the position of corporate criminal liability is less clear. 
German criminal law only applies to natural persons implying a corporate entity cannot 
commit a criminal offense. Forfeiture orders and regulatory fines may be applied to corporate 
entities in the event of proven wrongdoing but for the Officers themselves can be held 
criminally liable for breach of duty. One feature evidenced in this analysis of different 
jurisdictions is that there is legal provision in EU law for corporate and Officer criminal 
liability. Defences provisions around having proper systems and controls are commonplace, 
although penalty regimes do differ markedly. EU mandated criminal liability is consistent 
with the principles of the EU Treaty but also consistent with the principles underpinning this 
proposed proposal.    
 
The wholly artificial arrangements doctrine is well established, supporting the notion that 
“nationals of a Member State cannot attempt, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, 
improperly to circumvent their national legislation. They must not improperly or fraudulently 
take advantage of provisions of Community law”61. As stated in Thin Cap case, “In order for 
a restriction on the Freedom of Establishment to be justified on the ground of prevention of 
abusive practices, the specific objective…must be to prevent….the creation of wholly 
artificial arrangements”62 The principles governing when an abuse of law can be deemed to 
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have occurred and the benefit of that right withdrawn is not entirely clear. The French Civil 
Code is best placed to provide insight by placing emphasis on actions executed in an 
excessive manner which causes harm to a third party. Equally applicable to an abuse of 
secondary legislation as well as an abuse of Fundamental Freedoms, the teleological aspect to 
the abuse of rights doctrine is based on the hypothesis that for an abuse to apply the legal act 
in question has to be contrary to the legal purpose of the legislative provision. The conflict 
arises as a result of the somewhat potential different purposes associated with secondary EU 
legislation and Fundamental Freedoms, the former generally focusing on minimising tax 
avoidance and the latter on promoting economic integration. Therefore, the linguistics used in 
CJEU rulings is probably the most helpful domain for defining a minimum threshold for tax 
abuse. The earliest case in Van Brinsbergen stated that an abuse occurred when arrangements 
were enacted “entirely or principally”63 for purposes of circumventing tax. In Halifax abuse 
was defined as occurring when such an arrangement was “essentially”64 for the purposes of 
circumventing tax (corresponding to “principally” in Van Binsbergen), and in Koefed abuse 
was only deemed present where the “sole”65 purpose was to circumvent tax (corresponding to 
“entirely” in Van Binsbergen). It was only once the ruling in Emsland-Starke was in place 
that a more methodical test was identified to assess abusive behaviour, advocating an initial 
objective element assessing alignment with the purpose of the rules against a subjective 
assessment of demonstrable intentions to yield a benefit through artificial arrangements. Such 
an assessment is a structured proposition but gives little insight into the extent to which an 
intention deviates from the purpose to justify an abuse of rights to have occurred.    
 
The challenge for any scheme proposing to exploit the correlative relationship between 
proportionality and abuse of rights doctrines should consider a number of complicating 
factors.  First, Van Brinsbergen
66
 introduced the concepts of public interest and 
proportionality. Constraining EU Fundamental Freedoms may be justified on the grounds of 
protecting the general public interest and is proportionate to attain those requirements. 
Circumvention can occur without abuse with the differentiation being defined by what the 
Van Brinsbergen case highlighted as the artificial use of EU Fundamental Freedoms when the 
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outcome was the circumvention of Member State rules without an impact on the public 
interest. Any public interest claim associated with circumventing tax payments should offer 
adverse public interest and therefore align more closely to an abusive categorisation. The 
challenge will be reconciling a national ruling based on an EU collective public interest. 
Secondly, the Cadbury ruling stated that for a wholly artificial arrangement to exist there 
must be a demonstration of not only a tax advantage but also a clear failure to achieve 
economic interpenetration through a genuine economic activity. A tax advantage on its own, 
of course, will be insufficient. Wholly artificial arrangements is a carefully worded phase 
synonymous with abusive behaviour which makes it particularly suitable for this proposed 
scheme but MNE and national tax authorities need to be mindful of exactly how the Vin 
Brinsbergen and Cadbury cases articulated their thought process in determining abuse.     
 
In leveraging the wholly artificial arrangement as a basis for defining a prospective abuse of a 
fundamental freedom is a credible and powerful concept to regulate behaviour, although 
untested when supplemented with corporate entity and Officer strict liabilities. If a financial 
statement is found to contain a false or misleading statement based on a wholly artificial 
arrangement the liability will rest firmly on the attesting Officer. To make this a practical 
proposal, although all transactions would constitute the CCR disclosure, a de minimis 
transaction threshold would be specified in absolute € terms in the EU Directive regarding the 
minimum transaction level subject to review on the grounds of a wholly artificial 
arrangement. Such a de minimis threshold would be uniform across all Member States, MNEs 
and Industry categories, and subject to periodic review.  There are judicial precedents in tax 
case law, mostly commonly in the context of VAT cases
67
 that suggest a common line of 
defence is frequently based around acting in good faith. If the attesting Officer took every 
step which could reasonably be required of him to satisfy himself that the financial statements 
were correct and complete. This could relate to reliance on internal controls or external 
advice. Considering the principle of null poena sine culpa (no punishment without fault), if 
the attesting Officer has acted without fault by undertaking all possible and reasonable steps 
to avoid an infringement of the proposed Directive ‘ED&A’ requirements then this would be 
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expected to be considered in a favourable light by a Court, as specified in the defence 
available set out in the relevant Member State legislation    
 
“Good faith” is a vague notion that, although well defined in contract law, is difficult to give 
a precise and unequivocal legal meaning in a wider context. The concept in legal terms has 
different connotations when expressed in terms of intention and defence demanding 
elucidation. Good faith is synonymous with honourable intentions and it is this wording that 
is relevant for the proposed attestation text. Conversely good faith has particular relevance in 
terms of legal interpretation or legal defence. It has merit with legal grounding in 
international law such as the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
68
 that noted how 
legal interpretation should be conducted with good faith in accordance with context, 
objectives and legislative intent. Similar provisioning is evidenced in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among 
States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
69
. Although the use of the term 
‘good faith’ as an instrument of interpretation is inconsistent between different Member State 
jurisdictions the impact depends on the context. The Netherlands does not reference the 
notion of good faith directly in its Netherlands Civil Code, but does provide provision for 
“determining what reasonableness involves….reference must be able to generally accepted 
principles of law…and to interests involved”70.but in Italy it is directly codified71. Case law 
in Germany
72
 and the UK
73
 are also supportive of the use of subjective and objective 
interpretation. In France case law the concept of good faith has been challenged as a point of 
legal obligation
74, but “may be used to limit the exercise by a state of discretion within the 
context of legal obligations to which it is subject” 75. This provides a difficulty for MNEs to 
use this line of defence consistently until a constant is agreed by the CJEU on this point 
specifically relating to the Directive in due course. In the jurisdictions that recognise the 
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legitimacy of subjective interpretation by searching for the parties intentions there should be 
an expectation the attesting Officer that relies on the notion of good faith would complement 
the other proposed lines of defence based around due diligence reliance and constructive 
knowledge. 
 
An attesting Officer may seek to use and rely on third party advice as part of any ‘good faith’ 
defence against a breach of the proposed Directive. To this point, recent opinion offered by 
the CJEU
76
 suggested the need for a number of criteria fulfilled for reliance on third party 
professional advice to be considered a legitimate defence. Although not a tax related 
Advocate General’s Opinion it nevertheless set out some general principles. First, the MNE 
must have relied on the professional advice in good faith. If it can be proven that they relied 
on the opinion against its better judgement or the advice was specifically tailored to the 
MNEs business activities the professional advice should be considered irrelevant for the 
assessment of fault. Second, the professional advice must come from an independent external 
specialist who must regularly work in a domain relevant to the tasks required. Third, the 
professional advice must have been provided on the basis of a full and accurate description of 
the facts by the MNE involved. Fourth, the professional advice must not be manifestly 
incorrect, and the plausibility of the advice must be assessed by the MNE concerned.  If the 
advice indicated that the legal situation is unclear, the MNE concerned is deemed to act at its 
own risk. This important opinion is highly relevant to the credibility of this proposal as it 
defines the  boundaries of acceptability in the eyes of the CJEU as to how a MNE can or 
cannot rely on the advice of a third party professional to defend against attestation breaches. 
 
One of the challenges that could be levied against the attestation part of the proposal is its 
position in regard to the rule of law and its unsettled place with regards to human rights.  
There is a need to finely balance fundamental rights, such as the human rights
77
 of an 
attesting MNE Officer, as enforced through the European Court of Human Rights, with the 
rights of an economic entity such as a MNE to exercise Fundamental Freedoms, as enforced 
through the CJEU
78
. Contemporary political and economic life has an emerging sense of 
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justice associated with a social contract that this reform proposal aims to create and this 
arguably stems from human rights.  
 
To address such a challenge the legal doctrines of proportionality and legal certainty are 
important. The concept of legal proportionality, first recognised formally by the CJEU in 
1954
79
 and, in the context of this proposal, suggests that the legal legitimacy of the Directive 
would be a function of whether it is considered appropriate and proportional to achieve the 
objectives as enacted in the Member State legislation. Is the kind of attestation being 
proposed a suitable measure for achieving the legitimate aims of the proposed Directive, is 
the attestation necessary to meet that aim, and does the attestation have an excessive impact 
on the attesting Officer’s interests? This proposal promotes an attestation as a suitable 
component to nurture and enforce maximum due diligence over the completeness and 
integrity of the Directive’s financial threshold reporting requirements. By placing personal 
accountability on a serving Officer of the MNE it will not get lost in the common malaise of 
corporate processes. Pre-clearance of breaches will likely filter out the most acute forms of 
abuse with MNEs unlikely to want to face adverse publicity. The highest level of personal 
criminal liability of MNE Officers is an extreme outcome and the purpose of this attestation 
is not to award penal sentences to large numbers of serving Officers but rather disclosures are 
complete and that there are no wholly artificial arrangements in such disclosures. The ability 
to pre-clear breaches or explain with confidence the circumstances of genuine economic 
reason for what may appear tax abusive activities offers ample capacity to avoid the worst 
possible consequence of a threshold breach. There is a risk that Member State judiciary 
bodies make inconsistent rulings in the first instance but like many other areas of EU public 
law, despite the lack of appetite to engage in what may be deemed political decisions, there 
will likely be a body of settled case law in this domain within a reasonably short period of 
time.     
 
The other challenge around attestations could stem from the concept of legal certainty. 
Referring to a well-established principle in public case law
80
, legal certainty infers that any 
law must be clear and precise and its legal impact foreseeable. In this sense, the proposed 
‘ED&A’ would be laid out with no potential for material mis-interpretation. There is no 
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danger of the Directives ‘ED&A’ being used for anything other than its original purpose and 
this is important given the burden of criminal liability being placed on the MNE Officer. 
Member States may use the disclosures as a reason for pursuing some MNEs more 
aggressively than others but this is no different to the autonomy given to national tax 
authorities currently, and any personal criminal liability is based not on the underlying 
activities but expressed in terms of data completeness and integrity.  In this respect the MNE 
Officer is entitled to exercise the right to legitimate expectations. The doctrine of legitimate 
expectations is “undeniably part of Community law”81 although some commentators surmise 
that it is “rather intangible” [in EU law]….and “very few cases succeed on the legitimate 
expectations argument”82. The doctrine comes from public law and applies to the principles 
of fairness and reasonableness to a situation where a person has an expectation of a public 
entity retaining a long standing practice or keeping a promise. It demands consistency and 
proportionality from such public entities. 
 
In the context of this ‘ED&A’ proposal there are several aspects to a MNE Officer’s 
legitimate expectations. On the one hand it relates to a legitimate expectation around the 
procedures for executing the ‘ED&A’ Directive’s rules, and the measured and relatively 
consistent implementation of Member State rules for meeting the proposed Directive’s rules. 
On the other hand, it relates to providing for sufficient locus standi for judicial review in the 
event of an ‘ED&A’ conflict. A MNE Officer has a legitimate expectation of being treated in 
accordance with a fair and structured administrative process for resolving ‘ED&A’ conflicts. 
Any evidence of Member State procedural impropriety would justify judicial review. There is 
also an internalised angle on this doctrine too. A MNE Officer could be expected to have 
legitimate expectations that the controls and procedures put in place internally within the 
MNE to ensure integrity and completeness of data would be sufficient to rely on in making an 
attestation. Only a failure to ensure such controls are put in place or to oversee a level of due 
diligence over such controls would leave the Officer at risk. The external dimension to relates 
to having  a legitimate expectation that the Member State tax authorities and judicial system 
would treat him fairly in any investigation either as consistent with the policies and 
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procedures inherent within the Directive or from consistent past practice
83
. In accordance 
with the findings of Srivastava, the legitimate expectation of a MNE Officer “may not by 
itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to give due weight to it may render any 
outcome as arbitrary. This is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate 
expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary part of the rule of 
law” 84. Reference to these legitimate expectations referenced in this section constitutes the 
reasoning relevant to an equitable decision-making process relating to ‘ED&A’ 
investigations. 
 
The application of the doctrine of legitimate expectations to taxation is not a new concept. It 
has been well documented in scholarly literature and has been evidenced in administrative 
laws for some time. Legitimate expectations can be considered a procedural right although 
this has been extended to the enforcement of more individual expectations, something that 
has been termed substantive protection of legitimate expectations
85
. Of relevance to this 
research are the findings of Barak-Erez
86
 who highlighted the difference between 
expectations and reliance with most EU case law focusing on the latter point. Further 
research by Freedman and Vella
87
 focused on the correlation between legitimate expectations 
and fairness as a basis of the rule of law, setting out the “careful balance to be struck between 
certainty and fairness for the individual on the one hand, and flexibility and public interest on 
the other”88. Similarly, case law reference has been made to such a doctrine in a number of 
tax cases. In Unilever
89
 it was ruled that in the absence of reliance, legitimate expectations 
would not be enforced unless a taxpayer relied on a tax authority’s actions and as a 
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consequence witnessed change for the worse. As such, the judiciary will need to take note of 
any documented guidance, historical clearances, statements of interpretation, previous 
agreements and any other relationship form between the MNE and tax authority in respect to 
an attestation challenge as it may legitimately be relied upon. It seems realistic to argue that 
even where a MNE has enjoyed a favourable tax treatment for a number of years there should 
be no legitimate expectation to continue to enjoy such a benefit if an abuse of Fundamental 
Freedoms has been proven. In the event that an ‘ED&A’ disclosure prompts a tax 
investigation that results in a punitive tax charge being applied to a MNE on a set of 
circumstances previously approved or accepted by a tax authority, there is an argument that 
the MNE may have a legitimate expectation of such a favourable tax treatment continuing but 
there is no statutory provision for any EU tax authority for open ended assurances. A tax 
authority armed with more granular information could be expected to exercise their right to 
review and, where necessary, pursue abusive transactions irrespective of their previous 
actions. Ultimate responsibility, however, resides with the MNE. Reliance on an auditor’s 
certification of compliance may not be relied upon.  In Newham
90
 it was held that an ultra 
vires bi-lateral assurance by a tax authority with a MNE cannot give rise to a legitimate 
expectation, although this becomes potentially complicated when public statements are made 
by the tax authorities and no such case law exists that has ruled on this matter.
91
.     
 
The final consideration is the adherence of the ‘ED&A’ solution proposal to human rights 
legislation. Ensuring the tenets of this solution proposal align with the rule of law is 
imperative but there is a necessary alignment with the European Convention on Human 
Rights too, hereafter referred to as ‘ECHR’. Any solution proposal, and the associated 
procedures and actions adopted by Member States and their tax authorities will likely attract a 
degree of reliance by MNEs and its Officers on the ECHR to challenge ‘ED&A’. There is 
limited academic literature relating to the correlation between accounting disclosures or 
attestations with criminal liability and its impact on the legislative provision of human rights 
protection. Considerable case law
92
 on corporate tax cases has made reference to the ECHR 
although “there have not been many successful challenges of tax provisions under the 
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ECHR”93. The ECHR articles and protocols set out specific rights, acknowledging the fact 
that some are more relevant than others and that different Member State jurisdictions have 
differing human rights legislation to accommodate the provisions of the ECHR.  
 
First, article 1
94
 of Protocol 1 provides for respecting protection of property. There have been 
a number of EU cases on this matter, the most pertinent of which is Hentrich v France
95
 
whereby a French court ruled, in relation to article 1 of Protocol No 1, that “there must be a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to 
be released”. If such proportionality is violated then there would be a case under the ECHR. 
This would be relevant if a Member State tax authority took disproportionate efforts in 
relation to the perceived abuses to investigate a MNEs transactions based on the accounting 
disclosures. 
 
Second, article 6
96
 provides for a right to a fair trial, providing the taxpayer with an 
independent and impartial trial within reasonable time. In the UK there have been some cases 
relevant to this research synopsis. King v Walden (Inspector of Taxes)
97
 ruled that in the case 
of a taxpayer being negligent in his tax return and was subject to criminal liability there was 
no defence around a right to a free trial.  A right to a fair trial may be possible if there is a 
delinquency in proceedings and the same could be applied to any judicial proceedings. A 
more interesting challenge may arise where investigation procedures used by a Member State 
tax authority based off the enhanced disclosures demand the disclosure of incriminating 
information that may be used against them. In some jurisdictions such as the UK if a MNE 
cooperates with the tax authority they will not usually prosecute but rather settle out of Court. 
Reconciling this approach with a more formal rigid penalty regime could introduce some 
difficulties as a right to a fair trial, as a human right, may be infringed if he was enticed under 
threat of more penal liability to provide incriminating evidence. The case of R v Allen
98
 ruled 
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that disclosure of information cannot constitute a violation of the right against self-
incrimination. 
 
Third, article 7 upholds that “no one shall be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law 
at the time it was committed” 99. The impact of this is that the implementation of any 
‘ED&A’ requirements in the proposed EU Directive could not incur criminal penalty for 
retrospective violations as they would only become effective after Member State 
transposition. This does not preclude using enhanced accounting disclosures that shed light 
on retrospective tax abuses in evidence against a MNE when examining wholly artificial 
arrangements. 
 
Fourth, article 8
100
 provides for right to privacy. There is case law
101
 evidence of when 
taxpayers have alleged tax legislation unreasonably impinges on confidentiality and the right 
of privacy. There is a risk that a MNE or its Officer may refuse, on the grounds of privacy, to 
supply information for specific reasons. This may not necessarily relate to the statutory 
disclosure itself but rather information demanded in any subsequent investigation by a 
Member State tax authority or Court. This remains a weak argument, substantiated by case 
law such as Guyer v Walton
102
 whereby the taxpayer unsuccessfully argued that disclosure of 
information infringed the right to privacy of his clients. Data protection is a fundamental right 
enshrined within Article 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the processing of all 
data by law enforcement agencies must comply with the principles of “necessity, 
proportionality and legality”103. 
 
Fifth, article 14
104
 contains a prohibition on discrimination and although it does not provide 
an exhaustive list of discrimination types, the right could correctly be applied to any potential 
discrimination suffered by a MNE if it could demonstrate that it was being singled out for 
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undue or disproportionate pursuit of tax abuse activities. There is an element of ambiguity 
with regards to this right that is only aggravated by its absence in case law precedent relating 
to taxation and corporate rights. Not all differential treatment is discrimination. 
Discrimination occurs when differential treatment cannot be reasonably justified. A Member 
State tax authority may assess a MNE more closely than another MNE but is infringing no 
rights in doing so. It is legitimate to treat MNEs differently. If a MNE has a track record of 
tax avoidance or is publicly exposed as deployed such practices there is no discrimination 
evidenced if a Member State tax authority elects to assess that MNE with an extra level of 
scrutiny above and beyond another MNE who does not have such a record. 
 
Sixth, article 17
105
 provides that no one may use ECHR rights to seek the abolition or 
limitation of rights guaranteed in the Convention. In Oxhey v Raynham
106
 it was ruled that 
Member State legislation must intend to act consistently with the Member State’s obligations 
under International Law. Legislation must be consistent with the ECHR but also international 
laws such as the EU Treaty. If there is any ambiguity around Member State laws in relation to 
provisioning the proposed EU Directive in this solution proposal then there is always the 
possibility of a referral for a judgement in relation to its compliance with ECHR. There is no 
known case law precedence that suggests ambiguity in a tax or accounting law has been 
relied upon in relation to its compliance with ECHR as an aid to judicial interpretation.  
 
The doctrine of human rights provides this research with some important elements regarding 
the reform proposal. It serves to constrain Member States in creating penalty laws to support 
the proposed Directive within the expectations of the ECHR and it establishes behavioural 
goals to the extent that they can be influenced by external EU institutional actors. Although 
there appears little evidence of any material risks to the proposed solution on the grounds of a 
successful claim under ECHR there are two further points warranting consideration. In some 
non-corporate tax law cases
107
, Courts have made a recurring reference, in relation to human 
rights, of parties being subject to an “individual and excessive burden”. Does it necessarily 
follow that the ‘ED&A’ provisions mean that a MNE Officer could extend the concept 
relating to having to bear an “individual and excessive burden” through the proposed 
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extended disclosures and attestation requirements? If so would an Officer subject to 
potentially excessive and burdensome tax authority investigative scrutiny as a result of 
‘ED&A’ have a case under ECHR article 1 of Protocol No. 1? It remains a possibility and 
therefore a risk but there is no such case precedence to support this on the grounds of either a 
substantive interpretation of this right or from a procedural interpretation perspective. Finally, 
there is the challenging question regarding the balancing potential conflicts between human 
rights and abuse of rights. The manner in which the legal system addresses the potentially 
inherent conflicts of balancing the interests and rights of the EU in the protection of an 
Internal Market as set out in EU Fundamental Freedoms with individual ECHR rights of EU 
subjects when there is evidence of abuses of the former is the key challenge. There would be 
no credible argument that an individual surrenders ECHR rights if there is evidence of an 
abuse of EU Fundamental Freedoms but it may, in the eyes of the judicial system, weaken 
any case that a MNE or its Officer may bring when attempting to defeat an ‘ED&A’ violation 
by utilising the ECHR. Under such circumstances, if a Court is to consider a permissible 
interference with ECHR rights then it must be in accordance with the law and have a 
legitimate aim
108
. Any assessment on the reasonableness of such a restriction would be based 
around the principle of proportionality. The extent of any interference is important but Courts 
tend to assess any case by assessing whether a particular course of action such as a tax 
investigation consequential to the proposed ‘ED&A’ could be attained by a less intrusive 
mode. This has been recognised through judicial reference to the “margin of appreciation” 
doctrine
109
 outlining the flexibility offered to Member States and their institutions in fulfilling 
their ECHR obligations, acknowledging that a uniform standard of human rights protections 
is difficult to achieve. Margin of appreciation is a context dependent assessment which is 
easier to apply to qualified rights rather than absolute rights
110
 and there are examples of 
conceptually relevant human rights case law outside tax or accounting cases referencing 
margin of appreciation in relation to article 8 which ruled on the fair balance between the 
economic interests of a country and individual rights
111
, in relation to article 14 and a case 
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ruling on a fair balance between protecting the interests of the community and respecting 
fundamental rights
112
, and in relation to article 1 of Protocol 1 that ruled on the 
proportionality between a legal penalty and the legitimate aim underpinning the legislation
113
. 
All of these have relevance and potentially provide the basis for any challenges regarding 
potential interferences with ECHR rights raised in the context of the solution proposal.  
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Chapter Eight: Rationalising the Proposed Solution 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Although the path to reform is a challenging one, the ED&A solution detailed in Chapter 
Seven offers a credible strategy for reducing tax avoidance practices. Succeeding in 
implementing such a legal solution proposal will be a challenge, very much determined by 
the underlying alignment to established legal doctrines both in absolute terms and in 
accordance with the legal order inherent within the adopting Member States. The solution 
components are subjected to a critical assessment of its absolute compliance with the 
fundamental concepts underpinning the Rule of Law since laws are rarely adopted 
successfully or sustainably if they infringe on such concepts. Reliance on the doctrinal 
concepts of abuse of rights, substance over form and proportionality direct the analysis 
towards how these are relevant not just in relation to the solution in principle but to their 
alignment with the legal order in each of the sample set of Member States.   
 
 
8.2 Alignment to Rule of Law 
 
The rule of law remains a contested concept. In its most basic form it refers to what Hayek 
termed “rules fixed and announced beforehand…which make it possible to foresee with fair 
certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan 
one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”1. The credibility of any proposed 
solution would demand alignment with the rule of law. In Chapter Six an assessment was 
conducted of the mainstream solution options against the basic concepts generally understood 
to form part of the rule of law. For the solution proposal we will apply the component parts 
against the more detailed definition in accordance with a UN report
2
 definition stating the 
rule of law as; 
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“A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally 
enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human 
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in 
the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency."
3
 
 
This particular definition of the rule of law has been selected as it has a number of additional 
component parts to its content that Bingham omitted that have direct relevance to this reform 
proposal. Reference to accountability to the law refers to the processes, norms and structures 
that hold MNEs and EU institutions legally responsible for their actions and who may impose 
sanctions if they violate the law, a potent issue for a reform proposal that delivers tax 
compliance through the targeting of MNEs directly rather than the Member States. Reference 
to equality before the law reflects legal egalitarianism that is important given the diversity of 
the MNE population in the EU, and reference to accountability to the law reflects the strength 
of a law to ensure that the legal rule being proposed underpins the claim of being held 
culpable of the breach of a law. Reference to the separation of powers is a political doctrine 
reflecting the diversity of power inherent in the ordinary legislative process of implementing 
a Directive, and participation in decision-making is an important element given the diversity 
of stakeholders influencing the EU tax reform process. The emphasis placed on legal 
certainty is similarly significant as a component of international law to enable MNEs to 
regulate their conduct with security and protecting the taxpayer from arbitrary use of state 
power which reforms often offer ample opportunity to exploit. The rule of law aspect is 
important because of the competing forces of law making and judicial oversight roles and 
responsibilities. This tension resides at tax administration, tax legislation and judicial tax 
ruling levels across EU and Member State domains. It refers to a set of set of principles and 
ethical standards that are analogous with the concept of legality. Disparate national 
provisions relating to tax laws have posed little issue from a rule of law perspective while 
operating in tandem, but efforts to promote a centralised pluralistic direct tax law or related 
initiative through the EU raises challenges.  
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Compliance with the rule of law would provide credibility to the proposal. In Chapter Three 
it was shown how the Common Law Legal Origins legal doctrine
4
 is a useful starting point 
whereby the integration of legal norms through a common law system in each Member State 
impacts economic behaviours. The link between market or economic behaviour correlated to 
its legal system, suggests that in the context of this research changes to EU law reform are 
likely to impact on the economic behaviours of its constituents, both sovereign and corporate. 
La Porta
5
 endorsed the earlier historical versions of legal origins theory by suggesting how 
legal rules are propagated by particular economic contexts. Legal rules at Member State 
change frequently in response to local needs and substantive rules of law are flexible to this 
local environment whereby it requires a more essential change in ‘legal infrastructure’6 that 
embraces more deeply rooted legal rules and practices that determine the role of the legal 
system in shaping economic behaviour. Member States cannot do this singularly as it requires 
a more fundamental force to enact change. La Porta also highlighted how this fundamental 
force is more likely to be effective through common law means than civil law
7
, supporting 
the distinction implied by Hayek’s analysis of the differences between common law and civil 
law
8
. The legal philosopher Hayek promoted the notion that the bulk of knowledge in a 
society is local in character and dispersed, implying that no individual could master enough 
information to anticipate the effects of a planned change in laws. Research by Armour
9
 et al 
suggested that legal origins theory defines the ‘quality of law’ by ensuring legal rules shape 
economic decisions and outcomes according to how far they support market based economic 
activities. This theory is important to this proposed scheme as it recognises the importance of 
EU Fundamental Freedoms driving Internal Market MNE behaviours, as well as how it 
signifies the importance of Member State tax laws residing along more broadly based EU 
provisions for resolving complex issues such as EU tax abuse. Each has their part to play and 
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it is these provisions working in parallel that need to be assessed from a rule of law 
perspective.   
 
When considering the proposed scheme in the context of the rule of law, its content may be 
viewed “as a means rather than an end”10. Conventionally, law starts with an act of illegality 
and the judicial system uses evidence of the illegality to pursue prosecution. In the context of 
corporate tax avoidance we start looking at the evidence to see if a crime has been 
committed. It requires a different line of reasoning than many other aspects to law making. 
The EU would be empowered with the legal authority to mandate corporate disclosure 
through the EU Directive and the Member States would be empowered to implement law to 
regulate the process of review, challenge and penalty of the corporate disclosure.   
 
There is no such concept as the EU rule of law although there has been reference to the more 
general concepts of an international rule of law
11
 and academic reference to “supranational 
rule of law”12.   In the context of this research, the rule of law needs to be applied to Member 
States and the MNE and its Officers. For Member States there is an obligation to exercise its 
powers based on legislative authority utilising channels that make such public rules limited to 
their absolute statement, limiting subjective interpretation by officials and abiding by due 
process of law. For the MNE and its Officers, there is a responsibility to obey these laws, be 
cognisant to changes in the laws, have controls in place to ensure abidance and do not act in 
any way that compromises the operation of the legal process. Given a MNE must obey the 
law where it exists but does not have any obligation where it does not is an important point. 
They have no obligation to behave in accordance with the morality, purpose or spirit of the 
law.   
 
Whether it is possible to curtail the abusive attack on Fundamental Freedoms without 
adversely impacting the rule of law is a debatable point. There is an element of discretion 
offered to Member States in how they implement locally into law and how, whether and to 
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what extent national tax authorities wish to pursue a potentially abusive disclosure. Such 
discretion warrants a more prescriptive process to nurture a homogenous implementation of 
the Directive. The EU Treaty represents formalised constitutional arrangements 
accommodating both rules on establishment and movement as well as defining the 
competencies and inter-relationships between EU institutions and Member States. It grants 
and restricts powers, provides for judicial review through the CJEU, and ensures legal 
protection of EU law for Member States and its subjects, including MNEs. Administratively 
‘ED&A’ is predictable in its application and is subject to a straightforward judicial 
enforcement process. Subjectively, the predictability of the outcome of extended disclosures 
and the extent to which a Member State tax authority decides to enforce a prospective abuse 
is far from certain and to this extent could be considered to offer a negative impact on the rule 
of law. Intuitively, this dilemma could be extended to virtually every solution that has been 
promoted to date to curb EU tax abuse and the deep-rooted complexity of the problem 
challenges such conformity to the rule of law.      
 
Introducing an element of criminal liability into disclosure violations is a material point. 
Illegal behaviour is but only one element of law. Law forecasts illegal behaviour and 
accommodates violations in its provisions. To shape such illegality within the law it is 
necessary to understand what would drive violations. Behavioural Law and Economics 
Theory advocated by Thaler
13
 identified three primary drivers, namely bounded rationality, 
bounded willpower and bounded self-interest. Such drivers necessitate a change in corporate 
thinking when architecting avoidance schemes for this proposed scheme to become effective 
in the long term. The disclosures, attestation and its liabilities need to ensure that there is an 
“unthinking obedience to them”14 rather than the nurturing of an ongoing “calculation of the 
costs or benefits of abiding by them”15.      
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To understand better how the proposed new law potentially impacts compliance it is 
necessary to look at how such an ‘ED&A’ scheme would empower legal authorities such as 
Member State tax authorities and judicial institutions to establish and maintain a corporate 
taxation order by regulating corporate behaviour. Securing such compliance through the 
threat of criminal liability is a new concept to EU law but not to international law. Feld and 
Frey
16
 promoted the concept of a “psychological tax contract” to explain how the way in 
which a tax authority treats a taxpayer influences their tax morale. If a Member State 
implements punitive tax laws or implements an unconstructive and threatening approach it 
can result in higher tax avoidance. Tax compliance requires a deterrence as well as 
responsive regulation. The measured way in which this proposed scheme is being promoted 
would be consistent with this point, notwithstanding a level of frustration from those MNEs 
that do not currently have an ability to generate CCR data in an automated and robust 
manner. There is little that ‘ED&A’ itself could be considered to be unfair or threatening, 
although the manner upon which Member State tax authorities follow up on prospective 
abusive conduct would impact the relationship outcome between MNE and tax authority.  
 
Opinion is divided about whether introducing criminal law provisions impacts behaviours. 
Mill
17
 advocates criminality in terms of the harm principle. Research by Slemrod and 
Tyitzhaki
18
 as well as Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein
19
 all noted a positive correlation 
between a legal deterrent and tax compliance. Lord Delvin similarly promoted the view that 
introducing an element of criminal law into legislation is to enforce a moral principle
20
. 
Conversely Robinson and Darley argued that “having a criminal justice system that imposes 
sanctions no doubt does deter criminal conduct but manipulating criminal laws within that 
system to achieve heightened deterrence effects will be ineffective”21. Furthermore Robinson 
and Darley stated that criminal law rarely influences behaviour despite the assumption by 
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policy makers that application of criminal law always influences conduct
22
. More recent 
research by Parker
23
 assessed the regulatory-compliance relationship and the propensity of 
businesses to adopt legislation with criminal provisions, concluding that there were a number 
of drivers, most significantly the enforcement strategy, the internal characteristics of a MNE 
and the manner in which a MNE interacts with the economic and political environment. To 
better understand whether the proposed scheme’s criminal law provisions would assist its 
objectives, research
24
 has found that certain personal characteristics of individuals typically 
respond badly to the threats of legal action, namely repeat offenders, risk seekers and those 
with lack of self-control although none of these behaviours are typically evident at senior 
management targeted by the proposed scheme. If the ‘ED&A’ rules were dismissed for 
whatever reason by the MNE then it may similarly encourage dismissal by the Officer 
although the different liabilities implied in the Directive may render this observation as 
meaningless. 
 
Economic models of self-interest typically drive out behavioural patterns regarding tax 
avoidance. The punishment for tax avoidance discounted by the possibility of prosecution 
and conviction is commonly rather small relative to the gain. The personal punishment for tax 
avoidance relative to the corporate gain in the context of this proposed scheme to resolve 
corporate tax avoidance is rather large. This may generate a rather unpredictable set of 
behaviours relative to that documented in academic literature to date. Legal positioning 
theory
25
 has been shown to advocate an understanding of behaviours in the legal system to 
the processes by which the permissible is extracted from the possible. One may determine the 
moral order in ascertaining what is done versus what can be done. Such a moral order is a 
loose and complex system of rules, conventions and principles that impact behavioural 
patterns. In the context of this research these may be a function of the individual Officer, the 
MNE corporate culture, national culture in which the Officer and / or MNE resides and the 
group behaviours enacted by those individuals and entities around the attesting Officer and 
MNE. The relevance of corporate governance is also significant in that behaviours will also 
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be a function of how a MNE sharpens up its governance in response to the ‘ED&A’ 
disclosure requirements of the proposed Directive. Greenfield
26
 turned to behavioural 
economics to advocate how changes to corporate governance are beneficial to a MNE as well 
as socially beneficial, an important point given the assumed strengthened governance that a 
MNE Officer would be expected to put in place to assure oneself of corporate compliance.     
 
For a criminal law provision to be effective in this proposed scheme the MNE Officer would 
need to acknowledge the personal repercussions of the criminal sanctions inherent within the 
Directive. Such an acknowledgment would need to include an appreciation of the disclosure 
reporting and attestation actions required and the lines of defence available to excuse any 
actions which may be considered criminal in nature. This understanding would be expected to 
be reflected in his business decision-making conduct. Although more commonly relevant to 
private forms of corporate entities, MNE Officers may be incentivised to make decisions that 
conflict with the proposed Directive and in such cases it is for the MNE Officer to decide 
whether the perceived costs of non-compliance outweighs the personal benefits of a 
prospective criminal action. In such cases, if a senior MNE Officer is likely to personally 
benefit in terms of compensation from tax abuse activities there may be a different risk / 
reward assessment than a MNE Officer who is unlikely to derive any direct benefit. Such an 
assessment is likely to factor in the probability of being discovered, the total amount of the 
potential punishment, and the delay in which a penalty typically follows the law violation. 
 
Analysis of jurisprudence in providing an approach to understanding how law is granted its 
authority to enforce behaviours provides a useful insight. It has been claimed that what makes 
a rule a legal rule is not determined by its content but by its source. Austin expressed this in 
his “command theory of law”27 whereby command lies at the heart of the legal system 
surmising that every law needs its own legal personality. In the UK, law is the prerogative of 
the Sovereign and is enforced by punishment in the event of non-compliance. As an EU 
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Directive has the authority of EU law this provides sufficient command to enact subjects to 
obey the law, Hart
28
 on the other hand observed that there are primary and secondary rules of 
obligation. In the context of the proposed scheme, the proposed EU Directive would be the 
primary rule and the Member State rules and judicial process for interpretation and 
enforcement of those rules would be the secondary rules. Other researchers offer useful 
literature such as Dworkin who claimed that every legal rule has a moral dimension
29
 
although there is plenty of resistance to such an ideal from other researchers such as Hart who 
claims no such linkage and that the acceptance and compatibility of a law with moral values 
served as a criteria for the validity of a law
30. Dworkin’s theory suggests that if legal 
positivism is invalid and individuals or MNEs do have rights above and beyond those 
expressly set out in law then the view that an action that inflicts economic harm on a Member 
State through profit shifting could be considered rightly abusive on moral grounds even if it 
is not implicitly set out as such in law. A Member State, the argument would go, has a legal 
right for its tax subjects to act in certain ways beyond that set out in law and the judicial 
system has a right to defend such rights.  
 
There are a number of observations that may be made that, in advance of a more detailed 
analysis in respect to the proposed ‘ED&A’ components, relating to its consistency with the 
Rule of Law. ‘ED&A’ is neither strictly a rule based nor principles based solution. While the 
concepts of rules and principles have traditionally been useful to classify specific provisions 
in tax law they have a slightly different purpose for this proposed scheme in the sense that 
they serve to underpin a set of enforceable provisions targeting behavioural changes through 
legally binding disclosures. There is no debate around the notion that this proposed scheme 
deals with facts, with factual disclosures mandated through the Directive.  The discretion 
around whether a Member State tax authority pursues threshold breaches inferring tax abuse 
introduces an element of threat and uncertainty that is useful for encouraging behavioural 
change. An observer may conclude that the potential inequitable way in which potential tax 
abuse evidenced is investigated is unfair but this would be a fallacious conclusion. A rule that 
mandates inconsistent procedures or actions is one matter and not constituted within this 
proposal. There is an element of discretion in the manner upon which national tax authorities 
                                                     
28
 Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994) 
29
 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth & Co, London 1978) 
30
 Herbert Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford,1994) 
 246 
may pursue potential anomalies but this is because it is seeking evidence of illegality rather 
than responding directly to it. It is the threat that nurtures behavioural change that is 
consistently provided for not the potential consequences of off-limit disclosures that would be 
subject to Member State investigation under any proposed scheme and does not differ from 
the situation MNEs find themselves in already today. Any adverse impact on a MNE or its 
Officers would be based upon violations of disclosures and control requirements to validate 
their authenticity. If the rule of law is based around equality before the law, legal certainty, 
transparency and accountability then given a MNE taxpayer will continue to be able to act 
freely, plan their tax affairs and make decisions based on the law then ‘ED&A’ conformance 
to key aspects to the rule of law is secure. Perversely, it is EU Fundamental Freedoms that 
arguably compromise certainty by providing for an environment that contradicts Member 
State tax laws and offers opportunity for exploiting loopholes and ambiguities. By mandating 
more extensive disclosure it exposes a broader set of such loopholes and ambiguities and 
makes for a stronger case of more extensive case law over time in ruling out opportunities to 
practice profit shifting.   
 
There is an argument that curtailing Fundamental Freedoms for the purposes of mitigating tax 
abuse within an internal market is also a force for social good since the curbing of abusive 
practices against such Fundamental Freedoms do not compromise the internal market’s 
workings. The merits of redistributing taxable payments in order to maximise profits that 
benefit corporate stakeholders such as employees and shareholders hold no more merit than 
the benefits to the citizens of Member States in being rewarded with its rightful taxable 
income.  There is no disagreement about whether a law offers a common social good 
implying consistency with the rule of law. A social good may well be served by maximising 
profits to stakeholders but a common social good can only be served through the common 
public purse which in its totality is bereft of its maximum potential as a result of tax abuse. 
 
The proposed ED&A scheme also safeguards political rights through the protection of 
Member State sovereignty in the formation and enforcement of the rules compliant with the 
proposed Directive. From a MNE Officer perspective civil liberties are protected through the 
clear definition of the attestation requirements and formal procedures for appeal. Mechanisms 
for accountability affirm the political equality of all Member States and commercial equality 
of all in scope MNEs and constrain potential abuses of Member State power and corporate 
power. Proponents of the proposed scheme would also rightly point out the merits of how the 
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legal procedures advocated in the Directive both to enact rules in to national law and the 
procedures inherent in enforcing such rules, the legal reasoning underpinning the legitimacy 
of the Directive’s requirements, and the legal consequences determined by the outcome of 
implementing the Directive’s rules are clear and well defined. 
 
In respect to independent adjudication of laws, if MNEs operating across the EU are bound 
by a common Directive and set of thresholds, it necessarily follows that the process for 
investigating exceptions or anomalies is equally consistent. Initial investigations would be the 
responsibility of the tax authority in the relevant reporting Member State and not necessarily 
the country where the MNE is domiciled, closely followed by judicial appeal in 
circumstances where a ruling by the tax authority is deemed to be unacceptable to one of the 
counterparties, initially in the Member State judicial system and upon appeal to the CJEU.  
Over time judicial rulings on matters of conflict need to form a settled set of case law 
responses to threshold breach scenarios so that there is a common set of defendable 
acceptable exceptions to the thresholds. The rate at which Member State tax authorities 
pursue prospective abuse evidence will be important. Maintained this rate at a high level will 
ensure the criminal liabilities associated with ‘ED&A’ violations act as a deterrent. Such a 
level is hard to define but would probably be at least 20 – 25% with a lower pursuit rate 
possibly prompting the opposite effect and encouraging even more tax abuses.  
 
In its purest form, the rule of law ethos promotes due process of law and equality before the 
law. The federated multi-tiered nature of the EU and its institutions ensure the institutional 
mechanisms for implementing the rule of law are complex and dispersed. Moreover, against 
this background of complexity, what may appear to align with the rule of law for one 
stakeholder may not be viewed in the same light for a different stakeholder with different 
perspectives. In theory such ambiguity should not exist but in the case of EU law it is relevant 
as how the rule of law may be interpreted by a MNE may be different from a Member State 
or EU institution. This proposal also advocates a legal order that supports improved 
governance standards and stronger multilateral cooperation to fight the battle of corporate tax 
avoidance abuses. The CJEU has a role to play in this process, scrutinising not just the 
Directive’s alignment and legal conformity with the general principles of EU law but also the 
Member State measures implemented as a consequence of the Directive ensuring adequate 
respect for the EU Treaty and general principles of law which include human rights in any 
 248 
judgements consequential to its implementation. In this respect the CJEU would play a 
crucial role in guiding direction over the proposed Directive’s influence and enforcement. 
 
Consistent application of the law could infer that the judicial adjudication of the proposed 
Directive’s legal rules should be consistent across equivalent case law, and is made without 
taking into account the status, commercial domination or influence of any of the parties 
involved. Publicity around several high profile MNEs such as Google and Starbucks avoiding 
tax could arguably attract the attention tax authorities in Member States suffering most from 
the profit shifting activities of these MNEs suggesting a less than fair application and 
enforcement of the law. But this is the case now irrespective of whether a new ‘ED&A’ 
Directive is adopted and ‘ED&A’ only emphasises more credibly the need for more detailed 
disclosure to either vindicate or suppress any claims of tax abusive. The Directive would 
adhere to pre-established transparent procedures and allow a fair claim to the opinions and 
interests relevant to a given case. This proposal offers a fundamental direction away from 
centralised rule making that characterises other areas of EU law. This proposal promotes an 
EU solution transitioning away from a more traditional role of being a donor of tax avoidance 
change via CJEU rulings to one of co-ordinator of a mandated policy to mitigate the adverse 
consequences of EU Fundamental Freedoms abuses through an accounting Directive. Once 
the Directive is implemented the EU would act as a compliance manager rather than an 
enforcement manager, collating information from Member States to review and share for the 
purposes of further iterative enhancement while leaving enforcement to the Member States 
themselves. 
 
Irrespective of the merits presented in support of the proposed scheme’s alignment to the 
Rule of Law, there remain a number of points that will be grasped by critics resisting the 
proposed changes. “Fairness in the application of law”31 forms the basis of the rule of law, 
and there could be a challenge around whether the enhanced disclosures would provide a 
sufficient level of information that will allow objective judicial reasoning. Every MNE will 
proclaim a unique reason or set of circumstances that justify a given course of action. The 
larger the potential benefit to the MNE from profit shifting, the higher the MNE investment 
that could be justified in engineering a complex web of transactions to mask the abusive 
                                                     
31
 United Nations, ‘The Rule of Law and Transactional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict Societies’ (2004) 
Report of the Secretary-General, 4 
 249 
transactions. If Member State tax authorities pursue just the largest potential abuses this is not 
necessarily a fair application of the law if similar tactics by less material MNEs are not 
pursued with same energy. Any arbitrariness that results from such a law is likewise an 
unhelpful effect. Research by Shane
32
 is particularly relevant in this respect, advocating two 
principal problems facing EU law making. First is the tendency for “public officials, even if 
conscientiously attentive to law, will often find the written law applicable to their particular 
problems or opportunities to be genuinely vague.” implying that any ‘ED&A’ Directive 
would always be susceptible to variable interpretation to reflect both the complexity of 
underlying transactions and the propensity to enact a disclosure probe based on the subjective 
assessment by the Member State tax authorities on such complexity. If the Directives 
‘ED&A’ procedures are clear in text but ambiguous in terms of how they are interpreted and 
implemented at Member State level then MNEs will retain a degree of incentivisation to shift 
profits and reduce taxation. Second, there is evidence that “the chances are remote that law 
can and will be enforced against nonconforming behaviour”33 suggesting that even where an 
opportunity arises to probe prospective abuse there is an unhealthy reluctance to do so. This 
may not necessarily be as negative as it may suggest. Shane stated that the rule of law must 
have “an operational consequence even when the actual prospects of sanction for illegality 
are remote”34. This suggests that written rules need to be supported by societal norms, 
conventional expectations and behaviours that ensure Member State tax authorities behave as 
if they are accountable to the public interest. This promotes a sense of legal authority that is 
important resulting in a public policy to reduce corporate tax abuse based less on the actual 
outcome but more about whether it has been “conscientiously and systematically pursued”35. 
Such enforcement should be expected to drive changes in behaviours rather than propagate a 
high number of judicial rulings of alleged abuses. In the end an evaluation is required 
concerning how the tax and accounting system operates in response to the proposed Directive 
as much as the formal rules contained herein. 
 
8.2.1 Country-by-Country Reporting and the Rule of Law 
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CCR does not compromise any rule of law definition, in fact it positively promotes many 
aspects of the doctrine. Propagating CCR disclosures through an EU Directive ensures that all 
Member States and their corporate tax subjects are accountable to the additional disclosures.  
Consistent application to all Member States irrespective of economic size or other economic 
metric and consistent application to MNEs irrespective of industrial segment or any other 
commercial metric is an important point. It has no adverse impact on human rights, and offers 
equality, fairness and accountability in relation to the law. From an accounting point of view, 
CCR is a fairly standard and established accounting practice even if it is not widely adopted 
in statutory accounting. Reconciliation with consolidated accounts is straightforward and 
there are no specific complexities around the accounting segmentation required. The CCR 
procedure is transparent and straightforward, and as an annex to statutory reporting offers no 
legal uncertainty. There is sensitivity regarding legal protection offered to private sector 
business investments
36
. Confidentiality from public scrutiny could be sighted as a reason to 
refrain from disclosure but this has no credibility in terms of the rule of law. No MNE 
conducting and reporting business transactions with economic substance have anything to 
fear from ‘ED&A’. Claims that mandating the publishing of CCR data compromises 
competitive advantage is considered a weak argument and has been rejected by the CJEU
37
. 
For larger MNEs transparency is already largely in place as data is comprehensively 
scrutinised by market analysts and there is no empirical evidence to suggest any linkage 
between financial transparency and MNEs competitive advantage at any level across industry 
size or types.  
 
From a fairness perspective, the Directives proposals are entirely equitable in terms of what is 
being asked in relation to CCR but offer a degree of discrimination against smaller MNEs in 
terms of their implementation as the costs associated with CCR are likely to be higher as data 
is likely to be less readily accessible or available for computation from the outset and 
disproportionately larger and burdensome for MNEs at early stage development where 
investment in financial accounting systems are likely to be less of a priority than developing a 
business proposition itself.    
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8.2.2 Threshold Disclosures and the Rule of Law 
 
Akin to CCR reporting the implementation of threshold disclosures offers a similar profile of 
alignment to the rule of law. As an additional disclosure it offers additional complexity in its 
compilation specifically for MNEs operating in industries that have an operating model that 
makes distinguishing activities attributable to different Member States as being difficult to 
quantify. Although these are small in number the accounting standards associated with 
compiling the thresholds will be less established and to that extent a set of guidelines will 
need to be issued by the EU as part of the Directive aimed at avoidance any conflict or 
inconsistency. These will likely be updated on an ongoing basis to reflect specific case 
examples as they are raised in the ‘ED&A’ process. 
 
Procedural certainty is set out in the clear ‘ED&A’ procedures and prospective review paths 
offered to national tax authorities with regard to investigations and Member State judiciaries 
in terms of MNE appeals. The legal certainty relating to the outcome could be criticised as 
being less clear but the Directive’s provisions are designed to ensure complete and accurate 
data for the purposes of encouraging pre-clearance, explanation or investigation rather than 
for the purposes of creating an ambiguous set of data liable to subjective interpretation. The 
objective is to mandate the disclosure of data for the purposes of an assessment by the 
relevant tax authority rather than providing for a defined path of prospective certainty 
regarding the outcome of such a disclosure. For any breaches of the ‘ED&A’ disclosures the 
concept of consistent application may be challenged on the basis of the autonomy offered to 
national tax authorities in deciding whether to investigate MNEs on the basis of their data 
published. This is a function of its implementation rather than legal integrity. Both national 
Courts and the CJEU have political accountability that in itself implies the granting of rights 
to enforce the measures in the proposed Directive. The importance of enforcement should not 
be underestimated. Research by Laux and Stocken
38
 concluded that ‘raising accounting 
standards without improving enforcement can backfire and reduce reporting quality
39’. 
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Similar conclusions were drawn by Hope
40
 and Holtausen
41
.  Empowering national tax 
authorities to investigate potential abuses and the availability of a judicial escalation path at 
national and European level addresses this point.  Depending on whether a country is a 
general economic benefactor of profit shifting in terms of tax revenue as opposed to a general 
loser may skew national judicial rulings relating to ‘ED&A’ that will require normalisation 
through more independent CJEU rulings. Such a need for judicial normalisation can only be 
mitigated through a levelling of economic conditions across Member States, which is entirely 
unfeasible, or through the EU centralisation of a taxation taskforce responsible for pan-
European enforcement of ‘ED&A’ but this is not deemed a near-term aspiration of the 
solution proposal. 
 
From a judicial perspective, if a MNE raises a dispute regarding threshold interpretation by 
the tax authority, the Courts have demonstrated in the past that they follow no single and 
consistent set of rules in deciding when to accept or disregard on a form of conduct. This is 
unhelpful and in itself provides uncertainty to the legal outcome but this is endemic across 
most forms of legal systems and it could be expected that within a reasonable short period a 
set of established assessment criteria would be set akin to similar judicial reviews by the 
CJEU that would be adopted by national Courts in order to avoid protracted disputes through 
arbitrary differences in rulings between different Member State judiciaries. For example it 
has been shown that the basic notion of substance and form is well established cross the EU 
and there is no reason why such a doctrine cannot be capitalized further by tax authorities 
once furnished with more detailed disclosures. In circumstances when declining to accept a 
MNEs choice of form in the interpretation of a threshold breach there is no obvious reason 
why Courts would not be able to assert as a matter of principle that substance over form 
would take precedence. Adherence to established legal norms of assessment will avoid any 
temptation to diverge from acceptable means of interpretation – in such a case, if a form is 
accepted then the appropriate conclusion would be that “nobody owes any public duty to pay 
more [taxes] than the taw demands”42. So despite the fact that this solution does not have 
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clear stare decis (to stand by things decided), as previously referenced there are established 
legal ‘”bedrock precedents”43 that underwrite the legitimacy of concepts such as form and 
substance that will enable MNEs to better understand the consequences of entertaining 
abusive practices. 
 
8.2.3 Attestations and the Rule of Law 
 
The attestations offer any prospective critics of this reform proposal some potential fuel for 
challenging its credentials in respect to the rule of law. Despite its merits relating to 
promoting accountability in relation the law, a principle residing at the heart of the schemes 
objectives, and the transparent and straightforward nature of the attestation, challenges 
remain. Such clarification relates to the challenges of fairness, certainty and adverse impact 
on human rights. Critics of such an approach will proclaim that a MNE Officer should not 
have to suffer from the potential threats of personal liability relating to the completeness and 
integrity of ‘ED&A’ that reside within the legal boundaries set out in EU Treaty. Such 
criticism would be fair but this proposal asks the MNE Officer simply to attest to the 
completeness and integrity of the data, adherence to the threshold guidelines and to the 
absence of any wholly artificial arrangements.  
 
Attestations nurture a control system of the accounting disclosures through the establishment 
of processes and practices that ensures disclosure integrity. This is achieved through 
strengthening the incentives for MNE and its Officers to improve controls and have better 
management accounting visibility and accountability in their statutory disclosures. The 
Directive in no way mandates such a control system but the obligation and liabilities for 
incomplete or inaccurate disclosure would likely encourage internal control reviews to avoid 
such omissions or errors. Attestations utilised in the context of this proposed Directive likely 
create a new direction for corporate responsibility. The challenge is to construct a Directive 
that accommodates a mix of corporate and individual responsibility blended in a way that 
develops a comprehensive set of rules and working practices that provide incidental benefit to 
a collective Member State objective in minimising abusive tax minimisation strategies. 
Modelling liability for abusive practices from the MNE to the individual Officer reflects the 
actual operational decision making in an organisation. The non-prescriptive manner of the 
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governance controls required for attesting to the disclosures is intentional but may attract 
criticism, and may at worse incentivise conditional statements within the attestation 
identifying control weaknesses beyond the attesting Officers control. Disclosures, combined 
with liabilities, create a powerful incentive to fix control weaknesses in accounting 
disclosures but if they are cost prohibitive, particularly for smaller MNEs, then a weakness 
will persist in the context of equality and equitability before the law. 
 
Whether the purpose and intent of the legislation is clear enough is similarly a fair challenge. 
In this case the purpose and intent of the legislation is for MNEs to provide enhanced 
accounting disclosure to enable tax authorities to have a clearer view of where abusive tax 
minimisation practices are being enacted that reflect an abuse of EC Fundamental Freedoms.  
Enforceability is a key principle underpinning the legitimacy of a law and as it stands there 
would appear to be little issue of enforceability in ‘ED&A’ proposals as long as any escalated 
judicial dispute process is well defined and rulings are consistent and fair. The rule of law 
suggests that a taxpayer should know with certainty what his legal position is and it is this 
point that critics will focus on when challenging this reform proposal. If this were a tax law 
reform proposal then an assessment of its relative ambiguity would be reasonably 
straightforward. As an accounting directive it combines the toxic combination of accounting 
disclosures as a certain input and a tax liability as a possible outcome. The legal position is 
clear as the attestation wording sets out a clear requirement and the guidelines for penalties 
and liabilities for an attestation failure that would be expected to be adopted set out a clear 
liability construct. For an attestation failure, the liability is clear for the Officer and for the 
MNE the consequential liability will be nothing other than a near certain direction to improve 
disclosure controls, improve disclosure governance and to cease any offending artificial 
transactions depending on the nature of the attestation failure. 
 
Thus in conclusion, a common Directive homogenously implemented across all Member 
States grants consistency and coherence to accounting disclosures and hence to the 
underlying principles inherent within the rule of law. The purpose of the rule of law is to 
“enhance human rights, protect persons from fear and want, address property disputes, 
encourage economic development, promote accountable governance and peacefully resolve 
conflict”44. This proposal promotes accountable corporate governance through the ‘ED&A’ 
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attestations. No other form of legally binding testimony would encourage a form of corporate 
behaviour more consistent with mitigating, if not eliminating, tax abuse behaviours. Aside 
from some legitimate challenges to the rule of law relating to the attestations, the reform 
proposal is sound in the context of the rule of law. Conversely, there is a meaningful 
challenge to the rule of law if EU Fundamental Freedoms continue to be interpreted in a way 
that promotes a legal system that perpetuates abusive behaviour. In changing a behavioural 
order within the EU those abuses may be curtailed and a closer alignment of the operational 
tax system to the rule of law restored.  
 
8.2.4 The Impact of the Rule of Law in Member States on ‘ED&A’  
 
The concept of whether an EU supranational concept of the rule of law may exist is strongly 
contested. As it stands, the confidence of all EU citizens and national authorities resides in 
the legal order associated with each Member States. For the EU to succeed there must be a 
shared respect among all Member States for the rule of law. For the purposes of reviewing 
the compatibility of the proposed solution within the context of the rule of law in our sample 
set of Member States, all such jurisdictions offer well defined, respected and stable 
constitutional legal provisions that are applied equitably and impartially. The challenge 
regarding how the proposed ‘ED&A’ Directive can be lodged in a complex EU political 
framework requires an assessment of whether a material addition to public policy relating to 
commercial accounting and disclosures adversely impacts expectations about commercial 
rights. In this sense commercial rights relate to transparency, legal certainty, fairness and 
confidentiality. If there is a perception across MNEs in Member States that their commercial 
rights have been exploited then the rule of law is compromised.  Beyond the judicial system, 
this solution has a complex quadru of relationships to consider, namely the EU body of 
institutions, Member States, national tax authorities and the MNEs themselves.  The effective 
embodiment of the rule of law demands that there is no transgression of rights, that the 
proposal has the broad support of all such stakeholders and that the legitimate boundaries of 
the relationships between these stakeholders are understood and not compromised. To this 
extent the proposed ‘ED&A’ solution would become largely self-enforcing although it is 
important to understand the provisions within the EU for supporting some of the ‘ED&A’ 
concepts such as the judicial review of threshold breaches and attestation failures relating to 
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allegations of abuses. Despite historical challenges from Germany
45
 and Italy
46
, the 
supremacy of the CJEU and the principle of primacy remain and this is as relevant to a 
Directive as to any other form of legal provision. 
 
The precise content of the principles and standards stemming from the rule of law may vary 
at national level, depending on each Member State's constitutional system. CJEU case law 
provides limited guidance as to what it considers this list of principles are in their totality, and 
hence has little option to revert to considering the rule of law as a common value enshrined as 
part of the EU Treaty. Different Member States have different perspectives on the value of 
the rule of law. In Italy, the Stato di diritto is a well-established doctrine although Italy 
attracts most commentary about rule of law issues. In 2013 the OECD published a report
47
 
highlighting how policy measures intended by the Italian government exhibited adverse 
uncertainty of policy measures, procrastination in the judicial system and lack of 
transparency that nurtured corruption. Similarly, the World Justice Project
48
 found Italy had 
worst record of monocracy abuses, highlighting issues with regard to access to justice and 
evidences of corruption with uncertain variability relating to judicial independence and 
fundamental rights. Such a backdrop is unhelpful in the execution of our solution proposals 
but not an inhibitor as the Italian government would be obliged to implement the Directive’s 
rules and MNEs would be subject to the Directive’s measures. Italy has a commendable track 
record in combating tax avoidance with specific methodologies such as redditometro 
implemented for personal tax avoidance and the aggressive role of Equitalia in nurturing 
collaboration between public bodies in the assessment of corporate tax avoidance and debt 
collecting.  In France the established Etat de droit embodies the principle of constitutional 
decision making and legal order ensuring that the notion that state must act in a legal manner 
in accordance with the law. It provides for “judicial review of statutory law in accordance 
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with formal and substantive rules laid down in the Constitution, which is placed at the top of 
the hierarchy of norms”49. The rule of law is now “regularly relied on by parties in judicial 
proceedings to convince the courts to strictly apply well-recognized standards which the 
courts impose by way of judicial review”50. Such a credible inherent legal order promotes a 
solid set of rule of law principles that provide no issues for the ‘ED&A’ solution. In the UK, 
the rule of law differs from Germany and France in that there is no written constitution, no 
bill of rights or judicial review of legislation, although in respect to the latter the creation of 
the Supreme Court has now provided for a constitutional separation of legislative and judicial 
powers. Despite this it is accepted that the UK has legal protection of its subjects against 
unlawful official conduct by a separate administrative court
51
 supplemented by English law 
incorporating the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and its First and 
Sixth Protocols
52
. There is clear legal form relating to actions taken outside taxation law, 
known as ultra vires
53
, and provision for substantive interpretation of taxation law exist to 
prevent unreasonable legislative encroachment of laws on rights
54
. In Germany, the rule of 
law, or Rechtsstaat, is well established, incorporating both formal
55
 and substantive
56
 
concepts in law. This constitutional order embraces the principles across federal and state 
level of the German government hierarchy. The Rechtsstaat has provisions
57
 for promoting 
the principles of legality, fair procedure, legal certainty and proportionality, all of which are 
important for the sustainability of the ‘ED&A’ solution. In the Netherlands, again the basic 
concepts of the rule of law are observed, with clear provision across the constitution and the 
BurgerlijkWetboek, most recently updated into the Netherlands Civil Code
58
 and provides for 
access to justice, implementation and enforcement of legislation, European procurement and 
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administration of justice. Of particular relevance to this proposal is the law relating to 
“commercial contracts”59 and its reference to “abuse of circumstances”60 that endorses a good 
moral conduct by criminalising behaviours in situations where a person knows that another is 
being induced to execute a wrongful act and fails to prevent it from happening. 
 
The rule of law representation in any form of EU policy or initiative relating to a 
supranational tax policy raises practical issues as there is no EU rule of law but more a set of 
shared features that have commonality in the heritage of Member States. But even where EU 
rule of law principles are evident there is no meaningful distinction between the EU and 
Member State meanings and emphasis of the rule of law. The EU Treaty places no reliance 
on Member State constitutions or constitutional as a basis for interpreting the principle of the 
rule of law. There are some subtle differences as one would expect between Member States in 
constitutional mechanisms relating to due process of law and protection of rights and these 
are reflected in the different expressions of the rule of law in those jurisdictions. This is as 
applicable for the application of EU Law into the civil law provisions as well as the criminal 
provisions relating to abusive tax avoidance practices as initially exposed through the 
Directive’s ‘ED&A’. The philosophical assumptions behind any Member State diversities at 
a detailed level should be considered immaterial in the accommodation of the measures 
proposed in the ‘ED&A’ proposal. Theoretically any variations in the extent and method 
adopted for defining how the rule of law is enacted in different jurisdictions could present a 
challenge. The EU judicial system should be able to enforce equitably across the EU without 
incurring the wrath of MNEs suffering from inconsistent rulings but this is difficult to 
predict. This is just as relevant for this solution though as for any other tax rules based 
solutions that have previously been either implemented or proposed, and highlights the 
importance of the CJEU in adjudicating such matters. The CJEU’s authority to review 
‘ED&A’ decisions made by national tax authorities of Member State Courts is relevant to the 
rule of law that infers guaranteeing the Treaty’s legal order and securing confidence in the 
legal integrity of the proposal. 
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8.3 Legal Conditions Underpinning the Credibility of the Proposal 
 
 
There are three established legal norms that may be relied upon to underpin this proposal, 
namely substance over form, proportionality and abuse of rights. As established legal 
principles they provide the necessary legal order for ensuring the proposal is workable and 
enforceable, and ultimately becomes an effective EU tool for mitigating tax avoidance 
practices. These legal conditions are general principles and although unspecific to tax law are 
fully evidenced and adaptable to the requirements for this proposal. These doctrines in EU 
tax law provide us with a framework of orientation, creating an identity in this body of law 
that nurtures a common understanding. 
 
8.3.1 Substance over Form 
 
From a substance over form perspective, there is a proliferation of evidence supporting 
judicial examination at both Member State and CJEU level regarding the authenticity of 
activities controlling levels of corporate taxation. In situations warranting investigation, the 
tax authorities will assess MNEs statutory reporting based on an interpretation of 
transactional substance. In this sense, substance is defined as the economic characteristics and 
outcomes of an economic transaction, which may or may not differ from legal form of the 
transaction. A somewhat backward looking doctrine looking at the factual situation of a tax 
outcome once it has happened rather than one that focuses on searching for some reasoning 
for prompting the tax behaviour at origination, it is a well-established principle utilised for 
analysing taxpayer behaviour. It is a useful tool to be used by tax authorities and judicial 
institutions for establishing whether there has been an abuse of rights. In the case of the 
‘ED&A’ proposal such an analysis would focus largely on whether a MNE has abused any 
EU Fundamental Freedoms for the purpose of tax avoidance by being party to transactions 
that have no economic substance. The objective is for Member States to examine and 
evidence what may initially be considered a legitimate transaction or set of transactions but 
upon scrutiny are engineered for no other purpose than to exploit EU Fundamental Freedoms 
in some capacity for the purpose of reducing tax obligations. National tax authorities are 
under an obligation to deal with taxpayers in an equitable manner in similar circumstances.  
A business purpose test is initiated to assess the outcome of a course of transactional 
activities, the basis upon which interpretation may ensue alongside GAAR assessment 
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precedents in a given jurisdiction and an abuse assessment in relation to EU Fundamental 
Freedoms.  
 
Once the business purpose is assessed the tax authority contrasts the outcome against 
legislative intentions. This sets out an analysis of the transaction against the spirit of a 
particular tax law where or if relevant. If a set of economic activities demonstrates no 
business purpose it is not unrealistic to assume that form alleged to be associated with it is 
not defendable and that characterises abuse of the law. In tax terms this would represent a 
prohibited transaction exercised with improper intent particularly where a MNE has choices 
and has decided on a course of statutory reporting associated with a lower tax liability. Early 
case law set out guiding principles in this domain. In Weiss v Stearn
61
 it was held that 
“questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was actually done rather than the 
declared purpose of the participants….when applying income tax laws……we must regard 
matters of substance and not mere form”. Gregory v Helvering62 first noted the business 
purpose test and Higgins v Smith
63
 first promoted the requirement that an element of 
economic reality must reside within the transaction to give substance to the transaction 
beyond its tax treatment. In more recent times specifically in relation to EU tax cases, the 
case of Ocean Finance
64
 ruled that national courts should look beyond contractual 
arrangements if such contractual arrangements are economically groundless and indefensible 
but constitute a purely artificial arrangement that had been established with the sole aim of 
generating a favourable tax benefit.  
 
The interpretive aspect to converting ‘ED&A’ data into a potential abuse action requires 
careful consideration. If the ‘ED&A’ data suggests tax avoidance the usual course of action 
should be to analyse the civil form of the transaction in the first instance. Once this is 
established the outcome of the economic activity and the economic substance of the 
arrangement are assessed. In UK and France the interpretation is normally based around the 
substance of the arrangement whereas in Italy and Germany and Netherlands the civil law 
form takes precedent where the intent of the MNE is assessed. Ultimately the emphasis of 
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interpretation in the first instance resides with the Member State tax authority and, given no 
form of interpretation prevails over another, any conflict or inconsistency that arises between 
Member States may be escalated for CJEU interpretation. Establishing whether MNEs 
transactions are abusive or not should be assessed on individual case merits and this is 
consistent with current practices. Although it is impossible to find a universally acceptable 
rule to differentiate abusive from non-abusive activities, the judicial process of interpretation 
itself offers a suitable mechanism for case-by-case assessment. With every case likely to 
exhibit unique characteristics and circumstances such a process mitigates any criticism that 
an identical set of circumstances could possible generate differing interpretations that may 
have a criminal law liability under the attestation provisions. 
 
Member State tax laws do provide some insight into how various jurisdictions will address 
judicial interpretation. In Germany the law states that “The tax statute shall not be avoided by 
an abuse of the arrangement opportunities of the law. If there is an abuse, the tax claim 
originates as it does from a legal arrangement that adequately reflects the economic substance 
of the transaction”65. The German Supreme Tax Court has set out the position in various 
rulings
66
 that an abuse of legal form shall be found if a legal structure is found that is 
inappropriate to reach the pursued goal, serves to reduce tax and cannot be justified by non-
tax factors. Acknowledging the right of a MNE to minimise corporate income tax, the 
German Court typically regard “artificial, unusual or uncommon transactions as abusive67. In 
another case
68
 the Supreme Tax Court ruled that in tax cases the general abuse of legal form 
provisions should be assessed in the context of special abuse provisions in German tax law on 
the basis of their purpose. In another relevant case
69
, the Supreme Court found that tax 
arbitrage could not be considered abusive even when a structured transaction had been 
established with a tax friendly construct if the MNE was able to establish credible business 
substance around employees and physical assets in the country concerned. In all these cases 
consideration is evidenced of legal and economic substance where the Court made an 
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interpretation based on the legal form, the chosen form in terms of tax impact, and  
justification of form and intent of the MNE taxpayer.  
 
In the UK, similar supportive conclusions are also evident.  Notwithstanding the fact there 
has been no formal accommodation of a substance over form provision in UK tax law since 
Ramsay
70
 there is plenty of more contemporary case law in corporate tax law
71
 evidencing an 
assessment of the legal manner in which a transaction is structured in respect to defining tax 
liability. The sham doctrine is well established in various cases
72
 but hasn’t been referenced 
to date in relation to freedom abuses. Interestingly there is judicial reference to abuse of 
rights doctrine in UK direct corporate taxation case law
73
, focusing largely not on illegal acts 
but improper acts that do not exercise rights in an acceptable manner. The acknowledgment 
that a right can be abused is of high significance. Unlike the UK, France has an abuse of law 
procedure and an established substance over form assessment methodology. Such a provision 
relating to a substance over form interpretation relating to corporate tax was enacted in 
France in 2004
74
 and sets out the conditions necessary to successfully apply the substance 
over form interpretation. Cases such as Janfin
75
 and Clement Bayard
76
 both exemplified how 
an abuse of law as a legal concept under French civil law denies benefits associated with 
utilising a right when the use of that right exceeds the limits of its reasonable use and 
enforcement. Established criteria set out how the court is able to define such excessive 
behaviours. In recent years the French Supreme Administrative Court has introduced 
references to the term ‘fraud to the law’ facilitating the French tax authorities specifically to 
restore the true nature of transactions that reside outside the scope of sL64 of the French Tax 
Code Procedures. There is also a social angle to judicial interpretation in France. Under 
French law the abuse of rights provisions limit the scope of rights that have been granted to a 
MNE but can also be used by the courts to adjust the law to reflect the needs of society as it 
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evolves. Numerous cases
77
 in France have referenced simulation as an abusive practice that 
denies legal effect to transactions that are artificial or simulated. In the Netherlands, 
legislators have been reluctant to formally reference substance over form as a doctrinal 
concept in respect to tax avoidance but there is evidence in Netherlands case law
78
 of a 
willingness to take into account fact and circumstances in relation to potentially abusive 
transactions, specifically around the use of intermediary entities and TRPRICE. This is 
enacted through either a legislative provision or procedure called the richtigeheffing, or 
levying position, under which a legal transaction in dispute may be ignored for tax purposes, 
or through judicial implementation of fraus legis whereby the spirit of the law in question is 
decisive rather than the exact wording.  There is no explicit criteria for assessing whether 
there is sufficient substance to transactions although, consistent with the other 
aforementioned Member States, there is ample evidence that courts are increasingly willing 
to identify and rule against abuses of law in the domain of corporate taxation even though the 
boundaries within the Netherlands are not so universally challenged and quite as closely 
defined as elsewhere. 
 
Beyond these contributions of Member State judicial rulings, the CJEU’s jurisprudence in 
clarifying the interpretive aspects to tax avoidance in the context of abuse of EU freedoms is 
important. For the purposes of this proposal EU law is involved and as such the CJEU will 
ultimately provide rulings around conflicts to shape the boundaries from an EU law 
perspective. In the case of Segers
79
 the CJEU held that the need to eradicate abuse for public 
interest reasons established the reasoning for the different treatments enacted by tax laws in 
Netherlands and that the need to address such abuses justifies different treatments in some 
circumstances. In Centros
80
, the highly significant ruling stated that Member States could, 
subject to case by case analysis and in the context of EU law objectives,  take measures to 
prevent taxpayers “attempting, undercover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to 
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circumvent their national legislation or to prevent [taxpayers] from improperly or 
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community law”81 
 
There are a considerable number of further case law precedents underpinning this proposal’s 
ethos that an abuse of EU freedoms is a legitimate claim to challenge the legal form given to 
a set of suspected abusive transactions. Such cases include Leclerc
82
 and Van Binsbergen
83
. 
In the former case the CJEU held that courts should differentiate between those transactions 
executed for normal commercial reasons differentiated from those executed for the sole 
purpose of achieving improper advantage. Member States can pursue freedom restrictions if 
they can justify them for public interest reasons and meet the requirements of the 
proportionality principle. Arguably much of this case law is based on mitigating improper 
advantage gained from exercising Fundamental Freedoms rather than examining the detailed 
structuring of transactions that may lack economic substance and therefore imply a tax 
advantage. In theory there is little difference but in practice it requires a different level of 
assessment. There is no single approach in place yet for necessarily utilising ‘ED&A’ data for 
the purposes of local interpretation but there is a clear and common theme that enables tax 
authorities to try and counter any kind of outcome that lacks economic substance and abuses 
a fundamental freedom. As these CJEU cases highlight, there is no inhibitor for the Member 
States, or indeed the CJEU where required, to assume such an assessment role to provide a 
more common and dominant approach to protecting the taxing rights of Member States. 
 
8.3.2 Proportionality 
 
Proportionality is granted considerable strength and influence in EU law and virtually every 
law has relevant provision for a proportionality assessment. It bridges the gap between tax 
avoidance and tax abuse, and is relevant in its application for this reform proposal in the 
context of economic substance
84
, tax investigation
85
 and legal redress
86
. In this sense any 
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‘ED&A’ reporting that results in a tax investigation would require proportionality to be 
applied to an allegation of substance over form in order to determine whether an abuse of 
rights has occurred. Member State tax authorities are not able to attain unlimited rights in 
addressing tax abuses as consideration needs to be given to formal constitutional rights 
provisions as granted through national laws. This may or may not conflict with direction from 
the CJEU regarding the principles attained through case law for assessing when tax 
avoidance measures are deemed proportional. Proportionality is granted considerable strength 
and influence in EU law and as such would be expected to add a credible check against 
excessive and adverse interpretation of ‘ED&A’ data.  
 
In the context of the ‘ED&A’ proposal the objective would be to ensure Member States 
courts invest a proportional amount of time investigating a MNEs transactions in relation to 
the prospective level of tax abuse. Loss of Member State tax revenue is the consequential 
result of abusing Fundamental Freedoms and so assessing the right level of proportionality in 
relation to applying measures required to assess such abuses are less clearly defined. Case 
law provides unhelpful conflicts in this regard, noting the difference between the ruling in 
Leur- Bloem
87
 that held that tax investigations should be limited to exactly that and not reach 
beyond tax avoidance breaches. In Part Service
88
 it was clear that the authorities had every 
desire to look beyond tax avoidance activities to the underlying legal breaches that 
constituted an abuse of rights. ‘ED&A’ data is a proportional measure as it advocates specific 
granularity around transaction reporting and threshold disclosures, both of which could 
expose pre-determined behaviours. ‘ED&A’ is a general accounting provision relevant to all 
Member State and MNE industry types. There is a tripartite challenge to balance the 
commercial interests of the MNE with the public civil obligations of the Member States with 
the personal interests and human rights of the attesting Officer. It constitutes an appropriate 
and reasonable, set of disclosures and attestation to be used for the purposes of making data 
transparent in the pursuit of mitigating tax avoidance. The proposed Directive would offer a 
firm basis for ‘ED&A’ through an established EU legal framework but permit flexible 
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interpretation by Member States under the auspices of their sovereign doctrinal forms of 
interpretation against their tax laws.   
 
The ‘ED&A’ solution is a means of determining, through data transparency, whether, in the 
view of a Member State tax authority, tax avoidance may have occurred. Upon adoption of 
this proposed reform, it will be the interpretation that ensues that will be the basis of 
evaluating the specific transactional circumstances under relevant tax law. Once a court has 
ascertained the substance of the offending transactions it may rule that they go against the 
relevant tax norms in that Member State, or be considered abusive in respect to Fundamental 
Freedoms, or both. In accordance with the aforementioned Part Service case, the 
interpretation pursued as a result of the ‘ED&A’ must be consistent with EU principles and 
relevant to the aim of tackling tax avoidance. Similarly, it should not be presumed that the 
exposing of MNE tax abuse is necessarily correlated to the abuse of Fundamental Freedoms 
even though such reasoning is commonplace. The measures inherent within ‘ED&A’ are 
certainly an effective and suitable tool for triggering investigations into prospective tax 
irregularities, but the manner in which the measures should be framed would avoid 
diminution of other legal rights, including human rights of the MNE Officers in the execution 
of attestations. Indeed, the Fundamental Rights Agency is the EU’s own expert human rights 
body that screens proposals and ensure  the reform proposal for a new Directive are checked 
against the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. There are enough checks and balances in this 
process to protect their legitimate interests, with clear boundaries set to encourage data 
completeness and integrity that is proportional to the objectives of the Directive, but not too 
punitive to compromise their human rights through making them personally liable for 
activities outside their control. All these points ensure a balanced and proportional treatment 
of taxable and human rights. 
 
8.3.3 Abuse of Rights 
 
From an abuse of rights perspective we have to be clear on what rights are being challenged. 
A MNE may proclaim that the right to choose the most tax efficient transaction model is no 
lesser of a right than the right of a Member State to raise revenues consistent with their tax 
laws. Does a MNE, given all its competing interests and stakeholders, have any less 
responsibility to Member State tax revenues than to its own shareholders? What is relevant 
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though is the tension and dysfunction between the conflicts of the EU rights embedded within 
EU Fundamental Freedoms and the government of the issues relating to tax avoidance. These 
conflicts are fuelled further when one considers the dual political authorities of the CJEU and 
Member States giving rise to an inherent system of checks and balances, with evidence of the 
CJEU allowing, to a limited degree, Member States to enact measures to mitigate abuses. 
Enabling Member States to mitigate the adverse consequences of EU law is not unreasonable 
if it undermines its tax laws and denies it rightful tax revenues. However it is limited to the 
extent that it must not undermine EU Fundamental Freedoms. Providing for the right balance 
is a challenge and as yet ill-defined as what is considered abusive in one Member State must 
endure a likewise consideration in other Member States if consistency of application is to be 
achieved. The balance is best explained by Lasok who stated “the concept of abuse of right is 
concerned with the exercise of a right either for ends different from the legal purpose served 
by the right or in an excessive or disproportionate way”89. 
 
An abuse requires a form to abuse and in this case relates to the Fundamental Freedoms 
granted through the EU Treaty. An abuse of these Freedoms is, under law, challengeable. 
There are many angles to this though. On the one hand, the most prolific abuse has been 
related to the free movement principles, and on the other hand we need to consider the notion 
that is only becomes relevant when there is harm imposed on a third party as result of the 
abuse. The legal purpose of Freedom of Movement provisions is to “eliminate discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality”90 in a single “internal market”91 rather than facilitate the 
minimisation of tax liabilities. In theory therefore, a transaction used for minimising tax that 
grants no advantage to the objectives that were set out in the EU Treaty could be considered 
abusive. Conversely, if the underlying objective of the EU Treaty is economic integration is 
an abuse of rights relevant when it outlaws the use of EU law where the result is not 
economic integration? In other words, the question arises whether an MNE cannot take 
advantage of EU law if it doesn’t fulfil EU Treaty objectives of economic integration. What 
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is abusive to a Member State may not necessarily look quite so abusive under all conditions 
when looked at the context of the Internal Market. In order to examine this conflict, one may 
apply the principle of proportionality. Abusive behaviour must be “entirely or principally”92 
based on circumventing national law. Centros took the matter further by insisting that any 
alleged abuse had to be considered in light of being proportionate to any public interest aims. 
Given the fact that abusive behaviour relating to profit shifting would incur an adverse 
economic impact on the Internal Market itself in its totality, the public interest is not well 
served by artificial shifting of economic activity to reduce the overall tax liability in the 
Internal Market. In this sense from a tax perspective this serves as a useful case law 
precedent.  
 
The clearest reference by the CJEU to abuse of EU Fundamental Freedoms in a corporate 
income tax case was in Cadbury
93
 although this has not resulted in abuse of rights legislation 
being clearly denoted in the legislative provisions of Member States. Other rulings have 
referenced abuse in other types of tax case such as Daily Mail
94
 in a Capital Gains Tax ruling. 
Other rulings in areas of non-taxation are evident such as Van Binsbergen
95
 regarding the free 
movement of services and Emsland-Starke
96
 regarding the free movement of goods, and it 
could be expected that these cases would be used as a reference point in building out the 
principle further. For example in Emsland-Starke the CJEU has found favour in the view that 
a generalised abuse of rights legal principle is evidenced in Member States law and has no 
apprehension in reflecting such points in CJEU case law. Despite this contradictions are 
evidenced in the provision of a coherent approach to defining what constitutes and abuse or 
not and although this provides a challenge to a tax authority pursuing an abuse case as a 
result of enhanced disclosure it can only be a matter of time under such an EU Directive that 
a body of settled case law emerges. This proposal can rely entirely on the CJEU test 
advocated in Emsland-Starke but over time would be reinforced further if this evolved from 
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being a general test of attempting to mitigate abuse of Fundamental Freedoms to a more 
ambiguous but focused outlawing of abuse of law. Such a condition of a common EU legal 
principle in this regard would be useful.  
 
Previous case law
97
 has focused on establishing the objective of transactions and applying 
criteria to ascertain whether they indicated abusive conduct. Given EU “law cannot be relied 
on for abusive or fraudulent ends”98 it is useful to have case law direction in this respect, as it 
is “by no means easy to define the precise scope of that principle”99. The problem to resolve 
is identifying the prospective abuse in the first place. In this sense the low level of disclosure 
mandated on MNEs as part of its statutory reporting is disabling Member States from even 
attaining the point of challenge at the outset. Resolving this matter relies on resolving the 
challenge in identifying abuse rather than in the legal challenge of that abuse. One 
unanswered question in case law is whether abuse relates to the absolute act of circumvention 
of Member State tax laws or whether it relies on utilisation of EU Fundamental Freedoms for 
invoking such circumvention. Member State tax law targets the former whereas the latter has 
no clear tool for redress. Furthermore, there is no clear case law distinction, however, 
between fraud and abuse. Can an abuse take place without it being fraudulent? If abuse relies 
on a Member State being denied of its rightful tax revenues through the use of artificial 
transactions with no economic substance then by definition it is fraudulent. The CJEU has 
notably avoided the use of the word fraud in many of its judgements suggesting the terms 
association with criminal law being contentious and unsuitable as it stands. 
 
To crystallise what an Abuse of Rights in the context of this research means requires a multi-
dimensional perspective. A Member State could bring a case against a MNE regarding abuse 
of EU Fundamental Freedoms but there is little reason to doubt why a MNE couldn’t bring a 
case against another MNE on the basis that it should not be allowed to exercise specific 
rights. Early case law provided clear direction. The CJEU ruled in Van Binsbergen that a 
Member State could take action in situations whereby an entity is exercised EU Fundamental 
Freedoms solely for the purpose of circumventing national law. Noting the proliferation of 
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cases covering abuses of all EU Fundamental Freedoms suggests general application, 
specifically referencing the use of the term “improper advantage”100 that suggests not only 
application to specific EU Fundamental Freedoms but also aimed at stemming abuses that 
attempt to circumvent the objectives of EU laws. The prevailing headwind of Member State 
sovereignty protectionism has for a long time sought to mitigate the non-legislative 
enlargement of EU competencies engineered through the development of general principles 
of EU law. Comfort may be drawn from this research that the leveraging of an Abuse of 
Rights doctrine has the opposite effect in that it returns to the Member States an interpretative 
opportunity in which abusive EU law may be curtailed.      
 
8.3.4 An ED&A Directive: A Compelling Instrument for Reform 
 
This proposal advocates the use of a Directive rather than EU regulations, a multilateral 
convention or Member State rules and regulations to deliver an ED&A solution. Member 
States levy taxes and there has been significant quantitative growth in Member States 
legislation and judicial rulings to preserve the politically salient issue of taxation. A Directive 
enables the EU, in the absence of conventional taxing powers, to exert considerable 
regulatory power over a matter such as accounting disclosures and taxation matters more 
generally. Given the “fiscal impotence”101 of the EU it can utilise Directives to good effect by 
seizing control of technical and broadly apolitical issues of corporate regulation and 
governance. The EU is, in a sense, a regulatory body in that it is not a political state capable 
of dealing with matters such as taxation directly even though such EU regulation in the form 
of a Directive can impose considerable regulatory influence on Member State tax policies and 
taxpayer behaviours. 
 
The EU Directive remains the most powerful instrument of secondary legislation. It is 
binding only with regard to the stated ends set out in the text, but leaves an element of 
discretion to the Member States as to the means by which to achieve them. It remains the 
most effective legal instrument for imposing unity on somewhat diverse Member State legal 
orders. In contrast an EU regulation, despite rising in number in recent years, would be 
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effective so far as implementing provisions for other secondary tax law but not anything more 
substantial in form. Similarly, detailed tax legislation derived from the European Council or 
Commission is likely to have constrained legal standing for substantial reform as the scope of 
legislative powers remains limited and would likely attract more public scrutiny.  Such public 
scrutiny usually focuses on the equity and legitimacy of the impact of a EU regulation or 
legislation on the Member State whereas the challenges administered to Directives is often 
focused on the methods of Member State adjustment to it.  
 
Historically other legal instruments have occasionally been used such as multilateral 
conventions that represent a multilateral undertaking, the most pertinent example being the 
Arbitration Convention. The Arbitration Convention was adopted to provide MNEs facing 
double taxation due to adjustments in their profits a remedy that obliged Member States to 
resolve the double taxation issue. This intergovernmental convention provides for no CJEU 
interpretative jurisdictional competence and there is no international or supranational body 
with the competence to interpret or apply the Convention’s provisions in an unintended 
manner. The instrument is widely acknowledged to be narrow in its scope, only focusing on 
addressing transfer pricing related double taxation. Lacking precision in its provisions it also 
provides for uncertain interpretations in relation to DTT’s where possible conflicts may arise 
both in legal substance and precedence. The omission of any provision to independently 
adjudicate the application of the Convention breaches fundamental features of legal certainty 
and fair adjudicative procedures previously identified as principle tents of the rule of law.    
 
The cornerstone of ED&A centres on accounting transparency and specific disclosures and 
attestations. If it were to take the form of a more direct tax instrument then it would require 
unanimity in policy decision-making. Such unanimity is not only extremely difficult to attain 
but at a minimum would likely demand high policy and enforcement autonomy for Member 
States, not something easily supported by the objectives of the proposed reform. Unanimity 
to create direct tax reform is only matched by the unanimity that would similarly be required 
to change any aspect of the instrument once transposed into Member State law. As an 
accounting Directive such unanimity is not required but rather a more measured DMV 
approach to policy approval. As ED&A is a more novel reform proposal it seems more 
appropriate to adopt the latter approach in implementing a new standalone accounting 
directive.   
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As the desire for reform intensifies, the agenda for proposing new schemes is becoming more 
prolific and imaginative with previously dismissed notions pertaining to addressing tax abuse 
being reassessed. The clearest recent evidence of a Member State attempting to incorporate 
the concept of mitigating tax abuse into its legislation without actually using the phraseology 
is the UK’s Diverted Profits tax102 (hereafter referred to as ‘DPT’), representing a new tax on 
profits artificially diverted from the UK. The basis of the charge applies to tests relating to 
avoidance of a PE and to insufficient substance tests, both of which the CJEU considers 
abusive. For the tax to apply there would need to be a “main purpose”103 to avoid tax, or the 
“tax mismatch” conditions104 would need to be met, resulting in a more complex and 
subjective assessment of tax charge based on the difference between actual profits and those 
that would have arisen absent of the mismatch. Mismatch arrangements are defined as 
transactions that increase the expenses or reduce the income of one related party when the tax 
paid by the other related party as a result of those transactions is less than 80% of the that 
reduction of tax liability. The insufficient substance tests are interesting too in that they apply 
certain thresholds. For example, where a single transaction between related parties produces a 
tax reduction greater than any other financial benefit, where the transaction is part of a series, 
and where mismatch arrangements contribute economic value to the transaction that is less 
than the tax benefit.  
 
The DPT aims to define formulaic metrics and threshold principles akin to the solution 
proposed in this reform proposal, and similarly requires pre-notification to the tax authorities, 
but with some subtle differences in legal form, namely it is a standalone tax intending to 
enforce penalties on abusive behaviour as opposed to legislating for anti-avoidance rules, 
akin to much of Member State anti-avoidance law, or transparency initiatives aimed at 
promoting changes in behaviours, akin to the reform proposal in this research. There are a 
number of potential areas of challenge, not least in regard to its compatibility as a tax with 
EU law. Applying a penalty rate in excess of the standard UK corporation tax rate infers 
discriminatory treatment contrary to EU law between those non-UK companies incorporated 
in another Member State trading in the UK than a UK entity if it carried out the same 
activities. Additionally the inability to use group, consortium and loss reliefs as offsetting 
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factors further challenges the notion that it could be justified by an overriding reason of 
public interest and proportionate to the underlying objectives of the legislation. Others have 
argued that the “limited grounds for taxpayers to dispute initial assessments and the 
requirement for the tax to be paid upfront mean [the tax] is contrary to Article 6 of the 
[ECHR]”105. As suggested in Chapter Seven assertions by taxpayers to raise human rights 
objections in tax cases have generally proven to be ineffective although this does not 
diminish the view of this research that this approach adopted by the UK to tackle abuse of 
rights although politically astute is not likely to stand the test of legal challenge likely to 
ensue from MNEs in the judicial system.  
 
The ED&A proposal is much more likely, in EU legal terms, to be future friendly in the sense 
that it reacts with immediacy to today’s tax abuse conduct and builds longer term legal 
sustainability through its rule of law alignment and adherence to the aforementioned doctrine 
of principles. It has a number of unique features worthy of note. This research has 
demonstrated that reform demands a multi-faceted proposal akin to the BEPS proposal but in 
conflict with those such as the CCCTB and GAAR proposals. Reforms targeting specific 
issues such as TRPRICE individually have a track record of very limited success. BEPS is a 
step forward as it is similarly multi-faceted but does not address directly the elements of 
thresholds and attestation accountability so important for nurturing MNE behavioural change. 
No known published law reform proposal to date promotes a tripartite solution of CCR, 
Thresholds and Attestations. Historically EU corporate tax avoidance reforms have targeted 
applied reform of the legal system rather than the ED&A proposal that targets the MNE with 
a broader econometric solution embedded within the legal framework in which they operate. 
Targeting the MNE rather than burdening an intermediary agent such as the Member State 
legal system or the CJEU with addressing profit shifting is a unique proposal and infers that 
behaviours rather than transaction structures form the basis of reform. In elevating 
behavioural science to the fore of resolving tax abuse, specifically those elements of 
behavioural science relating to judgment and decision-making, models developed by 
Braithwaite and Ayers, Harre, and Thaler assist in underpinning the targeting of end agent 
MNEs. It also explains the importance of the ‘substantive’ element to tax abuse decision 
making so prevalent now in the judicial evaluation process.  
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This reform proposal admittedly has some areas of vulnerability most notably in relation to 
data privacy of legal entity structure disclosures, the inertia or capacity issues sometimes 
evident in the resourcing of tax investigations by Member State tax authorities and the rather 
limited criminal jurisprudence supporting criminal enforcement of sustained ED&A breaches. 
The sensitivity relating to data privacy concerns are reflected by the differences in approach 
as proposed by the OECD for limited mandatory disclosure of data to tax authorities via 
“Competent Authority Agreements”106 as opposed to public statutory disclosures As tax 
authorities are obliged to collate more granular data in statutory reporting this will provide a 
much more comprehensive set of data that will require resources to assess and action against 
prospective abuses. It is not unrealistic to assume that those jurisdictions likely to benefit 
from such data in the pursuit of suppressing abuses are more likely to invest in tax 
compliance resources than those countries that are likely to be tax-losers.   On the criminal 
jurisprudence point, the advancement from a simple civil law reform proposal to one that 
incorporates criminal law provisions is a step beyond previous reform proposals but its 
specificity in the ED&A proposal is based on examples of successful precedents implemented 
in civil legal systems within our selected EU jurisdictions
107
 as well as in various statutes 
within the UK common law legal system
108
. These provisions provide the necessary 
foundation for MNE behavioural change. 
 
This reform proposal utilises precedential reasoning as a basis for assisting the judiciary in 
resolving contentious disputes. This is recognized by identifying the established doctrines 
that can be relied upon more effectively with enhanced data. These doctrines combine 
historical, legal and narrative context for negotiation a resolution of tensions between a 
specific case and an abstract set of rules placing heavy emphasis on precedential reasoning. 
This is important for the reform proposal as the EU has an evolving orthodoxy of civil and 
common law and it will be important to establish a settled set of principles and norms for 
resolving case-by-case issues. For example, in relation to tax avoidance, if an abuse of rights 
is evidenced through enhanced accounting disclosures as advocated in ED&A then it 
necessarily follows that such an abuse can be proven when we apply established concepts 
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such as substance over form and proportionality. Such a legal order can evolve that has clear 
boundaries defining tax abuse and corporate entities will start to nurture different behaviours 
in their tax planning activities. In the promotion of specific and established doctrinal norms 
for the purposes of tax abuse assessments by the judicial system it will be a necessary input to 
understanding how increased data transparency once utilized can be interpreted in a 
consistent manner where required by Member States and the CJEU.  
 
This reform proposal is uniquely underpinned by a blend of both doctrinal and comparative 
analysis. In avoiding overtly theoretical or empirical perspectives on reform the focus has 
been on ensuring reform is closely aligned to the levels of legal acceptability in the sample 
Member State legal constructs. The comparative analysis has embraced comparing the 
influence and authority of various stakeholders, the bedrock of civil codes where relevant, 
and the nature of conflicts between Member State and EU law and jurisprudence. The 
application of a comparative impact assessment on the sample Member State constructs 
reinforces the credibility of the proposal so lacking in many reform proposals advocated to 
date. 
 
 8.4 Legal Metrics for Measuring Success 
 
Adopting measures to quantify the success or otherwise of adopting an EU Directive to 
mitigate a known but largely unquantifiable level of tax abusive behavior will be a difficult 
but not insurmountable challenge. Complying with the provisions of the Directive ultimately 
rests on the MNE taxpayers themselves but the secondary provisioning of Member State 
responsibilities regarding embedding attestation requirements into national law and 
empowering national tax authorities with the powers and resources to investigate prospective 
abusive activities resulting from more data transparency will be just as critical. Ensuring 
more accounting data transparency but doing little about it from a tax enforcement 
perspective will fail the cause. 
 
Adoption of the ‘ED&A’ proposal in its totality is likely to take a number of years to 
implement. The eight success measures identified in this thesis will reflect this phased 
approach, with some initial measures of success required to ensure a measure of progress up 
to transposition, others to reflect disclosure compliance, and others to reflect target measures 
 276 
for assessing the success of the outcome. Certain metrics are required to measure the success 
or otherwise of meeting the objective of reducing tax abusive behaviours that result in profit 
shifting activities to lower tax jurisdictions. It is proposed that as part of the EU Directive, 
provision is made for the Commission to compel both national legislatures and national tax 
authorities to provide information not only to the Commission itself but to share information 
and specific data mandated by the ‘ED&A’ provisions between the relevant tax authorities on 
an annual basis. The information and data derived from the directive over time should 
provide both quantitative and qualitative policy indicators, hereafter referred to as  ‘QPIs’, all 
of which will provide coverage across all components of the Directive’s footprint. Such 
transparency regarding the policy indicators should facilitate better federated management of 
policy implementation, enhance accountability of Member State governments and provide 
valuable data to the Commission in its efforts to reduce tax avoidance practices.  
 
QPI 1: Transposition of CCR into Member State Law 
 
The EU Directive process would follow an Ordinary Legislative Procedure
109
 with initial 
proposals formed by the Accounting Directive Committee of the Commission followed by 
joint adoption by the EP and European Council, the former adopting its position by a simple 
majority and the latter by DMV. Once adopted, the Directive will specific a date, ideally 
within two years, that will ensure Member States have accomplished transposition of the 
Directive’s provisions into Member State law to ensure CCR compliance. This would be 
sufficient time for the laws to be adopted to reflect local situations but also enable a timetable 
to be set for MNEs to realistically be given the time to properly implement CCR reporting. A 
Commission review of these laws to ensure absolute consistency and compliance will be 
required and any material deficiencies likely to adversely impact the integrity of the future 
phases are to be identified and addressed well in advance of the CCR live date. There should 
be no open infringements of the Directive by the point of transposition, and therefore no pre-
litigation notices issued to any Member States. 
 
QPI 2: Transposition of Thresholds and Attestations into Member State Law 
 
                                                     
109
 Consolidated version of the European Treaty [2008] art 294, OJ C115/13 
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The Directive will specify a date, ideally within two years of the CCR live date that will 
ensure Member States will have enacted national laws locally to meet the threshold and 
attestation requirements of the Directive. This would be sufficient time for the laws to be 
adopted to reflect local situations and ensure sufficient resources and processes are in place 
for monitoring and enforcing this enhanced disclosure and attestation.  Member States should 
be obliged to provide periodic updates to the Commission regarding progress during the 
transposition period.   This will ensure absolute consistency and compliance, and any 
material deficiencies likely to adversely impact the integrity of the final phases would be 
identified and addressed well in advance of the threshold metric reporting and attestations 
transposition date. There should be no open infringements of the Directive by the point of 
transposition, and therefore no pre-litigation notices issued to any Member States. 
 
QPI 3: CCR Disclosure Metrics 
 
A realistic measure of success would be a compliance target for CCR disclosure set at 90% 
within 12 months of the transposition date for CCR reporting and 100% at the transposition 
point that puts into effect threshold disclosures and attestations. It is imperative that CCR 
compliance is complete for the attestations to become workable. These are aggressive targets 
to reflect the compulsory nature of disclosure, but acknowledging there will be an element of 
delinquency at the beginning prior to attestation to reflect possible disputes around in-scope 
compliance. Where a MNE is operating close to a de minimis threshold there may be disputes 
around whether it needs to effect disclosure or not. Similarly there will be an element of 
delinquency to reflect either logistical problem within the MNEs reporting systems regarding 
programmatic generation of disclosure data or indeed a short period to resolve technical 
accounting queries around disclosures. Both of these would be expected to be resolved within 
the above timeframe.  
 
QPI 4: Threshold Disclosure Metrics 
 
The measure of success associated with the threshold metrics would be trend based rather 
than quantitative in nature. To this extent, a cumulative trend analysis compiled over a 10-
year period consisting of aggregated data from all Member States would be considered 
necessary to identify a positive trend towards reduced abusive practices. Deducing abusive 
behavior from the thresholds themselves is not a straightforward task but a collation of 
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various trends will provide substance to the argument that progress is being made in reducing 
the propensity to enact artificial debt transactions to facilitate tax relief. With regard to the 
Threshold Set One it would be expected to witness evidence of both a closer correlation over 
time between the Member State jurisdiction that sees declared profits and tax paid with the 
jurisdiction in which the customer revenues are generated, as well as an absolute reduction in 
the overall number of controlled transactions passing through two or more Member State 
borders. For Threshold Set Two it would be expected to see an absolute reduction over time 
in the number of tax relief rules available through changes in Member State tax laws. As it 
becomes transparent that certain tax rules are being exploited as a result of either data 
transparency or through the results of tax investigations then rules may be amended 
accordingly. Similarly a rising dispersion ratio, particularly in those Member State 
jurisdictions that witness high dispersion at inception, would be a commendable measure of 
success. For Threshold Set Three, the key measure of success will be to identify reductions in 
the Legal Entity to Group Entity Debt to Equity ratio, particularly for those highly leveraged 
legal entities at inception, A similarly useful measure would be, once again, a settled number 
of case law precedents for challenging and unwinding what are found to be abusive debt or 
funding transactions that are structured in a way for no other purpose other than to avoid 
corporate taxation. 
 
QPI 5: Attestation Metrics 
 
Accepting the reality of an initial level of delinquency associated with the adoption of any 
new regulations on such a broad scale, the implications of MNEs not submitting an 
attestation statement by an Officer of the MNE past the transposition date would be a breach 
of the Directive’s provisions and merit the relevant Member State sanctions accordingly .A 
combination of such sanctions and auditor oversight of publication of statutory financial 
accounts will ensure adherence to the attestation requirement. Anything other than achieving 
98%-100% compliance across all in-scope MNEs across every jurisdiction of the attestation 
requirement at point of attestation transposition would constitute a failure in the 
implementation of the Directive’s provisions.  
 
QPI 6: Investigating Tax Breaches 
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A provision in the Directive will mandate Member States to empower their tax authorities to 
both pre-approve and investigate breaches of thresholds through the provision of meaningful 
data as indicators of potential tax abuse activities. The concept of Tax Inspectors without 
Borders
110, hereafter referred to as ‘TIWBs’, as promoted by the OECD has been rejected in 
this proposal. The TIWB concept has merit in investigating pan-European tax abuse as result 
of these disclosures but the public availability of data and likely resistance by Member States 
in losing autonomy over the investigation of the tax affairs of its corporate subjects suggests 
this is far from a suitable option. At Member State level it is impossible to ascertain in 
advance the level of likely breaches that require pre-clearance or investigation. A low level of 
investigation will undermine the concept of the thresholds, and given the thresholds have 
been carefully set to capture moderate to high levels of potential abuse it will be important 
that Member States use the disclosures for the purposes intended, namely to probe further 
into MNE data. The higher the threat of tax investigations, the more effective the deterrent 
against abusive behavior, not only in terms of the prospective financial cost for the MNE but 
from a personal liability perspective for the attesting Officer.   As a more general measure it 
is proposed that the number of threshold breaches pre-cleared in proportion to the absolute 
level of breaches disclosed increases over the first 10-year period of legislative enactment 
although this should be measured as a trend rather than in specific statistical terms. This 
would signal heightened awareness of the significance of the thresholds and more diligent 
control over threshold disclosures and the underlying activities driving the threshold data.   
 
QPI 7: Inclusion of CCR in IFRS or IAS protocols 
 
Ultimate adoption of CCR into global accounting standards would be a long-term measure of 
success. The path to complete adoption has begun for certain industries in certain 
jurisdictions, and this Directive proposal suggests an extension to complete industrial 
coverage for all EU jurisdictions. Broader assimilation into a global accounting standard will 
demand not only European success as part of this initiative but also recognition into US 
accounting protocol and by other similar large trading entities across the world. A positive 
recognition and proposal by the Commission in 2018 is expected to mark the beginning of 
that journey towards incorporation into an accounting standard, and IASB will likely to 
                                                     
110OECD, ‘Final Report on the Feasibility Study into the Tax Inspectors Without Borders Initiative’ (2013) 
<http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-global/TIWB_feasibility_study.pdf> accessed 21 July 2014 
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respond more expeditiously if the OECD promotes more formal proposals to act on its 
original BEPS recommendations for CCR accounting adoption.  
 
QPI 8: Long-Term Profit Shifting Trends 
 
A more quantitative based assessment organized by the Commission over a 10 year period 
from the Directive’s transposition point for the complete ‘ED&A’ initiative would serve to 
provide a broader view of the success of this initiative. The Commission should collate 
statistical trend analysis for the purposes of identifying pan-Member State trends in CCR 
disclosures and thresholds.  Such trends will crystallize a view on the relative merits of 
whether there are determinable improvements in behaviours that are mitigating tax abuse. 
Aggregated data in its totality will be a much more beneficial statistical base to work off 
rather than the data derived from individual MNEs. The materiality of tax abuse mitigation 
attributable to individual CCR or threshold disclosures may still prove difficult to quantify 
but for a large proportion of MNEs it may be possible to see the impact on consolidated 
financial accounts resulting from ‘ED&A’.  It is impossible at this stage to speculate about 
the collective data that will be generated by ‘ED&A’ and made available to the Commission, 
but we may rightly assume that such data will confirm a correlation between the introduction 
of ‘ED&A’ and the overall corporate tax revenues earned by Member States resulting from 
reduced tax avoidance practices. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to address a two-dimensional conflict. On the one hand the EU 
Fundamental Freedoms have arguably cultivated an environment for opportunistic MNEs to 
adopt common avoidance practices. On the other hand, such opportunities have been 
cultivated further by Member States providing a complex set of tax rules that provide for 
arbitrage that is reflected in additional artificial transactions that enable the manipulation of 
statutory financial accounting disclosures. 
 
The preceding discussion has established the following. There is evidence of corporate tax 
abuse which has resulted in the implementation of tax law rules at Member State level
1
. 
Despite extensive academic debate, no effective solution has been successfully enacted
2
. A 
radical reform proposal above and beyond anything that has been proposed to date is 
required
3
. Tax accounting, rather than tax laws, provides the basis for change
4
 Resolving tax 
avoidance requires the use of accounting data to spotlight on tax abuse rather than tax 
circumvention and the concept of abuse of rights is becoming a more powerful and more 
frequently referenced concept both academically and in CJEU judicial rulings
5
. Technical 
accounting reform achieved through accounting standards is a positive approach for resolving 
tax abuse
6
. Enhanced disclosures of accounting data, supported by attestations, are one way 
in which behavioural changes may be nurtured
7
. Criminalising behaviours via legislation has 
a managerial behavioural impact
8
. The most effective judicial custodian of overseeing the 
mitigation of direct tax abuses evidenced through the transparent disclosures across Member 
States promoted by the proposed solution is the CJEU
9
.  
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It is therefore submitted that, despite the failures to date of various initiatives and measures 
aimed at combating abusive EU corporate income tax practices, this problem can effectively 
be resolved. Such resolution can be implemented through a scheme of reform based on 
enhanced statutory reporting mandated through an EU Directive. The issue of tax abuse 
cannot be resolved effectively by directly attacking the tax avoidance practices themselves, 
such as TRPRICE or THINCAP, as tax laws attempt to achieve. The issue may be resolved 
by attacking the underlying corporate behaviours behind utilising such practices as an 
accounting tool, and to ascertain whether they are legitimate or abusive in relation to the 
rights granted by the EU Treaty. This reform proposal has the benefit of residing as a stand-
alone financial accounting disclosure solution as a complimentary measure to the current tax 
rules enacted by individual Member States. This mitigates concerns regarding loss of 
sovereign power over tax matters and does not adversely impact any accounting standards 
that are set out as standard protocols across the EU. Complimentary disclosures nurturing 
transparency offer little reason for resistance, other than from MNEs who have reasons to 
remain non-transparent about their country by country accounting and various metric 
disclosures. 
 
The objective of the proposed reform is the promotion of corporate accountability and 
transparency through this enhanced disclosure and attestation. A change in MNE tax 
avoidance behaviour would be prompted through mandatory disclosure of statutory financial 
data that will make artificial transactions transparent to Member State tax authorities that are 
empowered to pursue those conditions that are considered to be demonstrably abusive.  The 
need to offer a credible balance between a mandatory centralised EU solution offering a 
consistent set of rules with Member State autonomy over legislative provision, judicial 
review and tax enforcement of such rules is recognised and reflected in the reform proposal. 
It is unlikely to attract any meaningful level of political resistance and the Member State tax 
authorities will over time establish a more robust set of criteria based on the disclosures to 
pursue those abuses deemed most material to the Member State. Abuse will be easier to 
detect and investigations more targeted. Any potential discrepancies in what different 
Member State tax authorities deem abusive and non-abusive may, over time, become settled 
through CJEU case rulings. 
 
The credibility and sustainability of the reform proposal demands utilisation of established 
legal principles such as wholly artificial arrangements, abuse of rights and proportionality. 
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These doctrines offer academically credible doctrinal substance and judicial case law support 
to the prescribed approach and ‘ED&A’ policy content.  Successful judicial challenges to 
date have largely been based on clear abuse of Member State rules. Abuse of Fundamental 
Freedoms is evident but limited in its transparency, warranting leveraging these established 
principles such as  ‘wholly artificial arrangements’ to rule against abusive transactions that 
lack economic substance. CJEU case law precedent in this respect has further scope for 
assisting resolution of tax abuse issues once more transparent accounting disclosures are in 
place. This thesis has explored tax avoidance in terms of tax abuse and its importance in 
understanding what is demanded from a credible reform proposal to, at best, eliminate and, at 
worst, materially to limit tax abuse issues. A successful enactment of a tax abuse doctrine has 
ample scope for extending its reach to other non-tax treaty abuses as well in the future. 
 
The CJEU has established a credible set of relatively consistent evaluation criteria and 
principles in many aspects of tax avoidance practices. There is ample judicial precedent in the 
use of doctrines that support this research hypothesis relating to wholly artificial 
arrangement, abuse of rights and proportionality, ensuring that there is an established view 
regarding the CJEU’s interpretation of acceptable corporate taxpayer behaviour.  There are 
two striking observations. First, there is a lack of authority to force a Member State to remedy 
an abusive breach of EU Fundamental Freedoms. This effectively ensures that Member States 
benefitting from profit shifting can continue to ignore the issue. Secondly, those Member 
States that do suffer detriments from profit shifting simply do not have the accounting 
evidence in place to raise the requisite investigations that, in likelihood, would be supported 
by the CJEU in the event of it being pursued. With respect to the wider question of how the 
conflicts between Member State entitlement to tax policies reconcile with the EU tax 
directions and the case law of the CJEU, the outcome has been less tense than many would 
have predicted. Clear breaches of EU Fundamental Freedoms have been addressed where 
necessary by the CJEU, and as such, although Member State autonomy over its legal system 
has reduced, it is only one angle in a complex set of influences and compromises between a 
wider set of stakeholders. These stakeholders include the MNEs themselves and the Member 
State tax authorities. Modelling management behaviours and claims of ignorance around the 
boundaries of the law have been set out to explain or, at worse, justify abuses. EU 
Fundamental Freedoms provide an accounting capability to abuse the Internal Market and 
those with the most to gain continue to exploit such strategies while Member State tax 
authorities are starved of the information required to enable a more effective investigation or 
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prosecution. Member State tax authorities remain ineffective through a combination of weak 
co-ordination across jurisdictions, divergent focus on what is pursued between jurisdictions 
and a lack of confidence in the judicial system that have generally demanded a much more 
robust case substantiated with more detailed accounting and legal substance if it has any 
chance of winning tax abuse cases against MNEs. 
 
With respect to the need for common enforceability as a benchmark rule of law paradigm, the 
burden of challenging MNEs on their ‘ED&A’ is likely to reside primarily on those Member 
States that are net tax revenue losers of EU tax abuses. There is likely to be much more tax 
conflict raised as a result of ‘ED&A’ between various high and low tax Member States as it 
becomes obvious how MNEs have shifted profits between jurisdictions. Such conflicts 
potentially have economic and political impact and it will be important that broad consensus 
and consistent enforceability is achieved through CJEU case law.  It could be reasonable to 
evidence MNE behavioural changes driven by ‘ED&A’ in a short period of time following 
transposition, as demonstrated by the successful legislative provisions of Sarbanes Oxley in 
the US. The effect will take time to materialise, as a period of operational bedding-in within 
MNEs along with judicial challenges to specific transactional circumstances will over time 
provide for a more established statutory reporting disclosure operating environment.  
 
The reform proposal is satisfactorily aligned with the principal tenets of the rule of law, 
legitimising its credentials and underpinning the proposal with a backbone of legal best 
practice principles associated with successful laws. Each component of the proposal has been 
assessed and the proposed disclosures are facilitating measures towards greater transparency 
that breach no material rule of law principles, even though its resulting enforcement may be 
inconsistent and uncertain. This is no different from any tax law enforcement measure and is 
not specific to this reform proposal. The attestations offer few concerns regarding rule of law 
alignment other than a degree of uncertainty regarding its alignment to human rights 
principles, which has been mitigated through a measured approach to penalty enforcement. 
 
Limitations are acknowledged. Enhanced disclosures could impose a financial burden on 
many MNEs. In particular, the reform proposal’s thresholds may be considered to be a 
somewhat blunt instrument for identifying prospective abusive transactions that may require 
significant and therefore costly efforts by MNEs for capturing, and explaining where 
necessary, the required disclosures. Conflicts may arise between interpretations and outcomes 
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of threshold disclosures resulting in inconsistencies between Member States for similar 
disclosures. It is submitted that this is a small price to pay for maintaining sovereign Member 
State power as a constituent part of the reform proposal and would have no tangible legal 
consequences for the attesting MNE Officer. It may raise calls for separate accounting courts 
set up as dedicated chambers to adjudicate disputes between MNEs and Member State tax 
authorities although at present it is arguable that the existing judicial system provisions are 
sufficient for resolving any challenges. Beyond the EU borders, punitive measures aimed at 
reducing tax abuse in the EU presents a risk that such abusive tax transactions may be pushed 
outside the boundaries of the EU. This does not prevent the country-by-country data from 
exposing such corporate tactics but identifying the taxable destination of such transactions 
outside the EU may provide enforcement issues in many instances. Once implemented there 
could also be an expectation of extending the reform proposal beyond the boundaries of the 
EU.  Enabling tax authorities to examine the end-to-end translation trail of a set of MNE 
transactions that result in taxable charge avoids pushing the problem beyond EU borders but 
global adoption must be achievable in principle and desirable over the long-term to ensure 
enforcement is achievable across all jurisdictions. 
 
It is submitted that the time is right to implement this ‘ED&A’ proposal, given the challenges 
confronting Member States that face decades of public revenue deficiencies, the failure of 
previous policy initiatives and the political and societal consensus at resolving corporate 
abusive behaviours. It is time to move to a reform solution based on transparency and 
enforceable tax boundaries rather than tax compromises. These reasons provide substance to 
the timing and nature of the reform being proposed. CCR is now gathering support and 
momentum by both the OECD and EU Commission and will undoubtedly broaden its appeal 
over the next few years. The complexity of corporate tax abuse is aggravated by the 
competing forces of a continued commitment at EU level to enact changes to the EU tax 
system against an uncompromising desire at Member State level to retain legislative 
autonomy over direct tax affairs. Furthermore, the command and control process, structure 
and authority for the legislative, judicial, and enforcement functions of EU and Member State 
institutions for all direct tax matters remain unsettled, inconsistent and in places ill-defined. 
All these parties have a stake in tax abuse reform but this will be difficult to achieve while a 
common operating tax environment based on common tax or accounting principles is out of 
sight. 
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This thesis reveals further areas of prospective research. A particular area of relevance relates 
to the extent to which profit shifting incentives and initiatives impact real economic decisions 
rather than artificial economic decisions. In Chapter One it was stated how one may 
hypothesise about the collective level of EU tax loss associated with profit shifting but it is 
rarely extended to attempt to understand the real economic cost in relation to actual 
commercial decisions that result from the disharmony among Member State tax rules and 
rates. The nature of this reform proposal prompts further questions regarding the scope to 
develop a new model approach tax avoidance based on commercial behaviours resulting from 
enhanced disclosures, a deeper understanding of the correlation between the actions and 
inactions of Member State tax authorities and resolving tax abuses, and similarly to a more 
empirical centric based study of the impact of the threat of criminal liability on commercial 
tax planning. All these areas remain fertile areas of prospective future research. Beyond tax 
law, reference in Chapter Two to Abuse of Rights and its place in EU law offer further 
research potential to examine the potential advancement of the concept from a principle of 
EU Tax Law to a more general principle of EU law.  
 
Left unattended, this area of law is likely to become increasingly controversial in the future.  
Tax abusive practices have caused the practices of MNEs and their accounting and auditor 
partners to come under closer scrutiny. The widespread dissatisfaction with the MNEs’ 
attempts to regulate their own affairs liberally under the cover of EU Fundamental Freedoms 
and free from proper governance or scrutiny has resulted in a need to find an alternative way 
forward. This thesis provides such a reform proposal, demanding much greater legal 
involvement in the process of standard setting by the EU regarding certified mandatory 
accounting disclosures in a manner that may finally offer hope in addressing one of the more 
vexed unresolved areas of EU tax law. 
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